IR 05000269/1981032

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IE Insp Repts 50-269/81-32,50-270/81-32 & 50-287/81-32 on 811120-1210.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Procedure in Batch Release of Liquid Effluent & to Perform Adequate Radiological Survey
ML15224A518
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/07/1982
From: Bryant J, Myers D, William Orders
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML15224A514 List:
References
50-269-81-32, 50-270-81-32, 50-287-81-32, NUDOCS 8203020439
Download: ML15224A518 (9)


Text

REGQy UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report No /81-32, 50-270/81-32, and 50-287/81-32 Licensee:

Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name:

Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:

a,7 <1 cl 2,1"5 Orders(/

J Dat Signed D. Myers /

Dath Signed Approved by:

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/ A le J. Z/'1yanit, S$!5ton Chief, Division of-Ddie 'Signed J

~ident and Reactor Project Inspection SUMMARY Inspection on November 20, 1981 - December 10, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine announced inspection involved 177 inspector-hours on site in the areas of operations safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, radiation controls and PORV block valve failure Results Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in four areas; two items of noncompliance were found in 1 area (Violation:

Failure to follow procedure in batch release of liquid effluent; Violation:

Failure to perform adequate radiological survey).

8203020439 20218 PDR ADOCK 05000269 PDR

DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • J. E. Smith, Station Manager J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations
  • T. B. Owen, Superintendent of Technical Services
  • T. Cribbe, Licensing Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanic and security force member *Attended exit interview 2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 11, 1981, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The violations detailed in this report were discussed with and acknowledged by licensee managemen.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio.

Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operations during the report period November 20, 1981 -

December 10, 1981, to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and administrative control Control room logs, shift supervisors logs, shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records for three units were routinely peruse Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics and performance personnel on day and night shift Activities within the control rooms were monitored during all shifts and at shift changes. Actions and activities observed were conducted as prescribed in Station Directive The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant condition *

2 Plant tours were taken frequently during the reporting perio The areas toured include but are not limited to the following:

Turbine building Auxiliary building Units 1, 2, and 3 electrical equipment rooms Station yard zone within the protected area Unit 1, reactor building During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security equipment status and radiation control practices were observe Observations and inspection in the area of radiation control practices led to the identification of two apparant violations of regulatory requirement Details of these two inadequacies are given in this report in the paragraph entitled "Radiation Controls."

Oconee Unit 1 began the report period with refueling in progress; fuel load was completed on November 2 As the report period ends, preparations for unit restart are ongoing with a projected online date of December 24, 198 Oconee Unit 2 operated at 75% power from the beginning of the report period until December 10 when power was reduced to 50% to prolong core life until Unit 1 starts u Unit 2 is currently scheduled to shut down for refueling and 10 year ISI outage on December 24, 198 Oconee Unit 3 began the report period at virtually full power. On November 28, a severe leak on the 3B feedwater pump seal injection line forced a power reduction to 62% power to facilitate isolation and repair of the leak. The repair was completed and the unit was returned to full power on November 2 On December 6 power was reduced to 90% to facilitate plugging of leaking condenser tubes in the 3C2 water bo Repairs were completed and power escalated to 100% on December 7. At the close of the report period the unit is operating at full powe.

Surveillance Testing The surveillance tests detailed below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy. The completed test procedures examined were analyzed for embodiment of the necessary test prerequisites, preparation, instructions, acceptance criteria and sufficiency of technical conten The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, system restoration was completed and test results were adequat The selected procedures perused attested conformance with applicable Technical Specifications, they appeared to have received the required administrative review and they apparently were performed within the surveillance frequency prescribe Procedures Title IP/3/A/305/3D RPS Channel D Functional PT/O/A/230/01 Radiation Monitor Check PT/O/A/600/15 CRD Movement PT/O/A/610/17 4160V BKR Test PT/3/A/204/07 Reactor Building Spray PT/O/A/170/05 Penetration Room Vent PT/3/A/203/06 Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust PT/3/A/305/3B RPS Channel B Functional The inspector employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:

10 CFR ANSI N 1 Oconee Technial Specifications Oconee Station Directives Duke Administrative Policy Manual Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Maintenance Observations Maintenance activities were observed and reviewed throughout the inspection period to verify that activities were accomplished using approved procedures, or the activity was within the skill of the trade, and that the work was done by qualified personne Where appropriate, limiting conditions for operation were examined to ensure that while equipment was removed from service, the technical specification requirements were satisfied. Also, work activities, procedures, and work requests were reviewed to ensure adequate cleanliness and fire and radiation protection precautions were observed, and that equipment was tested and properly returned to service. Acceptance criteria used for this review were as follows:

-Station Directives-Administrative Policy Manual, Sections 3.3 and Technical Specifications Maintenance activities observed or reviewed were:

Work request N Subject Date Completed 21325 Troubleshoot Repair R1A-54 12/9/81

18758 Repair of 2HP-145 Seat Leak 10/21/81 20510 Preventive Maintenance on 2PR-1 10/2/81 20566 Preventive Maintenance on 2PR-6 10/2/81 Thirty-two outstanding work requests between #20898 of 11/20/81 and #21219 of 12/09/81 which were initiated by the operations group of Unit 2, were reviewed to determine that the licensee is giving priority to safety-related maintenance and not allowing a backlog of work items to permit a degradation of system performanc Of the areas inspected no violation was identifie.

Radiation Control a. Areas Surveys On November 4, 1981, the inspector performed a radiological survey of a temporary radioactive waste solidification facility located adjacent to the Unit 3 containment building. The components of the mobile facility were secured within a small fenced are The fenced area was roped off with one sign affixed to the gate stating that the radiation level at the boundary (the fence) was less than 2 mr/h The inspectors survey, however, revealed one location at the boundary reading 20 mr/hr. The inspector notified licensee health physics technicians who verified the inspector's findings and moved the rope to a point such that the radiation level was as poste On the same day, while performing a radiological survey around the Unit 2 borated water storage tank (BWST), the inspector detected a 6 mr/hr field in the area of the BWST manway which was roped and posted as being less than 2mr/hr at the boundary. Health physics technicians verified the inspector's findings and moved the rope to a point such that the radiation level at the boundary was less than 2mr/h On December 7, 1981, the inspector, while performing a routine survey of the turbine building, detected a 12 mr/hr field on the turbine building side of the block wall separating the decon room from the turbine building. The area was unposted, was readily accessible to personnel, and is the site of considerable station modification activit Health physics technicians were notified, the inspectors findings were substantiated, and the area was roped of CFR 20.203 requires that each radiation area (an area in which there exists radiation at levels of 5 mr/hr or greater) be conspicuously poste CFR 20.201 requires that the licensee perform surveys such as may be necessary for him to comply with the regulations of that par The three instances detailed herein, separately and collectively, constitute an apparent violation of the requirements entailed in

  • 10 CFR 20.201, specifically, failure to perform adequate surveys such that radiation areas were not adequately poste This is a Violation, (50-269/81-32-01).

b. Unplanned Release of Unit 1 and 2 Turbine Building Sump Since the September 18 tube leak on Unit 2 the shared Units 1 and 2 turbine building sump (TBS) contents have been pumped to the oil collection basin (OCB) in compliance with OP/0/A/1106/31 "Control of Secondary Contamination".

The referenced procedure requires "batch" release of the TBS when the sump contains water with greater than minimum detectable activity (MDA).

This method contributes to minimizing releases to unrestricted areas by maintaining account abilit On December 6 the TBS was inadvertently left in the automatic mode of operation subsequent to a routine batch release. This action allowed an unplanned 1800 gallon release of the TB sump to the OCB when the sump pumps started automatically on an increasing water leve The pumps were stopped automatically by radiation indicating alarm (RIA)-54. RIA 54 continously monitors the activity levels of the sump and will deenergize the system's pumps when radiation levels reach a preset limit. It's use for isolation has been allowed only when activity levels are less than MDA. It is not incorporated in the control circuit as a safety factor during batch release Upon realizing the TBS pumps were in the automatic mode, an operator immediately opened the pump circuit breakers, which returned the system to the local manual mode. A sample request was initiated and the subsequent isotopic analysis verified activity levels of the TBS were greater than MDA but less than limits for discharge to an unrestricted are No 10 CFR 20 limits were exceede The cause of the incident was failure to follow procedure OP/0/A/1106/31 which, in part, causes steps to be taken to prevent automatic restart of the TBS pumps during refill of the TB Failure to comply with the referenced procedure is a violation of technical specification 6.4.1a and applies to Unit 2. (50-270/81-32-02) PORV Block Valve Failure On October 14, 1981, with Unit 2 in cold shutdown, licensee personnel detected that the housing of the limitorque operator for valve 2RC-4 (PORV block valve) had failed. A portion of the operator housing had broken off and was lying on the pressurizer below. The failure occurred, as indicated on the attached Figure 1, at the compensator spring housin The licensee searched in vain for the necessary repair parts and on October 16 decided to borrow the Unit 1 compensator spring housing until replacement parts could

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be procured. Unit 1 is not scheduled to start up until December 24, 198 Later that day, after the housing had been replaced, electricians attempted to successfully adjust the valve operator limit switches to no avai The valve was cycling to mid-position and stallin Note:

In partial response to IEB-81-02, the PORV Block valve operators were modified such that valve operator control is through limit switches as opposed to torque switche The electricians attempted to cycle the valve from it's breaker but stopped when they detected a current spike of 18 amp Upon reentering the reactor building they found the compensation spring housing had again failed as indicated on Figure On October.18, a new compensator spring housing assembly was procured from Limitorque. On October 20, Limitorque and Westinghouse consultants arrived at the site to assist in the repair efforts. After consulting with licensee personnel and visually inspecting the valve operator, the consultants, assisted by licensee personnel, attempted to cycle the valve to no avai Closer examination of the operator revealed three bare electrical motor leads and other brittle insulation. The motor leads were repaired, some wiring errors were resolved, and the valve tested successfully at 0230 on October 21, 198 Evaluation of the equipment failures revealed that the initial failure was caused by improper adjustment of the limit switche The second failure was caused by cycling the valve from the breaker which overrode the limit switches. Evaluation has also revealed if RC-4 had been called upon to close, the operator internals would have been ejected and the valve would have remained ope At the end of this report period both Units 2 and 3 are operating with RC-4 shut. Unit 1 will be repaired and evluated prior to startu Inspection efforts in this area are ongoing at the end of this report perio This area will be maintained as an open item pending further inspection; 50-270/81-32-0 /

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