IR 05000269/1981009
| ML15224A376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1981 |
| From: | Bryant J, Jape F, Myers D, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A375 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-81-09, 50-269-81-9, 50-270-81-09, 50-270-81-9, 50-287-81-09, 50-287-81-9, NUDOCS 8106120352 | |
| Download: ML15224A376 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-269/81-09, 50-270/81-09, and 50-287/81-09 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name:
Oconee Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:
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D. Myers oDate S gned F. Jape Date Tigned W. OrS gned Approved by:
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J. Bryant, ection Chief, R id nt and Reactor Date 5ign d Project nspection Divisi SUMMARY Inspection on April 10 through May 10, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 243 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of operational safety surveillance, core power distribution surveillance, maintenance and routine surveillance testin Results Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- H. R. Lowery, Acting Superintendent of Operations
- T. E. Cribbe, Licensing Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included six technicians, 12 operators, five security force members, and four office personne *Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 1 and 11, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The licensee acknowledged the results of the inspection without commen. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Unresolved Item (287/80-32-01); Safety concern on an incomplete work request. The inspector reviewed isolation performed using work request 56242 and interviewed the cognizant shift supervisor and determined that the isolation specified on the above work request had been performed even through red tags had not been issue Review of previous work requests used for the same work indicated red tags were not used or required based on Station Directive 3.1.1(OP).
The informal attitude displayed in the performance of the above work request proved to be an isolated case based on inspector observations of maintenance activities throughout the remainder of the Unit 3 refueling outag.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviation New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations throughout the report period, April 10 through May 10, 1981, to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative control Control room logs, shift supervisor logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records for the three units were continually perused. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance,
chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel on day and night shift Activities within the control rooms were monitored during all shifts and at shift change Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in the Station Directives. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum require Operators were responsive to plant annunicator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a continual basi The areas toured include but were not limited to the following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Zone within the protected area During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security equipment status and radiation control practices were observe Unit 1 operated at virtually 100% full power throughout the reporting period with no significant difficulties aside from an operational transient involving the main turbine bypass valves. On May 4 at approximately 0900 the A main steam turbine bypass valves (2) failed to the open position causing a brief power spik Reactor power was decreased to approximately 85%. The problem causing the bypass valves to fail open was determined to be a malfunctioning steam generator pressure transmitte The spare pressure transmitter was selected and the unit was returned to full power where it remains at the end of this reporting perio Unit 2 operated at virtually full power throughout the reporting period with no major difficultie Unit 3 began the reporting period recovering from a reactor tri On April 9, the unit tripped due to loss of generator excitatio The cause of the trip was determined to be a malfunctioning generator voltage regulator circuit. The malfunctioning equipment was replaced and the unit returned to operation on April 1 The unit operated virtually unencumbered until April 25 when power was reduced to 63% in order to facilitate repair of a water to oil leak on the B feedwater pum While at reduced power, the unit tripped as a result of an inadvertent actuation of the fire protection water spray system on the main turbine oil tan The spray shorted a relay control which intitiated a turbine trip/feedwater tri No major difficulties arose out of the transient. The unit was restarted, placed on
.line at 1744 on April 26 and reached full power operation at approximately 0500 on April 27, where it operated until May 6. At approximately 0832 on May 6 it was discovered that 3CS-6, a valve in the quench tank drain line, was in the intermediate position. Valve 3CS-5, which is upstream of 3CS-6 in the same line, was inoperable in the intermediate positio This
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condition effectively constituted a breach of containmen The ultimate result of the breach was to shut the unit down in order repair both valve At 1406, while at approximately 16% FP, and in the process of shutting down the unit experienced a second reactor tri The trip was a result of a slight feedwater transient which caused a cold water power spike to above 20% powe At 20% power the turbine trip/feedwater trip RPS trip rearm Since the turbine had been manually tripped as part of the shutdown, a
reactor trip ensue No difficulties arose from the trip and all systems performed as expecte The issue of breaching of containment integrity as a result of the failure of valve 3CS-6 will be carried as an Unresolved Item (287/81-09-01). Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests detailed below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequac The completed test procedures examined were analyzed for embodiment of the necessary test prerequisities, preparations, instructions, acceptance criteria and sufficiency of technical conten The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, test equipment in use was calibrated, test prerequisites were met, system restoration was completed and that test results were adequat The..selected procedures perused attested conformance with applicable Technical Specifications; they appeared to have received the required administrative review and apparently were performed within the surveillance frequency prescribe Procedure Title PT/1/A/203/06 LPI Injection PT/2/A/202/11 HPI Injection IP/0/A/301/35 SR and IR Channel Test IP/2/A/305/3C RPS Channel C PT/0/A/290/04 Turbine Valve Movement PT/0/A/600/15 CRD Movement PT/0/A/250/10C Fire Protection Systems The inspector employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:
10 CFR ANSI N1 Oconee Technical Specifications Oconee Station Directive Duke Administrative Policy Manual
Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Maintenance activities were observed and reviewed throughout the inspection period to verify that activities were accomplished using approved procedures or the activity was within the skill of the trade and that the work was done by qualified personne Where appropriate, limiting conditions for operation were examined to ensure that while equipment was removed from service the TS requirements were satisfie Also, work activities, procedures, and work requests were reviewed to ensure adequate use of QA hold points and material, that fire and radiation protection precautions were observed, and that equipment repaired was tested and properly returned to servic Acceptance criteria used for this review were as follows:
-Station Directive 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.5, 3.3.11, and 3.3.15-Administrative Policy Manual, Sections 3.3 and Technical Specifications Maintenance activities observed or reviewed were as follows:
WR #12638 Packing Leak on FDW-310 WR #13043 1 ADA DIODE Ground WR #13434 U-2 CBAT Pump Repairs WR #13513 CBAST Pump will not Develop Discharge Pressure WR #13435 Clean Seal Supply Filters WR #16552 3CLPI Pump Switch Repair Outstanding work requests were reviewed to determine that the licensee is giving priority to safety-related maintenance and not allowing a degradation of system performances by developing a backlog of work item Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance of Core Power Distribution Limits The program and procedures for determination of the core power distribution levels were reviewed to assure adequacy of technical content and adherence to licensed power distribution limit The following procedures were reviewed as a portion of the inspection effort:
IP/O/B/0302/03A Incore Instrument Recorder Input Calibration IP/0/B/0302/03B Performance Calibration of Incore Detectors PT/O/B/0302/06 Review and Control of Incore Neutron Detectors Signals PT/O/A/800/30 Weekly Power Distribution Comparison
The inspector witnessed the retrieving of the in-core instrument flux data from the computer and the techniques used in acessing the unprocessed signals to determine operability of the detectors and verification that the number and location of the detectors met technical specification (TS)
requirement Signals-to-power level conversion programs were reviewed to verify that the corrected power signal contained inputs to allow for core geometry variations due to rod insertions, power level and boron concentration The calculational methods used in determining the linear heat rate were also verified by review of the program format to consider nuclear uncertainty factors and the power fraction prior to comparison to TS limit A detailed review of computer performance logs to verify compliance to TS limits on quadrant power tilts, axial imbalance, linear heat rates, and power level was performed for the preceeding 30 days. All questions by the inspector on the data reviewed were adequately resolved in a post inspection conference with the site reactor enginee In addition to the routine determination of power distribution limits the inspector interviewed reactor operators to ascertain their level of under standing of the requirements and means for power distribution ascessment during the periods of computer inoperabilit OP/0/A/1103/19
"Power Imbalance and Quadrant Power Tilt Calculation" using the back-up incore detector system addresses that condition. Of the four operators interviewed all displayed a satisfactory awareness of the basic method of calculation specified in the procedure and of related TS requirement Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identifie. Site Visits by Other NRC Regional Personnel During the period of April 27 to May 1, 1981 an NRC inspection was performed at Oconee by an inspector from the Engineering Inspection Branch of the Region II office in the areas of filler weld material for the standby shutdown facility hangers. Details of this inspection are contained in IE Report 269, 270, 287/81-0 The Chief of Reactor Projects Section 2A of the Region II office was on site May 1, 1981 to conduct a routine site visit and meet with the Station Manage Topics discussed in the meeting were general in nature and included operator training and performance.