IR 05000254/1993019
| ML20057C916 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1993 |
| From: | Hilland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057C908 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-93-19, 50-265-93-19, NUDOCS 9309300144 | |
| Download: ML20057C916 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Report Nos. 50-254/93019(DRP); 50-265/93019(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. OPR-29; DPR-30 Licensce:
Commonwealth Edison Company l
Executive Towers West III
1400 Opus Place, Suite 300
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Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois Inspection Conducted: June 29 through August 20, 1993 i
Inspectors:
T. E. Taylor
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P. F. Prescott D. M. Chyu Approved By:
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Pat Hiland, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section IB Inspection Summary Inspection from June 29 throuah Auaust 20. 1993 (Recort Nos. 50-254/93019(DRP): 50-265/93019(DRP))
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r Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident and
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regional inspectors of regional request; operational safety verification; monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; report t
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review; and events followup.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, three violations were identified in
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paragraphs 3, 5, and 8.
An example of a previous violation was also identified in paragraph 5.
In the Operations area a violation regarding the
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unacceptable material condition of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)
anc reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump rooms was identified. Also in
the Operations area, a procedural violation regarding the toxic gas analyzer (inoperability) and a missed post-maintenance visual inspection of RCIC was identified. The third violation, in the radiological controls area, regarded
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a failure to take adequate corrective actions for control of contaminated areas.
In the maintenance area, an example of a previous violation (50-
265/93012-02) regarding failure to perform adequate post modification testing l
was identified during the inspectors review of HPCI logic problems.
In the
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remaining areas, no violations were identified.
9309300144 93o922 P
I PDR ADDCK 05000254 i
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Cc9tacted Commonwealth Edison Comoany (CECO)
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- R. Pleniewicz, Site Vice President
- R. Bax, Station Manager
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D. Bucknell, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- J. Burkhead, Quality Verification Program Supervisor
- G. Campbell, New Station Manager
- A. Chernick, Performance Monitoring
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- D. Craddick, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance
- R. Dralle, Electrical Maintenance Department
- A. Fuhs, Regulatory Assurance
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D. Gibson, Master Mechanic
- H. Hentschel, Operations Manager D. Kanakares, Regulatory Assurance, NRC Coordinator G. Klone, Operating Engineer - Unit 1 J. Kopacz, Operating Engineer - Unit 2 J. Kudalis, Support Services Director K. Leech, Security Administrator
- J. Leider, Technical Services Superintendent B. McGaffigan, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning
- A. Misak, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
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- B. Moravec, Engineering and Nuclear Construction Site Manager i
- R. Norman, Sub Station Control
- M. Pacilio, Electrical Maintenance Department
- K. Peterson, Site Engineering & Construction B. Strub, Assistant Superintendent - Operations l
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on August 20, 1993.
The inspectors also contacted several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, operations, maintenance, and r
contract security staff.
2.
Operatina Experience Feedback (90700)
At the request of Region III management, the inspectors reviewed the licensee action to date in response to Information Notice (IN) 93-33.
IN 93-33 regarded potential deficiencies of Class IE Instrumentation and Controls cable. At the time of the inspectors review, the licensee had
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taken only minimal action in response to IN 93-33. This issue is
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currently under review by Commonwealth Edison Company corporate
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personnel; Quad Cities Station has not taken any action. This issue will be tracked as an Inspectie. Fellowup Item (50-254/93019-01(DRP)).
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No violations or deviations were identified. An inspection followup item was identified regarding the licensee *s review of IN 93-33.
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3.
Doerational Safety Verification (717071 The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable t
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspectors reviewed the operability of selected emergency systems, i
reviewed tagout records, and reviewed the proper return to service of
affected components.
Tours of accessible areas of the plant were conducted to observe plant
equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks,
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excessive vibration, and to verify that equipment discrepancies were
noted and taing resolved by the licensee.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions and observed implementation of radiation protection and physical security plan controls.
Observations:
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a.
Personal Accountability
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The inspectors noted a new emphasis on personal accountability at the plan-of-the-day meetings. The Operations Manager expects personnel attending that meeting to present resolutions for assigned items.
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b.
Plant Condition
During the report period, the inspectors found the material and l
environmental condition of the high pressure coolant injection
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(HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump rooms to be
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unacceptable. During a tour on July 8, 1993, the inspectors noted
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the following: the HPCI skid had a significant amount of water
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accumulation in the catch basin; metallic debris (wire and metal tags) was found under the HPCI turbine casing; a RCIC pump had a
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conduit held up by " duct" tape; a RCIC pump had small hanger clamps not attached; a HPCI drain valve gland nut was missing screws, and the rooms were cluttered with various materials left
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inside the contaminated boundary.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria l
11 states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be
accomplished under suitably controlled conditions including adequate cleanness.
Failure of the licensee to maintain suitably controlled conditions in the HPCI and RCIC pump rooms is considered a Violation (50-254/93019-02(DRP)).
Housekeeping and environmental condition in contaminated areas continued to decline. This issue was previously identified to the licensee. Corrective actions included initiation of a radiation technician housekeeping program. However, this program has not been effective in resolving the issue. This is considered a weakness and warrants additional licensee management attention.
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c.
Unit 2 Startuo During the Unit 2 startup, a hydraulic leak was observed on the header to the turbine control valves and the control intermediate valves. The cause of the leak was determined to be a crimp in the malleable hydraulic seal insert. As part of the seal replacement, the insert must be held tight and alignment maintained to preclude crimping and potential leakage. During previous replacements, no instructions or cautions were provided regarding the possibility of damaging the insert if not installed properly. The work was performed under the assumption of " skill-of-craft." The seal was -
replaced and the unit startup resumed.
d.
Hiah Pressure Coolant Iniection System (HPCI) Inoperability On July 26, 1993, while resetting the HPCI de trip logic, the light socket for " Turning Gear Reset Engage" light failed.
Subsequently, a HPCI logic power failure alarm was received. As designed, the HPCI and RCIC suctions swapped over to the torus.
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However, the condensate storage tank (CST) suction valve (2301-6)
did not close when the torus suction valves were fully open. The logic power failure opened the torus suction valves as if the CST level was low; however, the CST suction valve remained open since
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the logic power failure prevented the valve from sensing closure
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of torus suction valves. Apparently, a loose connection between
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the light bulb and the light socket resulted in arcing. The licensee identified this as a possible design p'roblem and Engineering suggested replacement of the light sockets with one having a current limiting feature. Since 1987, a total of six failures have occurred. The licensee planned to replace the 500 i
control panel light sockets during the next refuel outage. This is an Inspection Followup Item (50-254/93019-03(DRP)).
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Control of Contamination Boundarigi During the 1993 Unit 2 refuel outage, the inspectors identified a concern with control of equipment and material crossing
contamination boundaries.
Station management and radiation protection supervision addressed the issue through Heightened
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Level of Awareness (HLA) meetings and periodic tours by radiation protection technicians. During this report period, numerous instances of improper control of equipment and material crossing contamination boundaries were again identified by the inspectors.
Previous corrective actions failed to prevent improper movement of equipment through contaminated areas, or control draping of material across contaminated area boundaries.
Failure to implement effective corrective action is considered a Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI-(50-254/93019-04(DRP)).
One violation was identified regarding corrective action to establish control of contaminated areas. One inspection followup item was identified regarding HPCI control panel light socket replacement.
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4.
Safety Assessment /0uality Verification (40500)
During a previous inspection period, the inspectors identified that quality verification (QV) personnel were spending little time in the pl ant.
In response to that concern, corporate management required all QV personnel to spend approximately 10% of their time in the plant.
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During this inspection period, an increase for in-plant time of QV personnel was noted.
The HPCI rupture disc burst event on June 9, 1993, identified an immediate need for better management efforts to improve personnel performance. A Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) study was performed prior to the HPCI event. The licensee was not effective in utilizing the results of that RCM study. A special inspection was conducted to investigate the circumstances surrounding the HPCI event.
Details of that inspection effort are documented-in Inspection Report 50-254/93017(DRS)).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
F 5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities for both safety related and non-safety
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related systems were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that they-were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1/2 Construction of Berm in Discharge Bay Unit 1/2 Instrument Air Compressor and Dryer Annual Overhaul Unit 1 Condensate Discharge Header Support Replacement
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Unit 1 ID RHR Service Water Pump Overhaul Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water Three-Way Valve Unit 2 2C Condensate Pump Bearing Replacement
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Unit 2 Condensate Discharge Header Support Replacement Unit 2 28 Feedwater Regulating Valve a.
Unit 2 Main Transformer Fault
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On June 13,1993, Unit 2 was holding load at 450 MWe when a generator trip with subsequent turbine and reactor trips occurred.
The licensee determined the cause of the generator trip to be internal damage of the main transformer.
The A and C phases of the main transformer experienced ground faults. As a result of
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the generator faults, the cabinet for the generator potential transformer fuses blew open.
Evidence of electric arcing from the spark arrestor to the metal cabinet housing was identified.
In addition, results of oil samples indicated the faults were on the high side of the transformer.
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The main transformer was replaced. The licensee demonstrated a
strong team effort on the installation and testing of the
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replacement transformer. Total completion time was 17 days as
compared to 30 days for a previous Unit I transformer replacement.
Root cause analysis identified that the original transformer
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design was possibly incompatible with daily cycling.
b.
Condensate line Crack Technical Staff personnel performing a walkdown identified a leak I
(3-5 gpm) on the 30-inch condensate discharge header on Unit 2.
The leak was from a crack found in the toe of a fillet weld where a support stanchion met the process pipe. The stanchion stood
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about six feet in height and had a metal, plate to plate, sliding surface between the floor and stanchion. The crack ran a quarter of the way around the circumference of the stanchion. An
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ultrasonic test was performed on Unit 1; no problems were found.
The crack was repaired and results of non-destructive testing were satisfactory.
An engineering exempt change notice was prepared for the stanchions for both units to facilitate better support of the condensate piping. The old stanchions were removed and new bearing saddle type stanchions were installed. A walkdown of the condensate system for both units was performed. On Unit 2 a deficiency in a spring can support to a heater drain line was identified and resolved. The line on Unit I was visually inspected for possible vibration problems at low power. No further anomalies were identified.
c.
Instrument Air Comoressor
During an inspection of the annual maintenance overhaul on the Unit 1/2 instrument air compressor (IAC), the inspectors noted procedural deficiencies. A new procedure, "tiaintenance Surveillance," was being implemented to simplify paperwork. The procedure was developed for simple tasks such as changing out
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filters, fan belts, or greasing motors.
The level of detail in the procedure for the extensive overhaul of the IAC was considered inadequate.
Subsequently, a more detailed procedure was written. The inspectors reviewed the revision of the IAC overhaul procedure; the new instructions were adequate. A sample of other similar procedures were reviewed and no other i
problems were noted. Although the IAC is a non-safety component, this instance identified a need for added management attention i
during implementation of new programs.
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d.
Hich-Pressure Coolant in.iection (HPCI) Emeroency Oil Pumo (EOP)
and Turnino Gear Loaic Problems
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On July 13, 1993, during testing of the Unit 2 HPCI, wiring errors
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were discovered in the logic circuitry. The wiring errors were introduced during the HPCI external vacuum breaker modification.
The HPCI components affected were the E0Ps and turning gears on both units. As a result of the modification, a relay that provided a permissive signal to automatically start the E0P was disabled. Although the pump would not automatically start if the auxiliary oil pump failed to start, it could still be started manually in the control room or remotely. The problem introduced
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into the turning gear logic prevented the turning gear motor from
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automatically shutting off. The turning gear would disengage as
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designed on an emergency fast start.
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The E0P and turning gears are not safety related; however, the i
l failure of these support components could impact a safety system.
The wiring errors in the logic circuitry were not identified due
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to inadequate post modification testing after the HPCI vacuum breaker modification. The failure to perform adequate post modification testing resulting in HPCI inoperability is considered an example of a previous violation (50-265/93012-02(DRP)).
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e.
Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Coolina (RCIC) Ruoture Disc Replacement On July 20, 1993, as part of the Unit 2 startup and the post
maintenance surveillance requirements, RCIC surveillances were being performed. Operations personnel (equipment attendant) were required to perform a visual inspection of the RCIC system in accordance with the work instructions. The equipment attendant i
failed to perform the required visual inspection. The system
engineer was present at the time and noted a leak on the rupture
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disc flange; however, this adverse condition was not identified to Operations management. On July 27 a problem identification and a
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work request (WR) were generated to address the missed visual
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inspection.
The system engineer then signed off the visual i
inspection as unsatisfactory based on the observation made on July 20.
Review of the incident identified that the shift engineers were not aware of the required visual inspection as part of the post i
maintenance testing. For short unit outages, an informal process was used to identify outstanding WRs in preparation for unit startup.
Failure to provide adequate instructions or guidelines
to identify required post maintenance testing is considered a
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Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V (50-254/93019-05a(DRP)).
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IB Fuel Pool Demineralizer Removal and Transfer On August 17, 1993, mechanical maintenance technicians, with assistance from radiation protection, removed the fuel pool demineralizer filter from the radiological waste roof area.
Through use of a glove-bag style containment, use of mock-ups,
lessons learned, and lead shielding, the dose received was considerably less than previous removals.
Previous dose for filter removal was 5 person-rem.
Estimated dose for the evolution performed on August 17 was I person-rem.
One violation was identified regarding a failure to provide adequate instructions or guidelines for post maintenance testing. Also, an example of a previous violation was identified regarding post modification testing.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspectors observed test activities.
Observations made included one or more of the following attributes:
testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test equipment was in calibration; test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements; test results were properly reviewed; and test deficiencies identified were properly resolved by the appropriate personnel.
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The inspectors witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 1 Sequence Event Recorder Special Test Unit 1 HPCI Operability Test Unit 1 RCIC Operability Test at 250 psi Unit 1 Venting HPCI Instrumentation Lines
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Unit 2 HPCI Quarterly Operability Test QCOS 2300-13 Unit 2 HPCI Fast Start Surveillance
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Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewc3 the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for July 1953. The inspectos., confirmed that
the information provided met the req' arements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Update Report for July 1993.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Events Followuo (93702)
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Toxic Gas Analyzer Inonerability On June 24, 1993, during planned electrical bus manipulations, the toxic gas analyzer was rendered inoperable for about seven hours.
This was due to procedural adherence problems and a lack of
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operations shift management direction.
Review of the event l
identified that:
The shift engineer (SE) and shift control room engineer
(SCRE) were not aware of the effect of de-energizing and re-energizing Bus 16. The instructions used by the SE and SCRE j
stated that the toxic gas analyzer would be inoperable while the bus was de-energized. However, no details as to the specific components affected during this evolution were included in the instructions. Also, neither the SE nor the SCRE questioned or attempted to determine which components would be affected when Bus 16 was de-energized.
The annunciator procedure describing operator response to
" control room standby HVAC system minor trouble" annunciator was not implemented. Although the alarm was acknowledged, the cause of the alarm was not determined as required by the procedure.
Operators were not knowledgeable of the toxic gas analyzer
operation. The effects on system components for bus manipulations was not determined or discussed before starting the activity.
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The failure to follow existing procedures and the lack of adequate instructions appropriate to the circumstances is considered a
Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V (50-254/93019-05b(DRP)).
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loss of Unit 2 Offsite Power
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On July 27, 1993, while Unit 2 was in the process of'startup at
28% power, an Unusual Event was declared due to a loss of normal power to Buses 23-1 and 24-1.
A phase "C" ground fault, due to a
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lightning strike, was experienced at the Ceco Nelson substation l
tripping oil circuit breakers (0CB) 8-9 and 7-8.
That resulted in
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isolating one of the five 345 kv lines in the switchyard ring bus.
The isolation, combined with OCBs 10-11 and 9-10 opened a few
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hours earlier, resulted in a loss of power to Reserve Auxiliary
Transformer 22.
Subsequently, a loss of 4160 volt Bus 22 occurred -
due to a Bus 22 breaker failure. A special inspection was
conducted to review electrical maintenance activities. Results of
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that inspection are documented in Inspection Report 50-
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254/93024(DRS).
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One violation regarding inadequate procedures was identified. That
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violation resulted-in the toxic gas analyzer being made inoperable.
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Manaaement/P1 ant Status Meetina A meeting was held on July 9,1993, between the licensee's Vice President of Nuclear Operations, the Region III Regional Administrator,
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and members of each of their staffs. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the June 9, 1993, HPCI rupture disc event and licensee-l performance.
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10.
Inspection Follow Up Items Inspection followup items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, will be reviewed by the inspectors, and which involved some
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action on the part of the NRC, licensee, or both.
Inspection followup
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items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 2 and i
3.d.
11.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in
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paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the
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inspection on August 20, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this
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inspection report.
The licensee acknowledged the information and did I
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not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection
could be considered proprietary in nature.
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