IR 05000275/1991008
| ML16341G061 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1991 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341G060 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-91-08, 50-275-91-8, 50-323-91-08, 50-323-91-8, NUDOCS 9104300267 | |
| Download: ML16341G061 (14) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V.
Report Nos.
50-275/91-08 and 50-323/91-08 Docket Nos.
50-275 and 50-323 License Nos.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94108 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
March 11-15, 1991 Inspector:
Approved by:
F.
R.
Huey, Chief Engineering Section Date Signed Ins ection Summar Ins ection durin the eriod March 11-15 1991 Re ort Nos.
50-275/91-08 and 50-323/91-08)
relating to Unit 1 Inservice Inspection (ISI), Inservice Testing (IST) and inspector follow-up of open items.
Inspection'procedures Nos.
30703, 73051, 73753, 73755, 73756 and 92701 were used as guidance for this inspection.
Results:
General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s
l.
Other than a concern that ISI examiners were not verifying proper installation of room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) silicone sealant, there were no apparent problems identified in the ISI areas reviewed.
2.
Additional management attention to ensure effective implementation of the IST program appeared necessary.
In particular, the inspector noted that:
Too many components remain in an increased testing frequency without corrective actions being implemented.
Some components have been in an increased testing frequency for several years.
9104300267 9i0415 PDR ADOCK 05000275 Q
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"2-A review of engineering IST actions 'and evaluations identified in licensee audit report 90832T of February 19, 1991, along with 'the initial incomplete reply to quality evaluation no.
gE-AFR f0008221, indicate additional corrective actions in this area are required.
Si nificant Safet Matters:
None Summar of Violations:
None 0 en Item Summar :. During this inspection, two. new open items were identified (see sections 3 and 5).
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
"M. J.
Angus, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services
- S.
G. Banton, Plant Engineering Manager
"G.
L. Corsiglia, Electrical Engineer
- D. A. Gonzalez, ISI Supervisor T.
L. Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
- J. J. Griffin, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor C.
R. Groff, System Engineering Manager
- H.
W.
Kar ner, guality Assurance Engineer
"P.
M. Lang, guality Control Senior Engineer
"D.
B. Miklush, Assistant Plant Manager, Operation Services
"T.
W. Pellisero, System Engineering Senior Engineer
"C.
N. Pendleton, System Engineering Senior Power Productio
- W. T.
Rapp, Onsite Review Group Chairman
"J.
A.. Shoulders, Onsite Project Engineering Group Manager n Engineer The inspector also held discussions w'ith other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
"Denote those attending the exit interview on March 15, 1991.
2.
Inservice Ins ection-Review of Pro ram 73051 The inspector performed a general review of the basis of the licensee's Inservice Inspection (ISI) program and identified the following:
PG8E Letter No. DCL-89-171, dated June 23, 1989, submitted Revision 7 of the Inservice Inspection and Testing Program Plans for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
Revision 7 of the ISI Program Plan superseded the previous revisions in its entirety, and included several requests for relief.
The Unit 1 ISI program is based on the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, 1977 Edition through and including the summer 1978 addenda.
The initial inspection interval began May 7, 1985 when Unit 1 was'laced in commercial operation.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed Revision 7 of the Unit 1 ISI program plan, as supplemented by PG8E letters dated September 7 and 19, 1989, and issued a safety evaluation report on October 25, 1989.
The licensee's guality Assurance group performed ISI/IST audits 9081ST and 90832T, and the results were issued in letters dated October 4, 1990 and February 19, 1991.
The audit reports were reviewed by the inspector and found to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified in the ISI areas reviewe.
Inservice Ins ection-Observation of Work and Work Activities 73753 The licensee was conducting the Unit 1 fourth refueling outage.
This outage, was taking place during the second period of the first ten year ISI Interval.
The inspector reviewed the qualifications and certification records for the ISI Examiners and the equipment certifications.
Available ISI examinations performed during the inspection period were observed by the inspector.
During observation of the performance of VT-3 examinations of pipe hangers no.41-41R and no.41-42R, the inspector identified the f'ollowing:
There appeared to be room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) clear color silicone sealant, installed at adjacent and contact points between
" the hangers/shims and Component Cooling Water (CCW) piping.
The RTV sealant was not shown on sheets 33 (Revision 5) and
(Revision 6) of drawing no.
049253, used to perform the VT-3 examination.
ISI procedure number ISI VT 3/4-1, Revision 7, "Visual Examination of Component and Piping Supports",
did not contain instructions identifying that RTV between CCW piping and hangers/shims was acceptable, nor was the presence of RTV documented for engineering evaluation.
, The existing ISI examination procedure did not require documentation of foreign material found on hangers/piping during VT3 examinations.
The licensee examiner had found RTV in similar areas between CCW piping and piping supports before, and therefore the presence of RTV was not documented in the VT3 examinatin data sheet.
At the time of the subject examinations, the ISI examiners and system engineer could not identify licensee documentation that identified an engineering evaluation had been performed to approve the installation of RTV between CCW piping and hangers.
The inspector expressed concern that ISI examiners were accepting the presence of RTV between piping and hangers, without any documentation that this was an approved installation with regard to piping clearance, load stresses, long term rust protection, etc.
There were no, RTV acceptance criteria/information on the dr awings or in the inspection procedure used for this examination.
Later during the inspection, the licensee identified a Bechtel report entitled, "Unit 1 - First Refueling Outage Coatings Monitoring Program Inspection Report",.issued October 24, 1986, that identified in part the
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following information under CCW piping below elevation 140 ft:
"Where pipe restraints and hangers are in contact with the pipe, there is considerable rust indicating that crevice corrosion is N
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taking place on the hanger surface (shims) or on the pipe or possibly on both"
"Recommended action:
...Remove rust and clean crevices and adjacent surfaces where pipe hanger/shims contact pipe.
...After cleaning on a best-job-possible basis, seal the crevice area with room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) silicone sealant...".
The above concerns were identified as a followup item (50-275/91-08-01).
As of March 15, 1991 the licensee had'not been able to identify if a documented engineering evaluation of any effect on piping clearances, load stresses or long term corrosion/rust prevention, had been performed for the subject
To address the above concerns, the licensee identified the following:
Procedure ISI VT 3/4-1, would be reviewed to evaluate 'entering additional information on existing RTV installations and instructions for documenting any foreign material identified during examinations.
An Action Request (A/R) would be issued to identify the documented engineering evaluation process followed to approve the CCW RTV installations.
This item can be resolved when an inspector has reviewed the original documented engineering evaluation, A/R resolution and/or any new ISI procedures instructions generated as a result of this identified concern.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas reviewed.
4.
Inservice Ins ection - Data Review and Evaluation 73755 The inspector reviewed available NDE ISI calibration sheets, data sheets and NCR s generated this outage, prior to and during this inspection.
All reviewed documentation was found to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas reviewed.
5.
Inservice Testin of Pum s and Valves 73756 A.
The inspector observed available Inservice Testing (IST) performed per the following surveillance test procedures:
Unit 2 - Procedure No.
STP V-3F4, Revision 7, "Exercising Valve FCV-602 CCW HX No.
1 Saltwater Inlet".
Unit 2 Procedure No.
STP V-3R4, Revision 0, "Exercising Main Steam Isolation Bypass Valves, FCV-22, FCV-23, FCV-24 and FCV-25".
Unit 2 - Procedure No.
STP V-3S4, Revision 6, "Exercising Phase
'A'ontainment Isolation Valves (Group K613)".
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Unit 1 - Procedure No.
STP P-BB, Revision 16, "Routine Surveillance Test of Component Cooling Water Pump".
The performance of the above testing appeared to be performed in an acceptable manner, and the inspector did not identify any concerns.
The inservice testing ofASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves should be viewed as a major part of a licensee effort to ensure operational readiness of equipment.
The intent of this testing is to detect degradation affecting operation and assess whether corrective actions are needed to ensure that adequate
'operational margins are maintained.
During this inspection, a review of components identified for an increased frequency of testing, based on reaching an alert limit, identified the following:
A February 10,'991 Plant Engineering Memorandum identified (1)
There were approximately 41 components on "Alert" status, requiring an accelerated testing frequency.
(2)
The average age/days these components had been on this accelerated testing frequency was 573.5 days.
(3)
The number of components per year of assignment to this accelerated testing frequency status, was identified as:
1986 1987 1988 1989-1990 3 components 1 component 8 components 9 components 20 components (4)
A note in this memorandum stated,
"Reminder - The Systems Engineer has responsibility to track these components and perform an analysis or request maintenance to remove them from accelerated testing frequency."
A February 19, 1991 licensee audit report (90832T) identified a concern with the management of IST components in an alert status.
As a result of this audit guality Evaluation No.
gE-AFR f0008221 was issued December 21, 1990.
guality Evaluation No. gE-AFRg0008221, identified the following information.
(1)
Suggested corrective action (C/A), remedial/investigative item 3 stated,
"Evaluate Historical Data for Valves Currently on Test "Alert" frequency to verify their status is warranted."
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(2)
Suggested C/A, prevent recurrence, item 1, stated,
"Establish A Time Frame for Performing Engineering Evaluations of Valves in the "Alert" Status."
The initial engineering department January 28, 1991 reply to OE.
- AFR Q0008221 was incompleted, in that it did not address the following:
(1)
A reply to the request for a evaluation of historical data for valves currently on test "alert" frequency to verify their status is warranted.
(2)
A reply to the request to establish a time frame for performing engineering evaluations of valves in the
"alert" status.
The above information was discussed with licensee management during this inspection, and they identified the following:
Prior to this inspection, management was recently made aware that there were a large number of components that had been placed on "alert" status for several years, and plant engineering had been asked to review this area and provide additional information.
Neither the Quality Assurance (QA) Department nor management had completed a review of the initial QE-AFR Q0008221 pl'ant engineering reply.
After the inspector identified that the initial reply.was incomplete, they agreed and a March 14, 1991 update was issued to identify, "A review of the recommendations from QA was ongoing by the system engineer".
Management agreed that an efficient IST program should minimize the number of, and length of time, components are in an "alert" status, requiring increase testing frequency.
This item will be the subject of increase management attention.
Based on the information identified above, a review of the licensee actions taken for QE-AFR Q0008221 will be handled as a followup item (No. 50-275/91-08-02).
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas reviewed.
6.
Exit Meetin 30703 The inspector met with the licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1,
on March 15, 1991.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's finding up to the time of the meeting were discussed.
At this meeting the inspector identified that he had obtained some information that would be reviewed later in the region, with the findings documented in this report.
The available information was reviewed and the findings included in paragraphs 3 and 5 of this repor ~"