IR 05000255/1990039
| ML18057A717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1991 |
| From: | Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18057A716 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-90-39, NUDOCS 9101290107 | |
| Download: ML18057A717 (15) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report No. 50-255/90039(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI L;cense No. DPR-20 Inspection Conducted:
November 28, 1990 through January 11, 1991 Inspectors: J. K. Heller J. A. Hopkins T. J. Kobetz Approved By:.
o nsen, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A DATE Inspection Summary Inspection on November 28, 1990 through January 11, 1991 (Report N /90039(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors
- of actions on previously identified items, plant operations, maintenance, survei 11 ance, reportable events, security;* steam generator rep la cement, training, allegations, refueling activities, cold weather preparations, and NRC Region III request Results: Of the 12 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie The strengths, weaknesses and Open Items are discussed in paragraph 15,
"Management Interview."
9101290107 910123
~DR ADDCK 05000255 PDR
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company D. P. Hoffman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
+D. W. Joos, Vice President, Energy Supply
+G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager
- +D. J. VandeWalle, Safety/Licensing Director
+R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- +T. J. Palmisano, Administrative and Planning Manager
- K. M. Haas, Radiological Services Manager J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent R. B. Kasper, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Superintendent L. J. Kenaga, Health Physics Superintendent C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer J. R. Brunet, Licehsing Analyst
- W. L. Roberts, Senior Licensing Analyst
+K. A. Toner, Plant Projects Superintendent
- J. C. Petro, Quality Assurance
- R. E. McCaleb,- Quality Assurance Director Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
+A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator
+H. J. Miller, Director, DRP
. +M. P. Phillips, Chief, Operation Programs Section 2
+H. B. Clayton,.Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
- *+B. L. Jorgensen, Chief, Projects Section 2A
+W. G. Snell, Chief EP & Effluents Section
+R. N. Gardner, Chief, Plant Systems Section
- +J. K. Heller, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. A. Hopkins, Resident Inspector
+I. S. Yin, Reactor Inspector
+ Denotes some of those present at the Management Meeting on November 28, 1990
- Denotes some of those present at the Exit Interview on January il, 1991 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted during the inspection perio.
Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702) (Closed) Open Item 255/89038-04(DRP):
Use of gerieric specification change to replace carbon steel studs with stainless steel studs. A number of problems (concerning print updates and old versus new 2 {
- material compatibility) were identified. The generic specification change has been closed and all work done per the specification change has been reviewe Future changeout will be handled by individual specification chang The licensee evaluation is documented on commitment {racking log 89-06 (Closed) Bulletins 255/85003 and 255/87001:
"Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings" and "Thinning of Carbon Steel Piping in LWRs".
NRC Region III Management has reviewed the existing open items and determined these bulletins will be closed administratively due to their safety significance relative to emerging priority issues and to the age of the item The licensee is reminded that commitments directly relating to these bulletins are the responsibility of the licensee and.should be met as committe *
The items below (c - f) were identified by a team inspection lead by Region III, with support provided by the NRC office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).
The inspection report requested a written response for each of the items identifie The licensee response, dated September 20, 1990, was reviewed by NRR and a safety evaluation was issued on November 20, 199 This safety evaluation discussed and closed each of the four open item (Closed) Open Item 255/90019-0l(DRS):
Facility Change 915
"Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Room Modifications did not address the potential for airborne release, damage to equipment in the room, and heat loads in the syste (Closed) Open Item 255/90019-02(DRS):
A number of questions were raised during the review of Facility Change 914 "Containment Construction Opening". (Closed) Open Item 255/90019-03(DRS):
Facility Change 904
"Auxiliary Building Modification for Containment Access" did not address the potential for radioactive releas (Closed) Open Item 255/90019-04(DRS): * Facility Change 909 "Steam Generator Replacement" concluded that some technical specifications were not required prior to startup. The reviewers disagreed and requested that a new schedule be implemente No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 42700)
Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant and from the main control roo The performance of Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, Shift Engineers, and Auxiliary Equipment Operators was observed and evaluated.
Included in the review were procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activitie *
Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems, and nuclear reactor protection system Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducte Proper return to service pf selected components was verifie a.. General The plant began this reporting period in a refueling shutdown condition with the vessel defueled and all fuel in the spent fuel poo The inspector verified by observation, discussion with the control room operators, and review of checksheets that the spent fuel pool cooling system was operable. This included verification that the fuel pool temperature was maintained, spent fuel ventilation was operable during spent fuel pool activities, cooling water was available to the spent fuel pool heat exchangers, and emergency power was availabl Contaminated Water Spill In West Safeguards Room At approximately 8:00 p.m., on December 10, 1990, while attempting to place the safety injection and refueling water storage (SIRW)
tank on "fast recirculation," the licensee inadvertently transferr~d contaminated water to the spent fuel pool (SFP) and the engineering safeguards pipin The water introduced to the safeguards piping resulted in a spill of approximately 2000 gallons to the west safeguards room located in the auxiliary building basemen The addition of water to the SFP had little effec The inspectors investigation determined that the procedure used to place the SIRW tank on fast recirculation was apparently not appropriately implemente The plant operating procedure used was modified to account for various interfacing system being out-of-service for maintenance due to the ongoing refueling outag By reconfirming valve lineups, the licensee was able to secure the addition of water to the safeguards piping and the SFP and place the SIRW tank on fast recirculatio The licensee determined that poor communication between the Shift Supervisor (senior licensed operator on shift) and the Auxiliary Operators was the cause of the even To prevent recurrence, the Operations Superintendent reviewed the event with all of the shift supervisors and intensified the operators' classroom and simulator communications training.* The inspector has no additional concerns at this tim Tours (1)
On November 16, 1990, during a routine containment tour, a fire watch informed the inspector *that he was standing in an elevated dose area.. The area was near the north stair well on the 625 elevation. There were no signs or postings identifying this as an elevated dose area. *A Health Physics (HP) technician measured the dose in the approximate 1 square foot area and
...::;*
- .
(2)
(3)
observed approximately 50 mr/hr on the floor and 20 mr/hr at 18 inche The HP technician stated that the concern would be reported to the HP containment superviso On November 27, 1990, the inspector observed two people working in the area who were unaware of the elevated dos HP
technicians aga1n confirmed the dose rates and indicated that the HP containment supervisor would be informe On December 1, 1990, the inspector observed that the area was not identified as an elevated dose area and notified the Outage Manager and the duty HP Superviso The inspector described the events listed above and discussed his concern that personnel may be loitering in the are The HP Superintendent stated that there were no requirements to specifically post the area because it falls below the posting threshol However, the area was posted as an elevated dose area and both licensee and outage contract HP technician were
- briefed to be more sensitive to posting areas of elevated dose which are below the high radiation or "hot spot" threshol The HP Superintendent stated that poor communication between contractor and licensee HP organizations was the probable cause for this concern not being resolved in a more timely manne The inspector verified that the area was posted during a containment tou When exiting containment through the personnel air lock, the inspector observed several people not following the licensee method for removing anti-contamination protective clothin Additionally, due to the layout of the change out area, people had to throw some of their used protective clothing into a -
basket when standing on the 11 clean 11 side of the step-off pa After continued observation with licensee HP personnel present, the layout of the air lock change area was modified to prevent throwing protective clothin During a routine tour, the inspector observed a security g'uard hurrying to respond to a security door alarm in the radiologically controlled area (RCA) of the auxiliary buildin The guard attempted to "log in 11 using the Management Information System (MIS) computer but was denied access to the RC (T~e inspector did not observe the specific reason). Since MIS denied access, the guard was issued a self reading dosimeter (SRD) vice the MIS controlled ~lectronic dosimeter (EMD) and proceeded to respond to the door alar (Note: the guard was authorized under the appropriate Radiation Work Permit (RWP)).
The inspector asked the licensee HP staff how the guard's SRD dose was incorporated into the MIS data bas The MIS tracks each RCA entry, RWP used, individual dose received on EMD and dose accumulated against the RW HP stated that SRD dose is normally recorded when the individual exits the RCA and MIS is
- updated within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Normally, the log is then discarde The licensee was unable to find any record of the guard's RCA entr The licensee performed a dose assessment for the entry based on security door card reader history and entered the
~*best estimate 11 dose received into the MI (The guard's film badge captured all dose received for the quarter.)
This appeared to be an isolated case and the inspector had no additional concern *
(4) During a routine turbine building tour, contract employee working on the main condenser replacement project expressed concerns about the differences between the licensee's and contractor's confined space entry requirement The inspector forwarded the concern to the licensee's Safety Coordinato The Safety Coordinator*-.determined that although the licensee's and the contractor's entry requirements differ, both meet.
Michigan Occupational Health and Safety Administration standards and are being correctly implemente The Safety Coordinator forwarded the concern and the results of the investigation to the contractor, who then informed the individual work group During a review of the outage manager's logbook, the inspector noted that the outage manager had approved a deviation from the plant overtime limitations. The administrative procedures*permitted deviations from the overtime limitations and specified, by title, who could authorize a deviatio The list was comprised of senior plant manager The outage manager who approved the deviations was not 1ncluded on the list. The licensee reviewed the inspector's observation and determined that the unauthorized approval did not affect quality, however, the licensee determined that the list would not be expanded to include the outage manage In ~ddition, the outage manager was reminded of this requirement and a log entry was made in the outage manager logbook reflecting plant managements'
expectation The inspector had no additional concerns. *
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified *
. Maintenance (62703, 42700)
Maintenance activities in the plant were routinely inspected, in~luding both corrective maintenance (repairs) and preventive maintenanc *
Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to ensure that the maintenance activities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and were in conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during this review: Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and post maintenance testing was performed as applicabl **
The following activities were inspected: Install Flow and Pressure Indicators on Component Cooling Water Pump, P-52A (Work Order (WO) 24904125). SPS-016 ED-01 Battery Cleanin RM~63-1 Diesel Generator (DG) 1-1 Periodic Diesel Engine Inspection (Refueling Outage).
During the engine inspection, two defects were identified on the crankshaft vibration dampe The licensee evaluated the damage with tethnical assistance from the diesel manufacturer, ALCO Power Incorporated, and determined that the defects would not effect DG operability. The ALCO representative concluded that the damage occurred during factory assembly or testing. The only two previous inspections (RM-63-1 was a relatively new inspection) would not necessarily have discovered the defects because of their locatio The licensee determined that a special inspection of DG 1-2 was not warranted due to the lack of similar indications found during the
- inspection earlier in the refueling outage, the negligible impact the defects had on DG 1-1 operability, and the scope of engine disassembly required to perform additional inspection The inspector had no additional concern Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-2, Cylinder 2L Fuel Oil Leak (WO 24006908).
During the visual inspection of EDG 1-2 prior to performing M0-7A-2, EOG 1-2' Monthly Test, a fuel oil leak in cylinder 2L was identified. The copper washer on the fuel inlet to the injector pump was not seated properly and was repaired under Work Order N.
After EDG startup, the local operator identified a low temperature on cylinder 2L (100 degrees F - nominal is 800 F degrees).
Initial investigation revealed that the control rack latch (a device which holds the reciprocating fuel oil control valve shut) was engage The local operator disengaged the latch and the cylinder temperature returned to normal operating condition The inspector's investigation determined that the job supervisor~
who was also the work planner and was experienced with diesel engine maintenance, believed that the correct position for the latch was 11engaged.
To prevent recurrence, the licensee will add this event to the_
mechanical maintenance training program and has posted caution signs in the EOG rooms to remind maintenance personnel that Operations Department permission is required to change the positions*of the fuel oil control rack latch. The inspector had no additional concern e..
Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump, P-67A, Shaft Seal Leak (WO 24901897).
LPSI Pump P-67A was taken out of service to repair a pump shaft sleeve leak and to investigate the cause of increased vibration level readings on the pump inboard bearin Investigation revealed that the pump impeller jam nuts were loose, and the stuffing box bushing was galled onto and rotating freely with the impeller. Additionally, the thrust bearing had visib.le signs of wear *and the shaft was out of round in two place The root cause of the impeller galling appears to be the loose jam nut The pump bearings and shaft seal were repaired/replaced and the shaft was machined to specifications. The impeller jam nuts were torqued to their proper value Note: The last time P-67A was disassembled (1984) there was no required torque value in the procedur The maintenance procedure has been revised since the Additionally, P-678 was last disassembled in January 1990 and the impeller jam nut~ were properly torque Post maintenance testing was completed satisfactoril Service Water Pump Brace Modification to Reduce Vibrations, Facility Change No. 86 Braces were added to the three service water pumps to control vibrations during normal operatio Post modification evaluation of pump vibrations indicates a 60-80 percent overall reductio CC5-010 Clean and Inspect Component Cooling.Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger (HX) Tube CCW HX E-54A tubes (service water side) were cleaned and inspected using eddy current testing. There were no indications of marine fouling in the tubes. Only two tubes required plugging. A total of 98 out of 2020 tubes are currently plugge No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
S~rveillance (61726, 42700)
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing as described below and verified that testing was performed in
- accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were properly-accomplished, test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and deficiencies identified during the testing*were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following activities were inspected: M0-7A-1 Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 Monthly Test M0-7A-2 Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 Monthly Test Both tests required that one of the two air start motors ass~ciated with each diesel be removed from service prior to the start of the
test. If the diesel starts in less than 10 seconds then the test continue If the diesel does not start or the start time exceeds 10 seconds, the second air start motor is returned to service and_
another start test is performe If the diesel starts in 10 seconds or less the test continues. This test methodology verifies the redundancy of the individual diesel generator air start systems and permits trending of individual air st~rt motor However the diesels are not tested in.the as found condition (both air start motors in service). The potential exists that a slow or incomplete start may warm the system up such that the diesel will start within 10 seconds during the next start if the second air start is in service.or no This warm-up may mask or hide a problem with the air start syste The licensee was asked if a die~el generator sta~t with both air start motors valved in should be included as one ~f the rotation sequences for starting the diesel generator The system engineer agreed to review the starting methodology and implement appropriate change This is an open item pending the system engineer's revie (Open Item 255/90039-0l(DRP). M0-7B M0-37 Fire Water Pumps: P-9A, P-9B and P-41 (Monthly Operability Verification)
Fuel Handling Auxiliary Ventilati.on System (Operability Verification). Special Test T-223 Component Cooling Water Flow Verification (Design Basis Accident Flow Balance). M0-33 Control Room Ventilation Emergency Operation (Monthly Operability Verification)
On December 2-3, 1990, the A-Train of the control room ventilation system successfully completed M0-3 On December 3, 1990, the B-Train surveillance was interrupted because VC-10, the refrigeration condensing unit chiller, tripped on low oil pressur Repairs were completed under Work Order 24006694 and M0-33 was successfully completed on December 9, 199 One-open item and no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identifie.
Steam Generator Replacement Project (37701) The inspector observed the containment construction opening cement pour on December 8, 199 Observations made at the batch plant and at the construction opening were as follows~
(1) At the batch plant, the inspector verified that the moisture content of the aggregates was considered when making adjustments to the batch weight, the calibration of the batching equipment had been performed, special security measures were implemented to minimize delays and to safeguard the delivery trucks, and the drivers were cautioned not to add water once the batch wa in the truc *
,.
(2)
At the construction opening, the inspector witnessed the air content test, unit weight test, and "slump" test on the first batch of cement used for the pou The equipment used for these tests was all recently calibrated. All test data was recorded on a "Construction Material Testing 6ocument" developed by the contractor performing the tests. * As a minor note, the inspector observed that the acceptance criteria was not written on the "Construction Material Testing Document.
However, the test contractor's and Bechtel Quality Control (QC)
inspectors were familiar with the requirement Bechtel QC inspectors were observing the contractor testing and cement pour at both the batch plant and the containment openin The cement pour started at approximately 1:00 p.m. and was completed at about midnigh (3)
Before and during the cement pour, the tendon guides were inspected for blockage by inserting a "rabbit" wire through the guide tubes. There was no apparent blockage of the tendon guide tube For most of the report period, welding the steam generator (SG)
nozzles to the primary coolant system (PCS) was ahead of schedul Narrow gap welding of the hot leg piping to the SG nozzles proceeded without incident. This welding process was developed by the German company Kraftwerk Unio Minor repairs were required on one of c.. *
the hot leg welds due to weld porosity near the outside diameter of the joint. Cold leg welds required extensive repair on six of the eight joints due to unacceptable porosity scattered throughout the.
weld and lack of fusion {primarily in the stainless steel cladding).
The narrow gap weld defects were removed and the piping was rewelded by conventional mean A more detailed explanation of the welding process and problems will be in Inspection Report No. 50-255/90025(DRS).
On December 7, 1990, a contractor-employed level III quality control (QC) inspector, who was reviewing the radiographic film for the
construction opening liner plate welds, resigned. After discussion between the licensee and Region III personnel, the licensee interviewed the QC inspector (by telephone) to confirm th.at there were no safety concern The record of the telephone interview documented that the QC inspector had no safety concerns and his departure was mainly due to treatment by management and the excessive hours that he was workin He stated he was exhausted and chose to resign because he was on 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> call and occasionally worked between 18 and 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> per da The inspector reviewed Palisades Administrative Procedure Number 1.0Q
"Plant Organization and Responsibilities", and found that this proc*edure provided overtime limitations that apply to both plant and contractor personne The procedure also provided a mechanism to
deviate from these limitation The inspector reviewed the approved deviation and found what appeared to be a "blanket authorization" for the SG replacement project, permitting the contractor to control overtime. This appeared to meet the requirements to permit a deviation, _however this may be a case where the spirit of the administrative requirement was not me Because of delays in the project this may not'be the only exampl The licensee was asked to review this and determine if the contractor was controlling overtime in the manner that was intended by Palisades Administrative Procedure Number I. 0 After a new level III QC inspector was certified, the film of the liner plate welds was reviewed and no concerns were identified. A Region III specialist reviewed a sample of the film without any findings. _Based on the above, it appears the quality of the liner plate welds was not compromise No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Regional. Request (71707)
Licensee Use of Overtime Based on a NRC Region III memorandum, the inspector reviewed Palisades Administrative Procedure Number 1.00 (Proc. No~ 1.00) "Plant Organization and Responsibilities**, and Technical Specification~ (TS) section 6
."Administrative Controls", to evaluate the licensee's practices and pro.grams which control the use of overtime by departments other than Operations. The controls in place appeared to be adequate to control the use of excessive overtime by all CPCo and contractor personnel assigned to the Palis~des Nuclear Power Plan The details of the review were forwarded to Region III under separate correspondenc Due to the inspector's increased sensitivity to overtime concerns and the apparent departure from the spirit of the procedures in place, the
- licensee was asked to perform a detailed review of the contractor's control of overtime. (See paragraph 6.c above.)
-
No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Training (41701)
The inspector observed a training session - on shift - for hardware/software modifications made to the fuel handling equipmen The seminar was for all operators and supervisors directly involved in the refueling proces The licensee's Training Department recorded the attendance and gave individual training to any personnel who missed the on shift session The modifications are scheduled to be incorporated into the refresher training lesson plan prior to the next refueling outag The inspector contacted the Training Department to observe the methodology used to incorporate plant modifications, facility changes and other changes into the licensed operator initial and requalification training progra The process is outlined in Administrative Procedure 11.0, "Plant Training
- Organization and Responsibilities.
The modifications and other changes are evaluated by the Training Review Tracking Committee (TRTC) to determine their impact on operator knowledge/performanc The TRTC then assigns a specific technical group to develop the lesson plan detail * The lesson plan is reviewed and then incorporated into the initial and/or requalification training cycle. The process outlined in Administrative Procedure 11. 0, appears to be adequate to capture and incorporate faci 1 fty changes into the training program No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Refueling Activities (60705, 60710)
In preparation for the upcoming fuel load, the inspector reviewed procedures; interviewed Reactor Operators, Refueling System Engineers, and Training Instructors; and toured the fuel handling and storage system The inspector determined the following:
. Weaknesses were identified in the implementation of the foreign material exclusion (FME) procedures.*. During a tour of the spent fuel pool, the inspector found a pen detached from its lanyard and*
lying on the bridge. This is in direct conflict witn Palisades Nuclear Plant Permanent Maintenance Procedure MSM-M-47, step 5. which states 11All materials used within a FMEA shall be made fail-safe or have other special precautions in place to prevent loss of confrol of foreign material.
During interviews with operators, maintena*nce, and contract personnel - it became. apparent that, in the past, formal FME training had not been adequately addressed for refueling activities. The licensee has begun to formally brief refueling contractor and maintenance personnel on FM Reactor Opera~ors will be briefed prior to fuel movement operations~ The inspector will continue to observe the implementation of FME procedures during the upcoming fuel movement operatton Management involvement in refueling. preparations was very apparen Operations, the Refueling Systems Engineers, and contractors were found to have worked closely together to design procedures which were easy to use and took all the riew equipment modifications into accoun Reactor Operators felt confident in using the procedure Around the clock coverage will be provided by contractor personnel during fuel movements to assist in any equipment problems. This will prevent lengthy time delays and enhance ALAR The inspector noted that the FSAR did not reflect the current refueling machine and spent fuel pool positioning modifications. The system engineer stated that the modifications will be incorporated during the next annual FSAR updat No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.
1 Cold Weather Preparations {71714)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Cold Weather Preparations Check List and interviewed Reactor Operators. It was determined that adequate
. measures had been taken to prevent freeze up of vital safety equipmen The licensee had reviewed the effects of the extended outage and taken actions necessary to ensure areas normally kept warm by plant operation were adequately protecte One instance of test equipment freeze up did occu During the performance of Q0-13, a test tee, located on the auxiliary building roof next to the SIRW tank, froze and caused blockag The tee was heated using a hot air gun and heat tap The test was then completed satisfactoril No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie. Security (71707)
Routine facility security measures - including control of access for vehicles, packages, ahd personnel - were observed *. Performance of dedicated physical security equipment was verified during inspections in various plant areas. The activities of the professional security.force in maintaining facility security protection were occasionally examined or reviewed, and interviews were occasionally conducted with security force member Additionally, the inspector discussed the increased potential of threats to plant security based on the situation in the Persian Gul During the week of November 26, 1990, a regional security specialist inspected the site security system The inspector's conclusions were detailed in Inspection Report.No. 50-255/90037(DRSS).
During this report period, a contractor supervisor tested positive during random drug testin The individual's access authorization was revoked and a telephone notification to the NRC was made pursuant to 10 CFR 26.73(a)2(ii).
Any additional information pertaining to this subject will be discussed under separate corr~spondenc No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identJfie. Allegation (92705)
On December 12, 1990, the inspector received a telephone call alleging maintenance procedure violations and the fear of punitive measures if these concerns were brought to management's attention. This information was forwarded to Region III. Any additional information pertaining to this subject will be discussed under separate correspondenc No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Reportable Events (92700, 92720)
The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Report (LER) by means of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of record The review addressed compliance to reporting requirements and, as applicable, that immediate corrective action and appropriate action to prevent recurrence had been accomplishe *
(Closed) LER 255/90013:
Overtime Limit Exceeded Due To Scheduling Oversigh The event occurred due to personnel error by a licensed Shift Engineer and an Operations Scheduler for failing to recognize that Technical Specification overtime limits had been exceede Technical Specification overtime limitations are currently part of the Operations Training Progra To prevent recurrence, this event *was added to the* training as an example of unauthorized exceeding of overtime limit The quality of the individual work was not affected by the additional hours on shif No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.
Quarterly Management Meeting On Novembe~ 28, 1990, a quarterly management meeting was.held in the NRC Region III office - with the personnel indicated in Paragraph 1 in attendance - to discuss the steam generator replacement project, restart test plan, safety injection and refueling storage tank repairs, and status of engineering self-assessment. Questions were raised by Region III personnel that the licensee has agreed to evaluate.. Particular items included in the discussion were as follows:
- Should the startup test program include a requirement for natural circulation testing (Open Item 255/90039-02(DRP)). Should the startup test program include a requirement for auxiliary feedwater hammer testing (Open Item 255/90039-03 (DRP)). Should system measurements be made during the next cooldown to determine effect of the thermal cycle on the modifications (Open Item 255/90039-04(DRP)). Does the Safety Injection and Refueling Water (SIRW) tank flooi plate flexing induce stress on the pipe penetration welds that will affect the tank seismic certification (Open Item 255/90039-05(DRP)).
Four open items and no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identifie.
Management Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee repre-sentatives - denoted in Paragraph 1 -
on January 11,, 1990 to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio In addition, the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents.or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection was also discusse The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.
Highlights of the exit interview. are discussed below: Strengths noted:
(1) Trending of diesel generator start times using a single air start motor (paragraph 5.a).
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(2) Special security measures taken to minimize delays for the cement delivery trucks' access to the protected area (paragraph 6.a (1)).
b~
Weaknesses noted:
(1) Communicatians -
Improper valve line up resulting in contaminated water spill (paragraph 3.b).
Timely posting of elevated dose rate area in containment (paragraph 3.c (1)).
(2) Overtime Practices -
Outage Shift Manager unauthcirized approval to exceed overtime limits (paragraph 3.d).
Apparent "blanket authorization" to exceed overtime limits
{paragraph 6.c). The five Open Items were discussed:
(1)
(2)
Diesel generator (DG) surveillance in the "as found" condition (paragraph 5.a.). The licensee was asked to review the DG starting methodology to determine if problems with the air start system are being maske The last four were questions raised during the November 28, 1990 Quarterly Management Meeting (paragraph 14). Th~ licensee acknowledged receipt of Region III allegation review board evaluation of the allegation {paragraph 12).
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