ML20053E240

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-269/82-09,50-270/82-09 & 50-287/82-09.Corrective Actions:Computer Alarms & Statalarms Being Modified to Include Group 8 Position Limits
ML20053E240
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1982
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20053E229 List:
References
NUDOCS 8206070721
Download: ML20053E240 (3)


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o 273-'08' Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II l

101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 l

Re: Oconce Nuclear Station IE Inspection Report 4

50-269/82-09 50-270/82-09 50-287/82-09

Dear Sir:

With regard to Mr. R. C. Lewis's letter of March 4,1982 which transmitted the subject inspection report, Duke Power Company does not consider the informa-tion contained therein to be proprietary.

Please find attached responses to the cited item of noncompliance.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, executed on April 28, 1982.

Ver" truly yourst lu '... u.

l William O. Parker, JFK/php Attachment I

,,?.1'1'~lCtAL copy 8206070721 820525 PDR ADDCK 03000269 l

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Duke Power Company Responses to IE Inspection Reports 50-269/82-09, 50-270/82-09, and 50-287/82-09 Violation A Technical Specification 3.5.2.5 requires that the axial power shaping rod, positions be maintained in compliance with technical specification figure 3.5.2-4A1.

Contrary to the above, on February 27, 1982, the Oconee Unit 1 axial power Shaping rods were positioned outside the allowable limits for a period of eight hours.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.E.).

Response

1)

Admission er denial of allegcd violation:

The violation is correct as stated. This incident was reported to NRC as Reportable Occurrence R0-269/82-02, dated March 12, 1982.

2)

Reasons for the violation:

This violation resulted from personnel error on the part of the Control Operators involved. Group 8 APSR's were moved into the restricted region in order to clear a core axial imbalance alarm, but the operators did not know or verify that the rods were in the restricted region.

Group 8 APSR's had no position alarms.

3)

Corrective ac*.Lons taken and results:

When the rod positions were noted on a subsequent shift, the Group 8 APSR's were moved back into the allowable operating region. The startup procedure has been changed to require verification that all control rods, including Group 8, are within the proper position limitations prior to exceeding 80% power. The Operations personnel involved have been counseled concerning this incident.

4)

Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:

The computer alarms and statalarms are being modified to include Group r

i o position limits.

i 5)

Date when full compliance will be achieved:

It is expected that the modifications noted in (4) will be completed on all oconce uaits by September 15, 1982.

O Violation B Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires that the station be operated and main-tained in accordance with written approved procedures.

Contrary to the above, on February 20, 1982, licensee health physics technicians did not employ the directions embodied in procedure HP/0/B/1000/62/Q which led to two radioactive liquid effluent releases in violation of procedure OP/0/A/1106/31.

Total radioactive liquid release was 2.207 curies which is below the technical specification limits.

This is a' Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E).

Response

1) Admission or denial of the alleged violation:

This violation is correct as stated.

2) Reasons for the violations:

'The violations resulted from personnel error on the part of the Health Physics technicians involved.

They determined the Dilution Flow Rate (DFR) for.each j

release by a method other than the calculations required by procedure HP/0/B/

1000/62Q.

3) Corrective actions taken and results:

Sample results of releases were compared with recorded DFR values,which were corrected. This information was correlated with other liquid releases occur-ring at the time of the cited releases. No two releases occurred simultaneously, and the corrected DFRs for the two cited releases did not exceed the 38 cfs

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normally supplied by Keowee Hydro Station; therefora, no release limits were l

violated.

The technicians involved were counseled concerning this error. All HP person-nel involved in processing sample requests have been reminded of the correct method by procedure to calculate DFRs.

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4) Corrective actions to be taken to avoid further violations:

i No further corrective action is' considered necessary.

5) Date when full compliance vill be achieved:

All corrective actions have been completed, j

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