IR 05000269/1981014
| ML15224A416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1981 |
| From: | Bryant J, Jape F, Myers D, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A415 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-81-14, 50-270-81-14, 50-287-81-14, NUDOCS 8108180435 | |
| Download: ML15224A416 (7) | |
Text
O UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-269/81-14, 50-270/81-14, and 50-287/81-14 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: Oconee Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection at Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:.',/--
-/
F. ape,Senior Re ent nspector D te Signed
Date Signed W. T. Order Dt~ge Approved by:
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< JAI Bryant, Sgtion Chief, Division of
,esident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on June 10 - July 10, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 285 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of operational safety, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, and followup of previous inspection finding Results Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
PDR,
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
- T. E. Cribbe, Licensing Engineer
- T. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services Other licensee employees contacted included four technicians, twenty operators, ten mechanics, three security force members, and two office personne *Attended exit interview 2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 10, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings without significant commen. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a. (Closed) Violation (269/81-02-02) Failure to follow procedure when operating turbine building sump pump. Corrective actions described in DPC's response to NRC letter dated March 20, 1981, have been verifie b. (Closed) Violation (287/81-04-02) Failure to conspicuously post a radiation are Corrective actions described in DPC's response to NRC leter dated April 30, 1981, have been verifie c. (Closed) Violation (287/81-02-02) Failure to follow maintenance procedure. Corrective actions described in DPC's response, dated March 30, 1981, have been completed satisfactorily and were verified by the inspecto d. (Closed) Violation (269/81-04-02) Failure to report a reactor tri This items has been resolved as described in DPC's letter of response dated April 30, 198 e. (Closed) Violation (287/81-04-01) Overpressurization of steam generator. Procedure changes and corrective measures described in DPC's response dated April 30, 1981, have been completed and verified by the inspecto f. (Closed) Violation (287/81-04-03) Failure to follow procedur Corrective actions described in DPC's response letter, dated April 30, 1981, have been verifie *
g. (Closed) Violation (287/81-07-01) Failure to adhere to maintenance procedure. This item has been examined and found resolved as described in DPC'-s response, dated April 30, 1981 h. (Closed) Violation (269/81-04-02) Failure to follow procedure causing an uncontrolled decrease in the pressurizer leve The corrective actions described in DPC's response letter, dated April 30, 1981, have been verifie i. (Closed) Unresolved Item (269, 270, 287/81-07-05) Inadequate reviews of outstanding work requests. The inspectors have continually reviewed outstanding work requests and have conducted interviews with supervisors and other operations personnel. It has been verified that a workable program of outstanding work request review has been initiate Inspectors will continue work request review but consider this issue close. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations Units 2 and 3 operated at virtually full power and without significant problems throughout the report period of June 10 to July 10, 1981. Unit 1 was at virtually full power until June 22, when power was decreased to 90%
FP as a result of mechanical problems on a feed water heater. The unit remained at 90% FP until June 26 when it was shut down for an 85 day refueling and in-service inspection outage. A discussion of the unit shutdown and ensueing problems appears in paragraph 8 of this repor Throughout the report period the inspectors reviewed plant operations to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift supervisors logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records for the three units were continually perused. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health phsyics, and performance personnel on day and night shift Activities within the control rooms were monitored during all shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in the Station Directives. The complement of licensed personne on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifi cations. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant condition The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system restoratation completed and test results were adequat The selected procedures perused attested conformance with applicable Technical Specifications, they appeared to have received the required administrative review and they apparently were performed within the surveillance frequency prescribe PT/1/A/251/2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling IP/O/B/340/02 CRD Power Supply Checks IP/0/A/275/52 Valcor Solenoid Test IP/O/A/301/35 SR-IR Channel Checks IP/0-3/A/305/3B RPS Channel B On-line Test PT/2/A/202/11 HPI Pump Performance Test PT/2/A/600/12 EFDWP Performance Test The inspectors also witnessed set point adjustment of Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip setpoints. The high pressure trip was changed to 2290 psig from 2294 psig, Low Pressure Trip setpoint to 1810 from 1806 psig and the variable temperature -
pressure trip setpoint to 11.14T - 4696. The basis for this conservative adjustment was to increase the margin of technical specification required settings to allow for greater instrument setpoint drift prior to reaching reportable limit The inspectors employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:
10 CFR ANSI N1 Oconee Technical Specifications Oconee Station Directives Duke Administrative Policy Manual Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identifie. Monthly Maintenance Observation Maintenance activities were observed and reviewed throughout the inspection period to verify that activities were accomplished using approved procedures or the activity was within the skill of the trade and that the work was done by qualified personnel. Where appropriate, limiting conditions for operation were examined to ensure that while equipment was removed from service, the T.S. requirements were satisfied. Also, work activities, procedures, and work requests were reviewed to ensure adequate fire and radiation protection precautions were observed, and that equipment repaired was tested and properly returned to service. Acceptance criteria used for this review were as follows:
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Station directives 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.5, 3.3.11, 3.3.15
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Administrative Policy Manual, Sections 3.3 and Technical Specifications Some maintenance activities observed or reviewed were:
a. July 1, the inspector witnessed PT/3/A/600/12, Performance Test of the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump. The pump was tested after bearing oil leakage appeared on the turbin The inspectors reviewed maintenance procedures and techniques during repair b. Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) work for Unit 2 TDEFDW Pumps. The NSM was completed and tested satisfactorily. The modification upgraded the initiation signal for the EFDW system to safety grad c. Reviewed work request 17165 and verified T.S. requirements were met while trouble shooting of low pressure service water (LPSW) valve 565 was in progress on Unit 1. The valve is in the LPSW supply line to reactor building cooling unit d. Outstanding work requests were reviewed to determine that the licensee is giving priority to safety-related maintenance and not allowing a degradation of system performances by developing a backlog of work i
tem Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie. Steam Voiding in the "A" Reactor Coolant Loop During Unit 1 Cooldown On June 29, 1981 during cooldown of the Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
for a scheduled refueling outage, operators were experiencing trouble in cooling the "A" RCS loop. The inability to provide cooling flow to that loop eventually lead to the development of a steam void in the "A" loop hot leg at the entry into the OTSG. This section of the hot leg is referred to as the "candy-cane". The details of the event and subsequent actions are detailed belo Plant conditions at the time of the problem were:
RCS pressure 170 psig; loop "B" hot leg temperature 225F; loop "A" hot leg 360 F; pressurizer level 100 inches; all Reactor Coolant pumps stopped; core cooling flow at 3000 gpm from the Decay Heat Removal System (DHR).
This cooldown (C/D) deviated slightly from routine C/D's because of additional requirements to "hot soak" the reactor's onc.e-through steam generators (OTSG's). This is done to allow entry into the OTSG's early in an outag RCP's are normally utilized to force reactor coolant through the OTSG to cool the primary system to about 250oF when the DHR System would then be used to continue RCS cooldown. The RCS pressure during the would be maintained at the required pressure to prevent loss of RCP net postive suction head (314 psig) by the pressurizer heater However, on this occasion the RCP's were secured at an RCS temperature of 360 F when RCS
9. Containment Purge Valves The 48" Containment Purge Valves on Units 2 and 3 have their controllers tagged or deenergized and are administratively controlled to prevent their opening while a Unit is at power. This action was taken by the licensee as a result of information from the valve vendor (Henry Pratt) of possible generic problems in the valves electrical and pneumatic operators. Concern focuses around the reported inability of the valves to close from inter mediate postions under LOCA conditions. Preliminary calculations by the vendor indicated that limiting the opening of the butterfly valves to 65 degrees (90 degrees equals full open) would decrease the forces acting on the disk sufficiently to allow full closure under specified accident conditions. Subsequent analysis reveals previous calculations may be non-conservative in that openings as low as 350 may be required to meet the closing requirement The licensee is currently seeking additional information on which to resolve the issue and intends to keep the valves shut until their integrity can be assure The proper stop settings for the purge valves is an unresolved item until a technical justification of this matter is developed (269, 270, 287/81-14-01).
10. Electrical Isolation Oconee Auxiliary Electrical Systems Technical Specification 3.7 requires in part that for each unit the reactor shall not be heated above 200'F unless all 125 VDC distribution centers, diode monitors, and diodes required to supply the units four 125 VDC instrumentation and control panel boards, the 120 VAC auxiliary control power panel boards,and the 120 VAC auxiliary control power panel boards are operable. The 125 VDC instrumentation and control batteries with an associated charger are required to be operable as delineated below:
1. For operation of Unit 1 only, 1CA or 1CB, and 2CA or 2CB For operation of Unit 2 only, 2CA or 2CB and 3CA or 3CB For operation of Unit 3 only, 3CA or 3CB and 1CA or 1CB 2. For operation of any two units 1CA or 1CB, 2CA or 2CB, and 3CA or 3CB 3. For operation of all three units, five of the six batteries with their associated charger The above required combinations of control batteries and chargers are so stipulated as to provide necessary redundancy of listed equipmen At approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> on June 30, 1981 the licensee identified, during training and review of the Normal Power Procedures (OP/1/A/1107/02, OP/2/A/1107/02, OP/3/A/1107/02), that section 6, DC ground troubleshooting,
violated Technical Specification 3.7.1(e).
Section 6 of the above procedures disables the back-up or redundant function of the isolating and transfer diodes for all four channels of the 125 VDC Instrumentation and Control Power Systems. This degraded mode is not currently addressed in T.S. 3. Documentation review reveals that on at least two occasions, October 29, 1980 and April 9, 1981, the Oconee Units were isolated as detailed in the Normal Power Procedur The licensee identified this item during routine training of operators on the Normal Power line-ups and has documented the issue to the NRC in an Licensee Event Report (LER 269/81-13). On July 6, 1981 a technical specification change was submitted to the NRC to allow seperation of the station batteries for trouble-shooting D.C. ground On the basis of licensee self-identification with prompt and satisfactory corrective actions a notice of violation will not be issued for this matte.
Radio Frequency Sensitive Equipment A recent reactor trip at Sequoyah reportedly resulted from a HP technician using a hand held radio in an area containing RF sensitive Barton trans mitter The Sequoyah trip received a moderate amount of interest in the area of RF sensitive equipment and actions taken by the licensee to preclude inad vertent operation of that equipmen As a result of investigative efforts following a similar event at Oconee, Duke determined that the three cable spreading rooms contain equipment sensitive to RF signals/interference (No Barton transmitters).
As a pre cautionary measure, they posted warning signs on the entrance to these rooms which ban the use of hand held radios. Duke has not identified other areas or equipment which warrants similar concer Subsequent to the Sequoyah trip, discussions were held with the licensee concerning the identification of selected Barton transmitters as potentially RF sensitive. Duke has taken the issue into consideration and will factor into their analysis any future information.