IR 05000269/1981008
| ML15224A404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1981 |
| From: | Economos N, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A400 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-81-08, 50-269-81-8, 50-270-81-08, 50-270-81-8, 50-287-81-08, 50-287-81-8, NUDOCS 8108040334 | |
| Download: ML15224A404 (6) | |
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0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-269/81-08, 50-270/81-08 and 50-287/81-08 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name:
Oconee Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee Site near Clemson, SC Inspecto N. con
/Date igned Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief gate/Signed Engineering Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division SUMMARY Inspected on April 28 to May 1, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 28 inspector-hours on site in the areas of action on previous inspection findings and inspector followup items; safe shutdown facility welding; RC Pump stud corrosion; OTSG manway cracked studs; Unit 1 ten-year ISI pla Results Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in four areas; one violation was found in one area (Violation -
Failure to document weld material used to fabricate hanger welds - Paragraph 6.a.).
6108040334 810721 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- R. J. Brackett, Senior QA Engineer
- T. E. Cribbe, License Engineer
- G. Rothenburger, Support Engineer Mechanical Maintenance J. Vignati, Construction Engineer W. W. Gallman, Mechanical Junior Engineer NRC Resident Inspector F. Jape
- W. Orders D. 0. Myers
- Attended exit interview
.
2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 1, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Violation, 287/80-30-02 -
"Axial and Circumferential UT of Pipe Welds".
Duke Power Company letter of response dated March 6, 1981, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region I The inspector held discussions with the Senior QA Engineer and examined the corrective actions as stated in the letter of respons The inspector concluded that Duke Power Company had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance, performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circum stance The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemente (Closed) Unresolved Item 269, 270, 287/81-05-02 -
"Apparent Unaccept able Defects Shown on Radiographic Films."
The licensee ground and reshot the weld section with apparent unacceptable indications identi fied between radiographic stations 3-5. The inspector reviewed the radiographs taken after the repair and found them acceptabl (Closed)
Unresolved Item 269/80-03-01 - "Auxiliary Feedwater Thermal Sleeve Cracking."
B&W has informed the licensee by memo dated 2/25/81, Field Change Authorization No. FC-0342-02, Revision 3 that the qualification of these components is being extended for an additional fuel cycle. The licensee plans to inspect those sleeves that may be accessible during the upcoming refueling outag (Closed)
Unresolved Item 269/80-03-02 -
B&W's findings, as stated in a memo to P. H. Barton dated February 20, 1980, S/M ONS-80-093, concludes that the dropped stator did not affect the structural integrity of the nozzle (#9) or the nozzle-to-head "J" weld. Accordingly, B&W stated and the inspector agreed, that the ISI inspection normally scheduled for the reactor vessel head and nozzles (CRD) will be adequate to demonstrate continued serviceability of the hea. Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.
Inspector Followup Items (IFI) (Closed)
IFI 269/79-19, 270/79-17, 287/79-19,
"Electrode Material Control." The licensee's procedure has been revised to require strict control of material issued to welder This includes the use of leather pouches for storage of small quantities and for the return to the issue station of loose weld material that cannot be accounted fo (Closed) IFI 287/80-30-03, "Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) Code Required Records."
The licensee has issued a proposed change to Specification OS-27-A.1 (PPQAM) which delineates applicable codes and standards for the Oconee SS In the case where ASME Code classifications are invoked, the designated code dates are 1974 Edition, summer 1975 addendu Within these areas the inspector randomly selected the following items for a review of quality records including receipt inspection reports, code data reports, material certifications, certificates of conformance, nonconformance reports and dispositions acceptance tests as applicable:
Pipe/Fittings ISO/System Size Class Unit 900E11,W6980 217 R/0, 14C 6"x.432" IIIC A-106 2 Aux. Service Water (GR-B)
450E11,9ARN 217 R/0, 14C 6"x.432" IIIC SA-234 2 Aux. Service Water Pipe, L62723 217 R/0, 14C 6"x.432" IIIC A-106 2 Aux. Service Water (GR-B)
Pipe, L62723 218 6"x.432" IIIC A-106 2 Aux. Service Water Pipe, L62723 218 6"x.432" IIIC A-106 2 Aux. Service Water Pipe, L62723 218 6"x.432" IIIC A-106 2 Aux. Service Water Valves Dragon, 1/2" S.S. Packless ASME Class 2, S/N CX2020 Kerotest, 2" CFE 1500# globe ASME Class 1, S/N 004-25 Dressler, 3/4"x1" S.S. 1500# S. Relief ASME Class 2, S/N TD89532 (Closed)
IFI 269, 270, 298/81-05-03,
"Radiographic Films Containing Processing Blemishes."
The licensee has replaced the film processer with a newer model previously used at Cherokee. Weld W-6, ISO-25 was reshot in its entirety and the films were reviewed by the licensee on March 18, 1981. The inspector reviewed the reshots of the questioned radiographs and found them satisfactor.
Independent Inspection Effort Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) (Units 1 - 3)
The inspector performed a walk through inspection in and around the SSF to observe work activity, hanger installation, welding material control, storage, et In addition, the inspector selected the fol lowing welds for observation and record review:
Item Cable Supports Drawing N Status HSF-13 0944B Completed HSF-14 0944B Completed Pipe Weld N ISO Size System Status
225 10"x.719" Aux. Service In-Process Water
26 24"x.375 Diesel Air Intake Repair For these welds the inspector checked as-built hanger dimensions for conformance with those in the applicable drawings, workmanship, docu mentation, weld material quality records, welder qualification Within these areas the inspector noted that in the case of the cable supports the work was controlled thru Installation Procedure N IP/O/A3010/04, Change 2, "Installation of Non-Field Designed Cable Systems."
Step ten (10)
of the procedure requires that for all welding
filler material used, the type of filler material, Heat No, and QA Tag N be recorded on the work request or on attachment sheets and that welding must conform to the Oconee welding program. However, through discussions and interviews with the craft and cognizant QC inspector it was ascertained that welding on both hangers had been completed on the previous day without documenting the welding material as directed by the procedure. In addition, the inspector noted that although the procedure requires this information to be documented on "attached sheets", the inspector could find no sheets with provisions for this documentation. This matter was discussed at length with the licensee's representative who agreed with the finding and the inadequacy of the procedure in this are The inspector stated that failure to follow procedural requirements was in violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by DPC Topical Report DUKE-1-A, Section 17, paragraph 17.1.5. This violation was identified as item 269, 270, 287/81-08-01,
"Failure to Document Weld Material Used to Fabricate Hanger Welds". Steam Generator Manway Cracked Studs Discussions with cognizant licensee personnel disclosed that the governing station Procedure MP/O/A/1130/2, Revision 6 has been revised to ensure that changing and handling of the studs conforms with B&W recommendations and, that the stud closure seal is undamaged, clean and dry during installation. The revised procedure/approach, has been used twice - during the refueling outage of Unit 3 and during the "leaker" outage of Unit Currently the licensee is evaluating the use of stud tensioners for use on future outage Also the licensee plans to perform hardness tests on forty (40) selected studs. Studs removed from OTSG primary manways and handholes during the Unit 1 outage will be magnetic particle inspected for information purpose Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Closure Studs As a followup effort to IE Information Notice 80-27,
"Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Studs" and, the licensee's Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/81-02, the inspector interviewed the licensee's cognizant engineer in order to ascertain what action have been taken on this matter. As stated in the aforementioned letter, a significant amount of corrosion wastage associated with heavy accumulation of boron crud was discovered in the pump closure area, shank portion, of the stud The pumps where this problem has been identified were manufactured by Bingham Willamette Company and are installed in Units 2 and 3. It is believed this condition resulted from leakage around the closure gaske This leakage has been present for three to four years with a
maximum leak rate of approximately 0.5 gp The most severe degra dation appears to be in the lower portion of the shank and includes some of the threaded section in contact with the 304 S.S. pump casin The studs are made from low alloy carbon steel material, they are approximately 32" long with a nominal diameter of 3.846" at the shan In terms of corrective action, planned and/or taken, the licensee's representative stated that studs No. 9 in pump 3A1 and No. 20 in pump 2A2 were found to be less than the minimum acceptable shank diameter of 3.250" and were replaced with studs made from AISI 4340 materia Injection taps were installed in the casings in order to inject a material, "Furmanite", into the annulus above the upper closure gasket and thereby slow down the leakage rat Presently the licensee is negotiating with Mechanical Equipment Company of Lynchburg, Virginia to design and develop the necessary tooling needed to repair the mating pump surfaces associated with this leakag Also, the licensee has engaged Battelle to conduct an investigation into the corrosion mechanis Ten-year ISI Plan - Unit 1 The inspector briefly discussed the schedule for the upcoming ten-year ISI inspection with personnel. Plans and procedures are in the prelim inary stages which precluded any meaningful review in this area at this time.