IR 05000265/1993010
| ML20044F811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1993 |
| From: | Jeffrey Jacobson, Ward K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044F808 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-265-93-10, NUDOCS 9306010073 | |
| Download: ML20044F811 (7) | |
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U. S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-265/93010(DRS)
License No. DPR-30
Docket No. 50-265 j
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Licensee:
Commenwealth Edison Company-Opus West Ill
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1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove,IL 60515
Facility Name: Quad Cities Station, Unit 2 Inspection At:
Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted:. March 16 through May 20, 1993 i
Inspector: N[ /[f2 f/JV[7 f
K. D. Ward Date
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Accompanied By:
B. Mentrow, IDNS (March 23-24, Apri-2, 26-27, May 6, and 20,1993)
L 8 'Jf-13 I
Approved B.
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J. P/ atobs
, Chief Date
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.id Processes Section
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Inspection Summar_y inspection conducted on March 6-7. 26. 30-31. April 7-9. 21-22. 29. May 4-6.
11-12 and 20. 1993 (Report No. 50-265/93010(DR5))
Areas lnspected:
Routine announced safety inspection of inservice inspection (151) activities including review of programs (73051), data (73755),
procedures (73052), observation of work activities (73753), review of the
~i erosion / corrosion (E/C) program (49001) and facility modifications (37701).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
Based on the results of the inspection, the NRC inspector noted the following:
The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to properly implement the 1SI, E/C and modification programs.
The ISI, E/C and modification personal were very knowledgeable, and
utilized state of the art equipment.
- Management was involved in the ISI, E/C and modification activities in an effective manner.
93o6o20073 93o525 i
PDR ADOCK 05000265 i
O PDR
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DETAILS j
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Persons Contacted j
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Commonwealth Edison Company (CECol fj
- H. Hentschel, Operations Manager.-
- J. Leider, Technical Services Superintendent
- R. Walsh, Technical Staff Supervisor
- T. Kuksuk, inservice Inspection Coordinator
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- R. Ruesch, Erosion / Corrosion Coordinator
- D. Kanakares, NRC Coordinator
G. Knapp, ISI/IST Group Leader l
T. Finegan, Hydrogen Water Chemistry System Engineer i
M. Mills,. Cognizant Techincal Staff Engineer j
V. Goetz, Technical Staff, ISI
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U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRQ j
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T. Taylor, Senior Resident' Inspector i
J. Shine, Resident Inspector
- P. Prescott, Resident Inspector j
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Illinois De.partment of Nuclear Safety (IDNS)
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- B. Metrow, IDNS Inspector Lambert. NacGill. Thomas. Inc. (LMT)
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i R. May, level 111-
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Pacific Nuclear Systems Inc. (PNSI)
j K. Lukin, Level 11 Sergeant & Lundy (S&LJ H. Hatcher, Project Support, lead f
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J. Bushey, Level Ill Hartford Stear Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company (HSB)
e G. Bosley, Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANil)
i The NRC inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employees.
- Denotes those present-during the exit interview on May 20, 1993.
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2.
Inservice Inspection (ISI) Unit 1 l
a.
Pr oram Review (73051)
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Personnel from CECO, PNSI and LM1 performed the ISI in accordance j
with ASME Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 Addenda.
Where
ASME requirements were. determined to be impractical, specific i
relief requests were submitted in writing to the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR). The NRC inspector reviewed the specific I
relief requests, including the related correspondence between the
i licensee and the NRC. The sampling inspection plan for addressing
L intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) included 119 welds
't and was in accordance with Generic Letter (GL) 88-01.
One
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sweepolet to pipe weld, (No. 02C-F7, 12" diameter, 0.585" thick,
stainless steel material) located in the "C" recirulation riser,
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was found to be unacceptable. GL 88-01 requires an expanded
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sample if a cracked weld is found. CECO personnel expanded the
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sample to 29 more welds and notified NRR.
The 29 welds were
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ultrasonically examined (UT) and found to be acceptable, A Quality Verification Surveillance Report No. QAS 04-93-002 of.
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l-the 151 program activities was performed by CECO qualified l
personnel and found to be acceptable. Organizational staffing for
the ISI program was found to be acceptable and the services of an
' j Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANil) were procured from Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company. The
qualifications and certifications of all inspection personnel performing ISI were reviewed to ensure conformance with SNT-TC-1A.
b.
Procedure Review (73052)
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All applicable ISI procedures were approved by the ANIl and were
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reviewed by the NRC inspector. The ISI procedures were found to a
be acceptable and in accordance with ASME Section V,.1980 Edition, Winter 1980 Addenda.
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Data Review (737551
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The examination data was found to be in accordance with the
applicable ISI procedures and ASME Code requirements.
The NRC inspector reviewed documents related to nondestructive examination (NDE) equipment, data and evaluations, including the NDE reports:
of the IGSCC found in weld No. 02C-F7. Cracking found in this weld included one axial crack approximately 0.3" long and 0.49" deep, and two circumferential cracks, one approximately 1" long and-0.10" deep and the other approximately 5" long and 0.13" deep.
An NRR approved, full structural weld overlay, designed by Pacific Nuclear Systems Inc., was welded automatically by GE personnel.
The weld overlay was approximately 41/4" long and the average thickness 0.40".
NUREG ',13 Revision 2, Section 3.2.1. provided the guidance for a long term repair. The weld overlay was UT'd l
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and liquid penetrant (PT) examined by LMT personnel and found to'
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be acceptable.
d.
Observations of Work Activities (73753)
The NRC inspector observed work activities and had discussions I
with personnel during the ISI activities.
These observations
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included the following-
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LMT personnel performing UT using the Master / Slave Video..
.i System on pipe weld No. 02K S3 in the RICI system.
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LMT personnel performing manual UT of welds' No. N4D (nozzle
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weld), No. N5D (nozzle weld), No. 32C (safe-end~ weld) and No. 32D (safe-end weld) in the feedwater system.
1he ANIl was also performing a surve:llance of these activities
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The IDNS inspector observed UT of nozzle weld Nos. N3C and
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N3D in the main steam system, pipe weld Nos. 2C-F2, 2D-F2, 2D-54, 10S-S9, S10A, 02AD-S5, 4031-5-A5 and 4031-5-A7 in the
RICI system, pipe weld No. 10AD-11 in the RHR system,'and
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No. 10S-53 in the shut down cooling system.
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LMT personnel performing PT of pipe weld No.'10BD-57 in the
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RHR system.
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The IDNS inspector observed PT of pipe weld No. 10BD-S3 in the RHR system.
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(4)
CECO and GE personnel performing visual examinations of a feedwater penetration and sparger nozzle from inside the reactor vessel using an underwater TV camera.
The tapes were reviewed by the NRC inspector.
' l No violations or deviations were identified.
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f 3.
Recirculation Pine Crack During a routine health physics surveillance, a high level of smearable l
contamination and beta radiation was observed near a pipe weld.
Visual l
and PT examinations were performed indicating a through wall crack in
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the equalizing (bypass) pipe to sockolet fillet weld No. 02-F2B. This
sockolet is located on the recirculation manifold cross tie valve No. MO l
0202-6B. The crack was approximately 1/8" long and located at the toe j
of the fillet weld on the pipe side of.the 2" diameter, schedule 80,:
.1 (0.218" thick) stainless steel, equalizing line.
LMT and CEC 0 personnel performed UT of the weld and did not detect a-crack or other recordable indication.
Ceco stated that after approximately 20 years of operation, the cause may have been by one of the following degradation mechanisms:
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Intergranular stress corrosion cracking and crevice corrosion cracking
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High cycle vibration fatigue c.
Weld defect - CECO personnel stated that because of previous.
experiences with cracked sockolet joints, the most likely cause of
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the flaw initiation was a weld defect proagated by. service induced
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stresses.
The weld was not part of the 151 scope because ASME Section XI 1980
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Edition,-Winter 1980 Addenda, based on the make up calculation, does not require ISI on 2" diameter pipe. There were three other 2" bypass pipe to sockolet fillet welds in the same area that were also PT'd by Ceco and found to have unacceptable surface ~ indications.
The three welds were repaired, PT'd and found to be acceptable.
NRR and CECO discussed the proposal of a non-Code weld overlay repair.
Replacing the pipe would have required draining the reactor vessel, resulting in a potential extension of the outage.
In addition, draining the vessel would have increased radiation levels in primary containment, resulting in higher personnel exposures to implement the Code repair.
NRR agreed with the non-Code weld overlay of the weld for one cycle of -
operation. The IDNS inspector observed the welding and PT of the first layer of deposited weld metal. LHT personnel performed the PT and UT for bonding and thickness of the overlay and found the weld acceptable.
The NRC and IDNS inspectors reviewed the NDE reports, drawings and other-related documentation, q
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Reactor Water Cleanuo System Pipino Replacement Eight non-safety related 4" diameter, 304 stainless steel, 0.337" thick welds were UT examined by LMT personnel, and found to be unacceptable.
11 was reported that all indications exhibited characteristics typical
of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC).
j The_ pipe was replaced with approximately 36' of 316L stainless. steel i
pipe and new 304 stainless steel elbows. -The NRC inspector observed
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Stone & Webster personnel performing fitting and welding operations _ and
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visually examined several of the welds. Although not required by.B31.1, a preservice 100% volumetric UT was_ performed to meet baseline inspection requirements for Generic Letter 88-01.
The NRC inspector reviewed drawings, NDE_ reports and other related documentation. A Stone
& Webster auditor was also performing a surveillance of these activities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Erosion / Corrosion (E/C) Activities (49001)
Commonwealth Edison Company began their E/C program in 1988. A
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formalized procedure and administrative controls were established to ensure continued long term implementation of an E/C monitoring program
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for piping and components (Reference NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-265/91022(DRS); 50-254/92024(DRS)).
For this refueling ' outage, Ceco selected an inspection sample of m
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approximately 31 components, utilizing the EPRI Chec, Checmate computer
program.
Of the components examined, one 8' length, 1 1/2" diameter
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extraction steam piping (drain line) was found unacceptable and was.
replaced. The NRC inspector reviewed the E/C program, procedures, NDE
certifications, data since the previous outage, and observed MQS i
personnel performing ultrasonic thickness examinations on piping
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components in the extraction steam header drain system.
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To date, several components and pipe sections have been repaired /
replaced as a result of the E/C program.
The NRC and IDNS inspectors observed Stone & Webster personnel performing fitting, and welding l
operations, and visually examined several welds being repaired in the
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extraction steam system.
The NRC inspector also reviewed work requests, drawings, weld data sheets'and other related documentation.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
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Modifications (37701)
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Core Snrav Mark 1 Small Bore Pinino Modification No. M04-2-88-103A l
i This modification was performed to restore margins of safety to i
small bore piping systems that were subject to Mark I hydrodynamic
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loads not considered in the original design..This involved j
removal of valves No. 2-1402-7 and No. 2-1402-10 from lines' No.
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2-1418A-4"-LX and NO. 2-1418B-4"-LX and capping the remaining
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pipe. These lines were clean out and pre-operationial flushing
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lines for the 18 diameter core spray pump suction lines and were i
no longer required.
In addition, HPCI line No. 2-2315-4"-LX was
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rerouted to bring this sub system within design margins specified
for torus attached piping.
This modification was designed in accordance with ASME Section III, and examined in accordance with-ASME Section XI. The NRC and IDNS inspectors observed Stone and
.l Webster personnel performing fitting, cutting and welding operations, and visually examined several welds.
The NRC and IDNS inspectors also reviewed work requests, drawings, weld data sheets and other related documentation.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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b.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Coolina Pioina Modificatio_n j
No. M04-2-88-103C-This modification was to qualify the RHR piping. system for J
increased temperatures, and bring the piping system within Code design margins as evaluated by the Mark 1 Containment Report #
NED0-21888. This consisted of modifing seven existing large bore pipe support structural conponents, resetting three existing
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hanger preload settings, removing two existing supports, adding i
one pipe tee reinforcement pad, and modifing a wall penetration.
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This modification was designed in accordance with ASME Section Ill, and the components and supports examined in accordance with ASME Section XI and USAS B31.1. The NRC inspector observed Stone and Webster personnel fitting, cutting and welding operations and
.i visually examined several welds. The NRC inspector also reviewed l
work. requests, drawings, weld data sheets and other related-
documentation.
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7.
Exit Interview
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i The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in l
Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection. The NRC inspector i
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The NRC i
inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the
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inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the l
NRC inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any j
such documents / processes as proprietary.
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