IR 05000254/1993003
| ML20035A635 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1993 |
| From: | Falevits Z, Mendez R, Winter R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035A631 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-93-03, 50-254-93-3, 50-265-93-03, 50-265-93-3, NUDOCS 9303290100 | |
| Download: ML20035A635 (12) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- t ! - -i .. l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
, Reports No. 50-254/93003(DRS); No. 50-265/93003(DRS) - ! Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; No. DPR-30 j i ' licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company , Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station - Units 1 and 2 i Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL 61241 i
, Inspection Conducted: February 22 through 26, 1993 , , 3hf[Z3 Inspectors: p , , Z. Falevits ( Date l Od 84 & 3 Infra
R. Mendez ( Date i . + 3l17/O
J R. Winter C Date l Approved By: . [[c.44 C ' /R. N. Gardnet, CMef Date i Plant Systems Section i ! Inspection Summarv
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Inspection on February 22 through 26. 1993 (Reports No. 50-254/93003(DRS): ! No. 50-265/93003(DRS)) _ j Areas inspected: Announced followup inspection of previously identified EDSFI l findings conducted in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/111 and i electrical modifications (NRC Inspection Procedure 37700).
l Results: Twelve previously identified inspection findings were closed. During ! the course of the iaspection, the following were noted.
o Ceco recognized the need to streamline the modification process in late l 1991 and had initiated a comprehensive improvement program which will be
implemented in mid 1993.
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> o Quality Control was not involved in post modification tests.
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, 9303290100 930319 t PDR ADOCK 05000254 I . O PDR l i -. -
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, i i . z The Detailed System Walkdown Program and the new guidelines for ! o Calculation Procedures were considered good management initiatives.
L o . The engineers involved in the modifications resulting from EDFSI i findings exhibited dedication and knowledge in their area of expertise.
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Various programs to improve the electrical distribution system have been initiated.
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t- . ,! . f { DETAILS t i 1.
Principal Persons Contacted
i Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) { !
- R. Bax, Station Manager
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- B. Strub, Operations
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- B. Walsh, Technical Staff Supervisor i
- D. Kanakaras, Regulatory Assurance, NRC Coordinator
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- D. Craddicu, Maintenance
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- J. Leider, Technical Service l
- B. Moravec, Site Engineering and Construction
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- C. Moerke, Site _ Engineering and Construction
- C. Sepaniak, Technical Staff Engineer
- J. Burkhard, Quality Verification j!
- M. Richter, Engineering and Construction i
- M. Tucker, Engineering and Construction i
! U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (NRC) j >
- T Taylte, Senior Resident Inspector i
- P. Prescott, Resident Inspector i
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- Denotes those present during the exit meeting on February 26, 1993.
j 2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findinas ! a.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (254/910ll-OlAfDRS): 265/91007-01AfDRS)): i The EDSFI team determined that the second level undervoltage
relays were set too low.
l The licensee issued several modifications to resolve this issue.
! One modification shed several loads to ensure adequate level of-l voltage to start all required loads in the event of a LOCA. The j licensee also parallelled several power cable; to ensure adequate i voltage at the motor terminals.
In addition, the licensee l replaced the second level undervoltage relay with a more accurate l model with a 0.5% pickup / dropout ratio.
Furthermore, a desig1 ' change administratively raised the degraded voltage setpoint. A
remaining open issue involved the contribution of B0P loads and
their affect on the undervoltage setpoint. The licensee indicated
that previously, the ELMS program did not consider nonsafety l related loads in the degraded voltage calculations.
Pending NRC- ! review, this item will ' remain open.
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(Closed) Unresolved item (254/910ll-01B(DRS): 265/91007-01B(DRS)):
' The EDSFI team was concerned that the basis for assumed voltage
' levels, acceptance criteria, assumptions, references and worse-l case loading were not addressed.
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. . _ _- ..._.. _ _ __ _ . _. . ! . i . The licensee recognized that many original design basis i assumptions and calculations did not exist. The licensee ! developed procedures TID-DS-03, " ENC Technical Information for ( Engineering Design Calculations," ENC-QE-51, " Controlled Analysis i Originated by Engineering and Construction," and ENC-QE-81, ! " Review of Assumpt;ons and Judgements for Architect Engineer '! Supplies Design Evaluations." The procedures established ! guidelines to improve the quality and consistency in calculations, ! and preparation, review, and approval of calculations supplied by ' the architect engineer. During the course of the followup
inspection, the inspectors found that the design studies contained . adequate references, assumptions and acceptance criteria. This i item is considered closed.
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1 Closed) Deviation (254/910ll-02AfDRS): 265/91007-02AfDRS)): The EDSFI determined that 350 MVA and 250 MVA breakers in the 4kV ! , system could experience fault currents up to 109% (overduty) of ( < their maximum interrupting rating.
! ! The licensee corrected the overduty concern for the nonsafety 350 ! MVA buses by providing additional bracing to the buses.
For the , safety related 250 MVA equipment, the licensee planned to upgrade , the switchgear to achieve a 350 MVA rating. The switchgear
upgrade would be capable of interrupting an asymmetrical fault l current to 78,000A. The maximum expected asymmetrical fault ! current was calculated to be approximately 64,000A.
Based on ! these commitments to complete the switchgear upgrade, this item is ! considered closed.
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(0 pen) Deviation (254/91011-02B(DRS): 265/91007-02B(DRS)): EDSFI team determined that 250Vdc breakers could have a fault current exceeding their rating by 80%. I The licensee performed an analysis and determined that resistance j existed in the series starter, the thermal overload heater and the j breaker which were not included in the original calculation.
This
resistance lowered the fault current although not conclusively to an acceptable value. The addition of B0P batteries and planned-I shifting of the nonsafety loads should reduce the load on the j safety 250vdc battery. The architect-engineer will provide additional recommendations to resolve this issue.
Pending .l licensee action, this item will remain open.
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LClosed) Unresolved item (254/910ll-03(DRS): 265/91007-03(DRS)): The EDSFI determined that weaknesses such as no dynamic performance analysis, no frequency analysis and no static load profile comparisons existed in the diesel generator loading calculation.
To resolve this issue, the licensee proposed to perform a dynamic performance calculation; however, there was -little available component characteristic data to perform a meaningful study.
The
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l . . licensee added some clarifications, and addressed the lack of frequency analysis as not required since the licensee was not committed to Reg. Guide 1.9.
In addition, the licensee provided analysis on the Dead Load Pickup Capability Curve which showed loading is conservative. The licensee performed an automatic loading sequencing study which provided the most significant calculational update. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open item (254/910ll-04(DRS): 265/91007-04(DRS)): The EDSFI determined that the use of parallel DG operation to meet Technical Specification requirements created a situation vulnerable to overloading if the grid collapsed.
l The Technical Specifications were subsequently changed so it no longer required a diesel to be parallelled to the grid upon a failure of another diesel. This eliminated the vulnerability of the redundant diesel under condition of failure of one diesel.
The licensee concluded that there was a very low probability of risk of damage to a diesel during paralleling upon a concurrent LOOP /LOCA. The monthly test still parallels the diesel to the grid for approximately one hour.
During testing, that diesel will bc declared inoperable. This item is considered closed.
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(0 pen) Unresolved item (254/910ll-05(DRS): 265/91007-05(DRS)): Cable sizing at Quad Cities was established based on various industry standards that could not be identified by the licensee.
As a result, the team could not effectively evaluate cable sizing for ampacity and cable fill requi ements.
r To address this concern, the licensee utilized the Sargent & i. undy Interactive Cable Engineering (SLICE) program which assessed cable ampacity to confirm that currently installed power cables are adequately sized to carry their current. The initial licensee run J using maximum allowable current values for a given cable size indicated that approximately 90 routing points were thermally overloaded. A second run of the S! E program used actual running load currents and indicated that no cables exceeded the allowable ampacities.
However, in August 1992, an error was identified in the power / control thermal check subroutine of the SLICE program.
i After correction of the programming error approximately 901 cable tray routing points at Quad Cities and approximately 953 routing , points at Dresden were found to be potentially thermally overloaded. The licensee evaluated the worst-case routing points (with the highest overload factors) for Quad Cities and Dresden using again the calculated load current values for the power cables rather than the more conservative default current values which were previously utilized by SLICE.
This refinement resulted in a reduction of the number of potentially overloaded routing points but did not eliminate the potential for individual cables to be thermally overloaded. On November 12, 1992, the licensee took field current and temperature measurements on one of Dresden Station's worst-case routing points in an attempt to quantify the
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. _-. _ _ _.. -. , l . ! - i conservatism used in the SLICE program (see Dresden Unresolved $ Items 237/91038-05(DRS); 249/91038-06(DRS) for discussion of test i results). The licensee plans to perform additional scoping tests ! and analysis of data at Dresden and Quad Cities.. Pending licensee
experimental results, evaluation and NRC review, this item will j remain open.
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(0 pen) Open Item (254/910ll-06(DRS): 265/91007-06fDRS)): The team i observed that installed fuse sizes and types did not conform with -! the fuse sizes and types specified on design drawings.
l l The licensee has initiated a fuse walkdown program to resolve fuse ! installation discrepancies. Also, a fuse list and procedure to
control and maintain fuses has been developed. As of February 23, !
1093, approximately 70% of the known safety related fuses j ' g goximately 1725) had been walked down.
The walkdowns were ' suspended in July 1992 due to budget constraints, the licensee , plans to recommence walkdowns in March 1993. Approximately 135
discrepancies were identified of which 80 required fuse i replacement, 22 fuses had been replaced.
l , At the end of the inspection, the licensee informed the inspectors { that they had reprioritized the fuse replacement schedule and had l committed to replace all discrepant fuses recommended'by ENC
evaluations to be replaced.
In addition, the licensee stated that
more resources would be devoted to ensure that fuse deficiencies.
I are resolved in a timely manner.
Pending further licensee l walkdowns and resolution of identified discrepancies, this item ! will remain open.
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(Closed) Open Item (254/91011-07A(DRS): 265/91007-07AfDRS)): The team identified electrical configuration control and as-built j hardware deficiencies.
Examples included: (1) installed circuit ! breaker ratings differed from those specified on design drawings, i , (2) mislabelled breakers, (3) components shown on design drawing l but not installed in field, and (4) critical control room drawings ,; > i did not show as-built conditions of 125Vdc auxiliary battery.
l ! To address these concerns, the licensee replaced 16 breakers (RHR j - SW lA-lD cooler fans) with the correct type / size breakers using l Work Requests (WRs) Q98465 through Q98479.
In addition, numerous
Document Change Requests (DCRs) were initiated to correct the j noted drawing discrepancies.
In' addition, the licensee initiated ! a Detailed System Walkdown Program (DSWP)- to improve configuration
control.at Quad Cities.
Phase cae of the program deals primarily j with mechanical and instrumentat ion walkdowns of portions of i electrical systems. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open Item (254/910ll-07B(DRS): 265/91007-07B(DRS)): The , licensee had revised plant schematic and wiring diagrams to show ' proposed plant modifications that had not been installed yet in
the field. These modifications utilized the " chaining" i modification (CMOD) process. As a result, the existing electrical l drawings did not reflect the field as-built installations.
Also, i the interim document information system (IDIS) contained numerous i errors.
} To minimize and eventually remove the effects of the " chaining" i modification on the drawings, the licensee implemented the ! Engineering Change Notice methodology. To assure the as-built j condition of the drawings, a DCR is being generated at the time
the installation is completed to assure incorporation of design , changes into the original documents.
In addition, an as-built , walkdown program has been initiated to upgrade the electrical , drawings and to collect accurate Total Job Management (TJM) data.
i This program and completion of the remaining CMODs will continue
through 1994. Also, the IDIS data base has been updated to
include drawing revisions and to provide a more comprehensive ! . status of all drawings. Training in the use of IDIS has been l provided to central files and selected engineering and Technical j
Support personnel. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) kiolation (254/910ll-08(DRS)): The team identified that CR120A relays were failing due to higher than rated voltage l applied to the relay coils. The licensee failed to take prompt
corrective action to correct the identified deficiencies.
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To address this concern, the licensee replaced 115V coils with l 120V coils on all but one CR120A relay. WR Q74174 and WR Q74173 !
were completed for CR120A relays in panels 901-40 and 901-41 during the QlR12 outage. WR 003356 was issued to replace the ll5V j coil of relay 2-1705-104, which was missed during the last . repl acement.
In addition, the licensee has developed an action -
plan to evaluate all Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) items not
prioritized according to the new risk based methodology. This j violation is considered closed.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (254/910ll-09AfDRS): 265/910ll-09AfDRS)); } The EDSFI team identified numerous problems with miscoordinated ! breakers and fuses with the 250Vdc systems.
The licensee recognized the problems with a lack of coordination
with the above ac and dc voltages. The licensee was in the t process of determining the most technically acceptable design.to l ' achieve total system coordination.
Pending resolution of this ! issue by the licensee, this item will remain open.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (254/91011-09B(DRS): 265/91007-09B(DRS)): I The EDSFI team identified numerous problems with miscoordinated i breakers and fuses with the 125Vdc.
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The licensee recognized the problems with a lack of coordination ! with the above ac and de voltages. The licensee was in the !
process of determining the most technically acceptable design to .! achieve total system coordination.. Pending resolution of this ! issue by the licensee, this item will remain open.
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(0 pen) Unresolved item (254/910ll-09C(DRS): 265/91007-09C LDRS)): The EDSFI team identified numercus problems with miscoordinated l breakers and fuses with the 120 Vac- !
l The licensee recognized the problems with a lack of coordination ! with the above ac and dc voltages. The. licensee was in the l process of determining the most technically acceptable design to j achieve total system coordination.
Pending resolution of this j issue by the licensee, this item will remain open.
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(Closed) Open item (254/910ll-10fDRS): 265/91007-10(DRS)): The
EDSFI determined that there was no information to confirm l I electrical penetrations met Reg. Guide 1.63.
i Quad Cities low voltage penetrations {GE type NSO4) are the same ' type as those used at Dresden which Sargent & Lundy analyzed as ) part of SEP in 1981. Using' the same methodology as developed for j Dresden, the licensee analyzed the penetration and protection
, devices and concluded that the combination of a CR124C relay with i . CR123C1808 heater and the TEF or TEC magnetic only breaker i ' provided adequate thermal protection for the Quad Cities #10 AWG~ j
penetration conductors. The' inspectors concur with this j ' conclusion. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open item-(254/910ll-11(DRS): 265/91007-11(DRS)): -The ! ' EDSFI team identified deficiencies in documentation on the l capacity of the fuel oil system, including no consumption tests, j ! fire pumps tied to the same fueli oil storage tanks, no suction , head and vortex corrections for volume, and no tank slope ! ' correction.
j , The licensee performed fuel consumption' tests and the results were consistent with calculation assumptions.
Sufficient.conservatisms ! existed to cover any potential, volumetric losses -from fire pump
e operation, from vortex and transfer pump suction head and a slope j to the storage tank that made some amount of volume unusable.
No
further concerns exist. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved item (254/91011-12AfDRS): 265/91007-12AfDRS)): EDG fuel system components were originally classified as nonsafety and nonseismic and not all components were seismically analyzed.
, ' originally the Unit 1, 2 and 1/2 fuel oil system transfer pumps and the transfer piping were not seismically qualif 4.and the ' storage tanks were qualified to the general purchas .pecification I 0.05g requirement rather than the current Quad Cities Station safe.
shutdown earthquake (SSE) of 0.29 After performing Seismic j Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) analysis utilizing the l Generic 1mplementation Procedure (GIP), as. implemented by Quad ' Cities, the licensee concluded that the systems are seismically l
adequate to withstand the Quad Cities Station SSE. -This item is ' considered closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (254/910ll-12B(DRS): 265/91007-12B(DRS)): i EDG electrical output bus ducts may not be seismically qualified.
, a The Diesel Generator Unit 1, 2, and 1/2 systems' bus ducts were j not originally seismically analyzed. These ducts and supports are
a common configuration with a available data base from other j plants and nuclear stations. The Seismic Qualification Utilities ' Group (SQUG) analysis met all Generic Implementation Procedure { (GIP) requirements as implemented by the Quad Cities Station. The licensee concluded that the systems' bus-ducts are seismically
adequate to withstand the Quad Cities Station SSE.
This item is ' considered closed.
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(Closed) Violation (254/91011-13(DRS)): The EDSFI team determined .
that an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation had been performed' for
a temporary modification. The temporary modification required ' - . connecting motor driven compressors for testing Unit 2 containment' > ' while the unit was in a refueling outage. However, the licensee , connected the air compressors to a Unit 2 breaker while Unit 2 was at 100% power. This subsequently resulted in the failure of the 4kV compressor breaker and the occurrence of a half scram.
! . The licensee's immediate corrective action was to discontinue ! ' using the motor driven air compressor which had been connected to l . the Unit 2 4kV bus. The licensee planned to use diesel driven i g compressors-for future ILRT tests, additionally the licensee j initiated enhancements to the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations. These ' j enhancements were based on the principles contained in NSAC 125, i " Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations. This violation . is closed.
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Enqineering and Technical Support (E&TS) L a.
Desian Control / Modification Review
. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance and programs I relating to design changes and modifications.
The areas verified > t
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-. .. . . . . ! . included review and approval process, post modification test L requirements and execution, training, 10 CFR 50.59 reviews, and satisfactory completion of design requirements.
The following modifications were reviewed: (1) M04-1-91-019A - DW Cooler Fans lA-lG, fuel Pool Cooling - Pumps IA & IB, RBCCW Pumps lA, 1B & 1/2C (2) M04-2-92-006A - Power Cable Replacement - U-2 EDG HVAC , Supply Fan (3) M04-1-92-0060 - Power Cable Replacement - RHR Emer AHU 1A , (4) M04-1-92-006E - Parallel Power Cable Installation to MCC 18- > 2 (from Bus 18) (5) M04-1-92-006F - Installation of Parallel Control Circuit ' Conductors (for valves 1-1001-29A & 50)
(6) M04-1-92-006H - Installation of Transfer Logic.(to LOCA unit) for 1/2 EDG Auxiliaries (7) M04-1-92-0061 - Installation of U-2 Power Feed to the 1/2 DGCWP Cooling Fan (8) M04-1-92-006J - Installation of Parallel Control Circuit . Conductors (for valves 2-202-5A/5B, 2-1001-29A/29B/50) ' (9) P04-2-91-006H - Replacement of Degraded Voltage Relays for - Unit 2 (Buses 23-1 and 24-1) The inspectors concluded that the licensee was adequately - implementing the design control process for these l modifications / minor changes. However, based on the inspectors' , review of selected modifications and interviews with system engineers, the inspectors determined that the modification process
was cumbersome and difficult to implement consistently.
Problem
areas included completion of the following WR blocks, " Test ' Required." " Priority," " Safety Related," and " Work Instructions."
Also, Quality Control did not appear to be involved in the post ' modification tests.
. The inspectors found the modification packages to include adequate - , post modification testing. However, test procedure QAP-1270-5 did ' not provide adequate guidance to the technical staff engineers for those instances when a post modification t'st could not be i performed as delineated in the test procedure. The inspectors ' noted a lack of attention to detail for some work packages.
For ' example, the inspectors noted that the " prepared by" and " reviewed , by" sections of the final Documentation Checklist 0AP-1500-S33 ) .
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, f ! . ' were left blank for completed modification packages M04-2-92-006A and M04-1-92-019A. The work packages required that the technical ~ staff cognizant engineer and modification coordinator sign the
prepared by and reviewed by sections, respectively.
t . The inspectors determined that the present modification process l contained redundant activities. The licensee informed the f inspectors that in 1991, a Design Change Critical Process Team
(DCCPT) had been formed to improve the modification process.
The i inspectors examined the proposed improvements (consolidation of
various checklists and simplifying steps) planned to be - i implemented in July 1993, and concluded that this was a positive ' management initiative.
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Field Walkdowns '! t During field walkdown inspection of installed EDSFI modifications, the inspectors noted that the components installed in Diesel > Generator 1/2 Cooling Water Pump Transfer Starter Panel 2251-100, such as contactors, disconnect switches and mechanically interlocked breaker were not in the plant's Preventative . Maintenance (PM) program. The panel was installed in 1985.
No ! other discrepancies were identified.
Pending licensee evaluation, i this item is considered open (254/93003-01(DRS); 265/93003-l 01(DRS)). i ,
The inspectors observed the completed installation of the undervoltage relay modification. The inspectors found that the. i dropout value of one relay was set at 70% of pickup; however, the , relay setting order (R50) calibration card required the relay to be set at 99% of pickup.
The 70% setpoint was not documented on i the RSO data sheet. The licensee reverified the relay calibration j and found the relay within tolerance.
Subsequently, the licensee ? reset the relay to 99%. The vendor stated that setting the relay ( i at 70% rather than 99% should not adversely affect operation of
the relay; however, this practice was not recommended.
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Enoineerina Staff The inspectors noted that the engineers involved in the modifications resulting from EDSF1 findings exhibited dedication t and knowledge in their area of expertise.
In 1992, CECO held Quad Cities Engineering and Construction (ENC) ' Partnership workshops in an attempt to facilitate better ! ~ communications, ; identification 'of issues, and opportunities for ! inprovement between ENC, contractors and' technical staff.
The l feedback on issues that each group was "doing right" or " holding up progress" created a forum to work toward improvements.
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This , should improve support of plant operations and provide specialized { expertise to specific Quad Cities engineering needs. These were l considered to be a good management initiatives.
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Open Items l ! Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed
during this inspection are discussed in Section 3.b. -of this report.
I ! 5.
Exit Interview ! ! . The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph j
1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 26, 1993. The ! inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection ! activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.
The j inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the _ ! ! inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such i document / processes as proprietary.
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