IR 05000255/1990011
| ML18057A276 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1990 |
| From: | Dan Barss, Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18057A274 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-90-11, NUDOCS 9006200231 | |
| Download: ML18057A276 (20) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.~ U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/90011 Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Palisades Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted: May 21-25, 1990 'iJ-{J~ Inspectors: D. Barss, Team Leader Q,;z~ ~* Foster Accompany Personnel: Approved By: B. Holian E. Hickey w~~ William Snell, Chief Radiological Controls and Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary C./ll/Jo Date Inspection on May 21-25, 1990 (Report No. 50-255/900ll(DRSS)) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Palisades Nuclear Plant annual emergency preparedness exercise, involving a review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), observation by four NRC representatives of *key functions, activities, and locations during the exercise (IP 82301) and follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 92701).
Results: No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identifie The licensee demonstrated a good response to a hypothetical scenario involving
equipment failures and a large radiological releas Two Open Items were identifie One Open Item was related to poor command/control and overall direction of the Operational Support Center and the other regarded untimely activation of the Emergency Operations Facilit * DETAILS NRC Observers and Areas Observed D. Barss, Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), Maintenance Support Center (MSC) J. Foster, CR, TSC E. Hickey, OSC, MSC, Field Monitoring Teams B. Holian, CR, TSC, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company Norm Brott, Emergency Coordinator David Vandewalle, Safety Licensing Director Ray Brzezinski, IOC Superintendent R. D. Orosz, Palisades Engineer and Maintenance Mg Phil Loomis, Emergency Planning Administrator Steven C. Cote, Property Protection Superintendent R. Massa, Shift Supervisor J. L. Fontaine, H.P. Support A. Ganrica, OPS Coordinator M. A. Hobe, Senior Emergency Planner David L. Fugere, Senior Emergency Planner Karen L. Penrod, NOD Analyst Ralph W. Doan, Sr., Plant Safety and Licensing Mark A. Savage, Plant Public Affairs Director Michael Dawson, Nuclear Training Instructor, SEP L. J. Kenaga, H.P. Superintendent Jackson Lee Hanson, OPS Superintendent Kurt M. Haas, Radiological Services Manager All of the above listed personnel attended the NRC Exit Interview held on May 23, 199 The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the inspectio. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Open Items (IP 92701) (Closed) Open Item No. 50-255/89016-01: The licensee had not provided adequate training for security personnel responding to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Also, the EDF Security Officers Kit contained unapproved, uncontrolled, non-dated instruction To resolve this Open I.tern the licensee trained security supervisors on security responsibilities and actions to activate and operate the ED The EDF security officers kit has been provided with a controlled copy of Procedure Number EOF-10, Property Protectio During the exercise, security personnel were observed to properly respond to, activate and control access to the EO This item is closed.
.. *
- Genera 1 An announced, daytime exercise of the Palisades Nuclear Plant Site Emergency Plan was conducted at the Palisades Nuclear Plant on May 22, 199 This exercise tested the licensee's emergency response organization's capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluen This was a "partial participation" exercise with offsite participation by the State of Michigan, and Allegan, Berrien and Van Buren Countie Attachment 1 to this report describes the scope and objectives of the 1990 exercis Attachment 2 describes the 1990 exercise scenari. General Observations Procedures b. This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements, using the Palisades Nuclear Plant Site Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures, and the General Office Emergency Planning General Office Response Team (GORT) Emergency Operations Facility (EDF) Emergency Implementing Procedure Coordination * The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and generally timely. If the scenario events had been real, the. actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit state and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safet Observers The licensee's controllers/evaluators monitored and critiqued this exercise along with four NRC observer Representatives of the State of Michigan's emergency response organization also observed the licensee's onsite emergency response activitie Exercise Critique The licensee's controllers/evaluators held critiques in each facility (with participants) immediately following the exercis Lead contr6llers me~ jointly the day following the exercise to discuss observed strengths and weaknesses for each f~cility and the overall exercis The NRC discussed observed strengths and weaknesses, developed independently by the NRC evaluation team, during the Exit Interview.
Specific Observations (IP 82301) Control Room (CR) Control room personnel performed well, properly responding to scenario events and determining emergency classification Participants displayed excellent exercise roleplaying and noise levels were kept low throughout the exercis Response to the initial steam generator tube leak was immediat Procedures were consulted and procedural actions verifie Knowledge of applicable procedures was evident at all time The Alert classification was properly made at 0840 hours, based on the observed (scenario) leakrat An excellent decision to isolate blowdown was delayed by the Controller to preserve the scenario timelin The Shift Supervisor requested Health Physics personnel to monitor the steam lines to assist in steam generator leak location. It was indicated that a standard steam line monitoring plan had not been developed, and this should be considere Appropriate concern over shutdown margin was displayed; calculations of required shutdown boron concentration were performed and boron concentration~ adjuste Notifications to offsite authorities were quickly and properly performed per procedure and utilizing procedurally supplied form On declaration of the Alert, the plant alarm was sounded and a public address message advised plant personnel of the emergency classification and the reason for the classification. This was very we 11 don Per procedure, assembly/accountability was initiated on the declaration of the Aler As a point of clarification, NRC guidance specifies that this action is not required at the Alert classification, but is required at the Site Area Emergency Classification, and should be discretionary at the Alert leve When the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) closed, causing a turbine trip/reactor trip, the Shift Supervisor immediately diverted the crews' attention to the emergency operating procedures (EOPs).
Operators simulated the steps in EOP-1, verifying that each step had been take Report-backs 11 of procedura 1 steps could have been more complete, but the artificiality of the exercise Control Room makes this difficul Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl * Technical Support Center (TSC) The Technical Support Center (TSC) was rapidly activated following the Alert declaratio Minor pre-staging was noted in that the group area signs had been put in plac Overall, TSC performance was excellen Plant status w.as aggressively monitored, efforts were made to find ways to mitigate the ongoing (scenario) accident, and offsite dose projection and Protective Action Recommendations were very well don Excellent command and control was demonstrated by the Site Emergency Director (SEO).
Frequent and appropriately detailed status briefings were performe A log was kept of the times the various briefings were performed, including Public Address system briefings/updates for plant personne The SEO periodically c~lled all group leaders to the main table for updates and discussion Noise levels were acceptable throughout the exercis Status boards were well maintained with current informatio Trending of selected parameters was performed (containment dome radiation monitor, charging flow, pressurizer level).
Assembly/accountability was completed, with one individual unaccounted fo It was determined that the one individual was not missing, but that his badge had been 11pulled 11 or removed from servic Security personnel should understand that accountability can be declared as complete even if a small number of individuals remain to be accounted fo It was discussed whether non-essential personnel (then in assembly areas) should be sent hom Considering current plant (scenario) conditions, and that no benefit was gained from keeping personnel in assembly areas, the decision to simulate dismissal of non-essential personnel was correc TSC staff reviewed the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) to determine if further classifications were warrante At 1046 hours, following the plant trip, there was an active discussion on declaring a General Emergency (GE).
It was rapidly determined that the steam line break was not isolatable and a General Emergency was properly declared at 1048 hour Notifications of offsite authorities were very well don Updates as to plant status, release rates, dose projections and Protective Action Recommendations were performed on the required frequenc Voice and telecopy communications were utilized for such notifications/updates, and information exchange appeared to be excellen Offsite dose projections were made at frequent intervals after the release bega Dose projection efforts were excellen Use was made of six and twelve hour meteorological forecasts, and release durations were adjusted, as were release isotopic mixes, as better data became available. Offsite field team measurements were
utilized exclusively when it was evident that releases were not fully monitored by release path monitor Field team data was utilized for isotopic mix adjustment (iodine to noble gas ratio) and to back calculate a plant release rat Dose projections were then made to greater distances, utilizing this dat Dose projection staff consulted with other groups and adjusted the default release duration based on anticipated release terminatio They rapidly recognized that Protective Action Recommendations would be based on thyroid doses (the scenario plume had a large radioiodine component).
The TSC lacks status boards to track and prioritize the activities of in-plant team Such status boards enhance team control and awareness of task completion, especially for events which require multiple in-plant team Potassium iodide (KI) authorization was made for offsite teams, but was not observed for onsite or in-plant team Communications with other emergency response facilities was goo Turnover of responsibilities to the Emergency Operations Facility went smoothl The TSC did not have a "frisker type" contamination survey meter available to monitor personnel entering the facility from other plant areas for contaminatio Habitability surveys were conducted frequently to verify the facilities* statu Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl However, the following items ar recommended for improvement:
0 Prov~de/contamination survey meter(s) at each entrance to the TS Develop a status board to track and prioritize the activities of inplant team Operational Support Center (DSC) and Maintenance Support Center (MSC) The Operational Support Center (DSC) and the Maintenance Support Center (MSC) were activated in an orderly and timely manner utilizing applicable procedural guidanc Adequate staffing was
- readily available for assignment as necessary to various response team In both the DSC and MSC, status boards were maintained with accurate, up to date informatio Logs were kept of significant activities, information and decision Radiation Protection (RP)
personnel, upon returning to the DSC, documented the results of inplant surveys on approved message form Survey results were promptly reviewed by the Radiation Protection (RP) Supervisor.
,, ** An ample supply of radiation monitoring equipment was brought to the DSC to support exercise activitie All equipment was in good working order, calibrated and, where necessary, had appropriate operational response checks complete RP Personnel also checked equipment for operability before leaving the OS Equipment removed from the OSC was logged out, to ensure retrievabilit In both facilities, DSC and MSC, status briefings were provided to keep personnel well informed of plant condition Some briefings were conducted by the respective facility leader and others were conducted from the TSC over the general plant paging system, providing information to all site personne The Radiation Protection Supervisor did an excellent job of dispatching and directing the offsite field monitoring team The teams were effectively placed to catch the leading edge of the plume and provide prompt, accurate information concerning the postulated offsite releas Habitability surveys were promptly and regularly conducted in each facilit However the results of these surveys were not reported back to the facility leade Particularly, the MSC supervisor was unsure of the habitability survey results for most of the exercis Teams dispatched from the MSC/OSC to inplant assignments made good use of installed pl~nt telephone systems to maintain contact with th;= OS Portable radios were available for use by RP inplant team These radios failed to provide an adequate communication lin The licensee was previously aware of this problem and is actively seeking a solutio Command, control and overall direction of OSC and MSC activities was margina Activities were not coordinated at the supervisor or director leve A request for a particular activity would be made by the TSC to the appropriate MSC or OSC superviso The supervisor would then select personnel and assign them the task requested and direct them to contact the Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) for Health Physics Suppor The RPS normally had no prior knowledge of the assigned tas The team members would then need to describe their assigned task and wait while the RPS arranged health physics support. It would be more appropriate and effective for the supervisor assigning tasks to also contact the RPS to coordinate Health Physics suppor The OSC Director was not directly involved with planning activities for inplant teams and was not kept informed of all ongoing activitie The OSC/MSC does not have a centralized, unified mechanism to effectively track the composition, mission or priority of all teams dispatched for inplant activitie Each supervisor.in the OSC/MSC did keep track of their respective personnel, but no overall method of uniquely identifying teams and tasks was utilize * *
The failure to coordinate OSC/MSC activities at a director or supervisor level, the failure to maintain overall direction and control of OSC/MSC response, and the lack of a unified method to uniquely identify and track inplant response teams is considered an Open Item and will be tracked as Open Item No. 50-255/90011-0 It was also observed that the Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) was responsible for both inplant health physics support and directing and tracking offsite field monitoring tea Throughout this exercise both of these functions were successfully performed by one individua However, had more extensive inplant team activities (combined with abnormal inplant radiological conditions) and an ongoing offsite radiolo~ical release been encountered, this position could easily be overwhelmed with responsibilitie Consideration should be given to reallocating some of these responsibilitie With the exception of the one identified Open Item, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl Emergency Operations Facility (EDF) The day prior to the exercise, the inspectors toured each emergency response facility for general familiarizatio The Emergency Operations Facility (EDF), which is not a dedicated facility, was found fully set up and ready for operatio Based on a discussion with the licensee, it was determined that this has been a long standing practica to prepare the EOF in advance of drills or exercise The logistics of obtaining required computer hardware from distant locations has made this necessary to accommodate scenario timeline During the exercise, the Site Emergency Director initiated activation of the EDF at approximately 0938 hour By about 1000 hours site personnel began to arrive at the EO Around 1107 hours the Emergency Officer and Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) director arrived by helicopte At 1125 hours the remainder of the General Office Response Team (GORT), who had been prestaged near the EDF, were allowed to enter the ED The EDF Director took charge of the EDF at approximately 1132 hours and the EDF was formally declared activated at 1138 hour The initial request to activate the EDF occurred sooner than the licensee's scenario developers and controller team had anticipate The GORT team was artificially delayed due to these previous assumption Regardless of the controller induced delays, the EDF was not formally operational until two hours after initial activation was requeste This untimely activation, and the fact that the EDF was set up in advance did not satisfactorily demonstrate the licensee's ability to activate and staff the EDF in a timely manne This is considered Open Item No. 50-255/90011-02.
Initially, the activities in the EDF were decentralized and seemed somewhat unorganize When the Emergency Officer and EOF Director arrived, organization and teamwork improve Once the EDF was completely staffed and activated, the emergency response organization functioned wel The Emergency Officer aggressively pursued the resolution of puzzling technical questions by appropriately using staff expertise available in the ED Chemistry support personnel were very quick and accurate at calculating the postulated clad failure utilizing the primary coolant system data provided by the post accident sample Regular staff briefings were conducted to keep personnel informed,of major emergency response action Communication with counterparts in other emergency response facilities functioned wel Communications with State, local and federal official were effective and timel Status boards in the EDF were not always kept updated in a consistent manne With the exception of the one identified Open Item, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl Field Monitoring Teams (FMT) Field Monitoring Teams (FMT) were promptly dispatched from the DSC and reported to the assigned vehicle Inventory and equipment checks were performed in preparation for survey and sample taking activities. It was noted that FMT kits need a pair of tweezer The FMTs were provided with a good initial briefings of plant status and meteorological dat Throughout the exercise, frequent updates were provided, particularly as conditions changed which directly effected the FMT 1 Radio communication between the FMTs and the controlling base, DSC (and later the EDF), were clear, concise and effectiv Results of dose rate surveys and air samples were reported in a timely manne Survey techniques and contamination control practices were performed wel The FMTs were very effective at locating and identifying the plume centerlin Environmental samples of grass, dead vegetation, roots, soil and water were obtained utilizing approved method Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was activated and utilized by State, county and utility representatives.
- Representatives of local news media were present in the JPIC throughout the exercis NRC representatives did not directly observe JPIC activitie Exercise Objectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
The licensee submitted the exercise scope and objectives and a draft scenario package for review by the NRC within the established timeframe Following reviews, minor comments were provided to the licensee regarding the scenario packag These comments were considered and revisions made to the scenario package where applicabl The licensee 1 s scenario was considered challengin The initial event, a steam generator tube rupture, was easily recognizable, but the later non-isolable main steam line break and the resulting iodine release was adequately difficult to significantly challenge the emergency response organizatio An inconsistency was noted during the exercise between data provided for ground shine dose rates and count rates for surface contamination level This inconsistency was recognized by Controllers and did not hinder player activitie Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee 1 s program was acceptabl. Exercise Control Overall exercise control was consjdered goo As in previous years, the licensee utilized a room adjacent to the Control Room (CR) for the exercise C No effort was made to make this environment similar to the real Control Roo Nevertheless, CR scenario data was effectively conveyed to the player Many of the data sheets and the scenario timeline had scenario time onlj recorded on the This made it difficult for some controllers to quickly identify appropriate data page Also, the use of voluminous and multiple tables, charts and maps for radiological data was considerably complicate Though it was difficult to use, controllers did a good job of providing correct data to players at appropriate time Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee 1 s program was acceptabl. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some actions on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot The Open Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in detail in Sections and 6.d. of this repor ** 1 Exit Interview (IP 30703) The inspection team held an Exit Interview the day after the exercise on May 23, 1990, with the licensee representatives denoted in Section The licensee presented a summary of their findings identified in the controller critique held earlier in the da The NRC team leader then discussed the findings of the NRC inspection tea No violations of NRC requirements were identifie The licensee was informed of the two Open Items previously mentioned in this report, involving (1) poor command/control and overall direction of OSC, and (2) untimely activation of the ED The licensee was asked if any of the information discussed during the exit interview was proprietar The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietar Attachments: Exercise Scope and Objectives Exercise Scenario Sequence of Events
,) SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES SCOPE PALEX 90 is designed to meet exercise requirements specified.in 10 CFR SO, Appendix E, Section I It will postulate events which would require activation of major portions of the site emergency pla Offsite participants include the State of Michigan, Allegan County, Berrien County and Van Buren Count. OBJECTIVES The exercise will demonstrate the following items as dictated by the scenario: 1. Assessment and Classification Recognition of emergency conditions Timely classification of emergency condition_s 1n accordance with emergency action levels Communication Initial notification within specified time constraints (state and local - 15 minutes, NRC - 1 hour) Subsequent notification in accordance with procedure c *. Notifica~ion and coordination with other organizations, as required (other utilities, contractors, fire or medical services) Provision of accurate and timely information to support news release activity Radiological Assessment and Control Calculation of dose projection based on sample results or monitor readings Performance of in~plant and offsite field surveys and collection of environmental samples Trending of radiological data Formulation of appropriate protective action recommendations Contamination and exposure control MI0589-0138A-TP20-TP13 ~* Collection and analysis of a post-accident primary coolant sample* Emergency Response Facilities Activatio~, staffing and operation at appropriate classifications and within specified time constraints Adequacy of emergency equipment and supplies Adequacy of emergency communication systems Access control Emergency Management Command and control with transfer of responsibilities from Control Room to Technical Support Center to Emergency Operations Facility* b~ Assembly and accountability within approximately 30 minutes Coordination with State of Michigan emergency response organization Mitigation of operational and r~diological conditions Mobilization of emergency teams Reentry and Recovery Assessment of damage and formulation of recovery plan outline Identification of constraints, requirements and organization to implement the plan Exercise Control Provision for adequate free play Accurate assessment of player performance
- If the panel is unavailable.due to modifications, the post-accident sample will be either demonstrated administratively or rescheduled at an acceptable dat MI0589-0138A-TP20-TP13 Scenario Time-0030 0000 0010 0015 0048 0210 0215 0217 0224 0239 0245 0250 0400 PALEX - 90 Sequence of Events Event Initial conditions - normal full powe Equipment out of service - non Alarms - none *
. PCS leak rate (most recent results): 0.08 gpm identified, 0.034 gpm unidentified, 0.114 gpm tota Estimated primary to secondary leak rate: 0.001 gp Control Room indications of steam generator tube leakage receive Steam generator tube leakage quantified at 50-60 gp Plant shutdown at maximum attainable rate should be commenced and an "Alert" must be declare Leak.ing generator tentatively identified as "B" S/G; shutdown continues at maximum attainable rat "B" S/G main steam isolation valve fails closed, resulting in a turbine and reactor tri On the trip, a weld cracks at the base of a "B" S/G relief valve colunm, resulting in a steam line break outside containmen The following trans-ient results in 0.1% failed fue "General Emergency" must be declare "B" S/G isolated, deliberate PCS pressure reduction com-mence Steaming path established via "A" S/G MSIV bypass valv Cooldown rate is uncontrolled and release is in progress due to steam line brea SIAS receive SIAS reset and primary coolant pump P-508 restarte S/G is empty, release continues due to differential pressur Cooldown* rate is now controllabl Fuel damage estimated at 0.1%. Steaming path shifted to "A" S/G atmospheric dump valve MI0190-0050A-TM04-TP21
.. ~* Scenario Time 0538 0600 0600+
Event Shutdown cooling system in servic Release rate at minimum due to cooldown and depressurization; recovery phase demonstrate Secure from the dril MI0190-0050A-TM04-TP21
,. ~* 0800 PALEX - 90 Narrative SullUDary (-0030) Initial Conditions The plant is at full power, at the end of core life (10.5 gwd/mtu). No equipment is in a degraded mod No alarm conditions exis Meteorological conditions are as follows: Wind Speed: 8.5 mph Wind Direction: 214° Stability: F Ambient Temperature: 65°F Primary and Secondary Chemistry: Primary System Chemistry pH: 6. 8 Boron: 105 ppm Dissolved 02 : <.02 ppm e. Total beta gamma activity: 1.43 microcuries/ml Iodine dose equivalent: 3.1 E-2 microcuries/ml Total PCS gas activity: 4.42 microcuries/ml PCS Xe-133 specific isotope activity: 413 microcuries/kg Secondary System Chemistry Primary to secondary leak rate: 0.001 gpm Offgas Xe-133: 5.50 E-5 microcuries/ml Condenser air inleakage: 4 cfm A and B S/G gross gamma activities: <5.6 E-6 microcuries/ml MI0190-0050B-TP04-TP21 1 Primary Coolant System Leak Rate (Most Recent Results): 1. Identified: 0.08 gpm Unidentified: 0.034 gpm Total: 0.114 gpm 0830-0845 (0000-0015)' 2 The* exercise begins.when a through-wall crack develops in a tube in the 11811 steam generator, resulting in a 57 gpm primary-to-secondary lea Symptoms of a steam generator tube leak are indicated in the Control Roo Expected Actions: Respond to alarms in accordance with alarm response procedure. Conclude that steam generator tube leakage is indicated and refer to ONP 23.2, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," and Site Emergency Implemen-tation Procedure EI-. SS directs plant shutdown at the maximum attainable rate (for drill purposes, 30%/hr has been selected). SS directs steam generator and offgas sampling and radiation surveys of main steam piping to determine the affected S/G * . SS assumes Site Emergency Director position and: Classifies an "Alert" per EI-1 based on "primary to secondary leakage rate >50 gpm but less than charging pump capacity." Directs public address announcement and sounding of the emergency sire Delegates actions/notifications identified in EI-1 and marked on EI-2.1, Attachment 1, including emergency staff augmentation, personnel accountability, activation of TSC/OSC, onsite monitoring and offsite dose estimate Requires the completion of the emergency notification forms of EI-3, Attachment 1 and NOD Form 316 Commences 15-minute status notifications per EI-MI0190-0050B-TP04-TP21
0845-1040 (0015-0210) Plant Shutdown continues at 30%/h The steam generator tube leak is tentatively identified as being located in the 11811 S/ No other equipment malfunctions are note Expected Actions: Complete starting of TSC/OSC and turnover of responsibilities/plant statu. Continue shutdown at the present rate, as changing flow is adequate and no further S/G tube degradation is note. Confirm "B" S/G as the affected S/G and isolate functions in accordance with ONP 2. Monitor condenser offgas for release calculations and perform confirma-tory sample. Perform PCS isotopic analysis for iqdin (0210-0215) As plant shutdown continues, the 118 11 S/G main steam isolation valve CV-0501 fails closed, which results in a turbine and reactor tri On the trip, a weld cracks at the base of a 11811 S/G relief valve column (RV-0707), resulting in a 500,000 lbm/hr steam line break outside contain-men The resulting uncontrolled cooldown and pressure transient damages approxi-mately 40 fuel rods in various core locations for a total of 0.1% failed fue Expected Actions: Complete EOP-1, standard post-trip action. Due to multiple malfunctions, EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery Procedure" will be invoked and safety function status checks complete. The Site Emergency Director will reclassify the event as a "General Emergency" per EOP-9.0, based on "Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with potential loss of third fission product barrier" (the MI0190-0050B-TP04-TP21
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fuel damage attendant to the trip will not be il[IJlediately apparent) and will: Delegate actions/notifications identified in EI-1 and marked on EI-2.1, Attachment 1, including environmental assessment, estima-tion of core damage, and backup notification to Van Buren and Allegan countie b. Activate the EOF and JPIC and dispatch utility liaison Evacuate unnecessary personne. (0215-0245) Operations continue EOP-9.0 respons Safety function status checks are performed, the "B" steam generator is completely isolated (same isolation points required for both the excess steam demand event and the concurrent tube rupture), and PCS pressure is deliberately reduced to actuate safety injection. All primary.coolant pumps are stoppe The existence of fuel damage, S/G tube rupture, and steam line break results in an unisolable release containing iodine which will jeopardize protective action guidelines to the 10-mile EPZ and which will not be capable of being stopped until the PCS is cooled below 210°F and depres-surize PCS cooldown is uncontrolled at this point due to the insoluble steam line break, until the "B" S/B emptie Expected Actions: Assess fuel damag. Provide protective action recommendations to state and local officials as appropriat. Verify adequate feedwater reserves to support cooldow. Verify SIAS functions when receive. Verify natural circulation coolin. Verify safety injection throttling criteria met; throttle and reset SIAS as conditions permi. Restart at lease one primary coolant pump when conditions permit to assist in cooldown and pressure contro. Reduce PCS pressure and temperature as low as possible as quickly as possible to minimize the releas MI0190-0050B-TP04-TP21
,. ,,.- 1115-1344 (0245-0514) Cooldown continues to shutdown cooling entry conditions; cooldown rate can _now be controlled, as the "B" steam generator has blown dr The release continues at a decreasing rate as 11811 steam generator dif-ferential pressure decrease Until the PCS is cooled below 210DF and depressurized; however, all material transferred via the 118 11 S/G tube rupture will be released via the 11811 S/G steam line brea Expected Actions: Continue to cooldown and depressurize as required to meet shutdown cooling entry conditions and minimize releas. Determine if PCS activity is acceptable for circulation outside of containment and implement appropriate radiological controls in antici-pation of shutdown cooling operation. Revise protective action recommendations as require (0514-0600) The_ PCS has been cooled to less than 300DF and is at the minimum pressure for primary coolant pump operation The release continues via the steam line break at a low rat Expected Actions: Implement plans for reentry/recover. Consider options to eliminate release path via steam line break as radiation levels and steam pressure decrease, eg, erection of temporary barriers/enclosure. Verify shutdown cooling entry conditions are me. Provide TSC/PRC resolution of technical issues, eg, waiving require-ments for continued PCP operation while on shutdown cooling to support early PCS depressurization and termination of releas The recovery phase is demonstrated when the reduction of the release rate by shutdown cooling system operation is prove + (0600+) Terminate Exercise MI0190-0050B-TP04-TP21 }}