IR 05000275/1991032

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Insp Repts 50-275/91-32 & 50-323/91-32 on 910923-26.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Activities Relating to Units 2 Inservice Insp & Inspector follow-up of Open Items
ML16341G330
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  
Issue date: 10/10/1991
From: Huey F
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML16341G329 List:
References
50-275-91-32, 50-323-91-32, NUDOCS 9110290216
Download: ML16341G330 (8)


Text

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U. S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

REGION V

Report Nos. 50-275/91-32 and 50-323/91'-32 Docket Nos.

5G-275 and 50-323 License Nos.

DPR-80 and DPR-82 Licensee:

Pacific Gas II Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Units 1 and

Inspection at:

Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:

September 23-26, 1991.

Inspector:

Approved by:

W. J.

Wagner, Reactor Inspector F..

uey, C ief Engineering Section lO lOP ate igned Ins ection Summar Ins ection durin the eriod Se tember.23-26, 1991 Re ort Nos. 50-275/91-32 and 50-3-3 Areas Ins ected:

A routine announced regional inspection of activities re ating to Unst 2 Inservice Inspection ( ISI) and inspector follow-up of open items.

Inspection Procedures 73753 and 92701 were used as guidance for this inspection.

Results:

General Conclusion The licensee's inservice inspections of pressure retaining components were being satisfactorily performed.

~5i if'5f Summar of Yiolations:

None 0 en Item Summar

During this inspection, two open items were closed.

'9110290216 911010 PDR ADOCK 05000275

PDR

DETAILS Persons Contacted

  • S. Banton, Director, Plant Engineering
  • J. Griffin, Senior Regulatory Compliance Engineer
  • T.. Pellisero, Senior System Engineer
  • P. Lang, Senior guality Control Engineer

"J.

Keene, Inservice Inspection Documentation Specialist D. Taggart,'irector, guality Support D. Miklush, Acting Plant Manager, Operation Services D. Gonzalez, Inservice Inspection Supervisor The inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.

  • Denotes those individuals attending the exit meeting of September 26, 1991.

Inservice Ins ection - Observation of Work and Work Activities 73753 The licensee was performing Inservice Inspection ( ISI) during the Unit 2 second refueling outage.

The ISI examinations were taking place within the second period of the first ten year inspection interval required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI code.

Puality Assurance (gA) controls. for performance of nondestructive examination are described in gA Procedure (gAP)-9.A, "Control of Special Processes".

Implementation of gAP-9.A is provided in the Corporate Nondestructive Examination Manual which contains the approved procedures for conducting nondestructive examinations required for ISI activities.

This manual is controlled by Technical and Ecological Services (TES)

located in San Ramon, California.

The inspector observed ultrasonic (UT) examinations being performed on the steam generator 2-1 shell barrel to transition cone, girth weld W1-4.

The volumetric examination included a straight beam weld examination of the weld and heat affected zone for planar defects utilizing a 0 degree search unit.

Forty-five and 60 degree angle beam examinations were also performed.

Activities observed by the inspector-include:

type of apparatus used, calibrations before and after each examination, instrument linearity and ampl,itude control verifications, size and frequency of the search units, scanning speed,, limits of evaluation and recording of indications.

A recordable indication was identified and recorded for subsequent evaluation by a certified Level III ISI examiner.

The UT examinations observed were consistent with procedure N-UT-4,

"Ultrasonic Examination of Pressure Vessel Welds" and ASME Section XI requirement ~

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No violations or deviations were i 3.

Previousl Identified Items 92701 The inspector reviewed the qualification and certification records, of the NDE personnel performing the ISI examinations observed, for compliance with ASVE Section YI requi r ements.

'denti fied.

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Closed Follow-u Item No. 50-275/91-08-01:

ISI Examiner ocumentation o

Room Tem erature Vu canizin RTV Used Between Pi in and Han ers This item addressed the inspector's concern that ISI examiners were accepting the presence of RTV between piping and hangers without documentation that. this was an approved process.

Also,'SI procedure number ISI VT 3/4-1, Revision 7, "Visual Examination of Component and Piping Supports",

did not-contain instructions for documenting

'any foreign material identified during examinations.

In response to this concern the licensee issued Action Request (AR)

number A0223090 to document the original basis for the use of RTV on the Component Cooling Water (CCW) piping and hangers.

The AR references an inter-office memo dated September 26, 1986 (No.

086510)

which addresses coating repairs in Unit 1 containment.

The inspector reviewed this memo which provides the documented engineering evaluation on the use of RTV.

The use of RTV was part of the corrective actions taken to correct'coating deficiencies prior to returning Unit 1 to commercial operation.

Corrective action number 5 addressed CCW piping concerns as follows:

"Remove rust and clean crevices and adjacent surfaces where pipe hanger/shims contact pipe.

Remove rust and surface contaminatio'n only.

Do not remove or damage sound coating.

After thorough cleaning, seal the crevice area with room temperature vulcanizing silicone sealant and monitor these areas closely for corrosion during future refueling outages."

The AR also addressed the effect of RTV on pipe supports and documented that RTV is included in the consumable materials approved for use in containment in accordance with Administrative Procedure 0-51.

The inspector's review of the current list of consumable materials verified that Dow Corning RTV 732 was listed.

The licensee reviewed procedure ISI VT 3/4-1 to evaluate entering additional information regarding documentation of any foreign material identified during examinations.

The VT-3 portion of this procedure sets forth the performance requirements of visual examination to determine the general mechanical and structural condition of all types of supports.

VT-4 is to confirm conditions promotira continued operability of snubbers and spring type supports.

The licensee evaluation concluded that since foreign material is addressed in Section 6. 1.1 under the term "debris",

no revision.to the procedure is warranted.

The inspector's review of VT 3/4-1 indicated that foreign material was adequately covered in

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Section 6. 1. I.b, which requires the entire support structure to be examined for debris, loose parts, abnormal corrosion products, wear and physical damage.

The inspector also questioned ISI personnel on this matter.

The consensus was that since RTV is regularly usedon supports, there would be no need to document its presence as debris on the data sheet, unless the RTV was interfering with operation of a snubber or support.

Based upon the inspector's review of licensee actions taken, which document:

(a) that RTV was the subject of an engineering evaluation, (b) that VIV is listed as an approved consumable material for use in containment, and (c) that procedure ISI VT 3/4-1 adequately addresses debris, this item is closed.

b.

Closed Follow-u Item No. 50-275/91-08-02:

Mana ement of Inservice Testin IST Com onents on Alert Status The inspector reviewed licensee actions taken for Quality Evaluation (QE) Q0008221, which was written as a result of a concern with the

.

number of IST components on alert status:

The initial reply to QE Q0008221 was incomplete, in that it did not address historical data for valves currently on test alert frequency, nor was a time frame established for performing engineering evaluations of valves on alert status.

The inspector's review of the corrective actions taken identified and verified the following:

(1)

The root cause analysis added to QE Q0008221 attributed components remaining on alert status for excessive periods of time as being due to not having programmatic requirements for removal of components 'from alert within a specific or recommended length of time.

(2)

The number of components currently on test alert has been reduced from 41 at the time of the NRC inspection of March 15, 1991 to 19 as of September 3, 1991.

(3)

AP A-350, "Plant Sy'tem Engineering Program",

was revised by adding Section 4. 1.3.c, which requires the system engineering quarterly status reports to address components that are on ASME Section NI increased alert frequency testing.

This revision to AP-350 was approved by the Plant Staff Review Committee on September 25, 1991.

Based on the actions taken by the licensee, this item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

'E The inspector met with licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph

on September 26, 1991.

The inspector summarized the scope and findinos of the inspection as described in this repor ),