IR 05000259/1982016
| ML20058B937 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1982 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Chase J, Contrell F, Paulk G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058B817 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-82-16, 50-260-82-16, 50-296-82-16, NUDOCS 8207260202 | |
| Download: ML20058B937 (6) | |
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'o UNITED STATES
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"h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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E REGION 11
o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 g..... e
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 O
Report Nos. 50-259/82-16, 50-260/82-16 and 50-296/82-16 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama 4/2[f'l-Inspectors:
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d. W. Chase
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Dale Seigned M
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G. L. Paulk
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D6te ' Signed Approved by:
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F. S. Cantrell, Secti6n'
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Projects and Residen rograms SUl1 MARY Inspection on flay 12-19, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 24 resident inspector-hours in the areas of operational safety.
Resul ts Of the one area inspected, two violations were identified in this area; (Violation of Technical Specification 3.5.E.2 (Unit 1), paragraph 5 and violation of Technical Specification 6.3.A. (Units 1 and 2), paragraph 5.
8207260202 820715 PDR ADOCK 05000259 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- H. Abercrombie, Assistant fianager, Nuclear Production
- G. T. Jones, Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent A. L. Burnette, Operations Supervisor
- R. Hunkapillar, Operations Section Supervisor T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor i
T. D. Cosby, Electrical itaintenance Section Supervisor i
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- J. Domer, Supervisor, BWR Projects Section Other licensee employees contacted included licensed senior reactor operators and reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craf tmen, technicians, and engineering personnel.
- Attended enforcement meeting at NRC Region II office on May 27, 1982.
2.
flanagement Interviews On Itay 19, 1982, a management interview was conducted with the Power Plant Superintendent and other members of his staff. The licensee was informed of two violations identified during this report period.
During this meeting, the licensee was requested to not only respond to the two violations but to also address the following items, a.
Communication between test and operations personnel and also within operations, especially the unit operator, to ensure that the effects of a test to be performed are fully understood.
b.
The licensee's review of Power Services Organization (PS0) technical specification procedures, to ensure they are adequate in regards to precautions, plant conditions and communications.
c.
Implementation of Operations Section Instruction Letter (SIL)-21, Status Board Control.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items During this inspection one unresolved item was identified and is addressed in paragraph 5.
5.
Operational Safety a.
Plant Tour On Itay 12, 1982, while touring Unit 1 and 2 control rooms, the inspector noted that U-1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam
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supply valve was tagged shut with a hold order. The redundant systems, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
and Core Spray (CS), were not tested to prove operability. The Shift Engineer stated that HPCI was tagged out to do surveillance testing on the HPCI room temperature indicators. The Shift Engineer referred to page 170 of Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS), which states that whenever a CSCS system or loop is made inoperable because of a required test or calibration, the other CSCS systems or loops that are required to be operable shall be considered operable if they are within the required surveillance testing frequency and there is no reason to suspect they are inoperable. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
Further inspection of the Unit 1 and 2 Control Room revealed that a trouble light was illuminated for the
"A" Diesel Generator (DG). The Unit 2 operator stated that the reason for the trouble light was because of a test being performed on the "A" 4KV Shutdown Board which was in progress. The operator stated that the test consisted of transferring loads on the board and that he did not know the reason why the trouble light would come in.
The Assistant Shift Engineer (ASE), who was in the Shutdown Board Room and assisting in the test of the "A" 4KV Shutdown Board, stated that the "A" DG was operable and that the problem was with the light in the annunciator circuit.
At this time the inspector noted that the fol-lowing pump breakers were racked out:
(1)
1A and 2A CS pumps (2)
1A and 2A RHR pumps (3)
1A and 2A RHR Service Water pumps (4)
"A" Fire pump With the pump breakers racked out to the " Test" position,- the pumps were not capable of auto starting if called upon by an accident signal.
The pump breaker lights in the control rooms still indicated that the pumps were available for auto initiation; however, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room operators stated that they were unaware that the above pumps were racked out and unavailable for use.
The licensee stated that the pumps were racked out for approximately 10 minutes.
The inspector expressed his concerns to plant management in that a test was in progress which rendered one core spray and one residual heat removal pump inoperable on Unit 1 and 2 and the fact that none of the control room operators nor the Shift Engineer was aware of their s ta tu s.
Plant management stated that they were informed that the test, Specific Maintenance Instruction (SMI)-1, Procedure For Making Relay
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Functional Tests, was only authorized for the portion which transfers the power supplies to the shutdown board and not the part which racked out the pump breakers for breaker testing.
Plant management further stated that the pumps were still operable since the purpose of the ASE being present for the test was to rack the pump breakers in if needed during an accident.
The inspector questioned how the ASE would know to rack the breakers in if he did not have direct communications with the control room operators and the control room operators did not know that the pump breakers were racked out.
The licensee stated that the ASE would know because the DG breaker would go shut and the ASE would hear it close.
The licensee agreed to tenninate further testing on the shutdown board until they investigated and made changes to their communication between the control room and the shutdown board room, and reviewed the adequacy of test controls with the NRC.
On May 13, 1982, the licensee made a temporary change to the SMI-1 procedure requiring the ASE and the control room operator to maintain open communications via the internal plant phone system when the pump breakers were being racked out or being reinstalled.
In this way the control room operators would know the status of the pumps and could communicate with the ASE if the pumps were needed.
In addition, the NRC's position on the performance of this test is that it is allowed based on TS 3.9.B.4 which allows removing a 4KV shutdown board from service for five days to perform maintenance and testing.
However, the racking out of a pump breaker renders the pump inoperable; therefore, the performance of this test should not have been performed on Unit I with HPCI inoperable since this requires all of core spray and RHR to be operable (TS 3.5.E.2).
The Plant Superintendent was informed that failure to have all CS and RHR pumps available while HPCI is inoperable was a violation of TS 3.5.E.2.
The Plant Superintendent did not dissent to the violation.
In addition, the CS and RHR pumps were returned to service immediately after the inspector questioned their status.
(259/82-16-01).
b.
Procedure Review Further investigation into this event by the inspector revealed that an additional violation existed in the area of adherence to procedure.
Standard Practice 12.17, Administrative Controls for Plant Operation, requires that the Shift Engineer (SE) be informed of any instruction to be performed which removes CSSC equipment from service. The SE was aware that SMI-1 would be perfonned; however, only for the portion which transfer power supplies to the shutdown board.
He was not aware that the other portions of SMI-1 would also be perfonned which racked out the pump breaker _
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TVA's response to fluREG-0737 dated December 23, 1980 states that the unit operator will be kept informed of equipment status changes.
The inspector reviewed the plant's administrative procedures for control 'of maintenance, testing and equipment and could find no requirement for the unit operator to be kept infonned of equipment status changes..The licensee could produce no procedures requiring the unit operator be
kept informed of equipment status changes.
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The Plant Superintendent was informed that.< failure to infom the SE of equipment status changes and failure to have a detailed procedure for informing the unit operator of equipment status changes was a violation of TS 6.3 which requires detailed procedures to be prepared and adhered to for operation of equipment which has an effect on nuclear. safety.
(259/82-16-02,260/82-16-01). The Plant Superintendent did not dissent
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to the violation.
c.
Plant Status Board
The inspector also observed the maintaining of the plant status board.
This board identifies those major safety components which are inoperable.
Section Instruction Letter (SIL)-21 requires that the
operator maintain this board under the direction of the SE to identify
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inoperable equipment. The inspector noted that on May 12 and May 17, 1982, the board was not being used to identify inoperable equipment.
I The inspector expressed his concerns to the Plant > Superintendent in regards to maintaining the plant status board.
The Plant Superin-
tendent stated that he would ensure that SIL-21 was adequately imple-men ted.
This item will remain open for further evaluation.
(259/82-16-04),
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Breaker Operation During LOCA
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During a LOCA, all loads on the shutdown boards are shed and a timing sequence is initiated to start certain loads at specific times.
This sequence is important to prevent overloading the diesel generators and consequently having them trip off the line.
The inspector questioned whether having a breaker racked out arid then-racking it back in during the period this timing sequence is occurring would overload the diesel generators.
TVA is currently reviewing this item. This item will remain unresolved pending TVA's review (259/82-
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16-03).
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6.
Enforcement iteeting
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A meeting was held in the fiRC Region II office on May 27, 1982 with the licensee personnel indicated in paragraph 1.
The licensee was made aware of
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flRC's concerns regarding the inspection findings. The licensee presented their investigation findings regarding this event and stated that they were initiating certain actions to prevent recurrence.
The licensee stated their
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complete corrective action would be presented in their written reply to the formal NRC notice of violation but soiae of the actions being initiated or considered at this time were:
a.
The PS0 procedures are being reviewed and where required, the caution statements are being revised for clarity to ensure proper action is taken prior to removing plant equipment from service.
b.
An eight hour course in proper communications is being given to all operations personnel.
c.
The licensee is investigating the possibility of moving some testing to the back shift to relieve the work load and congestion during the day shift.
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One item of concern discussed with the licensee was the failure of the ASE to notify the operator when racking out the CS and RHR pump breakers. The licensee stated it was operations unwritten policy that this be done but the ASE failed to follow this action.
Based on NRC's concerns the licensee agreed to formally
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issue in writing the requirement that the oper notified prior to removing
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equipment from service.
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