IR 05000259/1982015
| ML20062K033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1982 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Chase J, Paulk G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062J893 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-82-15, 50-260-82-15, 50-296-82-15, NUDOCS 8208160528 | |
| Download: ML20062K033 (10) | |
Text
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o,, 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 g..... Report Nos. 50-259/82-15, 50-260/82-15 and 50-296/82-15 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 . Inspection at Browns Ferry site ear Athens, Alabama Inspectors: [M [ cu I, 4h/91 ! J. W. Chase / Date Signed bh t /lk L G. L. Paulk [ D6 te' Signed [d[['L Approved by: 4v F. S. Cantrell, Sec, tion' Chief, Division of D4te' Signed ' Projects and Resid(nt Programs SUttt1ARY Inspection on April 26 - !!ay 25, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 219 resident inspector-hours in the areas of e operational safety, reportable occurrences, maintenance observation, surveillance testing, organization changes, APRt1 and LPRf1 calibrations, review of plant operation and preparation for refueling.
Resul ts Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in five areas.
Three violations were found in three areas: (Violation of Technical Specification 6.3, paragraph six, eight and twelve; violation of 10 CFR 50.59, paragraph eight; violation of Technical Specification 4.8.B.1.a, paragraph twelve).
_ 8208160528 820804 PDR ADOCK 05000259 ~ O PDR . - - . _.. _ _ -
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- . , DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted G. T. Jones, Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Byrum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Pittman, Assistant Power-Plant Superintendent L. W. Jones, Quality Assurance Supervisor W. C. Thomison, Engineering Section Supervisor A. L. Clement, Chemical Unit Supervisor D. C.111ms, Engineering and Test Unit Supervisor A. L. Burnette, Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapillar, Operations Section Supervisor T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor M. W. Haney, Mechanical Maintenance Section Supervisor T. D. Cosby, Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor R. E. Burns, Instrument Maintenance Section Supervisor J. E. Swindell, Field Services Supervisor A. W. Sorrell, Supervisor, Radiation Control Unit R. E. Jackson, Chief Public Safety R. Cole, QA Site Representative, Office of Power Other licensee employees contacted included licensed reactor operators and senior reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, technicians, public safety officers, Quality Assurance, Quality Control and engineering personnel.
2.
Management Interviews Management interviews were conducted on April 30, May 7,14, 21, and 23, 1982, with the Power Plant Superintendent and/or the Assistant Power Plant Superir,tendents and other members of his staff. The licensee was informed of three violations identified during this report period. The licensee did not object to the three violations identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (259, 260/81-35-01) Failure to have drywell air sampling system setpoints set at 3X normal.
The inspectors reviewed Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.2.E-2 which sets the drywell air sampling system alarm points. The SI has been revised which now sets the alarm points at 3X normal based on previous data taken during steady state operation.
The inspectors had no further questions.
(Closed) Violation (259/81-35-02) Failure to take hourly activity samples on Unit 1 Reactor Building ventilation exhaust when the continuous air monitor was inoperable.
The inspectors reviewed SI 4.8.B.1.a.2 which is now used when a continuous air monitor is inoperable.
The SI logs the hourly sample and requires the chemist to report the results for each sample to the Unit operator.
The inspector had no further question * - . .
(Closed) Violation (260/81-32-01) Failure to test the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCIs) when Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCICs) was inoperable. The inspector verified that the training committed to in tne licensee's response was perfomed for operations personnel. The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Violation (259/82-01-01) Drywell pressure switch PS-64-58C was found isolated. The inspector verified the implementation of the licensee's response to this violation which consisted of revising sis, for instru-mentation which does not alam in the Control Room, to provide a second verification signature to ensure correct valve alignment following perfor-mance of the SI. The inspector also verified that interim corrective action prior to the sis being revised was being performed.
This consisted of the Instrument Foreman verifying alignment following each SI performance. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Violation (260/81-26-01) Startup of reactor without the under-voltage relays (UV) being operable on start buses 1A and 1B. The inspector verified the licensee's corrective action and had no further questions.
Recent changes in the Technical Specifications have deleted the requirement for having UV relays on the start buses.
(Closed) Violation (260/81-26-02) Operation of the reactor with less than the minimum number of Average Power Range lionitor Channels operable. TVA committed to setting the R (Fraction of Rated Power / Core Maximum Fraction of Limiting Power Density) factor no closer than five percent to the calculated value. Discussions with the Nuclear Engineers indicate that this will restrict plant operation during steady state and that the response to the violation should indicate that this would be done only during startup, when the R factor is most likely to change. TVA has committed to reresponding to this violation to clarify their position.
(Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/82-12-05) MM16 requires updating to include all installed diesel fuel filters. 11116 was adequately updated to reflect the current system configuration.
The inspector had no additional questions.
4.
Unresolved Items There was one unresolved item identified during this report period.
This item is discussed in paragraph five.
5.
Operational Safety The inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters relati:d to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held each morning with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that each was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site.
Observations included u
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instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby systems; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control room manning.
This inspection activity also included numerous infomal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis.
Portions of the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area con-trols; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area controls, personnel badging, personnel search and escort; and vehicle search and escort.
Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional areas during these tours.
In addition a complete walkdown which included valve alignment, instrument alignment, and switch positions was performed on the Core Spray system.
During the operational safety tour this month, several deficiencies were noted.
The licensee was notified of the deficiencies during the weekly Management Meeting: a.
On April 30, 1982, the inspector found the Main Steam line "A", Unit 1 flow element (PSI-138) high pressure side isolated.
The flow element senses high steam flow during a steam line rupture.
Each steam line has four sensing elements for redundancy. Technical Specifications require two per steam line to be operable. The licensee conducted an investigation but was unable to detemine the cause of the isolated valve.
The licensee verified all safety valves not monitored in the Control Room in the correct position.
b.
Unit 1 Raw Cooling Water switch (PS-24-133-C) was noted to have its drain valve stem locking nut not attached to the stem. This switch provides auto start of the Residual Heat Removal Service water pumps on , ! low RCW header pressure.
The licensee corrected the condition.
c.
Unit 1 Core Spray pump "C" suction valve, FCV 75-11, was noted to have a bent valve stem indicator which could possibly cause interference during valve operation. The licensee corrected the condition.
, d.
The Unit 1 Core Spray test bypass valve FCV 75-22 was observed to have ! its stem guide cap removed and lodged at a 45 degree angle in the top of the stem guide.
Possible interference and stem damage could result during valve operation. The licensee corrected the condition.
e.
Unit 1 pressure suppression chamber ring header snubber, SSX2A, was observed to be leaking silicone oil. The licensee changed out the ' j snubber and satisfactorily proved operability.
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f.
LPCI f1G set 3DN was noted to exhibit a high pitched squeal on April 27, 1982. The licensee investigated and changed out the flywheel bearing.
g.
During review of the core spray system, it was noted that drawing 728E904 in FSAR section 7.4 requires the high drywell pressure selector switch in the control room to have transparent covers installed to ensure the switch is not in the manual position, but is in the auto position. The transparent covers are not installed.
The licensee was infomed of this deficiency on April 30, 1982.
Additionally, the inspector informed the licensee that the core spray system high pressure permissive keylock hand switch on panel 9-3 (HS 75-59/60) was in a reversed position on Unit 3; Unit 1 and 2 switches are in the " Auto" position when the key is turned to the right and on Unit 3 " Auto" is to the left. This item will remain an open item.
(259,260, 296/82-15-01).
h.
Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System vent valve 74-772 did not have the packing gland retainer installed. The licensee took action to correct the deficiency.
i.
Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection vent valve 73-538 did not have the packing gland retainer installed.
The licensee took action to correct the deficiency.
Several thru-wall pipe leaks have occurred in the high pressure fire protection piping in Unit 2.
The licensee has replaced a 20 ft. section of the 3 inch pipe and plans to evaluate the removed pipe for cause of failure.
The removed pipe had large araounts of apparent corrosion buildup on the pipe internal walls. The inspector will follow this event for potential generic applicability and reportability.
This item will remain open for inspection during subsequent inspections.
(260/82-15-08).
. A review of the applicability section preceding the fire protection system l Technical Specification 3.11 indicates that the cable tunnel to the intake pumping station will incorporate high pressure water or C02 fire protection.
, ! The tunnel only has smoke detectors installed.
The licensee was informed of ' this item during the exit on liay 21, 1982.
This item will remain unresolved and followed up on future inspections.
(259,260,296/82-15-07) l 6.
Reportable Occurrence l The below listed licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if I the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or r planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety l l i *
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significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk: LER No.
Date Event
- 259/82-19 4/8/82 Excessive power peaking during startup.
- 259/82-21 4/14/82 Decrease in sodium pentaborate concentration in 5tandby Liquid Control Tank.
- 260/82-02 2/10/8E Failure of Main Steam Isolation Valve limit switch.
260/81-62 R1 1/15/82 MS line radiation monitor erratic.
- 260/81-54 11/6/81 Hydrogen analyzer "B" sample return pump inopera ble.
- 260/81-52 R1 4/13/82 Hydrogen analyzer removed from service for maintenance.
- 260/81-45 10/15/81 HPCI gland seal condenser head gasket leak.
- 260/81-39 8/7/81 HPCI gland seal condenser head gasket leak.
- 260/81-30 6/29/81 Residual Heat Removal Loop 1 inoperable because of valve FCV-2-74-57 having limit
. switch broken i
- 260/81-20 6/1/81 HPCI gland seal condenser had head
, gasket leaking.
296/81-62 10/9/81 DG 3C inoperable to calibrate relay.
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- 296/81-65 11/27/81 RCIC steam supply valve would not close.
During the inspector's review of LER 296/82-08 in which a continuous air monitor (CAM) sample hose was found disconnected for the Unit 3 reactor and turbine building ventilation exhaust, the inspector determined that the procedure used to perform a sensor check of the CN1s for all three units, which is required by TS 4.8.B.4, was not reviewed by the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC), nor approved by the Plant Superintendent as required by Technical Specification 6.3.B.
The Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to have an approved procedure was a violation of Technical Specification 6.3.B.
(259,260, 296/82-15-02).
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7.
flaintenance Observation , During the report period, the inspectors observed the below listed main-tenance activities for procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure, Tecnnical Specifications, radiological controls, Quality Control hold points, and posting of tagouts: . a.
tiechanical 11aintenance Instruction 45 - Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestor - Bergen-Patterson Removal and Replacement on Snubber SSX2A, Unit 1.
b.
flechanical itaintenance Instruction 59 - Functional Test of Bergen-Patterson Hydraulic Shock Arrestor on Snubber SSX2A, Unit 1.
c.
Repair of Fill Vial Valve Solenoid at off-gas Fost-Treatment Sample Station Panel 25-40.
o d.
High Pressure fire protection pipe removal and replacement (20 f t section) on 593 Level, Unit 2.
In the above areas, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Surveillance Testing Observation The inspectors observed the performance of the below listed surveillance tests. The inspection consisted of a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal from service and return to service of the system and a review of test data.
a.
S.I. 4.2.B.4 - Instruments that initiate or control CSCS Drywell High Pressure (PS 64-58 (E-H)) - Unit 2.
b.
S.I.4.8.B.3 - Off-Gas Post-Treatment Analysis - Units 1 and 2.
c.
Specific flaintenance Instruction (Sill)-1.
Procedure for making Relay Functional Tests.
(This test is discussed in IE Inspection Report 259, 260,296/82-16).
Two violations were noted during the conduct and procedural review of item b.
During the initial observation of S.I. 4.8.B.3, the inspector noted that . the surveillance was being conducted referencing a September 6,1978 version l of Radio-Chemical Laboratory llanual (RLit) Procedure 7098.
The surveillance was conducted in accordance with the requirements of RLM 709B. The inspector noted that the currently approved RLit 709B was dated February 19, 1980.
The radio-chemical laboratory procedure 709B being used was thus two years out of date and had apparently been used to conduct S.I. 4.8.B.3 on a weekly basis for the past two years. The inspector reviewed the currently approved February,1980 version of RLH 709B and found that the procedure was inadequate and could not be conducted as written.
The current procedure did not provide an off-gas sample return path in order to obtain the sample t ' . l ' _-- - . -
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fl ow.
Return Sample Valve 90-324A was not addressed in the current procedure, but was required to be open to obtain the off-gas sample. The Assistant Plant Superintendent was infomed of the inspectors' findings and informed that the failure to use the current February,1980 PORC approved procedure was a violation of Technical Specification 6.3. and would be used as an example of the failure to adhere to procedure Violation (259, 260, ' 296/82-15-03).
, The inadequate procedure was corrected and the new RLM 709B approved on May 11, 1982. The inspector completed the observation of S.I. 4.8.B.3 on May 12, 1982 since the initial attempt to run the surveillance was curtailed .' due to procedural difficulties.
During the conduct of the surveillance on itay 12,1982, the inspector became contaminated to 3000 DP!1 short-lived activy (limited to clothing only) and a nearby worker became contaminated to 6000 DPM. The short-lived activity stemmed from several leaking pipe fittings on a temporarily installed millipore sample pump used to obtain the off-gas sample. The pump vibration caused the fittings to become loosened.
The pump was not hard-mounted, but set unsecured on the floor. All personnel were evacuated from the off-gas building and the activity decayed to nomal background levels within two hours.
The inspector reviewed the sampling configurat!on in accordance with the system drawing on figure 7.12-2a of the Final Safety Analysis Report and drawing 47W610-90-2. The temporary sample pump was used to supplement the original installation.
Several plant staff and workers indicated the temporary sample pump had been ' installed for several years. The inspector reviewed available work plan records,10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation reviews, design change requests, and other records to verify the sample pump was properly installed and documented. MCR 302 was reviewed which indicated that the three similar off-gas sample stations in the turbine building were modified to obtain a larger sample volume by the addition of extra piping.
But no documentation evidenced the fact of the additionally installed millipore sample pump at panel 25-259 in the off-gas building and no safety evaluation was available for review.
10 CFR 50.59 requires that recoras of changes of the facility and a safety evaluation shall be maintained when changes are made to the facility as described in the final safety analysis report. The Plant Superintendent was infomed on May 14, 1982 that failure to maintain records of the sample pump installation and failure to perfom a safety evaluation r was a violation of 10 CFR 50.59.
(259,260,296/82-15-04).
9.
Organization Changes During this report period, fir. T. D. Cosby assumed the duties of Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor.
The inspectors reviewed tir. Cosby's resume' and compared his experience and education to that required by ANSI 18.1, ( Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel.
Based on this review, tir. Cosby was detemined to have met the requirements of ANSI 18.1 L f for his appointment.
In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Average Power Range Monitor (APR!l) and Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) During this report period, the inspectors reviewed the procedures for calibration of the APRMs, SI 4.1.B-2 and the LPRMs, SI 4.1.B-3.
Other surveillance instructions reviewed which were applicable to APRM and LPRM calibration were SI 4.2.C-1, Instrumentation that Initiate Rod Blocks Average Power Range Monitor, and SI 4.2.C-7, Instrumentation that Initiate Rod Blocks Power Range fieutron Monitoring System Flow Bias Instrument.
This review consisted of reviewing the procedures for technical adequacy and compliance with the Technical Specifications.
In addition, previous completed procedures were reviewed to ensure the frequency of performance was in compliance with the requirements and that the data and results were adequate.
In the above areas, no violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Review of Plant Operations During this report period, the inspectors reviewed procurement and storage at Browns Ferry. This inspection activity consisted on the following aspects: a.
Verified material and spare parts were being received and inspected by authorized personnel.
b.
Verified nonconforming items were segregated and tagged.
c.
Verified proper preventive maintenance program on stored items.
d.
Inspected for proper housekeeping and environmental requirements.
e.
Verified limited shelf-life items were controlled.
In addition, the inspector verified the traceability of several safety-related items.
In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Preparation for Refueling During this report period, the inspectors observed the receipt, inspection and storage of the new fuel elements for Unit 2.
The inspector reviewed the licensee procedure for inspection of new fuel, observed the inspection of new fuel assemblies performed by the licensee and verified the qualification of fuel inspectors. ine inspector also reviewed, for technical adequacy, the procedures for fuel handling, fuel transfers and core verification.
During this inspection activity, the inspector noted that the Fuel Inspection Check Sheet from GOI 100-2 was not of the latest revision.
The check sheet being used was dated May 1980; the latest revision is dated .
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August 1980.
The differences between the two check sheets are: the latest revision items to be checked correspond to the appropriate paragraph in the procedure while the out-dated check sheet did not correspond to the appro-priate procedure paragraphs.
In addition, the latest check sheet has a sign-off for inspecting the lower water rod while the old check sheet did not have this sign-off. The operator in charge of the fuel inspection stated that their inspection included inspecting the lower water rod.
The Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to have the latest revision of G0I 100-2 for inspecting fuel was a violation of Technical Specification 6.3. (example) (260/82-15-05).
While observing the inspection of new fuel, the inspector noted that CAM 2-RM-90-250, Turbine / Reactor Building air monitor, had its sample line from the turbine building blocked by the accumulation of approximately two cups of water. The normally installed metal sample pipe had been replaced previously with a clear plastic hose by the licensee because this line had previously experienced water accumulation.
The installation of this plastic hose created a water trap preventing drainage of water out of the sample line.
Even though the licensee had identified the possible accumulation of water, no surveillance was being performed on this line to check for a buildup of water.
l The Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to obtain a sample of the turbine building exhaust was a violation of TS 4.8.B.1.a which requires hourly samples of turbine building exhaust.
(260/82-15-06).
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