IR 05000259/1982006
| ML20052G082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1982 |
| From: | Chase J, Hardin A, Paulk G, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052G051 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.3.14, TASK-2.K.3.15, TASK-2.K.3.19, TASK-TM 50-259-82-06, 50-259-82-6, 50-260-82-06, 50-260-82-6, 50-296-82-06, 50-296-82-6, NUDOCS 8205140292 | |
| Download: ML20052G082 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$
E REGION li
o 101 MARlETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
Report flos. 50-259/82-06, 50-260/82-06, and 50-296/82-06
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Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tf4 37401 Facility llame: Browns Ferry lluclear Plant Docket flos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License flos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama Inspectors: [dIc f
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R. F. Sullivan
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Ddte Signed Nd wL 7[9[1P L J. W. Chase
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Dste Siigned f
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G. L. Paulk
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Date 5igned Approved by:
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3/23/22 A. liardin, Acting Chief, Division of Project Date Signed and Resident Programs SUttitARY Inspection on December 26, 1981 - January 25, 1982
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Areas Inspected This routine, inspection involved 200 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of operational safety, plant physical protection, surveillance, maintenance observations, licensee event reports, health physics, containment atmosphere dilution system, reactor trips and THI Action items.
Resul ts Of the nine areas inspected, no violations or deviations were observed in six areas, three apparent violations were identified in three areas.
(Violation of 10 CFR 50.59(b), (Units 1, 2, and 3), paragraph 7; violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), (Units 1, 2 and 3), paragraph 6; violation of Technical Specifi-cation 6.3.a. (Units 1, 2 and 3), paragraphs 5, 7, and 8.
8205140292 820503 PDR ADOCK 05000259 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees G. T. Jones, Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Pittman, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent R. T. Smith, Quality Assurance Supervisor R. G. lietke, Engineering Section Supervisor A. L. Clement, Chemical Unit Supervisor D. C.111ms, Engineering and Test Unit Supervisor A. L. Burnette, Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapillar, Operations Section Supervisor T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor it. W. Haney, llechanical Maintenance Section Supervisor J. A. Teague, Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor R. E. Burns, Instrument liaintenance Section Supervisor J. E. Swindell, Field Services Supervisor A. W. Sorrell, Supervisor, Radiation Control Unit BFN R. E. Jackson, Chief Public Safety R. Cole, QA Site Representative, Office of Power Other licensee employees contacted included licensee senior reactor operators, and reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, tech-nicians, public safety officers, QA; QC and engineering personnel.
2.
iianagement Interviews Management interviews were conducted on December 29, 1981, January 8, 20 and 22, 1982, with the Power Plant Superintendent and/or the Assistant Power Plant Superintendents and other members of his staff.
The licensee was informed of three apparent violations identified during this report period.
The January 20 meeting was held with management to discuss the inspectors concern that an increase in failure of personnel to follow procedures had been observed.
The plant superintendent indicated that based on information from the inspectors findings plus his knowledge of procedure problems relayed to him by his own staff, he would initiate prompt corrective action to improve performance in this area.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Followup (259/80-02-02). Text of final report for Refueling Test Instruction (RTI)-5, references the incorrect acceptance criteria paragraphs in RTI-5.
The inspectors found that the final report for RTI-5 had been changed to account for the proper acceptance criteria paragraphs.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup (259/80-02-01).
The final report for RTI-3B, 5, 23A and 32A had not been signed by the Plant Superintendent. The inspectors verified that these reports had subsequently been signed by the Plant Superintendent.
(Closed) Deviation (259, 260, 296/81-28-01).
Failure to take corrective action committed to.
The inspector has reviewed the implementation of the tracking system for commitments which is under the cognizance of the Compliance Staff and found it to be satisfactory.
In addition Section Instruction Letter-62, which instructs Field Services in how to follswup and document connitments, was reviewed and found to be satisfactory.
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(Closed) Violation (259/81-28-02).
Failure to provide required firewatch.
The inspector's have reviewed the procedures issued to control welding and burning during the torus modifications and found them to be satisfactory.
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In addition, the inspector has toured the Unit 3 torus area and has found no discrepancies in regards to posting of fire Watches.
(Closed) Unresolved (259/81-32-03).
Definition of emergency as it applies to maintenance. A new Standard Practice has been written and approved which
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authorizes the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) to perform the quality assurance review for emergency trouble reports as long as the STA has been trained in performing this review.
(Closed) Violation (259/81-28-06).
Food and drink stowed in Power Stores storage area. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action in regard to this violation and found it to be acceptable.
In addition, the inspector toured the storage area and noted no food or drink in the area.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.
5.
Operational Safety The inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held each morning with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control rooms such that each was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site.
Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby systems; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control
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room manning.
This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area controls; personnel badging, personnel search and escort; and vehicle search and escort.
Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional areas during these tours.
The inspector toured Unit 2 Reactor Building on January 4,1982 and observed in-leakage into the building thru a mechanical seal on the 565 level.
Heavy recent rainfall had generated a rise in the water table surrounding the plant leading to the in-leakage.
The inspector further investigated what precautions and/or checks are made to ensure that plant mechanical, electrical and passage penetrations are flood protected. The Final Safety
. Analysis Report discusses flood protection testing and requirements in section 12 and question 2.6.
Additionally, plant Mechanical Maintenace Instruction 19 delineates that the flood protection devices are to be inspected at five year intervals.
The inspector searched all available records to verify the Itil 19 five year inspection had been completed within the past five years. All records reviewed gave no indication the procedure had been conducted.
A review of scheduling requirements did not show the flood protection device five year requirement being scheduled.
Further, FSAR Section 12.2.9.3.2 specifies that door 229 flood gate operation take less than five minutes from the raised to lowered position. MMI 19 has no time requirements for flood gate operation specified. The Assistant Plant Superintendent was notified at the Weekly Management Meeting on January 8,1982 that failure to complete titI 19 within 5 years was an apparent violation of technical specification 6.3.a. and included as an example of failure to follow procedures.
(259,260,296/82-06-01).
During a routine operational safety tour January 7,1982, in the Unit 1 Reactor Building 565 level, the inspector observed the pendulous movement of the tru isfer piping for the condensate storage and supply system.
Horizontal movement of the piping during condensate transfer operations varied from 4 to 6 inches. Transfer operations automatically occur as required to maintain the condensate supply head tank full.
The inspector checked surrounding equipment to verify the pipe vacillations were not causing damage to other equipment. The inspector observed the transfer piping making contact with the following systems:
(1) Core Spray piping spring support mount.
(2) Containment Inerting Piping.
(3) Containment Inerting s,.pport brackets.
(4) Fire protection preaction sprinkler piping.
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(5) Chill water supply piping to Control Rod Drive hydraulic pumps 1A and 1B.
(6) Conduit runs from the U.T. Monitor system for the east side Scram Discharge Volume header.
The inspector, through discussions with plant staff, discovered that the transfer pipe movement has been a known long-tenn problem.
Design change request 2343, describing the " Uncontrolled (and sometimes violent) move-ments" of the condensate piping, was signed for transmittal to the Assistant Director of Nuclear Power in December, 1980. No apparent action has been taken to alleviate the problem to date.
The inspector informed the Plant Superintendent on January 8,1982 of his concerns. The Plant Superintendent committed to evaluating and investi-gating the significance of the inspector's observation. This aill remain an Unresolved Item (259/82-06-02) and followed up on future inspections.
During an operational safety tour of the Unit I reactor building on December 29, 1961, the inspector observed maintenance activities on the IB H2/02 analyzer pump. The Containment Atmosphere Monitor (CAM) analyzer is used to measure the percentage of oxygen / hydrogen formed in the total mixture of the atmosphere in the primary containment by sampling at points in the drywell and in the torus.
Samples are continuously drawn, analyzed, and returned to the torus as specified by the program sequencer. The inspector observed that the sample and return piping to the pump was disconnected and the pump was being removed from the system.
Sample piping is continuously exposed to the drywell and torus atmosphere during plant operation. Unit 1 was at full power. The inspector noted that no health physics (HP) requirements were in effect.
The inspector questioned the workers to see if a health physics survey was completed that indicated the piping and system to be " clean".
The workers responded that no survey had been performed. The inspector informed the health physics supervisor of the work activity in progress and noted his concerns about potential contami-nation. The health physics supervisor agreed that the system should be verified clean prior to and during system disassembly.
Radiological Control Instruction 10 specifically requires a SWP be written on work involving potential contamination. The job foreman was not aware that health physics
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coverage would be required for this job. No list of potential or known contaminated equipment is available for the job foreman to review prior to working on various plant equipment. Trouble reports do not require health physics review prior to beginning of work activity.
The pump had been previously removed without the personnel becoming contaminated.
Contami-nation surveys had been done by health physics previously on H2/02 system components, however, the inspector could find no survey which indicated pipe joint or exposed piping areas were surveyed during the time the pipes were disconnected from the pump or at any previous time the pump had been replaced. Other similar systems connected to the containment atmosphere which require HP coverage include: Containment Inerting System, Containment Atmosphere Dilution System, Differential Pressure Control Systea, Con-
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tainment Ventilation System, Primary Containment Purge Filter System, and Containment System piping and instrumentation.
The licensee took prompt corrective action of informing the job foreman of the potential for surface contamination during work on the H2/02 system when system piping is broken for maintenance. Additionally, signs were posted on the CAM equipment to indicate that HP coverage shculd be obtained prior to work inside the equipment cabinets. The Assistant Plant Superintendent was informed during the Management Meeting of January 7,1982, that failure to follow the RCI 10 requirment for a SWP to be written when potential contamination exists was an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.3.a., failure to adhere to Radiological Control Instruction 10. This violation is included as an example of the violation on failure to follow procedures.
(259/82-06-01).
6.
Containment Atmosphere Dilution System The Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System was inspected and discussed in inspection report 81-37, paragraph 5.
Further inspection efforts have revealed that the unresolved item (259/81-37-03, 260/81-37-03, 296/81-37-03)
concerning containment isolation valve stroke time testing will be made an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4) in reference to the two CAD vent path valves (FCV 84-19, FCV 84-20).
These power operated valves are required to be stroke time tested in accordance with ASME Boiler and Vessel Code,Section XI.
No records exist to verify that such testing has been done.
The Assistant Plant Superintendent was informed of the apparent violation during the Weekly Management Meeting of January 7,1982.
(259,260, 296/82-06-03).
7.
Health Physics On January 11, 1982, the resident inspectors were informed by plant management that a high airborne activity event occured at 12:30 a.m. on January 11, 982, in the Radwaste and Service Building. Activity levels at the peak of the occurrence were 8.0 x 10-7 uc/ml in the Radwaste Building and 5.57x10-7 uc/ml in the Service Building.
The half-life was calculated to be 20 to 22 minutes with the major contributing isotopes being Rb-88 and Cs-138. No releases to the environment above Federal Guidelines were made.
The inspectors review of this incident showed that a temporary flush hose had been installed at check valve 2-77-718 in the Off Gas drain fron the 1.75 minute hold up volume to the Off Gas Condensate Sump. The flush hose was installed to relieve blockage in this line.
The hose was initially installed on January 7,1982.
Upon completion of the flush operation, one end of the hose was routed to
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the Off Gas Condensate Sump, and the other end remained connected to check valve 2-77-718.
This arrangement allowed bypassing the seal header, which prevents off-gas from being released to the Radwaste Building, in the drain
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line. The end of the hose which terminated in the Off Gas Condensate Sump had been placed below the sump water level. When the sump was pumped down, the end of the hose was then above the water level allowing off gas to be emitted to the Radwaste and Service Building.
The inspector determined during the course of this investigation, that the installation of the temporary flush hose was perfonned without a MR, a TACF or a safety evaluation. On January 22, 1982 the plant Superintendent was informed that the installation of this hose was an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.59 (b) which requires the licensee to maintain records of changes in the facility, which include written safety evaluations, for those systems described in the safety analysis.
The Plant Superintendent stated that he felt this was an uncontrolled maintenance activity and not a violation of 10 CFR 50.59(b); however, the Plant Superintendent committed to revising Operating Instruction-77, Operation of Radwaste, to include a procedure for installation and removal of the flush hose. A Design Change Request (DCR)
has been sutxnitted to enlarge the diameter of the pipe to prevent blockage.
(Units 1 and 3 drain lines had previously been enlarger).
(259/82-06-04)
On January 17, 1982, a high ariborne activity release occured in Unit 2, 519 level, North East quardrant of the Reactor Building.
The air activity was found to be 2.32x10-8 uc/lm, (less than the maximum concentration permitted by 10 CFR 50) with the principle isotope being C0-60.
Six personnel had indications of nasal contamination which was successful _ly removed.
These personnel also received a whole body count with satisfactory results.
The inspectors review of this occurrence showed that the individuals involved were installing the Equipment Drain Sump Pump (EDSP) when the air activity was found by a H.P. technician monitoring the job on the 541 level (directly above the work area). The five individuals on the 519 level were wearing respirators as required, but the H.P. technician on the 541 level was not.
(The 541 level was not posted as a contamination or airborne area even though air activity on the 641 level was detected when removing the EDSP on January 15,1981).
The five individuals were contaminated when they removed their contaminated clothing on the 541 level. The sixth individual contaminated was the H.P.
technician on the 541 level performing surveys for the job in progress.
TVA is currently evaluating corrective action to prevent such occurrances from happening.
This item will remain open pending the inspector review of TVA's corrective action.
(259/82-06-05)
During the inspectors review of this incident, it was noted that the H.P.
technician monitoring the job on the 519 level did not sign in on the posted SWP for the job but used a SWP-Routing. A similiar occurrence took place on December 31, 1981 in which a H.P. technician monitoring the removal of the 25 gallon SDIV leval switch did not sign in on the posted SWP but used a SWP-Routine.
RCI-10 requires that a SWP-Routine not be used if the area is posted as a SWP are.
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On January 22, 1982, the Plant Superintendent was informed that the two examples of H. P. technicians failure.to use the posted SWP for monitoring jobs in progress was an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.3 which requires procedures to be adhered to.
The Plant Superintendent had no comment on the apparent violation.
While cleaning the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Building on January 15, 1982,-laborers noted the local air monitor to be alarming. The laborers exited the building and called H. P.
Air sample showed the air activity to be 4x10 uc/ml with the principle isotopes being Rb-88 and Cs-138.
The cause of the air activity has been determine to have come from the off gas system backing up into SBGT system and out holes in the "B" train SBGT dampers.
The holes in the "B" train SBGT are a result of the damper having it's blades come loose creating the holes which support the blades.
The cause of the off gas backing up has been attributed to two factors. The first factor of the back up is a damper in the idle dilution fan being slightly ajar preventing adequate clean air from entering the SBGT system.
The second factor is that there existed a possible icing over the off gas
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stack due to the unusually cold weather that week the.'eby restricting off gas flow through the stack but allowing off gas to enter the SBGT exhaust ducts.
During an operational safety tour of the Unit 2 Reactor Building on January 7,1982, the inspector observed radiological controls and security access requirements established for a short term outage on Unit 2.
Obser-vation included a review of special work pemits (SWP), security access controls, health physics coverage, and general housekeeping.
The inspector observed two workers installing scaffolding above an instrument rack at the drywell entrance in a boundaried radiation area. The inspector inquired as to which SWP covered the work in progress. The Health physics (HP)
technician informed the inspector that the workers were on a general HP work area SWP.
The inspector looked for the SWP, but could not find it.
The inspector asked the workers which SWP they had signed for the work in progress.
The inspector learned that the workers were signed in on the walk-thru SWP posted to cover general walk-thru of the west scram discharge
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pipe area.
The SWP specifically stated it was to be used for walk-thru only and covered a different radiation area from where the scaffolding was being installed.
The SWP alluded to by the HP technician did not exist. Only one technician was posted for work at the Unit 2 drywell access area. The HP technician indicated that he had an excessive workload and he had requested additional help.
Numerous workers were standing in line for HP coverage requirements (i.e.; dosimeter zeroing, SWP coverage, monitoring, etc.).
The inspector informed the HP supervisor of the apparent undermanning of health physics coverage. The inspector informed the Assistant Plant Superintendent on January 7,1982, that the work being conducted without proper SWP issuance was an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.3.a, failure to adhere to Radiological Control Instruction 10 Section V.A.1.
This
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l violation is included as an example of 'the violation on failure to follow procedures.
(260/82-06-01)
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8.
Surveillance Testing Observation The inspectors observed the performance of the-below listed surveillance tests. The inspection consisted of a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specification, verification of test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal from service and return to service of the system and review of test data.
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SI 4.9. A.2.b - Battery Analysis of diesel generator "B" battery b.
SI.4.9.a.2.c - Battery Discharge Test of diesel generator "B" battery i
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SI.4.2.c.8 - Instrumentation that -Initiates Rod Block Rod Sequence Control System Restraints - First Stage Turbine Pressure - Unit 1
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One violation was noted during the observation and procedu..
.aview of item c.
During observation of SI 4.2.c.8 on Unit 1 the inspector noted that several steps completed were different from the procedural steps as listed in the surveillance instruction. The following differences were noted.
(1) Step 4.1.c specifies use of a 200 psi test gauge. A 500 psi test gauge i
was used.
The heise gauge used is accurate to 0.1% of full range
_(15 psi) whereas the 200 psi gauge would be accurate to 12 psi.
(2) Step 4.2.a. requires that a. digital volt meter (DVM) be used to verify
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contact operation. Since it is common plant practice to use a' volt-ohm meter (V0M) to check contact operation, a V0M was used.
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(3) Step 4.2.a also specifies connection a DVM to terminals 5 and 6 of the alarm unit.
For convenience the technicians connected the leads to terminal strip points CC79 and CC84.
The intent and accuracy of calibration was met at the surveillance con-clusion; however, three steps were not adhered to in the procedure without
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concurrence of procedural change. This failure to adhere to the procedure i
violates Technical Specification 6.3.a., and is used as an example of the failure to follow procedure violation. The. Plant Superintendent was
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l informed on January 22, 1982 that this was an apparent violation
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(259/82-06-01).
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Maintenance Observation
During ths report period, the inspectors observed the below listed maintenance activities for procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure, Technical Specification, radiologial controls, Quality Control hold points, and posting of tagouts.
I Smoke detector maintenance in Unit 3 Instrumentation room a.
b.
Mechanical Maintenance Instruction 65 - Fire Protection Equipment Inspection l
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During the observation of MMI 65, en January 22, 1982, it was noted that many errors existed which requires a procedure update. These included; fire extinguisher types versus location being incorrect; fire extinguishers not listed, and fire extinguishers not identified. This item was discussed with the Plant Superintendent during the weekly management meeting on January 22, 1982, and remain an open item and followed up in future inspections (259/82-06-06).
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Plant Physical Protection During the course of routine inspection activities, the inspectors made observation of certain plant physical protection activites. These included personnel badging, personnel search and escort, vehicle search and escort, communications and vital area access control.
No violations or deviations were identified within this area inspected.
11.
Reportable Occurrence The below listed licensee event reports (LERS) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional in plant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk.
LER No.
Date Event 259/81-70 12/11/81 High vibration of LPCI valve itG set i
259/81-74 12/19/82 Nitrogen volume in CAD tank below minimum
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259/81-76 12/21/81 Pressure switch on permissive for
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opening LPCI injection valve failed 259/81-80 12/22/81 RCIC failed to pass pump flow rate
i requirement on test 259/81-81 12/23/81 Coupling damage in LPCI valve MG set 259/81-82 12/24/81 RCIC inoperable to replace flow transmitter 259/81-83 1/4/82 Main steam line radiation monitor C inoperable 259/81-84 1/8/82 Main steam line low pressure switch out of calibration 259/81-80
- 259/01-85 1/5/82 Torus level switches set one inch high 259/81-87 12/24/81 Smoke detector in reactor building inoperagle 259/81-88 1/4/82 Smoke detector in reactor building inoperable
- 259/81-90 1/13/82
"A" diesel generator air-start motors failed
- 260/81-19 Rev. I 12/31/82 Main steam line high temperature monitoring bypassed
- 260/81-37 8/5/81
"R" factor out of limits for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 260/81-65 1/8/82 Torus level switches set one inch high 260/81-68 1/8/82 Reactor low water level switch setpoint drift 296/81-70 1/7/82 Torus level switches set one inch high No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
12.
Reactor Trips The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor trips during this report period. The review included determination of f
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cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems and corrective action. The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appro-pria te.
On December 24, 1981, Unit 2 tripped at 9:18 a.m. from 99% power when an instrument mechanic accidently opened the wrong valve during a surveillance test on reactor level instrumentation which resulted in a main steam isolation valve closure which in turn initiated the reactor trip.
Seven main steam relief valves operated to control reactor pressure. Both HPCI and RCIC were initiated to control reactor water level.
Required safety systems performed as designed.
On January 1,1982, Unit 2 tripped at 8:32 a.m. during startup by high level on the IRMs at 2% power. The operator was withdrawing rods to maintain a heat up rate to operating conditions. The continuous withdrawal of control rod 26-11 from notch 04 to 14 resulted in a rapid reactivity insertion which produced the trip before operator action could be taken. Safety systems performed satisfactorily. TVA is currently evaluating corrective action as a result of this scram.
Corrective action, such as limited use of the notch override switch during heatup and sequence change, is being considered.
This item will remain open pending review of the correctlye action, (260/82-06-02).
On January 2,1982, Unit 2 was manually tripped at 421 p.m. from 17% power after experiencing high level problems in moisture separator A-2.
The problem was traced to a broken stem in level control valve LCV-2-6618. All required safety systems performed satisfactorily.
On January 5,1982, Unit 2 was manually tripped while in the startup mode to perfom maintenance on main condenser tubes.
Required safety systems performed satisfactorily.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
13. Till Items The following Till action items were reviewed during this report period.
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II.K.3.(14) This item addressed those plants which have isolation
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condensers. Since Browns Ferry does not have an isolation condensor no action is required. This item is considered closed.
b.
II.K.3(15) This item advises placing a time delay relay in the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system pipe-break-detection circuits, to prevent spurious isolation on system startup.
The HPCI system has this time delay. The RCIC system is currently being modified to introduce this feature into the circuitry on Unit 3.
Unit 1 modification is scheduled for
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March 1983 and Unit 2 in March of 1982. This item remains ~open until all modification work is complete.
C.
II.K.3.(19) This item concerns modification' necessary for plants without jet pumps. Since Browns Ferry has jet pumps, no modifications are necessary. This item is considered closed.
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