IR 05000254/1993026
| ML20062K236 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1993 |
| From: | Hiland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062K222 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-93-26, 50-265-93-26, NUDOCS 9312210241 | |
| Download: ML20062K236 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-254/93026(DRP); 50-265/93026(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License-Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee:
Commonwealth. Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois Inspection Conducted: October 1 through November 5, 1993 Inspectors:
T. E. Taylor P. F. Prescott R. K. Walton J. R. Roton Approved By:
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P. L. Hiland, Chief 10 ate Reactor Projects-Section IB Insoection Summary Insnection from October 1 throuah November 5. 1993 (Recort-Nos.-50-254/93026..
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by theLresident and regional inspectors of operational safety verification, monthly maintenance observation, monthly survei_llance observation, engineering and. technical support, plant support, and followup.
Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified regarding inadequate corrective actions taken to prevent performance of, unauthorized plant activities.
Specifically, the performance of a heating, ventilation,-
and air conditioning (HVAC) heater test was unauthorized and consequently.-
resulted in an inadvertent actuation of the computer room fire protection system.
9312210241 931209 7 PDR ADOCK 05000254'
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Plant Operation Performance in this area was adequate.
However,Ja weaknessiin the, licensee's:
winterization checklist was identified. fInter-departmental-communication was
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poor and resulted-in two events where the verification:of a' winterization
checklist was not completed and.an. unauth'orized plant-activity!waszperformed.
i j-Maintenance and Surveillance
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Performance in this area, with one'e'xception, wasLadequate. : A hal_on; actuation j
during computer room HVAC testing-occurred.. The-test; was; performed without; i
procedural guidance or operations oversight..This; event,shbwed;a need for.
management action to address.rcot cause resolutions.
In additionn intra '
departmental communication was weak in' that. the lessons learned on high:-
pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system! surveillance were not transmitted.toD
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avoided confusion during a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)-. surveillance-
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Enaineerino and Technical Suonort'
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Performance in this area was adequate.
Licensee activities:concerning'. Generic
Letter 89-10 were progressing.
The licensee's?teamworkiand technical-resolution of motor operated valve. torque switch settings; improved from
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l previous efforts. However,L licensee ' review of Information Notice 87-10 'was1 weak.
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Plant Support
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Performance in this area was adequate. 'One emergency preparedness: exercise
was monitored during the period. No. exercise weaknesses: were = identified.
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i DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) ~
R. Pleniewicz, Site Vice. President
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- G.' Campbell, Station Manager
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D..Bucknell,. Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- J. Burkhead, Quality Verification Program Supervisor l
D. Cook, Administrative Operating' Engineer
D. Craddick, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
- J. Dierbeck, Maintenance Supervisor-D. Gibson, Master Mechanir.-
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- H. Hentschel, Operations Manager-
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- D. Kanakares, Regulatory Assurance, NRC Coordinator-
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G. Klone, Operating Engineer. Unit 1-
- s J. Kopacz, Operating Engineer. Unit 2 K. Leech, Security Administrator,
- A. Lewis, Staff Assistant' Station Manager'
B. McGaffigan, Assistant Superintendent.. Work _ Planning
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- A. Misak, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor'
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- B. Moravec, Site Engineering and Construction Manager B. Strub, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on' November 5, 1993.
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The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees including members of the operating, maintenance, plant support,. and engineering staff.
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2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707 'and ~71714)-
l The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable-logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. ' The'
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l inspectors reviewed the operability 'of selected emergency _ systems,;.
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reviewed tagout records, and verified _the proper return -to service of affected components.
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Tours of acce'ssible areas of the plant were~ conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,- fluid leaks,.
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excessive vibration, and to verify that equipment discrepancies were-l noted and being resolved by the licensee.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness condition's '
and verified implementation of radiation protection and~ physical security plan controls.
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Winterization Checklist The inspectors reviewed the licensee's winterization checklist. This
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checklist was used to verify breaker positions for-circuits necessary to prevent freezing of important components. Although the checklist was completed, the verification was found incomplete since the last page was missing. After operations completed the checklist, the checklist was then turned over to electricians for verification. However, there were no provisions for electricians to document the completion of verification. Miscommunication between the shift engineer and the electrical foreman resulted in the premature signoff of the checklist.
The licensee initiated a procedure change to resolve the issue.
The inspectors had no further concern.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities for both safety related and non-safety related systems were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures,- regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical-specifications.
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 QCEPM 200-1 Inspection and Maintenance of 4 KV 1A RHR SW Breaker WR Q09123 Replacement of 1A CRD Water Filter 1B CRD Pump Speed Changer Repair Differential Pressure Test of Motor Operated Valve 01-1301-60 Unit 2 Thermography Inspection of the Emergency Diesel Generator Potential Transformers Unit 1/2
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Replacement of 1/2 "A" Diesel Fire Pump 4 KV Vertical Breaker Inspection a.
4 kv Vertical Breaker Auxiliary Contact Problems i
A concern with 4 kv breakers was identified regarding improper clearances between the mechanical linkages and the auxiliary-contacts.
The auxiliary contacts provided various logic signals-for the operation of the breaker.
The clearance between the
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auxiliary contact operating rod and a plunger was critical to.the
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operation of the breaker.
The licensee performed additional inspections of 4 kv breakers at the request of the inspectors. Of the eight breakers inspected, three were found to have incorrect clearances.
However, these breakers were verified to operate satisfactorily.
The following is a list of licensee actions taken to ensure 4 kv breaker operability:
Plunger spacing was adjusted on affected breakers.
- The 4 kv vertical breaker installation procedure was revised
to ensure proper clearance between the rod and plunger.
Training materials provided to oporators were revised to
include methods of verifying correct clearances during-breaker installation.
The licensee contacted the vendor for assistance to avoid
similar problems in the future.
A similar breaker problem was previously identified during review of.a loss of offsite power event.
The licensee's corrective actions taken for that previous event appeared adequate.
Review of licensee corrective action will be conducted as part'of the inspectors followup to inspection Report 254/265-93024(DRS).
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l A Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pumo (RHRSWP) Failure On October 10, control room operators twice attempted to start the Unit 1 "A" RHRSWP without success..The licensee documented the failure on a Problem Identification Form (PIF 93-0348)_and wrote a work request to repair the breaker.
Inspections of the breaker and its relays revealed no abnormalities.
The 1A RHRSWP motor was removed for overhaul and reinstalled.
Post maintenance testing was completed satisfactory.
Troubleshooting efforts to determine the breaker fault did not identify any root cause. The licensee concluded that an intermittent failure may have existed but was not evident during troubleshooting efforts.
The inspectors concluded the licensee's efforts to identify the root cause were reasonable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspectors observed test activities.
Observations made included one or more of the following attributes:
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test
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i equipment was in calibration; test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements; test results were properly
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reviewed; and test deficiencies identified were properly resolved by the appropriate personnel.
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:
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Unit 1 QCOS 1400-1 1A and IB Quarterly Core Spray Pump Flow Rate QCOS 2300-5 Quarterly HPCI Pump Operability Test
Unit 2
QCOS 2300-5 Quarterly HPCI Operability Test
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QCOP 1000-9 Torus Cooling Startup and Operation QCOS 1300-1 Periodic RCIC Pump Operability Test QCOS 1400-12A and 2B Quarterly Core Spray Pump Flow Rate QCOS 6600-1 Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test a.
Unit 1 Hiah Pressure Coolant In.iection (HPCIl Quarterly
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Surveillance On October 21, during performance of QCOS 2300-5, " Quarterly HPCI Pump Operability Test," Unit 1 HPCI was declared inoperable for
i exceeding inservice testing (IST) flow rate. The IST flow data was to be recorded at a specified HPCI turbine speed..However, the HPCI speed indicator in the control room was not accurate.
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Subsequently, the licensee utilized a hand-held tachometer to measure HPCI turbine speed locally for the test.
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verified satisfactory operation of HPCI and the licensee declared HPCI operable.
In addition, vibration data was to be recorded during the HPCI test. However, by the time a decision was made as to when to record vibration data, the torus level was rising due to HPCI turbine exhaust.
It was later determined that the vibration data should be recorded about 5 minutes into the surveillance activity.
Lessons learned from HPCI surveillance were not incorporated l
during a subsequent RCIC test.
The licensee did not realize that a hand-held tachometer was required to record the RCIC turbine speed locally and that the vibration data was to be recorded about 5 minutes into the surveillance activity.
Intra-departmental communication was lacking in that useful information was not transmitted.
This event also showed ineffective management oversight to improve performance.
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Unplanned Comouter Room Halon System Actuation On October 4, the computer room halon fire protection' system was inadvertently actuated.. The actuation occurred during testing of the computer room heating, ventilation, and. air conditioning-(HVAC) in-line duct heaters.
When the heater was energized, dust on the heater surface generated smoke causing the halon system actuation.
Review of the event by the inspectors identified several. concerns:
The work performed, using a blanket work' request, was beyond
the scope of Quad Cities Administrative Procedure (QCAP)
307-14, " Initiation and Control.of Blanket Work Requests."
Operations was not' cognizant of ongoing work activities.
- Maintenance personnel performing the activity failed to notify the shift engineer (SE) and obtain proper authorization prior to the heater test.
System engineering support was weak. The system engineer
was unaware of the test being performed and was unaware of two previous instances where dust on the heater had actuated halon system in the computer and document-rooms.
Therefore, lessons learned were not incorporated.
There was confusion between system engineering and
maintenance over ownership of the computer room HVAC system.
The event identified an unauthorized performance of a plant
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activity, a lack of oversight of test activities, lack of
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communication between departments, and system ownership problems.
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Although no other safety related-system actuated, a potential existed for personnel injury. Management action to improve-control of plant activities and to prevent unauthorized performance of plant activities were still lacking.
On December 4, 1992, an instrument mechanic reinstalled a temporary alteration (tygon tubing) on a reactor vessel level transmitter without instruction authorizing the activity.
Corrective action taken was to discuss with the technician involved the need to ensure that the appropriate instructions were in place prior to performing activities.
However, this corrective action was ineffective as evidenced by this recent recurrence.
Failure to take effective corrective actions to prevent performance of unauthorized plant activities is considered a Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI (50-254/93026-Ol(DRP)).
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Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Surveillance On October 26, the inspectors witnessed surveillance testing of the Unit 2 EDG. The inspectors identified that the EDG was nct-barred over prior to operation as recommended by the vendor.
In response to NRC Information Notice'91-62, " Diesel Engine Damage Caused by Hydraulic Lockup Resulting from Fluid Leakage into Cylinders," the licensee submitted a. technical specification change request and planned a modification to allow barring of the EDGs.
The license amendment was recently approved which allowed the licensee to bar the EDG; however, the modification had not yet l
been implemented. The licensee planned to change the surveillance j
procedure, once the modification was completed, to require barring i
of the EDGs.
The inspectors had no further concerns'.
One violation was identified concerning inadequate corrective action to prevent performance of unauthorized plant activities.
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Enqineerinc and_ Technical Sucoort (37700)
Licensee Response to Generic letter 89-10 l
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l As part of response to Generic Letter 89-10, " Safety-Related MOV Testing
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and Surveillance," the licensee recalculated thrust requirements for l
motor operated gate valves. A more conservative valve factor.of 0.5 was chosen for gate valve thrust calculations.
As a result, some new l
calculated valve thrusts were greater than the existing thrust values.
The inspectors reviewed several safety evaluations generated as a result l
of the new calculated values and determined that the licensee did not
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adequately address safety support functions in some evaluations.
Subsequent evaluations, after inspector prompting, more clearly explained the function of the valves in their safety support roles. No operability issues were identified during this review. ' In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee compensatory actions for operation of the valves.
Some valves required licensee followup. actions including modifications to valve operators, to ensure the recommendations of the generic letter were met.
On October 15 and 16, the licensee adjusted torque switch settings on both units' recirculation isolation valves. This was necessitated by use of the higher valve factor to ensure operability of the valves.
The inspectors noted'that the licensee's teamwork and its technical i
i resolution of the issue improved from previous efforts. The licensee's efforts to resolve this issue, including the decision to reduce power, were considered prompt and appropriate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Plant Support (71707 and 82301)
Emeroency Preparedness Exercise
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On November 3, the licensee conducted an annual emergency preparedness exercise.
The exercise consisted of a simulated security event.
complicated by multiple component failures.
The inspectors monitored the exercise from the simulator control room (SCR) and the Technical ~
Support Center (TSC).
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The associated supporting emergency facilities were activated within
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required time limits.
Personnel appeared knowledgeable of their
positions.
Equipment required to support _the exercise was available and in a good state of repair. However, a simulator software problem forced
controllers to utilize a backup method of data transfer. Offsite
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notifications were made within the required time limits.
Briefings in l
the TSC were both timely and informative.
The scenario was technically challenging and was adequately addressed by i
the licensee.
However, the-licensee was slcw in the declaration of an ALERT from the simulator control room.
The scenario did not drive the SCR operators to properly classify the ALERT. The operators'
interpretation of the emergency action levels differed with the interpretation of the scenario creators. The licensee continued.to evaluate the scenario problems.
The above observations were provided to
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regional specialists and is considered an Inspector' Followup Item (50-254/265-93026-02(DRSS)).
One inspector followup item was identified concerning emergency action levels interpretation.
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Followuo (71707. 92700)
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Licensee Response to Information Notice 87-10 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to Information Notice i
87-10, " Potential for Water Hammer during Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps." The licensee concluded that followup actions were not required and provided an explanation to support this position.
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the in:;pectors reviewed the licensee's explanation and concluded that
the evaluation performed was inadequate and a potential existed for_ a water hammer under the stated conditions.
This is considered an
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Inspection Followup Item pending further NRC review (50-254/265-93026-03(DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identified.
One inspector followup item was identified regarding licensee evaluation of Information Notice 87-10.
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Insnection Followuo Items
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Inspection followup items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, will be reviewed by the inspectors ~ and which involved some
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i action on the part of the NRC, licensee, or both, Inspection followup items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6 and 7.
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Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the i
inspection on November 5, 1993.
The inspectors summarized the scope and l
results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this
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inspectiun report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did i
not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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