IR 05000259/1982001
| ML20050N704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1982 |
| From: | Chase J, Hardin A, Paulk A, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050N678 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-82-01, 50-259-82-1, 50-260-82-01, 50-260-82-1, 50-296-82-01, 50-296-82-1, NUDOCS 8204140429 | |
| Download: ML20050N704 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES P
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E REGION 11 g[
101 MARIETT A ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 o,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report flos. 50-259/82-01, 50-260/82-01 and 50-296/82-01 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut 5treet Chattanooga, Til 37401 Facility llame:
Browns Ferry fluclear Plant Docket flos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License flos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama Inspectors: [.
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R. F. Sullivan Date Signed (~
.Wl9 J. h. Chase Date Signed W &~ '
a b 9 /3 r-G. L. Paulk Date Signed Approved by:
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A. K. Hardin, Acting Section Chief, Division of Date Signed Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUf1 MARY Inspection on January 6-8, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine safety inspection involved 20 resident inspector-hours on site in the area of operational safety.
Resul ts In the 1 area inspected, one violation was identified (Violation of a Limiting Condition of Operation paragraph 5.).
8204140429 820326 PDR ADOCK 05000259 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Dnployees
G. T. Jones, Power Plant Superintendent
- J. R. Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Pittman, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent
- R. T. Smith, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor
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R. F. Burns, Instrument ikintenance Section Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included licensed senior reactor i
l operators, and reactor operators, auxiliary operators, technicians, and engineering personnel.
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- Attended exit interview
2.
A formal management interview was conducted on January 8,1982 with Mr. J. R. Bynum.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee was informed of one violation identi-fied during this inspection.
The resident inspector had briefed plant management on January 6 of an improperly closed valve Immediate corrective
action was implemented.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee concerning this violation. The closed valve and TVA actions were the subject of a telephone discussion between l'ir. H. J. Green, Director of i
Nuclear Power and fir. R. C. Lewis on January 7.
Subsequently this violation discussed with fir. T. G. Campbell, Ibnager of Nuclear Production, of your
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staff and fir. R. C. Lewis, Director, Division of Resident and Reactor Project Inspection, in the Region II office on January 11, 1982.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
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There were no new unresolved items identified during this report period.
5.
Operational Safety a.
On January 6,1982, at approximately 1:30 p.m., while making a routine tour of the Unit 1 Reactor Building, the Resident Inspector found a pressure switch (PS-64-58C) isolated which rendered the switch
This finding was immediately reported to the Shift Engineer who sent an Auxiliary Unit Operator to confirm the resident inspector's findings. After the confirmation was made, two Instrument
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Supervisors were called by the Shift Engineer to unisolate PS-64-58C.
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The isolation valve for PS-64-58C was opened by the Instrument Super-visors at approximately 2:15 p.m. thereby rendering the switch operable.
The licensee determined that the probable time in which PS-64-58C was isolated occurred on January 4,1982 between the hours of 7:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.
These times were determined based on the time of performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.2.B-5, Drywell High Pressure Cali-bration and Functional Test, which calibrated switches PS-64-58A thru D.
b.
The inspector's review of the completed SI 4.2.B-5, showed that step 4.11, which called for opening of the isolation valve to PS-64-58C, had been initialed by the instrument mechanic indicating the isolation valve had been opened. The inspector discussed this with the Instru-ment Supervisor. The Instrument Supervisor stated that he had discussed this point with the instrument mechanic and he had indicated he was sure he had opened the valve. The licensee's corrective action for this incident was to:
1.
Verify that the redundant switches (PS-64-58A, B & D) were not i sola ted.
Verification was performed on January 6,1982.
None of the above switches were found isolated.
2.
Verify that all safety-related instrumentation in Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building was properly valved in.
Verification was performed on January 7,1982.
No valve position errors were identified.
3.
As an interim measure the Instrument Foreman is required to verify that the valve alignment is correct after the completion of any Surveillance instruction on a safety-related instrument which does not alarm in the control room if isolated.
c.
Instrument Function and Logic PS-64-58A thru D are pressure switches which measure drywell pressure and actuate Core Cooling Systems if drywell pressure exceeds 2.5 psig.
There are four pressure switches labeled PS-64-58A, PS-64-58B, PS-64-58C and PS-64-58D and each pressure switch has two switches
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associated with it labeled switch #1 and switch #2.
The functions of these switches are:
Switch #1 Initiates Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) if drywell pressure is equal to or greater than 2.5 psig and if there is low reactor pressure (less than 500 psig).
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Switch #2 Initiates High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) if drywell pressure is equal to or greater than 2.5 psig.
Initiates Core Spray if drywell pressure is equal to or greater than 2.5 psig and if there is low reactor pressure (less than 500 psig).
Sends accident signal to Containment Spray System (CSS).
This signal, in conjunction with high drywell temperature and after a set time interval has elasped, will allow opening of the CSS valves for drywell cooling.
The instrument logic is arranged in two trip systems with two channels per trip system (PS-64-58A and C constitute one trip system and PS-64-58B and D comprise the other trip system).
In order to initiate an accident signal the system requires the coincident trip of switch PS-64-58A or B and switch PS-64-58C or D.
(One out of two, taken twice).
The resultant logic with PS-64-58c inoperable is less conservative in that PS-64-58A or PS64-58B and PS-64-58D would have been required to actuate in order to initiate an accident signal; thus, if PS-64-58D did not actuate, no initiation signal would have been received.
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Technical Specification Action Technical Specification Table 3.2.B requires that there be two channels per trip system operable.
If this cannot be met then repairs shall be made in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
If it is not functional in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> then the system or component shall be declared inoperable.
PS-64-58C was inoperable for at least 52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br /> without the licensee's t
knowledge; therefore, the action statements of the Technical Specifi-i cation were not satisfied.
This is a violation (50-259/82-01-01)
l e.
Safety Significance The safety significance of having PS-64-58C isolated centers around PS-64-58A.
Since PS-64-58C would never have operated, PS-64-58A would
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have been required to initiate the accident signal.
Since PS-64-58A
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l was calibrated on January 4,1982 there was reasonable assurance that, l
if called on, this switch would have operated.
In addition, manual l
actuation of the safety system involved was available from the control
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room.
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