IR 05000263/1972003
| ML20024G659 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1972 |
| From: | Dreher F, Fiorelli G, Johnson P, Ogg W, Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024G656 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-72-03, 50-263-72-3, NUDOCS 9102140419 | |
| Download: ML20024G659 (11) | |
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION DILECTORATE OF REGULATOR'. OPERATIONS
REGION III
RO Inspection Report No. 050-263/72-03 S ubject : Northern States Power Company License No. DPR-22 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Priority: N/A Monticello, Minnesota Category: C Type of Licensee:
BWR (GE) 540 Mwe Type of Inspection:
Routine, unannounced
Dates of Inspection:
May 8 and 9, 1972 Date of Previous Inspection: April 21, 1972
'Y Principal Inspector:
K. V. Se, it d
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A/A!2L Accompanying Inspectors:
F.
Dreher (Date)
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(Date)
/a/72_
[$W. gg (Date)
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Other Accompanying Personnel None b$
2/72 f
Reviewed By: Gaston orelli, Chief i
Reactor Operations Branch (Date)
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Proprietary Information: None
9102140419 720608 PDR ADOCK 05000263 G
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SECTION I Enforcement Action: None Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters A letter was issued to the licensee on May 9,1972, informing him of one item of noncompliance noted during the previous int,Section.
I Unresolved Items: None S tatus of Previously Reported Unresolved Items A.
Fire protection for the HPCI turbine oil system is considered adequate.
Item resolved.
(Paragraph 11)
B.
Inspection of vane type flow switches by the licensee is pending.
C.
Inspection of reactor building to torus vacuum breaker valve seats by the licensee is pending.
D.
The limitorque valves installed at Monticello are not from the same series as those which recently encountered failures at another
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facility.
Item resolved.
(Paragtaph 10)
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i E.
The particular type.of GE CR-120 relays which encountered failures at another facility are not in use at the Monticello plant.
Item resolved.
(Paragraph 7)
Unusual Occurrences A.
A high temperature switch used to detect HPCI steam line leaks was determined to be out of calibration on April 3, 1972.
(Paragraph 15)
B.
On March 28, 1972, the service water pressure controller in the B loop of the RHR service water system was discovered to be operating improperly.
(Paragraph 14)
Persons Contacted Monticello Plant Operating Staff C. Larson, Plant Manager M. Clarity, Superintendent - Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection W. Anderson, Superintendent - Operations and Maintenance-2-
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I G. Jacobson, Plant Engineer, Technical W. Nimmo, Maintenance Supervisor W. Sparrow, Operations Supervisor R. Mielke, Shift Supervisor L. Nolan, Quality Engineer R. Jacobson, Chemist Northern States Power (Minneapolis Office)
B. Clark, Supervisor - Environmental Engineering W. Jokela, Manager - Quality Assurance A. Gray, Quality Assurance Engineer i
F. Fahlen, Senior Construction Superintendent
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M. Opstad, Nuclear Engineer Northern States Power (Onsite Construction Group)
B. Coke, Construction Superintendent J. Meier, Quality Assurance Inspector Midwestern Contractors. Incorporated D. Carpenter, Project Superintendent S. Swanson, QC Engineer Oscar Roberts Concrete Mix Plant
D. Wilcox, Plant Supervisor Shakipoe Sand and Gravel Company J. Haverly, Pit Supervisor M anagement Inte rview Ar. the conclusion of the inspection, Mr. Dreher, Region III Reactor Construction Eranch, conducted an interview with the following Northern States Power Company (NSP) representatives concerning radwaste facility construction:
C. E. Larson, Plant Manager W. V. Jokela, Manager - Quality Assurance J. C. Meier, Quality Assurance Inspector A. G. Gray, Quality Assurance Engineer F. H. Fahlen, Senior Construction Superintendent M. P. Opstad, Nuclear Engineer B. W. Coke, Construction Superintendent-3-
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I SECTION I Enforcement Actions None Licensee Action on Previously Identif f ed Enforcement Matters A letter was issued ta the licera te on May 9,1972, informing him of one item of noncompliance noted durirg the previcus inspection, t
Unresolved Item,rj Nne Sf atus of Previously Reported Unreso1*.*ed Items A.
Fire protection for the HPCI turbi w
'vatem is considered adequate.
Item resolvad.
(Paragraph 11)
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B.
Inspection of vane type flow swit-!.'s by the licensee is pending.
C.
Inspection of reactor building to torus vacuum breaker valve seats by the licensee is pending.
D.
The limitorque valves installed at Monticello are not from the same series as those which recently encountered failures at another facility.
Item resolved.
(Paragraph 10)
i E.
The particular type of CE CR-120 relays which encountered failures at another facility are not in use at the Monticello plant.
Item tusolved.
(Paraptaph 7)
Unusual Occurrences
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A.
A high temperature switch used to detect HPCI steam line leaks was determined to be out of calibration on April 3, 1972.
(Paragraph 15)
B.
On March 28, 1972, thI service water pressure controller in the B loop of the RHR service water system was discovered to be operating improperly.
(Paragraph 14)
Persons Cnntec.,ted Monticello Plant _ Operating Staff C. Larson, Plant Manager M. Clarity, Superintendent - Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection W. Anderson, Superintendent - Operations and Maintenance-2-
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Mr. Dreher discussed the aspects of facility construction which had been reviewed. He noted that revolution counters were not installed on the concrete mix trucks, tr, which Mr. Coke responded that counters would be installed. He also stated that the off-gas storage tanks had not been inspected aince their arrival onsite.
Mr. Coke replied that }
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af inspecting and resealing the !.nks or filling them with nif be discussed with NSP engineering.
(Paragraph 16)
@7M4 Following the interview with construction management personn Seyf rit, Johnson, and ogg conducted an interview with Messrs:
Clarity, Jacobson, and Sparrow concerning plant operation aspects or the inspection. The following matters were highlighted by the principal inspector A.
He expressed his understanding that the licensee intended to inst.11 a second MSIV reset switch during the outage to begin on May 11.
Mr. Larson concurred with this understanding.
(Paragraph 12)
B.
He stated that the inspection had included a review of the replace-nent of 22 Barksdale AC pressure switches with the required DC switches.
(Paragraph 13)
C.
He stated that the factors surrounding the calibration problem associated with HFCI high temperature switch setpoint had been revleved and that he understood the licensee intended to check
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the calibration of switches upon their removal from the system to determine an as-found setpoint.
(Paragraph 15)
D.
With reference to the service water pressure controller maloperation, the inspector expressed his concern with the failure to operationally test the component after maintenance.
Mr. Larson stated that this had been recognized by his staff and corrective measures had been taken.
(Parcgr_aph 14)
E.
The inapector stated that the licensee's report 1/ on the failure of l
the HPCI outboard steam isolation valve to close did not appear to have given sufficient attention to all the factors involved, particu-larly the failure of the gears to engage.
Mr. Larson responded that the plant had been opernting since the problem was encountered, and that it would be investigated further during the forthcoming shutdown.
The inspector stated that the matter would be reviewed in more detail during the next inspection.
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NSP ltr to DRL, subject: Reporting of Occurrences, dtd 4-25-72
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The inspector stated that the licensee's follovup report 2/ on main
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steam line flow element performance had given satisfactory comparison of the observed chat scteristics with the ASME calculated performanca for a Venturi with a discharge coefficient of 1.0.
It did not, however, explain the difference between this calculated performance and the original characteristic curve provided by the vendor.
Mr.
Larson responded that the basic curve supp11od by the vendor had
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been in error in that it had not been corrected for characteristic pressure of the steam.
l G.
The inspector stated that a review had been conducted of efforts being expended on the formulation of the Quality Aaaurance program, and that progress to date appeared to be slow. However, the content i
appears appropriate for the areas covered.
(Paragraph 9)
H.
The inspector stated that background readings had been taken at several TLD (thennoluminescent dosimeter) locations, and that all had been consistent with general area bac ground levels except for the one at the Maple Lake Substation where natural radioactivity in gravel recently deposited there gave a reading three times normal background.
I.
The inspector stated that, based upon his review of selceted systems, he understood that the instrument calibration prograr was surrently being transposed to a new and improved format. He sugge ten that care be taken to ensure that all instruccots are included sinco several local reading instruments had b.en observed during a tour of certain systems which had been last calibrated in 1969 or 1970.
J.
The inspector referred to difficulti.u encountered with indicators on testable chtch val *= 3 and stated that either the indication should be correct?d to prcvide indication of satisfactory testing of the va:ves or the proceder=2 whnuld be changed, after a proper review, to yrovide an alternata is41ccr. ion of satisfactory test.
(Paragraph b)
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NSP ltr to D.:d, subject: Performacre Rupert for Main Steam Line Flow Elements, did 4-25-72-5-
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SECTION II j
Additional Subjects Inspected. Not identified in Section 1. Where No Deficiencies or Unresolved Items Were Found 1.
General At the time of the inspection, the Monticello Plant was operating at essentially full rated power.
Plant shutdown was scheduled for May 11 to pemit operator examinations by the Operator Licensing
Branch of the Directorate of Licensing.
2.
Reactor Coolant System Review of Equipment' Operator's Log, January through April 1972.
a.
b.
Verification of proper heatup and cooldown rates (per Technical Specification 3.6.A.1), January through April 1972.
Required sampling for gross beta activity and monthly isotopic c.
analyses (Technical Specifications 4.6.C.1), January through April 1972.
d.
Completion of required reactor coolant che 'stry analyses
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(Technical Specifications 4.6.C.2 and 4.6.C.3(a)), January through April 1972.
Daily determination of reactor coolant system leakage (Technical e.
Specifications 4.6.D), January through April 1972, f.
Daily check of jet pump performance (Technical Specifications 4.6.0), January through April 1.972.
g.
Verification of proper calibration of seven reactor coolant system instruments selected at random. Review of licensee's calibration program.
h.
Reactor coolant system maintenance records.
1.
Maintenance program for related electrical systems.
j.
Tour of accessible portions of reactor coolant systems.
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Reactor Auxiliary Systems Review of the following itemw for reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, reactor water cleanup system, and reactor building
closed cooling water systems a.
Surveillance testing records during past 12 months to verify completion of RCIC nyace surveillance requirements (Technical Specifications 4.5,F.1).
b.
Maintenance records since commencement of plant operation, c.
Verification of proper calibration of 14 instruments selected at random.
Review of calibration program, d.
Electrical preventive maintenance for associated components.
e.
Tour of accessible portions of the systems in company with the Superintendent - Operation and Maintenance.
Log Review Control room Equipment Operator's Log, January through April 1972.
5.
Repairs to 1AR Transformer i
a.
Discussion with Plant Manager of the failure of 1AR transformer (reserve offsite power supply) including temporary repairs to faulty cable and plans for permanent corrective action, b.
Compliance with Technical Specifications 3.9 requirements for power supplies during plant startup and operation.
6.
Radwaste a.
Status of construction.
b.
Concrete placement.
(1) Review of QC system.
(2*/ Follow-up record review.
(3)
Follow-up observations of work.
Structures (off-gas tank).
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(1)
Review of QC system.
(2)
Follow-up record review.
Details of Subjects Discussed in Section I l
7.
GE CR-120 Relays As stated in a previous report,2/ failures were recently experienced with GE CR-120 relays at another facility.
Licensee personnel stated during this inspection that the particular relay involved was a DC relay with an associated time delay function and that no relays of this type are in use at the Monticello plant.
8.
Testable Check Valves During review of surveillance testing of motor operated valves in i
the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, it was noted that i
a testable check valve in the discharge line to the reactor had
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failed to indicate proper operation during several surveillance tests.
Discussion with plant personnel indicated that this problem J
was not unique to the RCIC system, but had also been encountered in the HPC1, LPC1, and core spray systems. The valve is acsentially a swing-check valve with a device attached for testing the valve to ensure that the disc is free and operable. The device consists of a (
pneumatic cylinder attached to an arm which penetrates the valve body.
Rotation of the arm by the pneumatic cylinder causes the check valve disc to lift, and a protrusion on the disc actuates an external reed switch on top of the valve by interacting with a nagnetic field.
Licensee personnel stated that difficulties had been encountered with the indicating mechanisms on most of the testable check valves although proper operation of the check valve and actuator had alwayJ been evidenced by a separate indicator. Licensee pereonnel stated that consideration was being given to deletion of thfu step from surveillance tests or modification to provide reliance en indication other than the reed switch.
9.
Quality Assurance Program Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that the Quality Assurance Program manual is approaching readiness for publication.
Several meetings have been held with the Nuclear Service consultants who are preparing ths manual for NSP, and considerable discussion has taken piece between the corporate office and site personnel.
NSP expects to have the manual available for RO review by May 23, 1972.
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Inspection Rpt No. 050-263/72-01
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10.
Limitorque Valves A discussion was hcid with Mr. Anderson, Superintendent - Operation and Maintenance, concerning the recent failure at another facility of s middle support bearing for the vorm gear shaft in a limitorque i
valve.
Mr. Anderson stated that although discussions with the vendor were continuing to determine whether similar failures might occur at Monticello, limitorque representatives stated that the valves installed in the Monticello plant are of a different series and i
should not experience the same problems.
11.
HPCI Fire Protection Discussions with Mr. Jacobson, Plant Engineer, Technical, indicated that fire insurance representatives had inspected the /ont!. cello plant and had raised no questions concerning the ':r* protection
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- vensee has no capabilities for the HPCI turbine oil system.
a plans to install a sprinkler system, and indi:2tionA cre that it is not required by electrical insurance inspectors.
12.
Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Reset Switch To reduce the possibility of a single short defeating the action of the MSIV's, the licensee has decided to install a second ewitch in the MSIV reset circuit. The wiring will be altered such that one I
switch will reset the inboard and the other switch will reset the outboard MSIV's. This change was to be made during a brief outage j
for operator licensing examinations expected to commence on May 11.
13.
Replacement of Barksdale AC Pressure Switches The licensee encountered difficulties in the stabitity of setpoints spray and LPC ofpressureswitchesassociatedwiththecore/andlicenseA) systems during September 1971. Although Regulatoryi S
reports discussed what was believed to be the resolution of the problem, subsequent difficulties led to the discovery by the licensee that AC pressure switches were being imp /roperly used in a DC application as described in a followup reportb to DRL. A review of the replace-ment of these switches, 22 in number, was made during this inspection.
Following replace ant, each instrument was functionally tested using the installed circuitry.
A detailed procedure for replacement had been prepared to document the actions performed.
4/
Inquiry Rpt No. 050-263/71-17 5/
NSP ltr to DRL, subject: Failure of ECCS Pump Start Permissive Switches to Trip Within the Specified Settings, dtd 9-24-71 6/
NSP ltr to DRL, subject: Failure of ECCS Pump Start Permissive Swtich and Relay, dtd 12-20-71-9 9-
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I 14.
Service Water Pressure Controller
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On March 28, 1972, the B loop of the residual heat removal (RHR)
service water system was started for a test. The system includes
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a pressure controller which is designed to maintain the service water pressure in the heat exchanger above the pressure of the primary coolant in the shell side. At this time, the valve was observed to
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open when it should have closed. Although the initial diagnosis indicated that the controller had been wired incorrectly, further investigation showed that the electronic-to-pneumatic transducer had beencalibratedpsadirectingeadofreverseactinginstrument.
As stated in RQ2. and licensee-- reports, required functional testing of the system after calibration of the centro 11er was inadvertently omitted. The cause of the miscalibration was traced to incorrect calibration records which showed the instrument to be direct acting.
This difficulty did not negate the ability of the B loop to perform its required containment cooling function had it been required to do so.
i The licensee has issued a memo to remind all personnel of the necessity
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for and means of implementing the requirements for functional testing.
In addition, the calibration record for the particular instrument has been corrected.
15.
HPCI Steam 1.ine High Area Temperature Switch (
During rout ne surveillance testing on Apri). 3, 1972, one of the high temperature switches used to sense increased temperature resulting andlicenseegrequiredsetpointof2000F.
from steam leakage faile to trip at t
-- reports, two sets of these As stated in Regulatory-switches are maintained by the licensee. When the three-month calibration is due, a set of switches is calibrated, installed, and functionally tested. The switches removed from service are then stored until the next calibration. Because of this practice it was not possible to determine whether the switch which failed to trip as required had been improperly calibrated while in service or whether its calibratiion may have been disturbed while in storage.
It should be noted that the failure of a single switch would not defeat the high temperature isolation function in this system since the redundant switch and the one-of-two twice logic would have been available.
In any event, the procedures have now been changed to 7)
Inquiry Rpt No. 50-263/72-04 8_/
NSP ltr to DRL, subject: Reporting of Occurrences, dtd 4-25-72 9_/
Inquiry Rpt No. 50-263/72-05
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I require an immediate check of the calibration of the switches when removed at the three-month interval so that any setpoint drif t during the in-service period will be readily identified. The nominal
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setpoints have also been reduced to the range 185 - 1900F to allow
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for'possible upward setpoint drift during this period.
16.
Radwaste Facility Construction During the inspection, it was noted that the concrete being used in the construction of the radwaste facility is being transpr.ted from Osseo, Minnesota, 28 miles from the plant.
Since transport times ranged from 40 to 55 minutes, the inspector stated that revolution counters should be used on concrete mix trucks to provide an indication of the amount of agitation experienced by the concrete during transport. Discussions with licensee construction personnel also revealed that the off-gas storage tanks have not been checked since their arrival on site to verify that the tanks have remained sealed and that the desiccant is still effective. The inspector polated out that tanks exposed to significant temperatures tend to collect moisture and that it was good insurance to make periodia examinations to assure that the moisutre absorbing capability of the desiccant was being maintained. The licensee's construction management agreed to (a) install revolution countese on the mix trucks and (b) discuss with NSP engineering the matter of inspecting the off-gas ranks.
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