IR 05000255/1990021

Safety Insp Rept 50-255/90-21 on 900828-1010.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Maint,Fire Protection,Security,Allegations,Mgt Meetings & Public Meetings

ML18057A543
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	10/24/1990
From:	Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18057A542	List: IR 05000255/1990021 ML18057A541
References
50-255-90-21, NUDOCS 9011010307
Download: ML18057A543 (16)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR R~GULAJORY COMMISSION Duck~t Ne. 50-255 C~nsumers Power Company ATTN:

David P. Hoffman Vice President Nuclear Operations 1945 West Pdrnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 Ger, t 1 emen:

REGION Ill 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 n(,-1,

~

1~:~.*-.'

I.I : ~

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messr J.* K. Heller, E. R. Schweibinz, B. E. Holian and J. F. Schapker during

• .the period of August 28 through October io, 1990, of ~ctivities at the Palisadei*Nu~lear Generating Plant authorized bj NRC Provisional Operating License No. DPR-20 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. G. B. Slade an~ others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consi~ted-of a selective examination of procedures and representative_ records, ob~ervattons, and interviews with personne No violations of NRC reqtiirements were identified during the course of this inspectio In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter, the enclos~d inspection report and your re~ponse will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo *

We will glad1y discuss any questions you have concerning this inspectio

Enclosure:

Inspectibn Report No. 50-255/90021(DRP)

See Attached Distribution 9011010307 901024..

PDR ADOCK 05000255 G

PNU

Sincerely,

µarl-Brent Clayton, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2

Consumers Power Company Distribution

REGION III'

Report No. 50-255/90021{DRP)

Docket No. 50-255 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:

Palisades Nuclear Generating Plan Inspection At:

Palisades Site, Covert, MI*

Inspection Conducted:

Augu~t 28 through Octbber 10, 1990 Inspectors: J. K. Heller J. F. Schapker E. R. Sthweibinz B. E. Holian Approved

/1

~

Cb7 r(__ -h v-By:

B. L. Burgess, Chief

Reactor Projects Section 2A DATE

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Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 Inspection on August 28 through October 10, 1990 (Report No. 50-255/90021 ( DRP))

Areas Inspected:

Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of: actions on previously identified items; plant operations; maintenance; fire protection; security; allegations; management meetings;

• public meeting and, NRC Region III requests. No:safety Issues Management System (SIMS) items were reviewe..

...

Results: Of the 9 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. A new open item was identified and is discussed in paragraph 3.g, pertaining to the Safety Injection & Refueling Water Storage Tan Strengths and weaknesses *are discussed in paragraph 13, 11Exit Interview

• DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company.

• P~ Hoffman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

1. • G. B. Slade, Plant Gen~ral Manager

• R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager

• D. J. VandeWalle, Technical Director R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager

• k. M. Haas, Radiological Servi~es Manager

• J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent R. B. Kasper, Mechanical Maintenance Sup~rintende~t K. E. Osborne, Systein Engineering Superintendent R. M. Brzezinski, I&C Engineerin~ and Maintenance Superintendent L. J. Kenaga, Health Physics Superintendent C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer

D. J. Malone, Plant Projects Supervisor

1. W. L. Roberts, S~nior Licensing Analyst

• K. A. Toner, Plant Projects Superintendent

• L~ Seama~s, Projects Engineer Nuclear Regulatory Commission.(NRC)

• Brent Clayton, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2

• B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A

1. • J. K. Heller, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes some of those present at.the Management Meeting on August28, 199 * # Denotes some of thos~ present at the E~it Interview on October 12, 1990 *

Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force~ were also contacted during the inspection perio.

Actio~s on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702) (Closed) Deviation (255/90008-0l(DRS)):

Corrective action to resolve violation (255/88022-01) was not implemente The licensee's previous corrective action commitment for verification of misplugged tubes in the "A" and "B" steam generators was not complete The licensee committed to perform a 100% visual verification of tube plugs to assure all plugs were in the correct location. This commitment was made to

• resolve the number of tube plugging discrepancies (misplugged tubes, defective plug welds, and incomplete plug welds) which *

had been identified since 198 The NRC inspector reviewed documentation stating that the licensee had reviewed the video tapes which confirmed correct plugging with the exception of

those areas where video quality or obstruction prevent confirmation. *All steam generator tubes were confirmed except 16 in 11A 11 steam generator and 12 in 11 8 11 steam generator cold leg The NRC inspector agteed with the licensee's reasons for not performing a special visual inspection for 28 tube The reasons included: the plant operational status (80 percent power) at the time of the deviation; the near-term replacement of the steam generators; leak before break analysis (tube leak prior to failure); the administratively red~ced leak rate requirement (.1 gpm over a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period); and, the large man-rem exposure required to perform the inspectio The inspector also noted that cold leg entries were made due to other tube leaks and therefore, reduced the rationale for not performing.a remote v~sual scan of the 28 tub~s not previously v.erifie (No number assigned)

The licensee notified the inspector that commitments documented in Inspection Report No. 50-255/89032(DRS),

paragraph 2.B, concerning replacement of control rod drive housings was being revised due to scheduling problem The

.

inspector reviewed the revision and concluded that the change did not affect plant operations or the safety of the publi Discussions with *licensing personnel concluded that the-licensee is aware of NRC commitment (tlosed) Open Item (255/88017~01(DRP)): Not doing a sudden or gradual air pressure loss test~ This subject matter is captured by an INPO SOER that the licensee has committed to implemen This item is administratively close~. (Closed) Viol~tion (255/89009-0l(DRP)):

Failure*to perform a between-the-seal test of the escape hatch after each us The licensee response stated that a letter would be sent to NRR requesting permission to perform an alternate test to prove hatch operability. This letter was sent and is currently being

.reviewed by NRR (TAC number 77493). Additiqnal questions pertaining td this violation will be addressed by separate.

correspondenc This item is administratively closed..

No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.

Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 427_00, 60705, 61701)

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Routine facility operating activities were observed as conducted in the plant andfrom the main control roo Plant startup, steady power operation, plant shutdown, and system(s)* lineup and operation were observed as applicabl The performance of: Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, Shift Engineers, and Auxiliary Equipment Operators was observed and evaluate Included in the review was procedure use and adherence,

records and logs, communications, shift/duty turnover, and the degree of professionalism of control room activitie Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made' to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitoring systems and nuclear reactor protection systems, as

_

-applicabl Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducte Proper return to service of selected components was verifie Genera 1 The unit began the reporting peri6d at 80 percent powe On September 15, 1990, the licensee removed the unit from service -

to start a 150 day outag The major objectives were:

refuel the reactor; replace steam generators; rebuild the condenser; replace high ptessure feedwater heaters and drain coolers; and, perform generator ~nd low pressure turbine maintenance as well

• as other major modification and maintenanc Other activities included Technical Specification testing and special testing to

• verify plant performance after all the changes to the plan CFR 50.72 Notifications

• \\

(1) Spurious Start of the -"C 11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump On August 28, 1990, a spurious start of the 11C 11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump occurre At the time, plant configuration control personnel were verifying wiring configuration in the activation cabinet. The personnel were interviewed but they could not identify how their activity caused the activatio The licensee verified that the pu~p start wa not the result of equipment failure or a valid start s i gna Based on the above, the licensee secured, the pump and reset the activation logic. The inspector h~s no additional questions at this time but will revisit this topic when the LER 255/90014 is reviewe (2)

Excessive leakage from penetration MZ-69 during local leak rate testing *

On September 25, 1990, the licensee made a 10 CFR 50.72 telephone notification to the NRC when local leakrate testing for penetration number 69 exceeded the administrative limit by approximately 2000 cc/mi To date, the combined total -for all penet~ations has not ~xceeded.6 La which is_ one of the reporting threshold The licensee was reminded that if a-conservative 10 CFR 50.72 telephone notification ~as made then it is appropriate to resolve the matter by retracting the notification by the 10 CFR 50.72 telephone network *

.*

• Temporary Modificati.on 90-110 The inspector reviewed Temporary Modification 90-110

"Reconnection of the Loop 2B Cold Leg Drain Line.

The drain line was reconnected to facilitate draining of the primary*

coolant syste However, the isolation valves (two in series)

leake To minimize the leakage, dual hose clamps were installed. The safety review check sheet and the safety analysis attached to Temporary Modification c90-110, addressed reduced primary coolant system inventory operations but was silent wit~ respect to refueling operations. The i~spector discussed this aspect with the NSSS system supervisor. The*

supervisor was able to show that refueling operations had been considered but not documented on the safety analysi The supervisor agreed to revise the analysis to address the refueling mode of operation and another minor question pertaining to code classification. The inspecttir reviewed the change arid does not have any additional questions pertaining to this matte * * Tours**

(1)

The door from the east safeguards room to the cable tendon passageway had multiple signs none of whi.ch addressed the reason the door should remain shu The inspector op~ned the* door and reported his observations to operations

• managemen They expressed concern that a potential flood path may exist from the passageway to the safeguards room

• if any depth of water is.in the passageway; no signs identified thts proble The inspector expressed concern that the dominant sign on the door may not iidequately express the personnel and equipment problems that may occur when the door is opened. During a subsequent tour the inspector 'found that the clutter of signs was resolved, and only one sign

• remaine The inspector also noted that the door to the west safeguards room is also cluttered with signs. This was discussed with the licensee and they were requested t review it during their next monthly tou (2)

The wooden guard rail, installed on the concrete retain1ng wall next to the containment, wo~ld deflect~approximat~ly three inches when a slight pressure was app Tied by the inspector~ The inspector expressed concern to the safety officer that.the guard rail may create a false sense of securit During a subsequent tour, the* inspector noted that the wooden guard rail had been replaced with a metal on (3)

During a tour of the turbine building, the inspector observed a flame cutting evolution that did not appear to have fire retardant material properly placed to protect adjacent materia In this case, the inspector observed

(4)

(5)

(6)

sparks occasionally landing on one of the two operating main feedwater pumps and adjacent cable trays. This was discussed with.the shift engineer and the system engineer; additional flame retardant material was installed t protect adjacent equipment. See paragraph 5,"Fire Protection" for additional discussion on. this subjec The inspector noted that the license~.installed plywriod barriers in high traffic areas to protect sensitive instruments that, if bumped or disturbed in any way, could cause a plant transient. The. barriers were in place

. while staging activities were performed during plant operation *

• During a tour 6f the tendon detentioning house, located near the Safety Injection and Refueling waster storage tank, the inspector observed a near misswhen the dead leg of a chain fall fell approximately 100 feet and landed in the housing between two individuals. This information was-provided to the safety office Tours of the turbine building, auxili&ry building and the containment revealed extensive outage activity and a lot of clutte To monitor and control outage work activities *the licensee has established the positions of shift manager and area coordinator The personnel report to the outage manager and are responsible for.the outage sthedule and controlling the flow of activities. Review of the manager's and coordinator's logs indicate that plant cleanliness is a consistent concern and appears to be a driving force in maintaining control of the clutte Refueling ActiVities The inspector.observed refueling activities from the contro room, spent fuel p6ol and containmen The inspector verified that: shift manning was in accordance with the Technical Specifications; vessel arid fuel pool water levels were in accordance with administrative limits; fuel pool and vessel boron concentration were above Technical Specification minimum concentration; l/M plots were used during cont~ol rod movement; refueling containment integrity was in effect; fuel accountability methods were in place; convnunication between work stations was functional; refueling floor and fuel pool radiation monitors were operational; and loose object control was in

• effec Prior to this refueling outage, modifications to the fuel transfer trolley and both refueling bridges were complete Both bridges were modified to include computer generated interlocks that control horizontal movement of the bridges and vertical speed of the mast and grappl In addition, either bridge can initiate movement of the transfer trolle Interviews with the operators indicated that

the modification enhanced the fuel transfer proces The inspector noted that the operators were quite comfortable with the modifications and there were no expressed concerns about the f. * Spent Fue 1 Pao 1 Hea:t -Exchanger Tube Leakage On October 7, 1990, the licensee determihed that one or both of the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers have tube damage as evidenced by an increase of water in the Spent Fuel Poo The leak was determined to be a maximum of 25GPM and was reduced to approximately 17 GPM by manip_ulating the Component Cooling Water Syste Heat loads in the Spent Fuel Pool required a source of coolin To secure the leak, a spool piece was installed which directed Spent Fuel Pool water to the Shutdown Cooling Syste The Shutdown Cooling System was not required to support the Primary Coolant System because the reactor.

was completely defuele An existing procedure (SOP 27).was

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utilized to control the spool piece i~stallation *. Prior to use the procedure was reviewed and modified to assure that cut~ent plant conditions were addresse *

During this event the licensee monitored the Spent Fuel Pool level and boron concentratio The level was maintained by draining to the Safety Injection and Refueling Water (SIRW)

storage tank and the boron concentration was monitored and maintained above the administrative limit of 1800 pp The inspector does not have any additional concerns related to*

this issu Safety Injection and Refueling Water Storage Tank Leakage

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On October 8, 1990, the licensee discovered that the rest room located adjacent to the control room, was contaminated with water leaking from the roo The water also leaked to the cable spreading room located below the rest roo ~ sample of water showed similar isotopes to those found in the SIRW tank. The SIRW tank is located above the control roo Initial investigation did not find any structural problems with the SIRW or piping connected to the SIR It was also unclear if recent SIRW tank activities (draining the refueling cavity to the SIRW or transfer of water from the Spent Fuel Pool to the

SIRW tank) resulted in a tank overflow. A review of chart recorders for the SIRW tank level instruments did not indicate that the SIRW had been overfille The licensee has drained the tank to facilitate inv~stigation and repair. The SIRW tank was not required to support the current mode of opetation and will not be required to support plant operations for approximately 60 day The licensee investigation is continuing and will be documented on Deviation Report 90-24 The cause of the leakage is an open item pending completion of the licensee evaluation (Open Item 255/90021-0l(DRP)).

7 Improper Documentation of Work Assignments The licensee informed the inspector that personnel failed to properly perform and document assigned work assignment Disciplinary action was taken against the individuals. This information was provided to Region III. Additional questions on this subject will be relayed by separate correspondenc One open item and no violations, deviations, or unresolved items were identifie.

Maintenance (62703, 42700) *

Maintenance activities in ~he plant were routinely inspected, including both corrective maintenance (repairs) and preventiv maintenance.. Mechanical, ~lectrical, and instrument and control group maintenance activities were included as availabl The focus of the inspection was to assure the mainteriance acttvities reviewed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures,.

regulatory guides and industry codes.or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following-items were considered during this review: the Limiting Conditions for Operation were me while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were*

obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicabl The following activities were inspected: Drilling, s~w and wire cutting of the containment construction openin The inspector verified th~t controls were implemented that pre~ented a breach of the containment inner linet until after the reactor was defuele Tendon 1 i ft-off, detent i oni ng and. tendon remov_a 1 per PSC procedure F&Q 1.0, 2.0 and Removal of eight main steam relief valves for testin For three of the valves (RV-0724, RV-0723 and RV-0718) the inspector reviewed the work order The inspector did note that a work platform was erected on the piping below the valve Part of the platform was resting on the main steam.atmospheric relief line. This was discussed with the shift outage manage During a subsequent tour, the work platform was remove Votes testing and envi~onmental electrical qualification (EEQ)

maintenance of VOP-0760 per WO 24004347 Implementation of Facility Change 865 per WO 24004302 No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie '..

• • Fire Protection (71707, 64704)

Fire protection program activities, including fi~e pr~vention and other activities associated with maintaining capability for early detection and suppre$sion of postulated fires, were examine Plant cleanliness, with a focus on control of combustibles and on maintaining continuous ready access to fire fighting equipment and materials, was included in the items evaluate.

On September 1, 1990~ and approximately a week later, a fire was reported between a concrete wall and the main condense In addition, a third fire occurred while cutting an access way for the new access control to the auxiliary buildin The fires were extinguished within ten minutes and none required assjstance of an offsite fife departmen At the*

Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) the managers issued a stop work o~der for hot work activities inside the protected area, excluding the fabrication are The stop work was in effect for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to provide additional trairiing/briefing on the requirements co~tained in th~ fire protection implementing procedure A common element in each of the fires was that combustible material was in an out-of-the-way area and not readily visible. The licensee investigation.determined that the fire protection implementing procedures were adequate to control hot work activities. The problem was in the implemerttation of the program. This was confirmed by a QA audit that found additional examples of improper *

implementations. The licensee cofrective action appears appropriate. *

Implementation of the fire protection implementation program is continuously reviewed by the inspecto Any additional problems will be discussed in future inspection report No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items we~e identifie.

Security (71707)

Routine facility security measures, including control of access for vehicles, packages and personnel, were observe Performance of dedicated physical security equipment was verified during inspections in various plant area The activities of the professional security force in maintaining facility security protect.ion were occasionally examined or reviewed, and interviews were occasionally conducted with security force members. *

• The licensee informed the inspector that a security officer was found inattentive at a post; the officer was removed from dut This information was provided to a Region III security specialis If additional inspection is required, it will be documented by a**

future inspection repor During a tour of the turbine building, the inspector observed signs indicating that removal of the sign would result in a violation of the security plan. The inspector was informed that the signs are in locations where planned modifications will breach a vital or protected area boundary and is one of the measures to assure that security compensatory measures are implemented when the boundary is breache No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.

Inservice Inspection (ISI) (73051)

a.*

Genera 1 The NRC inspector reviewed the second ten-year ISI. Plan for the second period, second outag The ISI Plan conforms to the

.American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure VesseJ Code,Section XI, 1983 Edition, Summer 1983 Addend Relief req~ests in accordance With 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5)(iv) had been applied for and accepted by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for those inservice

examinations the licensee was unable to perform. The services of an Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) were procured and the ISI procedures, personnel certifications, and examination data were reviewed by the ANI The licensee is in the process of steam generator replacement during this oOtag Preservice examination of replacement steam generators was observed by the NRC inspector, i nc.ludi ng eddy.

cu~rent examinations of steam generator tubes (reference NRC Inspection Report No. 50-255/90012(DRS)). Procedures and Documentation Rev~ew (73052, 73755)

the NRC inspector r~viewed documents relatin~ to the following:

Ultrasonic instruments, calibration blocks, transducers and *

ultrasonic examination (UT) couplant certification Liquid penetrant material ~ertification Eddy current equipment certifications *.

. Non~destructive examination (NDE) personnel certifications in accordance with SNT-TC-l NDE procedures utilized for IS ~

NDE calibration and examination re~ort Documentation of the above ~omplied with the ASME Code and regulatory requirement Observation of Work Activities (73753, 73755)

. The NRC inspector observed work and discussed examinations with NDE examiner These observations included observation of calibrations and examination. performance, and review of documentation of the ND Liquid penetrant examination of emergency core cooling pipin *

Visual examinations of pipe hangers and restraint Preservice UT examinations of steam generator vessel weld Preservice eddy current examination of steam generator tube The preservice results were documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-255/90012(DRS).

The licensee's NOE activities complied with the applicable procedure and ASME Code requir~ment No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.

Safety Assessment/Quality Verification (35502, 40500)

9.

The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight activities, in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection, was evaluate The results of licensee auditing and corrective action programs were rbutinely monitored by attendance at Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) meetings and by review of Deviation Reports, Event Reports, Radiological Incident Reports, and security incident report As applicable, corrective action program documents were forwarded to NRC Region III technical specialists for information and possible followup evaluatio Deviation Report D-PAL-90-192, 11 Hilti Kwik Bolt Drill Bits,

• documented that a vendor incorrectly mixed a new style drill bit with an old style drill bit and shipped the bits to the site. If a new style bit was used with an old style bolt, the potential exists for a reduction in anchor bolt strength.* The reviewer had marked no in the block for reportable under 10 CFR 21 and stated that, "Surry and North Anna have apparently reported this issue.

The inspector reviewed the Administrative Procedure (AP 3.03, attachment 12) that implements 10 CFR 21 and found a potential weakness, in.that, the licensee can use another utility's 10 CFR 21 report as adequate notification to the commissio The inspector pointed out that if the other utility's 10 CFR 21 did not include Palisades as a recipient, then an adequate notification regarding Palisades was not mad This would require Palisades to make a 10 CFR 21 notification. The licensee agreed to revise AP 3.03 to resolve the weaknes The inspector was subsequently informed that Surry & North Anna had not made a 10 CFR 21 report, and this information was discussed with the license The licensee's evaluation of the Hilti Kwik bolt drill bits had not been completed at the conclusion of this inspection perio No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie Region III Requests (92705) Mr. E. G. Greenman memorandum dated August 21, 1990, requested a review of the licensee administrative controls for mid-loop or reduced inventory activities (Generic Letter 88-17) prior to

entering that conditio The inspector verified that procedures are active and in use for the following:

containment.closure capability; reactor coolant temperature control is representative of core exit condition~; redundant reactor coolant level indication is oper~ble; controls are in place to avoid reactor coolant perturbations; two means of inventory addition are available; appropriate size vent path is available when nozzle dams are installed; and, backup power-is available if the primary source is lost. All of the above, except redundant level indication, is contained in GOP 14, 11Shutdown Cooling Operations

• The redundant level indication is being installed this outag An attachment to GOP 14 provides an easy reference for the majority of the items by specifically stating how the items are implemente In addition, a second attachment provides a listing of degraded containment penetrations and what actions are required to declare the penetration operable *

. Mr. Edward G. Greenman memorandum dated September 26, 1990, requested that the resident inspector review the breathing air system and. determine if nitrogen could be introduced while breathin~ air was in use. Apparently the potential existed at another plant since instrument air, with a.nitrogen gas backup supply, was used as breathing ai This subject was discussed with the System Engineering Section Supervisor who stated that the service air system is used for breathing air and the service air system does not directly have a nitrogen backup suppl However, instrument air does* have nitrogen backup bottles for certain critic~l component The bottles are regulated at a lower pressure than instrument air and are isolated from instrument air by check valves. The.integrity of the check valves is confirmed by surveillance* test on a refuelirig frequency..

The instrument air.and service air are interconnected because the two systems share common piping connected to the three air compressor In addition, the inspector interviewed the diving contractor

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(underwater construction) to determine if a plant air supply is used for breathing equipmen The contractor stated that they supply thei own primary and backup supply. This information was provided to

• Region II Any additional questions will be addressed by separate correspondenc No violations, deviations, unresolved or open items were identifie.

P*ublic Meeting (94703)

On August 29, 1990, the inspector attended a public meeting at Palisades

. Park, hosted by Mr. Ross Jones, a Palisades Park residen The park

.is located-approximately four miles south of the plant and is a subdivision where the majority of the people are *summer resident The plant manager was the principle speake Also in attendance was the Director of Safety and Licensing, the Public Affairs Director and a member of the pres The subjects addressed pertained to dry storage of spent fuel, steam generator replacement activities,

• thermal discharge to the lake and other general t6pics ~f interest.

. Informal feedback from Mr. J6nes indicated that the meeting was informative, productive and positiv.

Management Meeting (30702}

On August 28, 1990, a management meeting was held at the Palisades plant between Consumers Power and Region III, with members of the State Public Service Commission in attendanc The agenda covered: the steam generator replacement project; the Pali.sades Generating Company; a recently complet~d Engineering De§ign Self Assessment; op~ration topics of *

interest; and, general topics of interest. Region III concluded that.

these meetings are valuable because they maintain the. lines of communication between Consumers Power and NRC Managemen The licensee agreed and expressed an interest to conduct the next meeting in Region III to permit an expanded NRC attendanc.

Open Items Open Items are matters which have been discusied with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some actibn on the part of the NRC or licensee or.bot An Open Item disclosed during the inspection is ~i~cussed in Paragraph.

Exit Int~rview (30703)

The inspectors met with license~ representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on October 12, 1990, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspectio In addition. the in~pector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.* However, the licensee requested that the names of individuals involved in disciplinary action (paragraph 3.h & 6.a) not be listed on the docket *

. Highlights of the Exit Intervtew were: The strengths noted:

(1)

(2)

(3)

( 4)

(5)

(6)

Awareness of NRC commitments (Paragraph 2.bL The licensee conservativ~ approach to 10 CFR 50.72 Notifications (Paragraph 3.b.(2)).

Use of barriers tri protect sensitive equipmerit (Paragraph 3.d.(4)).

Use of outage group to control cleanliness (Paragraph 3.d.(6)).

Use of the stop work order (Paragraph 5)..

Involvement of Security in the evaluation.of work scope (Paragraph 6.b)

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'\\'" The weaknesses noted:

c~ (1)

Incomplete documentation of a safety analysis (Paragraph 3. c) *

(2)

Control of signs (Paragraph 3.d.(1))~

(3). Safety problem with guard rai.l (Paragr.aph 3.d.(2)).

(4)

Hot work implementation problems (Paragraph 3.d.(3) and Paragraph 5).

( 5)

Work platform supported. by piping (Paragraph 4. c).

(6)

Iricorrect justification for not making a 10 CFR 21 report *

(Paragraph 8).

The licensee was informed of Region III interest in the SIRW tank leak arid the expectation that this will be an item to be discussed

. at the next quarterly management meeting~

The 1 i censee was informed that the i nattent i*ve security officer (Paragraph 6~a) and the twb examples of improper*documentatio~

of work assignments (Paragraph 3.h) were referred to Region II The Open* Item (SIRW tank leak - Paragraph 3.g) was discussed and will be reviewed when the corrective action document is complete The 10 CFR 50.72 notifications (Piragraph 3.b) were discussed and the licensee was reminded of the procedure to retract a 10 CFR 50.72 notificatio The licensee was informed of the NRC interest in "High pressure to low pressure interface (Event V)" and cascading Technical

Specifications. The names of the plants:at which Event V insp~ction has been performed was ~rovided to the licensee. * *

Positive feedback from the p~blic meeting (Paragraph 10) and management meeting (Paragraph 11) was discussed. *. **

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