IR 05000259/1982017
| ML20058B649 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1982 |
| From: | Economos N, Girard E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058B631 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0803 50-259-82-17, 50-260-82-17, 50-296-82-17, NUDOCS 8207260094 | |
| Download: ML20058B649 (7) | |
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Report Nos. 50-259/82-17, 50-260/82-17, 50-296/82-17 i
Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68 Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Decatur, Alabama and licensee offices in Chattanooga, Tennessee Inspector:
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Fd Da e Signed
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Approved by:
4% fr >-r p cs N. Econom6sFA'cting Section Chief
/ Date/ igned Engineering Inspection Branch Division of Engineering and Technical Programs SUMMARY Inspection on May 26-28, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 30 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings (Units 1, 2 and 3),
licensee event reports (Units 1, 2 and 3), inspector follow-up items (Units 1, 2 and 3), meeting on inservice testing program for pumps and valves (Units 1, 2 and 3), and NUREG-0803 (Units 1, 2 and 3).
Results No violations or deviations were identified.
8207260094 820628 PDR ADOCK 05000259 O
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees G. T. Jones, Plant Superintendent, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP)
- J. R. Bynum, Assistant Plant Superintendent, BFNP T. L. Chinn, Compliance Staf f Supervisor, BFNP R. E. Rogers, TVA Regulatory Staff D. Mill s, Engineer, BFNP B. R. McPherson, Engineer, BFNP N. R. Thomas, TVA Mechanical Systems Group P. F. Romine, Engineer, BFNP A. Gandy, OA Engineer, BFNP L. Parvin, QC Supervisor, BFNP
- D. A. Howard, Supervisor, Baseline and Inservice Inspection Group (BISIG)
- G. L. Belew, Supervisor, Program and Procedures Section, BISIG
- J. T. Lewis, Engineer, BISIG
- T. B. Schreeder, Engineer, BISIG J. Foy, Metallurgical Engineer, Codes and Standards Group E. Wilson, Senior Engineer R. Bollinger, Nuclear Engineer Other Organizations R. J. Clark, Browns Ferry Project Manager, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Resident Inspector J. W. Chase
- G. L. Paul k
- Attended exit interview held at Browns Ferry site on May 27, 1982
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 27 and 28,1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The following items were discussed and identified to the licensee.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item (259,260,296/82-17-01): NUREG 0803, para-graph 8.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item (259,260,296/82-17-02): Possible Undersize Welds, paragrpah._.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Violation 260/80-34-03: Undersized Socket Welds.
This item
involved socket welds which had been completed and accepted by TVA but which the NRC inspector found did not meet the minimum size require-ments specified by the applicable code.
The welds identified as undersize were nine pipe to socket fillet welds on a High Pressure
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Coolant Injection (HPCI) System by pass line for Unit 2.
TVA's letters i
of response for this item, dated February 18 and March 30, 1981, have been reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
In the response letters, TVA indicated that weld metal was added to the welds and that
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they had been re-examined and accepted. The inspector verified the licensee's repairs as described in NRC IE Report 259,260,296/81-36.
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Based on the inspector's discussion with the licensee's QC Supervisor and his previous verification of corrections to the originally under-
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sized welds this item is considered closed.
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The inspector informed the licensee that he was concerned that there might be safety-significant undersize welds in piping installed in
previous outages.
The inspector stated that this concern would be
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followed up in subsequent inspections and identified it as inspector follow-up item 259,260,296/82-17, "Possible Undersize Welds".
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b.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (259,260,296/81-07-03): Identification of portion examined for welds examined on a sampling basis.
This item l
involved the inspector's finding, from a review of records, that the weld areas examined in an inspection period had not been adequately identified for certain welds that were required to be partially
inspected during an inspection interval. The inspector discussed this i
item with the cognizant inservice inspection (ISI) engineer and was
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informed that, if the sample locations inspected could not be I
adequately established, the weld portions examined in subsequent inspections would be increased to assure that requirements were met.
This item will remain open pending Region II's verification that
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sufficient welds had been sampled and identified in the ISI records.
c.
(0 pen)
Violation (259,260,296/82-13-01):
Inadequate examination instructions. This item involved the licensee's failure to specify visual and penetrant examinations for certain socket welds in the work instructions and their failure to provide instructions for transition checks on certain structural welds. The licensee's letter of response for this item, dated August 31, 1981, was reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
The inspector discussed the licenseo's corrective actions for the socket welds with the QC Supervisor and reviewed documentation of completion of proper inspections on the socket welds as documented on Work Plan 8476R3. The inspector considers the actions taken relative to this portion of the violation to be adequate.
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The inspector questioned the responsible (ISI) engineer as to whether the licensee's commitment-for preparation and issuance of instructions to include requirements for transition checks on structural welds had been met. The inspector was informed that the procedure for this inspection would be issued by the planned Unit 2 refueling outage (July 1982).
This item will remain open pending the licensee's issuance of the
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structural weld inspection procedure and Region II's verification that it adequately specifies transition checks for structural welds.
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(0 pen) Violation (259, 260, 296/81-13-02): De: rent control. This item involved the licensee's failure to provide controlled copies of nondestructive examination (NDE) procedures to QC supervisory and inspection personnel required to use the procedures.
The licensee's letter of response for this item, dated August 31, 1981, was reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
The inspector verified that the QC personnel who use the NDE procedures now have the current approved revisions.
It was not clear to the l
inspector how the licensee assures proper control and updating of the
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procedures. The inspector was informed that a site procedure was being prepared to describe the cnntrol of the procedures.
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l This item will remain open pending Region II's verification of the adequacy of procedural requirements covering the-issuance and control i
of NDE procedures at the site.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (259/81-13-12): Visual examination during ISI of reactor vessel cladding was not compared with PSI results. This item involved an inspector's concern that no records were made of the surface condition of reactor vessel cladding examined inservice and
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that no attempt had been made to compare the condition with that i
observed and recorded in preservice inspection (PSI).
The inspector discussed this item with the licensee and was informed that no record I
of inservice condition and no comparison with preservice condition had
been made because the cladding checked during inservice showed no
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unusual condition or evidence of possible degradation.
It was also noted that later approved revisions of the code applicable to_ ISI (e.g., ASME Section XI (80W80)) have deleted the requirement for
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reactor vessel cladding patch examinations.
l Based on his discussions with the licensee's ISI engineer, the i
inspector is satisfied that this item can be considered closed.
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f.
(0 pen) Violation (259/81-16-01): Failure to inspect and verify spring l
hanger settings in accordance with ASME Section XI. This item involved the licensee's failure to verify settings for spring hangers, snubbers t
f and shock absorbers as required by ASME Section XI.
The licensee's
letter of response for this item, dated September 4, 1981, has been
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reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
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The inspecto discussed this item with the licensee's ISI engineer and was informed that the procedure for performing the subject verifica-tions was in preparation and would be issued by the July 1982 refueling outage.
The inspector reviewed the acceptance limits provided by the licensee's design organization and questioned whether they were intended for operating condition (with thermal loads) checks or refueling outages.
The ISI engineer agreed to contact his design organization regarding the condition under which the acceptance limits were to apply.
This item will remain open pending Region II's verification that adequate procedures have been prepared and inspections performed for verification of settings for spring hangers, snubbers, and shock absorbers.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (259, 260, 296/81-36-01): CRT screen extremity used for examination calibration point.
This item documents an inspector's finding that, for material thicknesses of 2 to 2h inches, ultrasonic examination procedure N-UT-4 provides a calibration that could result in OD indications being missed in examinations.
The inspector discussed this item with the licensee's ISI engineer who informed the inspector that the procedure would be corrected and re-issued by the July 1982 refueling outage.
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(Closed) Unresolved-Item (296/81-36-01): Methods of locating welds ground flush are not clearly defined.
This item involves an inspec-tor's concern that the location of a flush ground reactor vessel weld might not have been adequately determined.
The inspector discussed the process used in determining the weld location with the ISI engineer and is satisfied that the location was satisfactorily identified. This matter is considered closed.
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(Closed) Violation (259,260,296/81-36-03): Inadequate procedure for installation and inspection of locking devices. This item involves locking devices for fasteners installed on the licensee's main steam
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isolation valves (MSIV's). The devices in question, which are commonly referred to as " pants leg" washers, are used to prevent installed nuts and/or bolting from turning and becoming loose. It was found that some of these devices had not been installed properly on the licensee's MSIV's and that some of the bolting that were locked in place had loosened.
The licensee procedure for maintenance on the valves (MMI-17) did not describe adequately the installation of these washers. The licensee's letter of response for this violation, dated February 22, 1982, has been reviewed and determined acceptable by Region I,.
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The inspector discussed this item with cognizant licensee personnel and verified the corrective action through a review of documentation and discussion with the NRC resident inspector who witnessed installation of the washers on the Unit 3 MSIV's. This matter is considered closed.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Reportable Occurrence - Licensee Event Reports (Units 1 and 2)
a.
(0 pen) Licensee Event Report 259/81-037: Reactor water cleanup system isolation valve. As described in NRC IE Report 259,260,296/81-20, this item was left open pending the licensee's completion of metallographic examination of a sample of the valve material in order to permit Region II to evaluate this data together with the licensee's corrective actions.
The inspector asked the responsible licensee metallurgical engineer whether the results of the metallographic examination had been received.
The inspector was informed that the report of the work was expected shortly but had not as yet been received.
This item will remain open pending Region II's final review of this data and the adequacy of licensee's corrective action.
b.
(0 pen) Licensee Event Report 260/81-026: Inservice inspection of high pressure coolant injection did not receive evaluation.
This item involved improper evaluation of ultrasonic examination ISI results.
The inspector discussed this item with the licensee's ISI engineer, who indicated he believed the discrepancy had also involved Unit 3 welds.
The inspector questioned whether the report adequately described the event. The ISI engineer agreed to determine whether the event should have also been reported for Unit 3 and to obtain additional informa-tion on the event for NRC review during the July 1982 fueling outage.
l This item will remain open pending Region II's further review of the details regarding this item and their determination of the adequacy of the report and corrective action.
6.
Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI's) (Units 1, 2 and 3)
a.
(0 pen) IFI (259, 260, 296/82-13-03): Liquid penetrant procedures do not provide complete instructions. The inspector questioned the licensee's ISI engineer as to whether revised penetrant examination procedures, specifying the extent of base metal examination required and prohibi-ting power wire brushing, had been issued. The inspector was informed i
that all of the procedure revisions had not been completed but that the l
revised procedures would be issued by the July 1982 refueling outage.
l This item will remain open pending Region II's review of the procedure change. ~. _.
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(0 pen) IFI (259,260,296/81-13-04): Magnetic particle procedure does not'
provide complete instructions.
The licensee magnetic particle
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i procedure did not contain requirements to assay adequate lighting for the examination. The inspector questioned the licensee's ISI engineer
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j The inspector was informed that a procedure revision covering lighting requirements would be issued by the July 1982 refueling outage. This
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item will remain open pending Region II's verification of the adequacy
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of the procedure change.
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c.
(0 pen) IFI (259,260,296/81-13-05): Jet pump holddown assembly replace-
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ment.
The inspector asked the licensee's metallurgical engineer whether they still intended to replace the jet pump holddown assemblies and, if so, when this work would begin.
The inspector was informed
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l that assembly replacement was expected to begin with Unit 2 during the outage planned to start July 1982.
This item will remain open for
follow-up on this work.
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7.
Meeting on Inservice Testing Program for Pumps and Valves (Units 1, 2 and 3)
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The inspector attended a meeting held at the plant site on May 26 and
27, 1982 to discuss the licensee's proposed pump and valve program and the associated relief requests and Technical Specification changes.
Licensee personnel and the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project engineer
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who attended the meeting indicated at the conclusion that they consider most i
issues associated with approval of the pump and valve program to be
resolved. Approval of the program is anticipated about September 1982.
8.
NUREG-0803, Generic Safety Evaluation Report Regarding Integrity of BWR
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Scram System Piping (Units 1, 2 and 3)
i NUREG-0803 provides guidance and a schedule to licensees, aimed at assuring
the adequacy of BWR Scram System piping. <0n August 31,1981 this report was l
transmitted to licensees along with Generic Letter 81-34,,which requested a plant specific response conforming to the guidance given in NUREG-0803. The
inspector verified that the response required had been provided to the NRC for the Browns Ferry plant.
Subsequent NRC and licensee actions will'be
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followed by Region II in inspections as inspector follow-up item 259,-260,
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l 296/82-17-01, "NUREG-0803"
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