IR 05000275/1991003
| ML16342B760 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1991 |
| From: | Morrill P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341G052 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-91-03, 50-275-91-3, 50-323-91-03, 50-323-91-3, NUDOCS 9104290067 | |
| Download: ML16342B760 (34) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
50-275/91-03 and 50-323/91-03 Docket Nos:
50-275 and 50-323 License Nos:
Facility Name:
Pacific. Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Ob'ispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
February 3 through March 16, 1991 Inspectors:
P.
P. Narbut, Senior Resident Inspector K.
E. Johnston, Resident Inspector B.
M. Olson, Reactor Inspector Approved by: ~~ '~~
.
"4 "\\( -Rl P.
J. Morrill, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection from Februar 3 throu h March 16 1991 Re ort Nos.
50-275/91-03 and 50-323/91-03 Areas Ins ected:
The inspection included routine inspections of plant operations, maintenance and surveillance activities, follow-up of onsite events, open items, and licensee event reports (LERs),
as well as selected independent inspection activities.
Inspection Procedures 35750, 37700, 37701, 40500, 60710, 61726, 62702, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92700, 92701, 92702, and 93702 were used as guidance during this inspection.
Safet Issues Mana ement S stem SIMS Items:
None Results:
General Conclusions on Stren th and Weaknesses:
The licensee's actions to identify two loose parts found reactor coolant system while the unit was in a refueling thorough and timely.
One par t was identified as an ECCS dowel pin and the other was confirmed to be a portion of tom during the first refueling outage.
in the Unit 1 outage were check valve a grid strap 9i04290067 9i04ii PDR ADOCK 05000"'75
-2" Section 5 a.
discusses weaknesses associated with the maintenance of equipment located in the intake area.
Component failures due to corrosion have been 'the subject. of previous inspection reports, non-conformance reports and several quality evaluations.
Additionally, several components whose failure could cause a plant transient were found in degraded conditions.
Much of the corrosion had resulted from saltwater flowing through hatch covers and spraying equipment.
Although eliminating the sources of saltwater appeared to require only minor design changes', little work had been accomplished.
Si nificant.Safet Matters:
None.
Summar of Violations and Deviations:
One violation regarding the failure of a security watchperson to stay attentive to duties was identified.
0 en Items Summar:
One enforcement item and three followup items were opened.
One LER review was close DETAILS Persons Contacted
'.
D.
W.
H.
"D. B.
"H. J.
- B. W.
D.
K.
W.
D.
"T. A.
"D. A.
H. J.
~J.
S.
W.
G.
".J.
A.
"S.
G.
M.
G.
S.
R.
R.
M.
R.
E.
C.
Townsend, Vice President, Diablo Canyon Operations 8 Plant Manager Fujimoto, Vice President, Nuclear, Technical Support Miklush, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations Services Angus, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services Giffin, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance Services Oatley, Assistant Plant Manager, Support Services Barkhuff, guality Control Hanager Bennett, Mechanical Maintenance Manager Taggert, Director guality Support Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor Phillips, Electrical Maintenance Manager Bard, Work Planning Manager Crockett, Instrumentation and Controls Manager Shoulders, Onsite Project Engineering Group Manager Banton, Plant Engineering Manager Burgess, System Engineering Manager Fridley, Operations Manager Gray, Radiation Protection Manager Tresler, Project Engineer Connell, Assistant Project Engineer The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees including shift foremen (SFH), reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, quality assurance personnel and general construction/startup personnel.
"Denotes those attending the exit interview.
0 erational Status of Diablo Can on Units 1 and 2 At the start of the inspection period, Unit 1 was in Mode 6, beginning a
refueling outage, and Unit 2 was at 100K power.
On March 7, 1991, Unit 1 experienced a loss of offsite power while refueling.
A six member NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) arrived on site March 8, 1991 to review the incident.
Results will be provided in inspection report 50-275/91"09.
Other problems identified during the Unit 1 refueling outage by the licensee and the inspectors are discussed in more detail in paragraphs 4,
5 and 9 of this report.
Unit 2 remained at 100K power except for brief periods to address balance of plant equipment problems.
At the end of the report period, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 in the process of an integrated leak rate test, and Unit 2 was at 100K powe.
0 erational Safet Verification 71707 General During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications (TS).
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other, operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions and to evaluate trends'his operational information was then considered to determine whether regulatory requirements were satisfied.
Shift turnovers 'were observed on a sample basis to verify that all pertinent information of plant status was relayed to the oncoming crew.
Ouring each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following:
(a)
General plant and equipment conditions.
(b)
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
(c)
Conduct of selected activities for compliance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
(d)
Interiors of electrical and control panels.
(e)
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
(f)
Engineered safety feature equipment alignment and conditions.
(g)
Storage of pressurized gas bottles.
The inspectors talked with operators in the control room, and other, plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent topics of general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other aspects of the work activities.
b.
Radiolo ical Protection The inspectors periodically obser ved radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedure's, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors verified that health physics supervisors and professionals conducted, frequent plant tours to observe activities in progress and were aware of significant plant activities, particularly those related to radiological conditions and/or challenge ALARA considerations were found to be an integral part of each RWP (Radiation Work Permit).
c.
Ph sical Securit 71707 Security activities were observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of,.the site security plan, and administrative procedures.including vehicle and personnel access screening, personnel badging, site security force manning, compensatory security measures, and protected and vital area integrity.
Exterior lighting was checked during backshift inspections.
On March 10, 1991, a security watchperson posted as a compensatory.
security measure inside the Unit 1 Fuel, Handling Building, was identified by NRC inspectors to be inattentive to duty.
The watchperson inside this vital area was compensating for an accessed (inoperative) security area alarm..
When initially observed, the watchperson'was leaning back in a chair with his feet propped up, with his h'ead down and eyes closed.
After telephoning the Security Department, one NRC inspector approached within three feet of the watchperson and obtained his name and badge number.
The watchperson was inattentive and failed to acknowledge the presence of the inspectors for approximately 10 minutes.
The licensee's investigation of this event determined that the watchperson had been posted inside the Unit,l Fuel Handling Building at 1533 hours0.0177 days <br />0.426 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.833065e-4 months <br />, March 10, 1991.
At approximately 1545 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.878725e-4 months <br />, the
'watchperson had been observed by another employee to be attentive to duties.
At 1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br />, 30 minutes later, the NRC inspector discovered the watchperson to be inattentive.
The security doors leading to the fuel handling vital area were locked and alarmed.
The licensee's immediate search of this vital area was completed without incident.
Region V analysis of this incident determined that the opportunity did not exist for an unauthorized individual to have easily gained undetected.
access from the protected area into the Unit 1 vital fuel handling area.
As identified in NRC Inspection Reports 50-275/90-02 and 50-275/90-17, dated March 3 and October 22, 1990, respectively, the licensee was previously issued a non-cited violation (Level IV) for three failed compensatory measures.
The licensee had identified these incidents and included them in quarterly safeguards event logs.
Two of the three incidents identified failed compensatory measures at vital areas.
During these two previous incidents, the opportunity did not exist for an unauthorized individual to have easily gained undetected access from the protected area into the vital area.
Section 3. 1.4 of the licensee approved Security Plan, as amended, requires in part that failure of any part of the security detection
I
4.
hardware system, at specific portions of the Fuel Handling Building, results in implementation of appropriate compensatory measures.
Paragraph 4. 2 of Security Procedure SP-420, dated March 4, 1988, requires in part, that appropriate security'ompensatory measures be implement'ed whenever a security alarm zone is removed from the secure mode, and that these measures will remain in effect until such time as the zone is secured.
Upon applying the criteria specified in NRC's Enforcement Policy contained in 10'FR Part 2, Appendix C, the failed compensatory measure identified by NRC inspectors on March 10, 1991, was identified as an apparent violation and included in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Enforcement Item 50-275/91-03-04).
d.
Mana ement Meetin Re ardin Licensee Probabilistic Risk Assessment PRA Activities On Friday, February 1, 1991, a five-member team from PG8E gave a
presentation at the Region V office on current PRA activities at PG8E.
The licensee provided an overview of the Diablo Canyon PRA and discussed the EPRI risk-based technical specification program,'s it is being applied at Diablo Canyon.
Following the licensee presentation, the Regional Administrator acknowledged the PG&E efforts and-emphasize'd the value of application of PRA insights to plant'operating issues.
In particular, he noted that some Region V licensees have made innovative use of PRA techniques:
For example, some licensees have used PRA to enhance compensatory me'asures during off normal operating conditions (such as during mid loop operations).
Also, some licensees have utilized PRA to optimize the performance of preventive maintenance activities, such that excessive use of Limiting Condition for Operation action statements are minimized.
The Regional Administrator encouraged PGSE to make best use of broad based applications of PRA insights to all facets of plant operations and maintenance.
One violation and no deviations were identified.
Onsite Event Follow-u 93702 a.
Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal Pum s Inadvertentl Shutoff Durin Refuelin 0 erations On February 7, 1991, while filling the refueling cavity 'from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) in preparation for off loading the core, a
RWST low level (33K) signal tripped the operating residual heat removal (RHR) pump.
Operating procedures required that the RWST low level trip of RHR pumps be disabled prior to filling the reactor cavity.
However, operators had begun to fill the refueling cavity without disabling the RHR pump trip.
When the operating RHR pump tripped, operators recognized the error and, within four minutes, restarted the pum Operators did not promptly notify plant management of the event nor recognize that this event was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
The required 4-hour non-emergency event report was not made until 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> later after it was identified as reportable by plant management.
This event is described in detail in Licensee Event Report (LER)
50-275/91-02, dated March 8, 1991'he inspector reviewed the LER and found the root cause accurate and the corrective actions acceptable.
The inspector noted that plant management had stressed to operations personnel the. need to promptly inform plant management of significant events (LER 50-275/91-02, closed).
Forei n Material Found On Fuel Assembl Durin Core Offload Ins ection During an inspection of fuel assemblies performed as part of the Unit 1 refueling outage, an object was found resting on the bottom nozzle assembly of a spent fuel assembly.'he licensee determined during a video inspection that the object was a cylindrical metallic piece with chamfered ends.'he object was retrieved and surveyed at approximately 150 Rads per hour on contact.
A non-conformance report (NCR DCl-91"TN"N017) was initiated to evaluate the origin of the object.
The licensee performed an extensive analysis to determine the or igin of the object and concluded that it was most probably an Anchor Darling check valve 'dowel pin.- Additionally, evidence suggested 'it was a dowel pin formally installed in safety injection accumulator discharge check valve SI-1-8956C.
The licensee speculated that the dowel pin had been left in the valve body during maintenance activities performed during the previous'outage and that it had not been discovered missing during the required foreign material exclusion inspection.
The licensee also concluded, based on operating experience and surveillance testing, that the pin could not have come from a failed check valve.
An inspection of check valve SI-1-8956C was performed during the refueling outage.
No evidence of damage to any portion of the valve was found.
Corrective actions discussed in the NCR included improvements to the Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) program and improvements to the check valve disassembly procedures.
The inspector found the licensee's review of this event to be comprehensive and thorough.
No 0 erable Unit 1 Diesel Generators With the Core Off-loaded On February 13, 1991, with the Unit 1 reactor core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool, and Diesel Generators (D/Gs) l-l and 1-2 removed from service for maintenance, D/G 1-3 developed a jacket cooling water leak and was declared inoperable.
Although without fuel in the reactor vessel the Technical Specifications do not require any D/Gs to be operable, with the exception of a crosstie available from
the Unit 2 standby startup power supplies, there was no emergency power available to supply spent fuel pool cooling.
Additionally, because the Unit 1 auxiliary transformers were'ut of service, both normal and crosstied emergency power supplies relied upon the availability of the Unit 1 standby startup transformers and buses.
Furthermore, only one spent fuel pool pump was operable at the time.
The single failure of any of these non-safety related components could have resulted in a loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool.
The licensee expeditiously returned 0/G 1-2 to a"functional, but not operable, condition (the licensee was not able to perform all post-maintenance testing required) before declaring D/G 1-3 inoperable.
0/G 1-3 was repaired (See section 5 for related maintenance activities) and returned to service on February 15.
The Augmented Investigation Team, responding to the March 7, 1991, Unit 1 loss of offsite power during refueling, reviewed the licensee's outage planning process to assess the availability of electrical power sources.
This evaluation is discussed in more detail in Inspection Report 50-275/91-09.
Pi e
Su ort Stud Glued In Place During the removal of a pipe support inside containment, it was discovered that one of the four studs for attaching the base. plate to the containment had been glued in place.
The other. three studs were appropriately welded in place.
A non-conformance report (NCR DCl-91-MM-N018) was initiated to address this condition.
Engineering determined that the pipe support had never been inoperable since three studs were adequate to support design loads.
Analysis of the stud and the containment liner showed that at one time a stud had been welded in that location and that the stud glued
'n place was not the original stud.
Inspection of the liner indicated that the stud may have been broken during bolt torquing or by a load applied to the top of the stud (such as it being stepped on).
The licensee determined that the pipe support had been removed once previously, during the third Unit 1 refueling outage (1989), to allow maintenance to be performed on the air operator for valve SI-1-8843 (Boron Injection Tank discharge check valve test line).
The work performed to remove and reinstall the-pipe--support base plate had not been specifically detailed in the written instructions for the job.
During interviews, the mechanics who removed and reinstalled the pipe support stated that they had not broken the stud from containment or observed that the stud had been broken or missing.
The licensee inspected all Unit 1 safety related pipe supports attached to containment.
No similar problems were found.
Of the 18 pipes supports, only the support for SI-1-8843 needed to be removed to allow maintenance activitie Based on this investigation, the licensee considered the glued stud to be an isolated case.
At the end of the inspection period, the licensee had not finalized corrective actions.
During the exit meeting, the inspector noted that the glued stud appeared to be a
deliberate attempt to falsify work and that corrective action should include a message to all site workers that management encourages employees to identi.fy plant problems so that they can be properly corrected and that. failure to do so may have serious consequences.
This is an open item pending the identification of corrective action (Fol 1 owup. Item 50-275/91-03-01).
Loose Nut Found On Feedwater Snubber Base late A loose nut was discovered on the baseplate of a snubber for a Unit 1 feedwater line inside containment.
The baseplate was secured by four concrete anchor bolts.
The licensee found that one nut was completely loose, a second was torqued to 10 ft-lbs, a third to 113 ft-lbs, and the fourth to 169 ft-lbs.
Subsequent investigatory action found that previously all four of these nuts'ad been found loose during the Unit 1 first refueling outage.
The required torque, the torque value last used, and the value to which the nuts were retorqued, was 285 ft-lbs.
The licensee tested the torque of adjacent pipe support nuts and found'them to be acceptable.
An analysis performed by the licensee determined that the snubber could have'performed its"function in-the as found condition.
The licensee could not determine whether the nuts had rotated or the bolts had backed out of the concrete.
As followup action, the licensee committed to perform a quarterly walkdown of the pipe support to see if the nuts were rotating.
Additionally, the licensee planned to inspect the support bolts during the fifth refueling outage of Unit 1.
The licensee actions were documented in a guality Evaluation (gE f0008503).
The inspector considered these actions acceptable.
S alled Concrete With Ex osed Corroded Rebar On May 9, 1990, the Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) system engineer observed that the concrete of the ASW pump 1-2 vault was spalled.
Design engineering performed a walkdown of the spalling area and on July 19, 1990 concluded that enough margin existed in the design of the wall to accommodate the failure of the spalled section during an eai thquake or a flood.
Upon removal of the concrete during the Unit 1 refueling outage, design engineering observed that the rebar under the area was badly corroded.
Additionally, other Unit 1 and
ASW areas were inspected and found to have degraded concrete.
Altogether a total of 43 square feet of damaged concrete was found,. with the largest portion being the section found in the ASW pump 1-2 vaul Oesign engineering concluded that because the walls were substantially overdesigned, the pump vaults were not degraded by the damaged concrete and could perform their design functions.
The licensee determined the cause of the damaged concrete to be cyclic exposure to salt water and air environments.
Salt water leaching through small cracks in the concrete corroded carbon steel rebar causing it to expand and spall the outer layer of concrete.
The ASW pump seal leak off sprayed onto the walls in the area of the spalling, providing the cyclic wet/dry environment.
The licensee felt'hat this phenomenon was common in saltwater environments and could occur in quality conc'rete.
The inspector questioned this conclusion.
The licensee commit'ted to inspect parts of the intake area which may be susceptible to the same type of environment.
This is an open item pending the results of the licensee's inspection (Followup'tem 50-275/91-03-02).
Forei n Material Found On-Lower Core Su ort On March 2, 1991, during a remote camera inspection of the Unit 1 reactor vessel, a small strip of metal was found on the lower core support.
The licensee halted refueling activities to retrieve the debris.
An event response plan (a documented action plan) was initiated and retrieval procedures were written.
After 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and a failed retrieval attempt, the debris was vacuumed.
The debris was sent to a laboratory for analysis.
The laboratory determined that the debris was Inconel 718 material and dimensionally matched a'ocumented fuel assembly grid strap corner, which the licensee had tom during the first refueling outage.
In October 1986, the licensee documented grid strap damage to fuel assembly C-42 during fuel loading activities.
The damaged assembly, which was photographed, had lost the corner of one of its grid straps.
An analysis determine that continued operation with the debris in the reactor coolant system was,acceptable.
In the exit meeting, the inspector commended the licensee in their efforts to retrieve and identify the piece of debris.
Re eated S urious Seismic Tri Si nals On February 27, 1991, a Unit 2 seismic trip undervoltage (UV) alarm was received.
The seismic trip UV alarm provides indication of a loss of a power supply to one of three seismic motion detectors which provide reactor trip inputs, Seismic trip UV alarms were received throughout the month of March.
The licensee suspected that water entering the cabin'et through an electrical conduit was building up on a cabinet heater (located at the bottom of a cabinet),
creating a high humidity environment.
The humidity was, in turn, causing the UV relay setpoint to shift,
P resulting in an alarm.
Corrective actions had not been effective in confirming the source of the water.
The inspector will followup the licensee's actions through routine inspection.,
Unit 1 Loss of Offsite Power While Refuelin On March 7, 1991, Unit 1 lost offsite power for almost five hours when a mobile crane boom came too close to a 500KV power line and caused an arc to ground.
All three diesel generators, which were operable at the time, started and supplied vital equipment.
Power was lost to Unit 1 non-vital equipment.
The event was classified as an Unusual Event due to the loss of'ffsite power.
Prior to the event, the licensee had been refueling, with all but five fuel assemblies loaded into the core.
Power was interrupted to the refueling manipulator crane,.which held a new fuel assembly retracted into its mast, and to the containment upender, which also held a fuel assembly.
During the event, most equipment operated as designed.
However, the auxiliary building ventilation system failed to restart.
Additionally, diesel generator 1-1 loaded onto its bus ten seconds later than designed.
The licensee also pursued other minor equipment problems identified dur'ing the event.
Power was restored, and the event terminated by returning the standby startup transformer and busses to service and aligning Unit 2 230KV power to Unit l.
The licensee initiated an event investigation team on the afternoon of March 7, 1991.
An NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) arrived onsite on March 8, 1991.
The AIT charter included establishing the events leading up to the incident and the licensee's response to the incident, reviewing outage planning strategy pertaining to the availability of AC power, and reviewing the licensee s response to recent similar industry events.
The results of the investigation will be included in inspection report 50-275/91-09.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Maintenance Observation 62703 The inspectors observed portions of, and reviewed records on, selected maintenance activities to assure compliance with approved procedures, technical specifications, and appropriate industry codes and standards.
Furthermore, the inspectors verified maintenance activities were performed by qualified personnel, in accordance with fire protection and housekeeping controls, and replacement parts were appropriately certifie a.
Materi al Condi tion of the Intake Area The inspector made several tours of the intake structure.
The intake structure houses the four circulating water pumps and their'uxiliaries, the four auxiliary saltwater pumps', the traveling screens, a chlorination system,'and water supply pumps for the site biological laboratory.
The inspector observed that the condition of several components had been degraded by corrosion.
o A drain line at the discharge of circulating water pump 1-1 was severely corroded.
Nuts on the flanges for the associated drain isolation valve were flaking away.
Although maintenance had been given approval to replace the nuts and bolts with stainless steel, the replacement was not performed during the Unit l outage.
The failure of the drain line could cause dramatic flooding of the non-safety related portion of the intake structure.
I o
The electrical panels for the Unit 1 and 2 intake cooling systems had corroded terminal screws, corroded control relays, and corroded fuses.
The failure of the intake cooling system could cause the loss of,the. circulating water pumps, resulting
, in an unnecessary plant transient.
o Many wall outlets and overhead lights were severely corroded, creating a potential safety hazard.
Several ladder's were not adequately secured,'due to corroded bolting, creating potential safety hazards.
Enamel had peeled off the floor of the Unit 1 ASW pump vaults and was lying loose.
The loose enamel could clog floor drains and could create a potential slipping hazard.
The corrosion associated with the second item described was due largely to salt water from the.traveling screen wash flowing around the sides of the biolab pump hatches.
The inspector observed that much of the west end of the intake structure was subjected to a deluge of saltwater whenever the traveling screens were in operation.
Numerous valves, copper tubing,'ipe, conduit, and instrument line supports were badly corroded.
Although the equipment was non-safety related, failures could potentially result in unnecessary plant transients.
Temporary corrective actions to prevent water from the travelling screens from entering the intake area, such as caulking around the edges of hatch covers, had been taken.
However, in the past such measures have proven to be ineffective over time.
Although more permanent corrective action to prevent water from the travelling screens from entering the intake area, such as constructing berms and splash guards, has been considered by the licensee, little has been completed to achieve permanent corrective actio PC
In recent years several plant problems have resulted from corrosion and degraded material conditjon at the intake structure, including the following:
o ASW train crosstie valve handwheels'ere frozen due to corrosion (Inspection Report 50-275/90-30).
o ASW vacuum breaker pipe supports were found to be badly corroded
{NCR-DCI-91-M-N015).
o ASW valve packing gland followers were corroded, causing bolts to shear (Inspection Report 50-275/89-05).
o ASW train crosstie valve 1-FCV-496 failed to operate from the control room due to corrosion of its manual operation lever (Inspection Report 50-275/89-14).
o ASW pump vault concrete spalling due to the corrosion of rebar (See Section 4f.).
The licensee has taken actions to improve the condition at the intake area.
Intake cooling water piping was replaced during previous outages after excessive corrosion was observed.
A full time paint crew was dedicated to the intake area.
A machine shop was built, to support intake area work.
However, despite these efforts, substantial portions of the intake area continue to degrade.
This is an open item to evaluate the licensee's progress in addressing the improvement of material condition at the intake structure (Followup item 50-275/91-03-03).
b.
Diesel Generator 1-3 On February 13, 1991, diesel generator 1-3 was declared inoperable as a result of leakage observed from a telltale drain on the diesel's jacket water cooling pump.
Since the telltale drained the shaft area between the pump and the pump's motor, failure of a mechanical shaft seal was suspected.
Work Order C0082266 was prepared to replace the mechanical shaft seal and rebuild the pump as necessary.
The inspector reviewed the work order while the mechanical maintenance personnel were preparing to remove the pump's discharge piping.
A prerequisite step stated,
"READ AND UNDERSTAND MSDS FOR CHROMATED WATER."
The prerequisite was included in the work order because potassium dichromate, which can be toxic, was added to the cooling water system as a corrosion inhibitor.
The inspector noted that the MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet)
was not included in the work package'nd questioned the maintenance personnel if any precautions applied to the work they were performing.
The mechanics indicated that the cooling water was not allowed to go down floor drains, and they were to wash if wetted by the water.
The mechanics added that although the work order prerequisite had been initialed by individuals on another shift, they had read the MSDS for chromates within the last year.
Further, the maintenance personnel stated that work orders often referred to a MSDS, but didn't provide it in the work package.
The inspector left the jobsite, went to the Work Planning Department, and read the MSDS for potassium dichromate.
The MSDS, dated June 2, 1980, was issued by the Portland General Electric Company and indicated that chemical resistant gloves should be worn if contact with the chemical was anticipated.
Eye protection was also recommended.
The Emergency/Safety Services Department was informed that the maintenance personnel did not appear to be knowledgeable of all of the requirements for working with the chemical.
A member of the department accompanied the inspector. to the jobsite, stopped the work in progress, and tailboarded the mechanics on the MSDS requirements.
Protective gloves were obtained prior to continuing with work.
An MSDS was left at the jobsite.
This copy from the Safety Service's MSDS book, was issued in January 1986 from the Genium Publish'ing Corporation and contained the same information as the MSDS located in the Planning Department-.
The diesel generator was returned to service on February 15,= 1991, after replacing the stationary face in the 'mechanical shaft seal.
Additionally, a different suction spool piece for the jacket cooling water pump was installed after the original piece cracked during installation.
Inspector comments related to not providing the MSDS with the work package, and the Safety Department having a more recent MSDS than the Planning Department were provided in an exit meeting on February 15, 1991.
On February 27, 1991, non-conformance report NCR DCO-91-SS-N022 was initiated.
The NCR would address training and/or briefing of personnel regarding hazardous material control.
One corrective action specified by the NCR was to require that applicable MSDSs be included in work packages.
Diesel Generator l-l On February 14, 1991, activities associated with scheduled 18 month preventive maintenance were observed on Diesel Generator l-l.
Work Order C0059887 was being used by mechanical maintenance to remove the rotor of the generator.
Interferences had been removed, and one end of the rotor was suspended by" rigging.
The inspector reviewed the work order and noted that the step in progress appeared to be number 10,
"ASSIST ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE BY PERFORMING DIESEL GENERATOR ROTOR REMOVAL IAW MP M-21.26."
However, of work order steps one through nine, only step six had been initialed and dated as complete.
Included in the steps not initialed were step number one for a tailboard prior to starting work, step number three for verifying that electrical personnel had completed measurements prior to rotor removal, step number seven for setting up the rigging, and step number nine for interference removal.
The fact that the steps weren't initialed and dated was brought to the attention of the mechanical maintenance personnel.
Action was taken to initial and
date all steps that had been performed.
The licensee had no requirement to initial and date work order steps just after they were performed; however, the practice described above. can lead to errors, including not performing steps or performing steps out of sequence.
The inspector's observation was brought to the attention of licensee management on February 15, 1991.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Maintenance Pro ram (62702 The licensee's program for maintenance activities was reviewed.
Attributes were selected. in areas of corrective maintenance, equipment control,,
and preventive maintenance.
In the area of corrective maintenance, the inspector verified that procedures had been established that included:
criteria and responsibilities for review and approval of normal and emergency maintenance requests, designation of an activity as safety or non-safety related, provisions and responsibilities for identification of inspection hold points, the identification of test and measuring equipment used during maintenance, and the review of completed corrective maintenance records.
In the area of equipment control, the inspector verified that procedures had been established that included:
the method of releasing equipment or systems for maintenance, including the use of tags, and the designation of equipment of that is environmentally qualified.
In the area of preventive maintenance, the inspector verified that procedures had been established that included:
methods for establishing preventive maintenance frequencies, responsibility for the. program, and scheduling of preventive maintenance tasks.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Surveillance Observation 61726 By direct observation and record review of selected surveillance testing, the inspectors assured compliance with TS requirements and plant procedures.
The inspectors verified that test equipment was calibrated, and acceptance criteria were met or appropriately dispositioned.
The inspectors examined diesel generator surveillance testing and results, including the licensee's examination and resolution of test failures.
In addition, the integrated leak rate test of the Unit 1 containment was performed during the outage and was examined in part by a regional specialist.
Other surveillance activities observed included fuel handling building ventilation testing and emergency core cooling system flow balancing.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
En ineered Safet Features Verification 71710 The inspector per formed a walkdown of physically accessible portions of the Unit 2 Safety. Injection system in accordance with inspection module 71710.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Refuel'in 0 erations 60710 The inspector.
observed the liftof the Unit 1'reactor vessel head prior to refueling operations.
During the head lift, one of the temporary
'rotective
"bullet nose" covers separated from a set of core exit.
thermocouple leads.
Bullet noses were installed to protect the
'thermocouple leads during head movement and prevent water intrusion while the reactor cavity was flooded.
The bullet nose was subsequently reinstalled prior to flooding the refueling cavity.
A similar event occurred during th'e third Unit 2 refueling outage
. (Inspection Report 50-275/90-08).
The licensee initiated a guality Evaluation (gE f7448) to address the root cause and to initiate corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
During the Unit 2 refueling outage some of the bullet noses were incorrectly turned 180 degrees preventing clips from engaging the thermocouple nozzle as designed.
The
'oot cause was determined to be a combination of inadequate procedures and difficult working conditions.
Corrective actions were taken to revise the procedure and provide training on a mockup.
As evidenced by the repeat event, the corrective actions taken following the inadvertent removal of the Unit 2 bullet noses were not fully successful.
The licensee initiated a second quality evaluation (gE f0008445) to address the Unit 1 bullet nose installation problems.
The mechanical maintenance manager indicated that further corrective, action would be taken to ensure that bullet noses are correctly installed in the future, including a pull test after installation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Licensee Event Re ort LER Follow-u 92700 a.
'tatus of LERs The LER identified below was also closed out after review and follow-up inspections were performed by the inspectors to verify licensee corrective actions:
Unit 1:
91-01 b.
Red Tele hone vs LER Trackin The licensee has evaluated the following 10 CFR 50.72 events for reportability under 50.73 and has determined that a 50.73 report is not required.
The resident inspectors have examined the licensee s
rationale and determined that regulatory requirements have been me.72 Report Date/Unit Event Reference NCR etc.
3/15/91, Common A '4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> non-emergency report to offsite organization made as a
result of a spill of 50 gallons of diesel fuel at the site fuel
'tanks.
No violations or deviations were identified.'n April 5, 1991, an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee's representatives identified in paragraph 1.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as described in this report.