IR 05000269/2007008

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IR 05000269-07-008, 05000270-07-008, 05000287-07-008; on 07/09/2007 - 07/25/2007; Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems
ML072770006
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/03/2007
From: Moorman J
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To: Brandi Hamilton
Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Power Co
References
FOIA/PA-2012-0325 IR-07-008
Download: ML072770006 (12)
v • d • e


Text

ber 3, 2007

SUBJECT:

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000269/2007008, 05000270/2007008, AND 05000287/2007008

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

On July 25, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at your Oconee Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed with Mr. R. M. Glover and members of your staff during an exit meeting on July 25, 2007.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating licenses. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. There was one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) identified during this inspection associated with the failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent unplanned inoperability of the Units 1 and 2 standby shutdown facility reactor coolant makeup system. This finding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, two licensee-identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in this report. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as noncited violations, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you contest any noncited violation in this report, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station.

DPC 2 In addition, several examples of minor problems were identified, including conditions adverse to quality that were not being entered into the corrective action program, narrowly focused condition report evaluations, and corrective actions that were ineffectively tracked or had not occurred.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

James H. Moorman, III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2007008, 05000270/2007008, and 05000287/2007008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55 Report No: 05000269/2007008, 05000270/2007008, 05000287/2007008 Licensee: Duke Power Company Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Location: 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 Dates: July 9 through July 27, 2007 Inspectors: J. Reece, Senior Resident Inspector, North Anna Power Station (Team Leader)

D. Rich, Senior Resident Inspector, Oconee Nuclear Station J. Reyes, Resident Inspector, Crystal River Nuclear Plant E. Michel, Reactor Inspector Approved by: James H. Moorman, III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000269/2007-008, 05000270/2007-008, 05000287/2007-008; 07/09/2007 -

07/25/2007; Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; biennial Identification and Resolution of Problems This inspection was conducted by two senior resident inspectors, a resident inspector, and a region-based reactor inspector. One finding of very low safety significance (Green), which was a non-cited violation, was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609,

Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution; however, several minor plant material condition deficiencies were identified during plant system walkdowns that had gone undetected by licensee personnel. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIP) entered annually into the CAP. Generally, the licensee properly prioritized issues and examined issues; although several minor problems were noted where lower significance issues were mis-categorized or the investigations lacked thoroughness. Formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were generally thorough and detailed. Corrective actions specified for problems were generally adequate; although, several minor problems were noted where corrective actions were not complete or not comprehensive. Audits and self-assessments were effective in identifying deficiencies in the CAP. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues through the CAP.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified by the NRC for failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent unexpected inoperability of the Unit 1 standby shutdown facility (SSF) reactor coolant makeup (RCMU) system during Unit 2 core offload.

The failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality involving proper control of Units 1 and 2 reactor core offload activities that ensure the SSF RCMU system remains operable during core offload was a performance deficiency.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in a loss of operability due to a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant due to possible external events. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the timely corrective action aspect of the Corrective Action Program component, in that the licensee failed to take corrective actions for an identified condition that could and did impact the operability of the opposite unit SSF RCMU system during reactor core offload

[P.1.(d)]. (Section 4OA2 a.(2).1)

Licensee-Identified Violations

Two violations of very low safety significance were identified by the licensee, and have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

4. Other Activities (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a.

Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) for issues across the reactor safety cornerstones to determine if problems were being promptly identified and entered into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The reviews were primarily focused on selected issues associated with the following seven risk significant plant systems:
  • high pressure injection (HPI) system
  • low pressure injection (LPI) system
  • standby shutdown facility (SSF) and related support systems
  • component cooling water (CC) system
  • AC power system, including Keowee Emergency Power System Additionally, the inspectors selected a representative number of PIPs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness, security and work control to assess each departments threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems.

The inspectors reviewed open and completed maintenance work orders (WOs), system health reports, trend reports, and the Maintenance Rule (MR) database for the aforementioned systems to determine if equipment deficiencies were being appropriately entered into the CAP. The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns of accessible portions the systems listed above with the responsible system engineers and/or operations personnel to determine if observable deficiencies existed. For identified deficiencies, the inspectors determined whether the deficiency had been entered into the CAP. The inspectors discussed the condition and status of each of these systems with system or component engineers and other plant personnel to verify that overall system health was monitored and trended to proactively identify corrective actions for deficiencies where necessary.

The inspectors reviewed selected control room operator logs for the inspection period to determine if equipment deficiencies, including those involving the systems listed above, were entered into the CAP.

The inspectors attended several plant daily status and PIP team screening meetings to observe management and PIP screening oversight functions in the corrective action process. The inspectors also interviewed plant personnel from various departments to evaluate their threshold for identifying and entering problems into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed selected PIPs associated with the seven systems listed above and a representative sample of PIPs initiated by each of the major plant departments to determine if the identified problems were properly prioritized in accordance with the licensees nuclear system directive, NSD-208, Problem Investigation Process, Revision (Rev.) 27. The PIP action categories (Category 1 through 4) are defined in NSD-208 and are numbered based on decreasing significance and level of effort to resolve the problem. Action Category 1 PIPs were significant conditions adverse to quality (CAQs)that require formal root cause evaluations. Action Category 2 PIPs were defined as CAQs for which formal root cause evaluations were normally conducted, although management had discretion to forgo a formal root cause evaluation. Action Category 3 PIPs were problems for which an apparent cause analysis was sufficient to correct the immediate problem. Action Category 4 PIPs were low level CAQs or conditions not adverse to quality, neither of which required any type of causal evaluation. The inspectors attended daily management status meetings, PIP screening meetings, and engineering status meetings to observe and assess licensee problem processing and issue categorization.

Action Category 1, 2, and 3 PIPs were reviewed to assess the adequacy of the root/apparent cause evaluation of the selected problems. The inspectors reviewed the root/apparent cause evaluations against the description of the problem in the PIP and the guidance in procedure NSD-212, Cause Analysis, Rev. 15.

The inspectors reviewed selected PIPs associated with the seven systems listed above and a representative sample of PIPs generated by each of the major plant departments to determine if the licensee had identified and implemented timely and appropriate corrective actions to address the associated problems. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions to determine if they were properly documented, assigned, and tracked to ensure completion. Where possible, the inspectors independently reviewed completed corrective actions to determine if the actions had been implemented as intended. The inspectors also determined whether common causes and generic concerns were appropriately addressed. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment Identification of Issues The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. PIPs generally provided complete and accurate characterization of the identified issues. In general, the threshold for initiating PIPs was low as evidenced by the continued large number of PIPs entered annually into the CAP. Employees were encouraged by management to initiate PIPs. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.

During the system reviews and walkdowns, the inspectors determined that system deficiencies were, generally, being identified and placed in the CAP and that the system engineers were appropriately monitoring and trending these deficiencies. Minor deficiencies, for which PIPs had not been written, were identified by the inspectors during the walkdowns. The PIPs initiated as a result of the walkdowns are listed in the

.

Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors determined that PIPs were, in general, categorized and prioritized correctly; and the licensee evaluations were technically accurate and of sufficient depth.

The inspectors determined that the root cause process delineated in procedure NSD-212 relied solely on a search of preassigned codes in the PIP database to determine if similar previous problems had occurred. The procedure did not specify the potentially more effective method of conducting word searches. This vulnerability was demonstrated by the disposition of PIP O-06-06221. This PIP documented a near miss reactor trip due to a mispositioned valve. The associated root cause evaluation failed to identify five previous PIPs associated with valve mispositioning problems that involved LPSW to HPI motor cooler valves. The inspectors performed a detailed evaluation of these five PIPs and determined that the licensee had not taken timely, effective corrective action to prevent the mispositioning events that resulted in inoperability of the Unit 1 C HPI pump on August 18, 2004, and a reclassification of the LPSW maintenance rule function to an (a)(1) status June 30, 2005, due to another HPI pump motor functional failure. The inspectors concluded that the licensees untimely response represented a weakness in the corrective action program which was also exhibited by an uncompleted corrective action for returning the LPSW function from an (a)(1) to (a)(2) status. Other corrective actions to address this issue had either been planned or completed.

Effectiveness of Corrective Action The inspectors determined that, in general, corrective actions developed and implemented for problems were timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety significance of the problem. The inspectors noted that the licensee identified a problem involving inadequate corrective action which is documented in section 4OA7 of this report. The inspectors also identified that the PIP database software program allows the reopening of PIPs which presents a vulnerability not adequately addressed by the NSD.

One example the team identified was PIP O-05-04359, which was reopened to add a problem involving reclassification of the LPSW maintenance rule function from (a)(1) to (a)(2) and back to (a)(1) due to an engineers conclusion that work was complete when, in fact, it was not. The enforcement aspects of this example are discussed in section 4OA7 of this report. Another example was PIP O-04-05550 that documented two new electrical relays that failed to pass a bench test and was reopened to review 10 CFR 21 reportability aspects. The inspectors noted that the relays had been installed in safety-related applications associated with the emergency power supply from Keowee; however, the inspectors determined that no operability evaluations had been performed.

The inspectors reviewed a subsequent operability assessment performed by the licensee which concluded that the emergency power supply was not adversely affected.

.1 Inadequate Corrective Action Resulted in the Inoperability of the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant

Makeup Pump

Introduction:

A Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified by the NRC for failure to take adequate corrective action to prevent unexpected inoperability of the Unit 1 standby shutdown facility (SSF) reactor coolant makeup (RCMU) system during Unit 2 core offload.

Description:

On May 6, 2007, the licensee declared the Unit 1 SSF RCMU system inoperable due to unexpectedly exceeding combined Unit 1/2 spent fuel pool (SFP) level versus temperature requirements which are specified in a graphical format. This occurred during a Unit 2 refueling outage while core offload to the SFP was in progress and was documented in PIP O-07-02462. The inspectors identified two PIPs that documented similar occurrences from a review of the licensees PIP database. PIP O-00-04262, dated November 30, 2000, addressed an issue regarding the impact of the SFP level versus temperature graph on reactor core offload. The PIP corrective action was to add a mechanical systems engineer to the site reload interface team to be knowledgeable of changing conditions during core offload; however, the proposed corrective action to address the issue programmatically to ensure proper planning for the condition in the future was deleted. PIP O-06-06696, dated October 14, 2006, documented a refueling outage critical path delay that resulted when reactor core offload was delayed because the SSF RCMU system operability requirements specified in the SFP level versus temperature graph had not been met. This PIP was a Category 4 PIP with no corrective action required. The inspectors determined that offloading spent fuel to the combined Unit 1/2 spent fuel pool created a condition that would result in the unplanned inoperability of the Unit 1 or Unit 2 SSF RCMU system if not controlled properly. The licensee had reasonable opportunity to develop and implement corrective actions which would ensure adequate control of core offload and prevent the unplanned inoperability of the Unit 1 and 2 SSF RCMU systems.

Analysis:

The failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality involving proper control of Units 1 and 2 reactor core offload activities that ensure the SSF RCMU system remains operable during core offload was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of operability due to a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant due to possible external events. This finding directly involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution under the timely corrective action aspect of the Corrective Action Program component, in that the licensee failed to take corrective actions for an identified condition that could and did impact the operability of the opposite unit SSF RCMU system during reactor core offload

[P.1.(d)].

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to ensure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this, from November 30, 2000 until May 6, 2007, the license failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving proper control of reactor core offload activities which could and did result in the Unit 1 SSF RCMU system being declared inoperable on May 6, 2007. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as PIP O-07-02462, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000269,270/2007008-01, Inadequate Corrective Action Resulting in the Inoperability of the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump.

.2 Unresolved Item for Untimely Corrective Action Associated With Use of Steel Plate with

Possible Laminations

Introduction:

The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) involving untimely corrective action associated with the use of potentially defective materials in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code applications.

Description:

On July 22, 2003, the licensee initiated PIP O-03-04686 to document the discovery of a lamination in a section of 3/4" steel plate (ASTM A36) that was slated for use as a pipe hanger in the Unit 1 Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System (WO 98538193, NSM 13093). The entire plate was then examined using ultrasonic testing and all laminations were removed. However, four additional plates from the same manufacturing heat (A2WT) were subsequently used in other safety-related applications without first being examined for laminations.

Over three years later, on September 28, 2006, a licensee corporate office audit (referenced in PIP O-06-06244) identified that the four additional, and potentially defective, plates had not been segregated as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV. The licensee has identified the following applications for which the potentially defective plate was used without having been examined prior to installation to determine if laminations were present:

Unit 2

  • WO 98561352-03, NSM 13105, Installation of Pipe Supports - Unit 1 The inspectors reviewed PIP O-03-04686 and noted that proposed corrective action sequence number 8 was approved on November 12, 2006 to identify the locations of all potentially defective material from heat A2WT and create work orders for the inspection of these locations. PIP O-03-04686 identified four of the above WOs (98588295-28, 98538272-03, 98541284-05, and 9860989-11) which had not yet been inspected to assure operability. The inspectors determined that specific corrective actions for sequence number 8 were not identified or completed as of July 12, 2007, almost four years after the initial discovery of the laminations on July 22, 2003. Based on the inspectors investigation the licensee initiated work requests to inspect the affected plates at the next available opportunity:

C WR 930555 - Inspect base plate for hanger 2-51-1478A-H6164 used in WO 98538272-03 C WR 930558 - Inspect base plate used for hanger 2-53A-1478A-H6673 in WO 98538272-03 C WR 930559 - Inspect 3/4" plate used for hanger 2-53A-1479A-PR1004 in WO 98538272-03 C WR 930560 - Inspect base plate used for hanger 2-53A-1479A-PR1001 in WO 98538272-03 C WR 930561 - Inspect accessible portions of base plate used in WO 98588295-28 C WR 930562 - Inspect base plate used for hanger 3-50-2479G-H6462 in WO 98541284-05 C WR 930565 - Inspect base plate used for hanger 3-50-2479G-H6664 in WO 98541284-05 C WR 930568 - Inspect base plate used for hanger 3-50-2479G-H6665 in WO 98541284-05 C WR 930569 - Inspect base plate used for hanger 3-50-2479G-H6666 in WO 98541284-05 It should be noted that WO 1716957 was written to inspect plate used in WR 98561352-03 on November 1, 2006, but results of the inspection were not available in PIP O-03-04686.

The first opportunity that the licensee had to inspect a portion of the affected plates located within the Unit 2 containment was during the 2007 spring refueling outage; however, the plates were not inspected at this time.

Analysis:

The inspectors identified a performance deficiency involving untimely corrective action to inspect the installed plates used for safety-related applications and thereby assure operability through the absence of laminations or defects. The determination of whether the performance deficiency is minor or more than minor, as described in MC 0612, remains open pending completion of the licensees inspections detailed in WR 930561, WR 930555, WR 930559, WR 930560, WR 930558, WR 930562, WR 930565, WR 930568, WR 930569, and WO 1716957.

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires, in part, that conditions adverse to quality shall be promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, on September 28, 2006, corrective actions to inspect and verify the absence of laminations in steel plate identified on July 22, 2003 and used for safety-related components, had not yet been completed. In order to fully assess the enforcement implications and safety significance of this issue, additional information from the licensee will be needed.

Consequently, pending NRC review of completed inspections identified by the work requests listed above, this issue is identified as URI 05000269,270,287/2007008-02, Untimely Corrective Action To Determine If Steel Plate Laminations Existed In Safety-Related Applications.

b.

Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's Operating Experience (OE)program to verify actions were completed in accordance with licensee procedure NSD-204, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 9. The inspectors focused on NRC generic communications and OE items associated with recent industry operating experience for a detailed review to verify issues were appropriately evaluated and entered into the CAP.
(2) Assessment The licensee was generally effective in evaluating internal and external industry operating experience items as well as NRC generic communications for applicability and entering issues into the CAP. Industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes.

Any documents requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure.

Additionally, OE was regularly included in System Health Reports and PIPs associated with station events as part of the causal investigations and corrective action development process.

c.

Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's self-assessment and audit program to verify actions were completed in accordance with licensee procedures NSD-607, Self-Assessments and Benchmarking, Rev. 9, and NSD-600, Technical Audits, Rev. 5. The inspectors reviewed samples of self-assessments and audits to verify that identified deficiencies and areas needing improvement were entered into the CAP tracking system. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
(2) Assessment Departmental self-assessments and audits performed by the Nuclear Performance Assessment Section (NPAS) and the Independent Nuclear Oversight Team were generally effective in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement. The inspectors verified that issues raised during the assessments were entered into the CAP for resolution.

d.

Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees Employee Concerns Program (ECP), which provides an alternate method to the PIP process for employees to raise safety concerns with the option of remaining anonymous. The inspectors reviewed the program as defined by licensee procedure NSD-602, Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)

& Employee Concerns Program, Rev. 4, to determine if concerns were being properly reviewed and resolved. The inspectors interviewed selected licensee personnel from plant departments to develop a general view of the safety-conscious work environment at Oconee Nuclear Station and to determine if any conditions exist that would cause personnel to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. Other related documents and training packages reviewed are listed in the attachment.

(2) Assessment The inspectors concluded that licensee management fostered a safety-conscious work environment by emphasizing safe operations and encouraging problem reporting through a multifaceted communications and training programs. The inspectors verified a method for anonymous reporting of safety concerns. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On July 26, 2007, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. M. Glover, Engineering Manager, and other members of the plant staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during this inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following findings of very low significance were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for characterization as NCVs.

  • 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures and shall be accomplished in accordance with the procedures. Contrary to this, on May 8, 2007, the licensee identified that Nuclear System Directive 104, Materiel Condition/Housekeeping, Cleanliness/Foreign Material Exclusion and Seismic Concerns, was not accomplished in that a nail was found within piping associated with the safety-related Low Pressure Injection system piping. The finding is identified in the licensees corrective action program as Problem Identification Process (PIP) O-07-02513. The finding is of very low safety significance because an evaluation determined that it likely would not have rendered the system inoperable.
  • 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) requires in part that appropriate corrective action shall be taken when the performance of a system does not meet established goals.

Contrary to this, on January 15, 2007, the Unit 1 low pressure service water system did not meet performance goals, but the licensee returned the Unit 1 system to an (a)(2) status without taking all of the appropriate corrective actions as required for a system in (a)(1) status. The finding is identified in the licensees corrective action program as PIP O-05-04359. The finding is of very low safety significance because a failure similar to that which initially forced the system to (a)(1) status did not occur during the period the system was incorrectly classified.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Batson, Superintendent of Operations
D. Baxter, Station Manager
J. Burchfield, Reactor and Electrical Systems Manager
S. Capps, Mechanical/Civil Engineering Manager
C. Curry, Maintenance Manager
G. Davenport, Compliance Manager
B. Hamilton, Site Vice President
M. Glover, Engineering Manager
T. Grant, Engineering Supervisor
T. King, Security Manager
R. Matheson, SRG Engineer
L. Nicholson, Safety Assurance Manager
J. Smith, Regulatory Affairs
P. Stovall, SRG Manager
J. Weast, Regulatory Compliance

NRC Personnel

J. Moorman, III, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000269,270/2007008-01 NCV Inadequate Corrective Action Resulting in the Inoperability of the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Makeup Pump (Section 4OA2 a.(2).1)

Opened

05000269,270,287/2007008-02 URI Untimely Corrective Action To Determine If Steel Plate Laminations Existed In Safety-Related Applications (Section 4OA2 a.(2).2)

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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