IR 05000269/1981007
| ML15224A386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1981 |
| From: | Bryant J, Jape F, Myers D, William Orders NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A379 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-81-07, 50-269-81-7, 50-270-81-07, 50-270-81-7, 50-287-81-07, 50-287-81-7, NUDOCS 8107080525 | |
| Download: ML15224A386 (17) | |
Text
0 oUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-269/81-07, 50-270/81-07, and 50-287/81-07 Licensee:. Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name:
Oconee Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Inspection at Oconee site near Seneca, South Carolina Inspectors:
'/'
F. Jape IDate Signed W. Orders
/
Date Signed
. Myer ate Signd Approved by:
Sn J. C.fBryant, S
,
Branch gned SUMMARY Inspection on March 10 through April 10, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved, 355-resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, startup test program following refueling, review of LER's, followup of previous inspection findings, TS compliance and training progra Results Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in five areas; three violations were found in three areas (Violation -
Failure to follow instruction for cable repairs - Unit, 3 paragraph 5; Violation -
Missed TS surveillance requirements -
Units 1, 2 and 3 paragraph 6; Violation Emergency power breakers misaligned, Unit 2, paragraph 7).
S 9107080525 910618 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager
- J. M. Davis, Superintendent of Maintenance
- J. N. Pope,. Superintendent of Operations
- T. E. Cribbe, Licensing Engineer
- H. R. Lowery, Acting Superintendent of Operations Other licensee employees contacted included 10 operations shift supervisors, three I&E supervisors, three unit coordinators, four I&E technicians, six maintenance foremen, eight maintenance craftsmen, 20 licensed operators, 10 non-licensed operators, five performance technicians, three I&E support engineers, and two office personne *Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were discussed on March 27 and April 3, 1981 and were summarized on April 9, 1981 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The Violations described in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 were discussed and acknowledged by licensee managemen Other items addressed during the summary meeting were also acknowledged by licensee managemen Actions to resolve the inspection findings were discussed and assigned for followup by licensee personne.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (269/80-38-01), Failure to Follow-Radwaste Procedur The licensee had initiated changes to procedure OP/O/B/1104/43 as stated in DPC's response letter, dated March 6, 198 However, the licensee decided to rewrite all radwaste procedures including OP/O/B/1104/43, en masse. This had delayed approval of the procedure in question. To resolve this matter, a change to OP/O/B/1104/43 was made and approved on March 7, 198 (Closed)
Infraction (287/80-26-01),
Failure to Comply with TS 3.14, Shock Suppresso The inspector verified corrective actions, as described in DPC's response dated December 23, 1980, have been imple mente (Closed)
Infraction (270/80-29-01),
Failure to Follow Procedure Sur veillance Procedur Licensee's corrective actions, delineated in DPC's letter to NRC dated December 23, 1980, were verified as complet (Open)
Infraction (287/80-25-01),
Failure to Comply with TS Corrective actions described in a letter to NRC from DPC, dated November 26, 1980, were reviewed. Five items were indicated, four of these have been completed and the fifth is under revie The incomplete item. involves a change to the pre-heatup checklist procedure, following discussion of this matter, the licensee indicated a letter of explanation will be submitted to the NR (Closed) Infraction (287/80-25-02), Failure to Properly Administrate a Procedure Chang Licensees corrective actions described in DPC's letter to NRC, dated November 26, 1981 have been verifie (Closed)
Infraction (269/80-28-01),
Failure to Maintain Material Accountability and Traceability. Administative changes and other corrective actions described in DPC's response to NRC, dated October 3, 1980 have been verified as complet (Closed) Infraction (296/80-28-02), Failure to Use Proper Procedure for Letdown Filter Cask Unloading. Plant modifications and administrative changes, as described in DPC's response to NRC, dated October 3, 1980 have been verified as complet (Closed) Violation (287/81-02-03), Failure to Comply with TS 3.1 Corrective actions described in DPC's letter to NRC, dated March 20, 1981 have been verifie (Closed)
Infraction (270/80-29-01),
Failure. to Follow Periodic Test Procedure.. Corrective actions described in DPC's letter to NRC, dated December 23, 1980, were verifie. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New'unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 7, 13, 14, 15, and 1.
Damaged Unit-3 Emergency Power SwitchingLogic Cables Six Unit 3 emergency power switching logic cables were discovered to be damaged due to heat and moisture on March 2, 198 The Unit was at cold shutdown, preparing to restart following a refueling -
maintenance outage, at the time of discovery. Cognizant personnel were assembled to formulate a repair plan prior to reactor startu Representatives from operations, performance, licensing and I&E agreed on the following repair plan and sequence: Pull six new cables, but do not remove old cables from the tray. The six new cables would be draped beside the cable tray Prepare new cables for termination Declare Standby Bus 1, phase C and Standby Bus 2, phase B voltage signals to Units. 2 and 3 emergency power switching logic inoperabl Perform appropriate surveillance per technica-l specification d. Terminate new cables, remove old cables from trays and secure new cables in the tray e. Restore power to the circuits and test for operabilit Work progressed as outlined, but portions of the existing cables were removed from the cable tray by the workmen, on March 3-4, 1981, contrary to instructions. Failure to follow instructions is considered to be a vio lation of TS 6.4,. The damaged portions of cables were not removed from their cable tray or otherwise disturbe Deviation from the planned work sequence was revealed at a meeting on 3/4/81. The cognizant engineers reported that the affected circuits were technically inoperable. A test of the affected circuits was conducted to verify operabilit The affected circuits were then properly removed from service to complete repairs and restore the system to norma Terminations were completed and restoration testing completed at 1404 hours0.0163 days <br />0.39 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.34222e-4 months <br /> on March 5, 198 Failure to follow instructions is a violation of TS 6.4.1.e. and applies to Unit 3 (287/81-07-07).
6. Operational Safety Surveillance The frequency and type of surveillance to be applied to unit equipment and conditions are specified in Technical Specification (TS) Several new items were added by Amendments 92/92/89, issued on January 28, 198 The inspector reviewed plant records and interviewed plant supervision and operators to determine compliance with these new requirement The findings are summarized below:
a. Emergency Feedwater Flow Indicators A check is required monthly and a calibration on a refueling (RF)
frequenc Records reviewed and interviews revealed the monthly check was not completed in February for all three Units as required. The calibration, due on Unit 3 only, was completed prior to restart from the RF outag S
4 PORV and Safety Valve Position Indicator A check is required monthly and a calibration on a RF frequenc Records reviewed and interviews revealed that the monthly check was not performed in February for all three Unit Also, the calibration,due on Unit 3 only,.was. not performe Unit 3 was returned to service on March 13, 198 Following discussion of this new TS surveillance the licensee prepared and issued IP/O/A/200/31A, Pressurizer Valve Monitor Calibration on March 26, 198 Emergency Feedwater Pump Automatic Start and Automatic Valve Actuation Featur A functional test is required on a RF frequenc An instrument string functional test was performed on Unit 3 prior to restart from the RF outage. This test is not due on Unit 1 and 2. The TS requirement was satisfie RCS Subcooling Monitor A functional test is required on a RF frequency. The test was due o Unit 3 only and was computed on schedul The test was incorporated into the Zero Power Physic Test Progra This TS requirement was satisifie In summary, part of item a and all of item b. were not me Failure to perform surveillance is a violation of TS. 4.1, Table 4.1-1 Items 49 and 50 and applies to Units 1, 2, and (269, 270, 287/81-07-01)
7. On-site Power Supply Operability Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1 requires two sources of on-site power be operable during power operation to provide for continuing availability of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)
System Inherent in the definition of operability of this system is the ability to transfe between either source -automatically-should the selected source become degrade This emergency power switching is explained in FSAR section 8.2.3.3.5. The ESF systems are powered through the main feeder buses (MFB) from either the unit startup transformer (preferred source) or from the standby buses (back up supply).
On 3/27/81 the Resident Inspector determined that the automatic transfer of the main feeder buses to the.standby buses of Unit 2 was unavailable. The MFB to SB Bus breaker controllers in the control room were in the manual rather than the automatic position as specified in OP/2/A/1107/02 Normal Power Lineup. The reactor operator was notified immediately and the power system was promptly returned to norma The licensee determined that the condition developed during breaker alignments for PT/2/A/251/10 Auxiliary Service Water Pump Performance Test, performed on March 26, 198 A operator mistakenly positioned the MFB to SB Bus breakers in manual instead of the auto positio T.S. 3.7.2(a) allows one of the two onsite power supples to be inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provided the alternate source is verified operable within one hour and every eight hours thereafte By not realizing that one of the onsite supplies was inoperable the licensee failed also to meet the action statement of the Limiting Condition for Operatio This failure to meet a-Limiting Condition for Operation (3.7.1(b))
where the appropriate Action Statement (3.7.2.(a)) was not satisfied is a violation and applies to Unit 2 (270/81-07-02).
In addition to the inoperability of the onsite power system the failure of shift personnel to realize the potentially serious degraded mode is another issue of concern. The degraded mode existed for more than 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> and was clearly indicated in the control room by two Statalarms labeled "MFB to SB Bus Auto Transfer Blocked". Control room operators should have interpreted these alarms during one of the three shift turnovers which transpired as a routine part of the duties of the operator at the control board as described in Station Directive (S.D)
3. The shift turnovers as described in S.D.3.1.8 require the on-coming reactor operator to tour the control room so an evaluation of the plant status can be made at the beginning of each shif The technique-of these turnovers is considered ineffective as evidenced by the above stated oversit The licensee has committed to evaluating shift turnover practices. The resident inspectors will consider the issue of ineffective turnover practices an Unresolved Item (269, 270, 287/81-07-06) until the results of the licensee evaluation are considere. Pressurizer Safety Valve Test Program Technical Specification 4.1.2 requires pressurizer safety valves to be tested at a specified frequenc The program established by DPC at Oconee to fulfill this requirement was examined and found to be in complianc The safety valves are removed at the specified frequency and replaced with another valve that has been teste Testing and setpoint adjustments are performed.at the Wyle Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama. The responsible engineer issues the Work Request for Valve removal and replacemen Work at the station is done using MPO/A/1200/7, Pressurizer Relief Valve Removal and Replacement. Testing at Wyle Laboratories is done using TP 1009, Steam Set Pressure and Leakage Testing of Spring-Operated Safety Valve Test results from 1974 to present were examined for all three unit The inspector had no questions with the test program or implementation of the progra Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Non-Licensed Training A review of the training program, established for non-licensed technical personnel at Oconee, was performed to assess the adequacy of the program and the documentation. The program provides general station training, occupa tional training (formal and on-the-job training). and periodic retrainin General station training includes station administrative controls, quality assurance policies and. procedures, radiological health and safety, industrial safety and first aid, housekeeping and fire prevention, emergency plan and procedures, station security plan and procedures, and use of protective clothin Occupational training consists of three interrelated segments; formal job training, on-the-job training and special training. Formal job training consists of instruction. in the basic principles and practices related to the assigned position and consistent with existing knowledge level. On-the-job training consists of demonstrations, instruction and supervised practice of job related activities. Special training is afforded in those areas not normally entailed in formal job training, such as on-site vendor instruc tio A summary of technical training rendered to licensee personnel during 1980 is detailed below by discipline:
MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE 95 Manhours Conducted By Station 504 Manhours - Basic - Training Center 254 Manhours COnducted By Vendors 853 Total Manhours INSTRUMENT AND ELECTRICAL 539 Manhours Conducted By Station 768 Manhours - Basic - Training Center 50 Manhours Conducted By Vendor 1358 Total Manhours HEALTH PHYSICS 69 Manhours Conducted By Station 1348 Manhours - Basic - Training Center 96 Manhours Conducted By Vendor S
1513 Total Manhours
CHEMISTRY 3 Manhours Conducted By Station 292 Manhours - Basic - Training Center 266 Manhours Conducted By Vendors 561 Total Manhours A review of the periodic retraining required by the established programs and a cursory inspection of applicable training files reveals apparent adequacy of both retraining and training documentatio Discussions with Oconee training personnel revealed that the Oconee Nuclear Station Training Plan is currently being revised to entail greater detail of program specifie The inspector will review the new plan when issued to assess compliance with current requirement Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Operational Safety Verification The. inspector reviewed plant operations throughout the report period, March 10 thru April 10, 1981. to verify conformance with regulatory require ments, technical specifications and administrative contorls. Control room logs, shift supervisors logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records for the three units were continually peruse Interview.s were-. conducted. with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,, and performance personnel on day and night.shift Activities within the control rooms were monitored.during all shifts and at shift change Actions and activities observed were. conducted as prescribed in Section 3.08 of the Station Directives. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specification 6.1. Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a continual basi The areas toured include but are not limited to the following:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Units 1, 2 and 3 Electrical Equipment Room Units 1, 2 and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms Station Yard Zone within the protected area Keowee Hydro Station During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equip ment status and radiation control practices were observe Oconee Unit 1 operated at virtually 100% full power for this reporting period with no major problem Oconee Unit 2 remained limited to 74% power due to an inoperable reactor coolant pump until a forced shutdown on March 1 The ensuing forced outage was twelve days in duration, involved repair of the crippled reactor coolant pump and repair of a-partially breeched reactor coolant pump electrical penetration. The unit started up on March 26 and operated at virtually full power with no major problems until a reactor trip.at 0109.hours on April The cause of the trip was determined to be a high moisture separator drain tank level due to a tank dump valve failur No major problems were encountered during or subsequent to the event thus the unit was restarted and operated at virtually full power the remainder of the reporting perio Oconee Unit 3 completed a prolonged refueling outage on March 1 Zero power physics testing and power escalation testing were successfully completed with little operational difficulty aside from a reactor trip from 40% power at 1040 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.9572e-4 months <br /> on March 16-due to loss of EHC control power. The unit was subsequently restarted, power escalation testing was completed and the unit has operated at virtually full power throughout the remainder of the reporting perio.
Monthly Maintenance. Observation Maintenance activities were observed and reviewed throughout the inspection period to verify that activities were. accomplished using approved pro cedures, or the activity was within the skill of the trade, and the work was done by qualified personne Where appropriate,1imiting conditions for operation were examined to ensure that while the equipment was removed from service.., the TS requirements were satisfied. Acceptance criteria used for this review were as. follows:
- Station Directives 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.5, 3.3.11, and 3.3.1 Administrative Policy Manual, Sections 3.3 and Technical Specifications Maintenance activities observed were as follows: RCP electrical penetration testing, repairing and restoring to service
- Unit Damaged emergency power switching logic cables repairs and restoration
- Unit CBAST pump repair and post maintenance testing - Unit Vital bus inverter blue ribbon connector checkout - Uniti Keowee Hydro Station inspection and maintenance of ACB's, time delay relays and overcurrent relay RCP visual examination for evidence of lighter than normal vibrations Unit Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified except for Item B abov This item is discussed in paragraph 5 of this repor.
Surveillance Observation The surveillance tests detailed below were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequac The completed test procedures examined were analyzed for embodiment of the necessary test prerequisities, preparations, instructions, acceptance criteria and.sufficiency of technical conten The selected tests witnessed were examined to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisities were met, system restoration completed and test results were adequat The selected procedures perused attested conformance with applicable Technical Specifications, they appeared to have received the required administrative review and they apparently were performed within the sur veillance frequency prescribe *
Procedure Title IP/O/A/301/35 Source Range.& Intermediate Channel Test IP/3/A/305/3A RPS Channel Channel A Out-live Test PT/O/A/150/08C Personnel Hatch 0 Ring Test PT/O/A/600/15 Control Rod Movement Test PT/O/A/600/10 RCS Leak Test PT/O/A/230/01 RM Check PT/O/A/610/17 Operability Test of 4160 Breakers IP/O/B/340/2 Control Rod Power Supply PT/O/A/170/5 Penetration Room Ventilation Test The inspector employed one or more of the following acceptance criteria for evaluating the above items:
10 CFR ANSI N1 Oconee Technical Specifications Oconee Station Directive Duke-Administrative Policy Manual Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Heat Tracing Circuit Failure
During a routine station tour the inspector discovered that heat tracing circuits 51-4 and E51-4 were both out of servic Local alarms in the
Auxiliary Building were activated. These heat tracing circuits service piping on HP-15 (non-safety related piping), but based on control room drawings, the circuits appeared.to service piping in the discharge flowpath of the Concentrated. Boric Acid Storage Tank (CBAST)
pump The CBAST flowpath heat tracing was required to be operable per Technical Specification (TS) 3. The inspector notified the shift supervisor at 1540 hours0.0178 days <br />0.428 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.8597e-4 months <br /> on March 16, 1981 of the apparent TS violation. The CBAST flowpath was determined to be open by pumping water from the CBAST pumps through the suspect pipin Licensee I&E personnel and resident inspectors reviewed system piping diagram OM 2339-10 that showed a detailed view of the area covered by each heat tracing circuit in questio Based on the review it was determined after several hours an operable heat tracing circuit did cover the TS required piping. The review also revealed a conflict between control room drawings and I&E "as-built' drawing The licensee committed to correct this conflict by using the detailedpiping drawings in the control roo The licensee will repair the two defective circuits and verify that heat tracing does exist per the "as-built" drawings on the CBAST flowpath during the next outage that provides access to the pipin A forced shutdown for repair of the circuits was. not required because no T.S. violation existe It was apparent to inspectors that the licensee had not evaluated the loss of the two heat tracing circuits relative to TS requirements. Several means were available to alert the licensee to the nature of the -condition:
The controlling procedures for unit startup OP/3/A/1102/01 ENCL.4.2 requires that heat tracing on the CBAST system be operable. prior to criticalit Primary auxiliary operator turnover sheets require heat tracing alarm panel review and logging of local alarm Unit supervisors review these logs 'each shif A heat tracing trouble alarm (Statalarm #1704/28) alerts operators of circuit failures and reflashes for each additional failur The control room alarm response manual requires the operator to verify that a backup circuit exists when he is notified that a safety-related circuit has faile The shift supervsors office maintains copies of outstanding work requests (WR).
A review of the WR revealed that two priorty 3 WR #00846 dated 9-29-80 and #00849 dated 9-30-80 had been issued on the subject circuit It is of concern to the resident inspectors that this potentially serious condition could exist for approximately five months. A factor that contri butes to this problem is the implementation of the precritical checklist of OP/3/A/1102/01 which appears inadequate in assuring that all safety-related
systems are operable prior to criticality because no system exists for the periodic review of outstanding work request Though there appears to be no violation at this time previous indication that the unit was in potential violation of a TS was not realized by the license The administrative. handling of this issue was inadequate, therefore, resident inspectors will carry the issue of not reviewing of outstanding-work requests as an Unresolved Item (269, 270, 287/81-07-05),
until a review of the-licensees ongoing program to improve this area can be mad.
RPS Instrument Accuracies Babcock and Wilcox letter to Duke Power Company dated February 6, 1981 advised the licensee of a matter which involved certain safety-related instrument errors which were found larger than previously assumed in FSAR analyses. A study performed by B&W concluded that the power-imbalance
,safety limits for Technical Specifications may be exceeded by about 2-3%
imbalance and 0.6% FP for all plants due to increased instrument string error A preliminary study by B&W revealed that concerns identified in the safety assessment are not felt to require immediate remedies because adequate string error margins exist to permit safe plant operation for current fuel cycle The licensee is currently awaiting the results of plant specific evaluations being performed by B&W for the Oconee unit The corrective actions, if required, would be a minor reduction in trip setpoint The resident inspectors will consider the issue of RPS setpoint reduction an Unresolved Item (269, 270,. 287/81-07-03)
pending the outcome of the ongoing B&W evaluatio.
Licensed Personnel Familiarization with Modifications, TS Amendments and Selected Procedure Changes Discussions and interviews with RO's and SRO's were conducted by the inspector to determine their knowledge of recently installed modifications, TS amendments and selected procedure change It appears that their know ledge of procedure changes is adequate, but knowledge of modifications is not as comprehensive as expected.. In some instances when a modification had been installed on one unit, but not the others, personnel assigned to that unit have an understanding, but the personnel assigned to the other units do no Generally a brief concise description of a modification is prepared and routed through a reading file for all operating personnel to revie At times, due to leave or other absenses, the operators and supervisors do not complete their review of the reading file in a timely manne The purpose of Station Directive 2.5.1, Training, is to maintain employees qualified and responsive to all functions of the statio This directive establishes a program to keep personnel familiar with plant systems and
changes thereof. However, full and adequate implementation appears to be lacking. Station Directive 4.4.1. "Station Modification Familiarization" requires maintenance personnel to be aware of modifications in order for them to perform their job functions properly. This directive does not refer to licensed personnel. The requalification program incorporates TS amend ments,. modifications,. and procedure changes into the training program, but this is often not timel This area of concern was discussed with licensee management who indicated a program would be developed-to properly keep licensed personnel up to dat This item has been designed as an Unresolved Item (269, 270, 287/81-07-04)
until the newly developed program can be reviewe.
Followup on LER's and Inspector Findings When attempting to followup on corrective actions described in LER's and previous inspection find.ings, the inspector often finds that licensee personnel responsible for carrying out the actions do not have the LER's or licensee reponse letters available to them. Hence, the inspector must review and describe the actions to the licensee in order to determine if the actions have been implemented. Often the actions taken are different than presented in the LER or inspection finding response letter and at times these actions may be only partically complete This issue was discussed with licensee management who indicated that a review could be conducted to correct the findin Until a programatic change is available for inspector review, this item is designated an Unresolved Item (269, 270, 287/81-07-06).
1 Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector performed an in-office review of nonroutine event reports to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described corrective actions appropriate for the identified cause, and adequately addressed the event and any generic implications. In addition, the inspector examined selected operating and maintenance logs, and records and internal incidents investigation report Personnel were interviewed to verify that the report accurately reflected the circumstances of the event, that the corrective action had been taken or responsibility assigned to assure completion, and that the event was reviewed by the licensee, as stipulated in the Technical Specification The following event reports were reviewed:
Report Number Title RO-269/80-31 RPS Flux/Flow Trip Setpoint Incorrectly Reset RO-269/80-34 EWST Level Indicator Failure RO-269/80-36 EWST and Part of HPSW Removed from Service RO-269/80-37 CBAST Pump Declared Inoperable RO-269/80-38 Loss of Keowee Overhaul Power Path
RO-269/80-39 Fire Detector String Removed from Service OTSG Leak RO-269/80-40 OTSG Leak RO-269/81-01 Steady State Tilt Limit Exceeded RO-269/81-02 DID Inverter Input Fuse Blown RO-269/81-03 DID Inverter DC Input Fuse Blown RO-269/81-04 Loss of EWST Level Indication RO-269/81-05 Leaking LPI Check Valve RO-270/80-21 TDEFW Auto Start Circuit RO-270/80-25 HPI. Pump Inoperable RO-270/80-26 CBAST Pump Failure RO-270/81-02 Penetration EMV-2 Failed to Hold SF RO-287/80-11 SG. Cracked Studs on Manway Cover RO-287/80-12 CBAST Sampling Frequency Exceeded RO-287/80-14 Deficiencies in Monthly Fire Fuse Inspection RO-287/80-15 BLss Level Instrument Inoperable RO-287/80-16 Fire Detector String.B-2 Inoperable RO-287/80-17 Fire Detector String 8 Inoperable RO-287/80-18 TDEFW Pump Oil Sump Empty RO-287/80-19 CRD Breaker Delay in Tripping RO-287/80-20 Fire Barrier Break - Unit 3 Cable Room RO-287/81-01 Polar Crane Moved Over Fuel Transfer Canal with IRV Head Removed RO-287/81-02 Apparent Corrosion Wastage of RCP Closure Studs RO-287/81-03 Over-Pressurization of BSG Secondary Side 1 Reactor Building E Flectrical Penetration Repair The degraded electrical penetration on the Unit 2 reactor building previously addressed in I&E inspection report 50-287/81-04 has been repaired. Unit 2 was shutdown on March 14, 1981 for the repair of a reactor coolant pump and the EMV-2 penetration. A cracked insulator on the reactor building side of the dual boundary penetration was discovered to have been the source of SF6 gas leakag The defective insulator was replaced and tested. The integrity of the penetration boundaries was verified by the inspectors through the review of acceptance criteria for the completed test procedure PT/O/A/0150/2 The cracked insulator was the failure mode suspected by the licensee when the depressurized penetration. was first discovere The subject penetration has temporarily been placed on an increased sur veillance test program before being returned to the routine quarterly schedul.
Unit 3 Post-Refueling Testing The inspector witnessed the control rod drop time tests under hot conditions and confirmed the computer recorded times were acceptable and met Technical
'Specification (TS) 4.7.1. The inspector ensured that all test prerequisites were signed-off and reviewed operator logs to confirm prerequisite testing
was completed. Instrumentation calibration dates were verified acceptable and instrumentation check-outs'of records and scaler-timers were witnesse The inspector observed initial criticality for Unit 3 cycle 6. Starting from an initial configuration of control rod groups 1 through 6 withdrawn to thefr upper limits, group 7 withdrawn to 85% and the part length rods withdrawn to 37.5%, a feed and bleed mode of operation of the primary coolant was initiated to deborate to criticalit Before reaching criti cality the feed and bledd operation was halted. and normal make-up and letdown with full pressurizer spray flow was continued to assure uniform mixing of the boron in the reactor coolant syste Ultimately, additional withdrawnal of group 7 rods was initiated to obtain criticality. -The measured all-rods-out-critical-boron concentration was 1463 ppm. This was within the acceptance band for the predicted valve of 1422 pp Immediately after obtaining criticality the licensee confirmed adequate overlap of source-range and intermediate-range nuclear instrument This test and part of the test to determine sensible heat, the upper limit for zero-power physics test, were observed on March 12, 1981 by the inspecto Portions of following phases of physics testing (TT/3/A/711/06)
were witnessed or reviewed by the inspector during the day and evening shifts: Differential Boron Worth Measurements Inverse Multiplication Plots to Criticality 3. Confirmation of Core Symentry by Rod Swap Group Rod Worths 5. Negative Temperature Coefficient. Measurements 6. Ejected Rod Worth Measurements 7. Verification of RCS Subcooling Monitor The-inspected observed portions of the power escalation testing TT/3/A/811/06 that followed the Zero Power Physics Testing and had no question Throughout the testing program the inspector observed adequate coordination between the test director and operations personnel, technical staffing was sufficient during the off-normal shifts and the test log was maintained and accurately reflected testing activities. Of the areas inspected no vio lations were identifie REGj UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
S ~101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 MAY 0 7 1981 Duke Power Company ATTN: W. 0. Parker, J Vice President, Steam Production P. 0. Box 2178 Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Report Nos. 50-269/81-07, 50-270/81-07 and 50-287/81-07 Reference is made to the subject inspection reports, covering an inspection on March 10 - April 10, 1981, which was transmitted to you by my letter of May 1, 198 Enclosed is a revised page of the Notice of Violation. Please replace the original with the corrected cop
Sincerely, R. C. Lewis, Acting Director Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection Enclosure:
Corrected Copy of Enclosure 1 (Notice of Violation)
cc:
J. E. Smith, Station Manager
MAY 0 7 191 APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Duke Power Company Docket Nos. 50-269, 270, & 287 Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 License Nos. OPR-38, 47, & 55 As a result of the inspection conducted on March 10, - April 10, 1981, and in accordance with the Interim Enforcement Policy, 45 FR 66754 (October 7, 1980),
the following violations were identifie A. Technical Specification 6.4.1.e requires the station to be operated and maintained in accordance with procedure Contrary to the above, on March 4, 1981, licensee maintenance personnel did not follow instructions for repair of emergency power switching logic cables in that the cables were removed from cable trays without proper authoriza tion or notificatio Removal of these cables from their cable trays caused them to be inoperabl This is a Severity Level V Violation.(Supplement I. E.)
and applies to Oconee Unit S
.
Technical Specification 4.1 specifies the frequency and type of surveillance to be applied to equipment for plant operatio Contrary to the above, two monthly surveillance checks and one refueling surveillance calibration added to the Technical Specification by amendment 92/92/89, effective January 28, 1981, were not performed on schedul This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I. E.)
and applies to Oconee Units. 1, 2 and C. Technical Specification 3.7.1(b) requires two independent emergency power paths be operable whenever the reactor is heated above 200 Planned removal of one power path is permitted provided certain tests are performed as specified in Technical Specification 3. Contrary to the above, the underground power path through transformer 2CT4 was removed from service through an error in breaker alignment, and remained misaligned for at least 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. The required surveillance tests were not performed during this period as specified by Technical Specification 3. This is a -Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.C.) and applies to Oconee Unit Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are hereby required to submit to
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his office within twenty-five days of the date of this Notice, a written state ment or explanation in reply, including: (1) admission or denial of the alleged