IR 05000254/1993014
| ML20045A502 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1993 |
| From: | Paul R, Schumacher M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045A501 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-93-14, 50-265-93-14, NUDOCS 9306110006 | |
| Download: ML20045A502 (5) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-254/93014(DRSS); 50-265/93014(DRSS)
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Dockets No. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois Inspection Conducted: May 11 through 14, 1993 Inspector:- I
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R. A. Paul Date Approved By:
<WM/ 4k M-Z-f8 M. C. Schumacher, Chief Date Radiological Controls Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on May 11 throuah 14. 1993 (Reports No. 50-254/93014(DRSS):
50-265/93014(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of radiological control program during a refueling outage (Q2R12), including organization and management controls (IP 83750), ALARA (IP 83750), audits and' appraisals (IP 83750), contamination control, and licensee' actions on previous inspection findings.
Results: The licensee's radiological controls program appears to be well conducted. The organizational structure, management controls, and staffing levels for the program appeared good. ALARA performance was good given the size and scope of the outage. Weaknesses were noted in the contamination control program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9306110006 930602 PDR ADOCK 05000254 G
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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- D. Craddick, Maintenance Superintendent
- D. Kanakares, Regulatory Assurance NRC Coordinator A. Lewis, Radiation Protection Manager
- J. Leider, Technical Services Superintendent
- A. Misak, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor.
- R. Moravec, Engineering and Nuclear Construction
- G. Powell, Lead Health Physicist, Technical
- M. Zinnen, Lead Health Physicist, Operating
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- T. Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector, NRC P. Prescott, Resident Inspector, NRC The inspector also contacted other licensee and contractor employees.
- Present at the Exit Meeting on May 14, 1993.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (IPs 83750 and 84750)
(Closed) Violation (50-254/91024-02) and Open Item (50-254/91024-03:
Failure to wear electronic dosimeters (EDs) as required and potential weaknesses with the ED program. To correct the violation and prevent'
programmatic weaknesses, the licensee reissued a memorandum emphasizing the proper use of dosimetry. The memorandum included instructions on proper use of the EDs and actions to be taken if dosimetry is lost and unattended.
Based on observations by the regional and resident--
inspectors, and licensee radiation protection personnel, it appears the corrective actions were effective.
(0 pen) IFl (50-254/93006-02: 50-265/93006-02):
Licensee identified problems associated with High Radiation Area (HRA) controls. ' Corrective actions included installation of swing gates across step off. pads leading into HRAs which provide assurance the area is barricaded and conspicuously posted, control of all HRA door keys by health physics personnel and inclusion of a video training tape on HRA controls as part-of the station orientation program. With the exception of two control.
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incidents caused by improper use of the new swing gates, it appears these actions have been effective. Because more time is required to further evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions, this item will be reviewed during a future inspection.
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Chanaes (IP 83750)
There have been no significant changes to the overall' administration of the radiological control program. With the exce pion of three management members who retired and another who terminated, the health physics and radwaste staff remained stable and well experienced. The vacated positions.were filled by a current staff member, a new health-physicist, and a contractor.
There are currently 41 Radiation Protection Technicians (RPTs) and 6 foremen.. Also, as described.in section 9, the licensee appears to have an effective ALARA staff.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Trainino and Oualifications (IP 83750)
The licensee's program for selection, verification, and training of g'
contract radiation protection technicians (CRPTs) is described in
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Inspection Reports No. 50-254/92013(DRSS) and 50-265/92013(DRSS).
With the exception of one positive programmatic change (more formal
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verification of CRPT resumes), there have been no significant changes.
The inspector discussed selected CRPT resumes with the licensee; no problems were identified with the selection process, and all senior CRPTs met the licensee's Technical Specification two year experience requirement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Audits and Appraisals (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed an off-site performance based quality verification audit of the radiation protection program (RP) including outage work activities, radiation work permits, high radiation area controls, and procedure adequacy, implementation, ant Narence.
Although a deficiency associated with lead shielding W. dlation, and weaknesses associated with HRA controls were identified during the comprehensive audit, it concluded the RP program was effectNa overall.
The inspector verified that corrective actions had been taken to address audit findings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination (IP 83750)
The inspector noted that several Radiation Occurrence Reports (RORs)
written since September 1992, identified contaminated tools or equipment outside the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA), but within the frotected The material was found during routine surveillances, and with the area.
exception of a tool having fixed contamination of about 100,000 dpm/100 cm, had slightly fixed and loose contamination levels.
In recognition of these weaknesses the licensee took corrective actions including changing the main release point to a lower radiation background area and improving equipment decontamination methods.
Further planned actions include establishing a centralized in-plant tool crib in a new building (LTD) which will be part of the RCA, and moving radioactive machining and equipment decontamination activities from the administrative building (non-RCA) to the LTD.
This matter was discussed at the exit meeting and will be reviewed at future inspections.
During tours of the station, the inspectors occasionally observed equipment and material lying across contamination boundaries.
Although these areas were conservatively controlled for contamination (1000 dpm/ gross smear) and there were no uncontrolled area loose contamination problems, tighter controls of contaminated boundaries should be initiated.
This matter was discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager and at the exit meeting. The Senior Resident Inspector will follow up on station corrective actions.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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External Exposure Control (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed several outage radiation work permits (RWPs) for adequacy and observed work in the drywell and reactor building to
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observe their implementation. Worker adherence to and understanding of RWPs were satisfactory. Access controls were good and it appeared adequate radiation protection personnel were available to provide health physics coverage.
The continued use of two individuals dedicated to
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coordinate and control work in the drywell helped to achieve ALARA.
Most workers appeared knowledgeable about work requirements and ALARA,
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and with the exception of one problem concerning dosimetry placement,
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there were no significant problems observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Internal Exposure Control (IP 837501
During this outage, the inspector reviewed aspects of the internal dose assessment program, including air sample placement and analysis, whole body count results, and procedure NRP 5410-5, " Methods for Estimating Uptake, Dose Equivalents and Derived Air Concentration Hours (DAC-Hrs)
From Whole Body Count Data After Acute Exposure to Airborne Radioactivity." The results of several examples used in the procedure to compute dose and DAC-hours were verified by the inspector; no significant discrepancies were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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As low As Reasonably Achievable (IP 83750)
The ALARA group is currently staffed with an ALARA coordinator, five'
ALARA specialists, a.4 one contractor engineer. Assisting the station ALARA staff were fiV" 4LARA specialists hired by the primary station
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outage contractor i.s were involved in planning, walking down and following field jobs, and performing pre and post job reviews.
The total station dose in 1992 was 1157 person-rem, which included two major refueling outages (about 220 refuel outage days), with respective total doses of 487 person-rem (Q2R11) and 475 person-rem (QlR12), both of which were near their respective goals. Q2Rll consisted of
considerable emergent and first time work, and QlR12 involved considerable valve maintenance and repair, and inservice inspection work.
For both outages, the licensee claims a dose saving of about i
960 person-rem through chemical decontamination and about 200 person-rem from other initiatives.
l The scope of Q2R12 was about the same as Q1R12, with a_ dose goal of 480
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person-rem; actual dose was about-440 person-rem. Chemical decontamination was performed on the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) and recirculation piping systems achieving decontamination factors ranging from 2 to 12 on the RWCU, and about 8 on the recirculation piping.
About 20% of outage activities were the result of emergent work, with the largest dose contributing jobs being valve maintenance and repair
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(about 100 person-rem).
Since the station broadened the scope of this work as part of an overall program to improve valve performance, this work will likely continue through subsequent outages.
The inspector specifically reviewed personal dose attributed to this work and discussed with the licensee the merits of performing a comprehensive
evaluation of the program to determine if further reductions of personal exposure can be made.
As a result of lessons learned during the post-job review of the reactor vessel level instrumentation system modification and the RHR and core spray motor inspection work performed during Q1R12, the licensee reduced the dose about 50 percent and 60 percent, repectively, during Q2R12.
During this inspection contract employees performing valve operation test and evaluation system (VOTES) testing, were interviewed to determine their level of understanding of ALARA principles, the steps taken to ensure initiation of those principles, and to provide the inspector better understanding of the nature of this work.
The workers were knowledgeable of ALARA principles and described the work practices used to achieve ALARA.
During these discussions, the inspector questioned workers whether that size crew was necessary.
Based on their response, the licensee determined further evaluation of crew size should be performed.
The results of the inspector's review of the dose associated with the valve maintenance program was outlined at the exit interview.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview The scope and findings of the inspection were reviewed with the licensee representatives (Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 14, 1993. The inspector discussed closure of previous inspection findings, observations made during inspection in the drywell and reactor building, the ALARA program, dose associated with the valve repair /modifiction, and self identified apparent weaknesses associated with the contamination control program.
During the exit interview, the inspector discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
Licensee representatives did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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