IR 05000259/1982012
| ML20053E042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1982 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Chase J, Paulk G, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053D990 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-82-12, 50-260-82-12, 50-296-82-12, NUDOCS 8206070554 | |
| Download: ML20053E042 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION $ E REGION 11 [[ 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 g ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-259/82-12, 50-260/82-12 and 50-296/82-12 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama Inspectors: Y-/ #-P P R. F. Sullivan Date Signed %% / u ses-r V J. W. Chase Date Signed m '> Y W 4-/o-W G. L. Paulk ~0 ate Signed " ~ Approvt oy + g _. e v - PV F. S. Cantrell, Seit}on Chief, Division of Date Signed Projects and Resident Programs St#titARY Inspection on February 26 to fiarch 25, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 221 inspector-hours in the areas of operational safety, plant physical protection, surveillance testing, maintenance observation, licensee event reports, reactor trips, onsite review committee, design changes and modifications and refueling.
I Resul ts Of the nine areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in six areas.
Three violations and one deviation were found in three areas.
[ violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion V, (Unit 1), para 9raph 5; violation of Technical Specification 6.3.A (Units 1, 2 and 3), paragraph 5; violation of Technical Specification 4.6.H.1 (Unit 2) paragraph 11; deviation for failure to meet a commitment date, paragraph 3]. 8206070554 820526 PDR ADOCK 05000259 G Ps)R
- . . i DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees G. T. Jones, Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent J. R. Pittman, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent R. T. Smith, Quality Assurance Supervisor W. C. Thomison, Engineering Section Supervisor A. L. Clement, Chemical Unit Supervisor D. C. flims, Engineering and Test Unit Supervisor A. L. Burnette, Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapillar, Operations Section Supervisor T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor fl. W. Haney, tiechanical fiaintenance Section Supervisor T. D. Cosby, Electrical flaintenance Section Supervisor R. E. Burns, Instrument liaintenance Section Supervisor J. E. Swindell, Field Services Supervisor A. W. Sorrell, Supervisor, Radiation Control Unit BFN R. E. Jackson, Chief Public Safety R. Cole, QA Site Representative. Office of Power Other licensee employees contacted included licensed senior reactor.
operators and reactor operators, auxiliary cperators, craftmen, technicians, public safety officers, QA, QC and engineering personnel.
2.
Management Interviews llanagement interviews were conducted on February 26, March 5,12 and 19, 1982, with the Power Plant Superintendent and/or the Assistant Power Plant Superintendent and other members of his staff. The licensee was informed of three apparent violations and one deviation identified during this report period.
In addition, a special management meeting was held on llarch 17, , 1982 to discuss the licensee's response to IE Inspection. Report 81-37. ' The i licensee committed to revising their response to IE Inspection Report 81-37.
l 3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings , (Closed) Unresolve (259/82-07-02, 260/82-07-02) Pneumatic door operators were not installed on Unit 1 and 2 diesel generator doors and C02 roan doors as n quired by the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 12.2.8.2.1.
Plant personnel performed a safety evaluation, for not having the pneumatic ! operators installed, with satisfactory results. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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(Closed) Unresolved (259/82-07-01, 260/82-07-01, 296/82-07-01) Failure to update itSECC IP-10 as committed to in TVA's letter dated December 7,1981 from tir. L. M. flills to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Discussions with Region II have resulted in escalating this item from unresolved to an apparent deviation.
(259/82-12-04).
4.
Unresolved Items There were no new unresolved items identified during the report period.
5.
Operation Safety The inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held each morning with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors made frequent visits to the control rooms such that each was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site.
Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby systems; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control room manning. This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis.
Portions of the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area controls; personnel badging, personnel search and escort; and vehicle search and escort.
Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional areas during these tours.
In addition a complete walkdown, which included valve alignment, instrument alignment, and switch positions, was performed on Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System.
During the walkdown of the Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC), the inspector utilized the plant operating instruction for this system (0171) and the system drawings to determine procedure adequacy, conformance to regulatory requirements, and proper system lineup.
The following problems were identified: A.
U-bolt steadying bracket nuts not fully engaged on steam leak temperature detector 3681/2D for the RCIC turbine.
B.
Test connection valve 71-605 on the turbine exhaust line did not have its packing gland retainer installe _
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C.
Hold order tag from last outage on FCV 71-19 (81-1065); the valve was in its required position and the system was fully operational.
' D.
Two drain valves connected in parallel across Flow Element 71-36 were not on the system drawings or listed in the system operational instruction (01 71).
An incorrect position of these valves could lead , to bypassing some minimum flow to the torus during RCIC injection to , the reactor.
FS 71-36 sends a governor valve control signal to the minimum flow valve 71-34 to shut 71-34 when RCIC discharge flow reaches ' approximately 120 gpm.
i E.
Two fastening bolts were missing from the outer rupture disc hold-down flange.
j F.
Snubber R-5 was noted as not meeting the optimum fluid level inspection - criteria established in SI 4.6.H.
These items were discussed with the Plant Superintendent on March 17, 1982 and !! arch 19, 1982.
Following are the results of these discussions by item number: A.
The licensee tightened the identified steadying bracket U-bolt nuts and cocrnitted to verifying Units 2 and 3 RCIC temperature detectors U-bolts properly installed.
B.
The licensee reinstalled the packing retainer on test valve 71-605.
C.
The licensee removed the identified hold order tag and committed to doing a general plant survey to find and remove other inactive hold order tags.
D.
The two drain valves were tagged shut and the Plant Superintendent agreed to make an evaluation into the circumstances involving these valves not being listed on valve lineup sheets or the sytem drawings.
In addition Units 2 and 3 had their valves tagged shut.
E.
The licensee determined that in addition to the bolts missing, the outer exhaust rupture disc was not installed.
Investigation of this , problem showed that the last time the outer rupture disc was known to l have been installed was on April 3,1980 when the inner rupture disc failed and the RCIC turbine tripped because of the high pressure between the inner and outer rupture disc.
The inner rupture disc was replaced at this time.
,l The inner rupture disc was also replaced during the last refueling outage in June 1981.
The inspector reviewed this work plan and the Trouble Report (TR) issued in April of 1980 for the inner rupture disc.
The licensee could not locate any TRs or work plans for the outer
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rupture disc.
Discussions with the engineer in charge of ensuring the work was perfomed satisfactorily during the June 1981 repair, showed that the engineer was not aware that an outer rupture disc was required on the system.
The work plan and the TR did not discuss how to replace the inner rupture disc other than to replace it, torque bolts, ensure system cleanliness, and to ensure work was performed satisfactorily.
No criteria was given in the work plan or TR in the proper method for removing the inner rupture disc, i.e., what components had to be removed, nor was there any requirement for ensuring the system was returned to its nomal configuration.
The safety significance for not having an outer rupture disc installed is that if the inner rupture disc failed, turbine exhaust steam would be emitted to the RCIC/ Core Spray room resulting in a RCIC turbine trip rendering the RCIC system inoperable, air borne contamination in the Reactor Building and a health hazard to personnel in the RCIC/ Core Spray room from steam.
The Power Plant Superintendent was informed on !! arch 19, 1982, that failure to have documented instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstance for activities affecting quality was an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V.
(259,260,296/82-12-06).
F.
The licensee replaced snubber R-5.
The removed snubber was subse-quently tested and found to be operable.
The inspector reviewed the circumstances concerning the failure to meet the optimum fluid level in snubber R-5.
The inspector reviewed past records of S.I. 4.6.H on Unit 1 and noted that during the last inspection in April 1981, snubber R-5 was found to be leaking oil.
Since the fluid level was still within the required two inch tolerance specification, no action was taken.
No inspection guidelines or replacement criteria were given in the surveillance instruction concerning several inspection requirements; oil leakage, damage, cylinder rod condition, and tightness of lock nuts and mounting eyes. Thus during the April 1981 inspection, the observed oil leak from the R-5 snubber was not scheduled for reinspection or corrective action. The next snubber inspection was scheduled for the next refueling outage in August 1982.
The inspector informed the Plant Superintendent on flarch 19, 1982 that the failure to provide inspection guidelines or criteria in SI 4.6.H was a violation of Technical Specification 6.3.A which requires detailed written procedures.
This item is an example of violation of Technical Specification 6.3. A.
(259,260,296/82-12-01).
Items listed in A, B, C, and D will be listed as an Open Item and followed up on future inspections (259, 260, 296/82-12-02).
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During the inspector's review of the new changes to 01-77, Operation of Radwaste on flarch 17, 1982, it was detemined that the changes made on February 9,1982 were not incorporated into the procedure used by the Radwaste Operators nor was the copy, which they used, a controlled copy.
The Power Plant Superintendent was informed on llarch 17, 1982 that failure to provide an approved procedure to the Radwaste Operators was an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.3.A which requires detailed written procedures to be approved and adhered to in the area of Radiation Control. This item is an example of violation of Technical Specification 6.3. A.
(259,260,296/82-12-01).
The inspector observed portions of the primary containment integrated leak rate test (S.I. 4.7.A.2) conducted on Unit 3, flarch 20-21, 1982.
During a preliminary test tour of the Unit 3 drywell on March 18, 1982, the inspector noted that snubber R-8 for the core spray system was apparently leaking oil.
The Assistant Plant !!anager was notified. The licensee replaced the snubber.
6.
ibintenance Observation , During the report period, the inspectors observed the below listed mainte-nance activities for procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure,' proper tagouts, adherence to Technical Specifications, radiological controls, and adherence to Quality Control hold points: A.
Post treatment radiation monitor cleaning on Unit 1 B.
Torus modifications on Unit 3 C.
Unit 2 Drywell Control Air Compressor replacement D.
R-5 RCIC snubber replacement on Unit 1 In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Operating Review Conmittee (PORC) i The inspectors made a review of the operation of Browns Ferry PORC.
This . inspection consisted of attending a PORC meeting to ensure that provisions t of the Technical Specifications and PORC Charter dealing with membership, review process, frequency, qualifications and material discussed were , i sa tisfied, j During thi.s inspection, the inspectors identified that the minutes of the ! PORC meeting were not being distributed to the Director, fluclear Power as required by Technical Specification 6.2.B.6.
This item will be addressed in l IE Inspection Report 82-10.
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a In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Design, Design Changes and Modifications The inspectors performed a review of the following work plans: A.
8239-2 Stage Target Rock Relief Valves B.
9040-Increase Detection Sensitivity of RHR, RBCCW and RCW Monitors C.
9882R1-Install MOV Bypass Valve Around FCV 73-3 (Mechanical) D.
9883R1-Install MOV Bypass Valve Around FCV 73-3 (Electrical) E.
9319-Install Off-line Process Radiation !!onitor The review of the above procedures consisted of ensuring a proper 10 CFR 50.59 had been performed and design changes were reviewed in accordance with the established QA/QC Controls.
In addition, the post modification test results were reviewed to ensure they were within the established acceptance criteria.
! In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Reportable Occurrence The below listed licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk.
LER No.
Date Event 259/81-69 R-1 11/15/81 CAM 0-RM-90-252 reads downscale.
- 259/81-86 12/10/81 Failure to perturb reactor water level.
- 259/82-02 1/6/82 PS-64-58C was found isolated.
259/82-11 2/22/82 C A!10- Rf1-90-252 out of calibration.
- 259/82-12 2/23/82 FCV 74-30 failed to close.
259/82-15 3/04/82 Windspeed and directional instrument failed.
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260/82-06 2/23/82 Reactor low water level switch out of cali bra tion.
260/82-07 2/23/82 Reactor low water level switch out of cali bration.
- 260/81-62 R-1 2/19/82
!!ain steam line radiation monitors were erratic.
296/82-01 2/12/82 Fixed fire protection valve initiated.
296/82-02 2/18/82 Smoke detector inoperable.
296/82-03 2/19/82 RWCU floor drain high temperature inoperable.
296/82-04 3/05/82 HPCI space temperature switch inoperable.
10.
Reactor Trips The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor trips during this report period.
The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action.
The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and held discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appro-priate.
A.
On February 28,1982, Unit 1 was manually scrammed from 450 megawatts to repair a leaking solenoid valve which was increasing the oxygen content in the drywell.
Required safety systems performed satis-factorily.
B.
On liarch 9,1982, Unit 1 scrammed on a turbine trip caused by a loss of EHC fluid. The loss of fluid was a result of maintenance personnel disassembling a check valve on the EHC system instead of a filter assembly. The required safety systems performed satisfactorily.
C.
On fiarch 14,1982, Unit 1 scrammed from 99% power caused by actuation of the main steam line low pressure sensor.
The sensors were actuated as a result of high pressure steam induced vibrations.
Five 11SRVs were actuated to control reactor pressure and RCIC was manually actuated to control reactor water level.
The required safety systems performed satisfactorily.
11.
Surveillance Testing Observation The inspectors observed the performance of the below listed surveillance procedures.
The inspection consisted of a review of the procedure for .
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technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal from service and return to service of the system and a review of test data.
A.
S.I. 4.5.F - RCIC Flow Test B.
S.I. 4.6.H.1 - Snubber Visual Inspection C.
S.I. 4.9. A.1.a - Diesel Generator "D" fionthly Test D S.I. 4.7. A.2 - Primary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test for Unit 3.
During the review of item B. the inspector noted that on Unit 2 during the Fby 23, 1979 accessible snubber inspection, one snubber (R-20 Lower) was found to be inoperable.
In accordance with Technical Specification 4.6.H.1, when one snubber is found to be inoperable during inspection, the inspection interval is required to be reduced to 12 months.
A review of file and scheduling records indicates that the 12 month inspection interval of SI 4.6.H.1 was not met and the next inspection was conducted October 17, 1980 during the Unit 2 outage. The Plant Superintendent was informed on , thrch 26, 1982, that failure to canplete the accessible snubber inspection ' at the reduced inspection interval was an apparent violation of Technical Specification 4.6.H.1.
(260/82-12-03).
During the observance of the surveillance instruction in item C., the inspector noted four fuel oil filters on each diesel-that apparently have not been checked, cleaned, or changed since diesel engine installation. A review of records and Mechanical fiaintenance Instruction 6 did not show these four filters listed.
The four filters include two filters in the line from the fuel oil storage tank to the day tank and two filters in the line from the day tank to the diesel engine injectors.
Failure to maintain these filters could degrade diesel operability. No failure of the diesel to start has been attributed to lack of fuel oil pressure or cleanliness. The Plant Superintendent was informed of the inspector's findings on thrch 5,1982.
This item will remain an open item and will be followed up on future inspections (259, 260, 296/82-12-05).
12. Unit 3 Refueling The inspectors reviewed documentation and observed fuel handling operations during the Unit 3 refueling outage.
Upon completion of fuel loading, quality assurance verification of fuel assembly orientation and location was accomplished with satisfactory results. The inspector had no additional questions in this area.
No violations or deviations were noted.
13. Plant Physical Protection During the course of routine inspection activities, the inspectors made
observations of certain plant physical protection activities.
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included personnel badging, personnel search and escort, vehicle search and escort, communications and vital area access control.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.
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