IR 05000254/1980025
| ML19353A306 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1980 |
| From: | Chrissotimos N, Dupont S, Spessard R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19353A302 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-80-25, 50-265-80-26, NUDOCS 8101080092 | |
| Download: ML19353A306 (14) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Reports No.
50-254/80-25; 50-265/80-26 Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Inspection at: Quad-Ci ties Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: October 20, 1980, through November 24, 1980 0,/
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Inspectors:
N. J. Chris timos u
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Approved by:
R. L. Spessa d, Chief
// :2 // 7 o Reactor Projects Section 1
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on October 20 through November 24, 1980 (Reports No. 50-254/80-25:
50-265/80-26)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced Resident Inspection of Licensee Action
on Previous Inspection Findings, Operational Sa 7ety Verification, Long Term Shutdown Activities, Monthly Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation, Licensee Event Reports Followup, IE Circular Followup, IE.
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Information Notice Followup, Plant Scrams, Refueling Activities, Followup l
on Headquarters Request, Fire Protection and Inspection 'of Licensee 's Test i
and Experiments Program. The inspection. involved a total of 264 inspector-
hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 48 inspector-hours onsite
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during off-shi fts.
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Results: Of the 13 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified
in 12 areas; two items of noncompliance were identified in one area - failure to perform surveillance, paragraph 7,
- inadequate testing, paragraph 7.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Corticted
- N. Kalivianakis, Superintendent T. Tamlyn, Assistant Superintendent Operations
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Heilman, Quality Assurance, Operations D. Bax, Assistant Superintendent Maintenance
- L.
Gerner, Technical Staff Supervisor G. Ccnschack, Senior Operating Engineer
- J. Heilman, Quality Assurance, Operations The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees, including shift engineers and foreman, reactor operators, technical staff personnel and quality control personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on November 24, 19f9.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
Open inspection item (50-254/80-12-01; 50-265/80-15-01).
The Licensee has established a method in which timely dissemination of information is provided to the operators, with regards to modifi-cations.
No further concerns were identified.
(Closed)
Open inspection item (011 50-254/80-01-02).
The inspector verified that the modification of the ADS valve air supply line on Unit 1 was completed.
No further concerns were identified.
(Closed) Open inspection item (011 50-254/80-10-02).
The inspector witnessed the ultrasonic testing of Unit 1 Jet Pump Beam Bolt Assemblies. No indications were revealed.
No further concerns were identified.
(Closed)
Open inspection item (011 50-254/80-10-01).
The inspector verified the installation of the G. E. 105X Relays.
No further concerns were identified.
(Closed)
Open inspection item (011 50-254/78-28-01; 50-265/
78-29-01).
The Mercoid Switch problems appear to have been resolved and action record 4-75-25 closed.
No further concerns were identified.
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(Closed) Open inspection item (011 50-254/80-12-03; 50-265/
80-15-03).
The inspector reviewed the Licensee's response to IEB 80-17 ite:i 6.c. ' perform a 50.59 review to increase SLLC flow to the maximum consistent with safety. ' The inspectors review was also included in the Safety Evaluation Report requested by NRR.
No further concerns were identified.
(Closed) Open inspection item (011 50-254/30-12-05; 50-265/
80-15-05).
The inspector reviewed the Licensee's response to IEB 80-17 supplement 1.
The inspectors review was also included in the Safety Evaluation Report requested by NRR.
No further concerns were identified.
3.
Operational Safety Verification Unit 2 The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of November, 1980. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Unit 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the month of November,1980, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2 SBLC and Unit 2 control Rod Drive systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and adminis-trative procedures.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Inspection During Long Term Shutdown The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during
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i the month of November,1980. The inspector verified surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicability of containment integrity. Tours of Unit 1 Reactor building accessible areas, including exterior areas were made to make independent assessments of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector
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observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance witn the station security plan. The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications and verified the implementation of radio-active waste system controls. The inspector witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated with radwaste ship-ments and barreling.
Tours of the Torus and Drywell were also included.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to l
initiating the wcrk; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstandir.g jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
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Unit 1 WR-QO1290 Reactor Feed Pump Discharge valve WR-003692 Acoust'.c M nitor (Change Feed)
WR-Q05043 Drywe??./ Torus Vacuum Breaker WR-Q05818 Dryweli Snubbers WR-Q07076 Protective Relays Bus 14-1 WR-Q07077 Protective Relays Bus 13-1 WR-QO7411 Electromatic Valve 1-203-3B WR-Q07567 ECCS Suction Header Screens WR-Q07643 SRM Channel 23 WR-Q07701 RHR Suction Valve Unit 2 WR-Q04352 RHR Pipe Hanger WR-Q07399 250v Battery Charger WR-Q07706 Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation Valve WR-Q07736 Core Spray Suction Valve WR-Q08428 Electromatic valve 2-203-3C WR-Q08493 Electromatic Valve 2-203-3C Unit 1/2 WR-QOl369 Rebuild Spare Safety Valve WR-Q06161 Rebuild Spare Control Rod Drive WR-007274 Spare CRD 111 Valve WR-Q05261
% Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Following completion of maintenance on the 2A Core Spray Suction Valve and Unit Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, the inspector verified that ti ese systems had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Monthly Surveillance observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveil-lance testing on the Unit 2 SBLC Demineralizer lecycle and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activ-ities: Unit 2 Core Spray Valve and Pump Operability, Unit 2 Scram Time Testing and Unit 1 Control Rod Friction Testing.
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No items of noncompliance were identi fied.
7.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were ful filled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifi-cations.
Unit 1 RO 80-21, dated September 1, 1980, Main Steam Isolation Valve leakage in excess of 11.5 SCFH limit during Local Leak Rate Testing.
R0 80-25, dated September 13, 1980, inspection revealed crack indications in welds on the
"A" and
"B" Core Spray Loops. Detailed evaluations are included in IE Inspection Reports 50-254/80-2 9 and 50-265/80-30.
Unit 2 RO 80-21, dated September 14, 1980, while performing surveillance on Core Spray, Suction Valve MO-2-1402-3A would not reopen from the Control Room.
The cause was attributed to the Torque Switch sticking on the motor operator.
R0 80-22, dated October 5, 1980, Main Steam Isolation Valves exceeding closure times prescribed in Technical Specifications.
R0 80-24, dated October 10, 1980, RHR Containment Cooling Valve failure during Operability Test.
R0 80-27, dated October 24, 1980, 2C RHR Pump failed to start during operability Surveillance.
In regards to R0 80-27, during the RHR Pump Operability portion of surveillance, QOS 6600-S1, the 2C RHR Pump failed to start.
The cause of this occurrence was discovered by the Licensee to be a misadjusted limit switch on the Suction Valve Motor Operator.
The limit switch had been incorrectly adjusted on October 22, 1980, when the valve operator had been replaced. The valve had been returned to service and stroked three times without any further testing performed on the valve to pump permissive interlocks.
This is contrary to Technical Specification 6.2.A.7 in that detailed written procedures for surveillance and testing systems and components involving the safety of the facility shall be prepared, approved and adhered to, and is considered an item of noncompliance.
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Prior to the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector reviewed the Licensee's corrective action which included additional training and testing specifications following maintenance on safety-related valves, which utilize interlocks necessary for system operation.
As a result of the review, the inspector has no further concerns and therefore no further response to this noncompliance is required.
R0 80-28, dated October 24, 1980, inoperable 1/2 Diesel Generator due to failure of the cooling water pump and performing the surveil-lance on the incorrect bus.
In regards to RO 80-28, after discovering that the 1/2 Diesel Generator was inoperable due to the 1/2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump failure, the surveillance testing required for an inoperable Diesel Generator was performed. The required surveillance was performed immediately on the ECCS systems supplied by the 4kv Bus 23-1, whose emergency power supply is the 1/2 Diesel Generator.
The following day, October 24, 1980, it was discovered that the previous surveillance had been performed on the incorrect bus.
The surveillance should have been performed on the 4kv Bus 24-1, which is supplied by the Unit 2 Diesel Generator. This is contrary to Technical Specifications 6.2.A.7 in that detailed written procedures for surveillance of systems and components that involve the safety of the facility shall be prepared, approved, and adhered to, and is considered an item of noncompliance.
Prior to the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector reviewed the Licensee's corrective action which included a change in the procedure for Diesel Generator surveillance. As a result of this review, the inspector has no further concerns and therefore no response to this item of noncompliance is required.
The combination of events described in RO 80-27 and R0 80-28 led to operation in a degraded mode. This condition existed undetected for 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />. Although Technical Specification limits were not exceeded, the serious nature of the event should be recognized.
The inspector discussed his concerns to plant management in regards to this matter in a special meeting.
Licensee management acknowledged the inspector's concerns and announced that in addition to immediate corrective action, a formal systematic study would begin to determine the circumstances which led to the event to prevent recurrence.
Except as described, no other items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
IE Circular Followup For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for-7-
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applicability ;:as crformed, and that if the circular were applica-e ble to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
IE Circular 80-18, dated August 22, 1980, 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for changes to rad.oactive waste treatment systems.
The Licensee conducts 50.59 reviews for all modifications and Appendix I Technical Specifications submittals addresses this.
The inspector has no further concerns.
IE Circular 80-21, dated October 8, 1980, Regulation of Refuelin, Crews.
The inspector verified that individuals responsible for and participating in refueling activities are in conformar.ce with the requirements addressed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
IE Information Notice Followup For the IE Information Notices listed below, the inspector verified that the information notice was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the in-formation notice were applicable to the facility, appropriate actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
IE IN 80-17, dated May 5, 1980, Potential Hazards Associated with Interchangeable Parts on Radiographic Equipment IE IN 80-18, dated May 5,1980, Possible Weapons Smuggling Pouch IE IN 80-19, dated May 6,1980, NIOSH Recall of Recirculating-Mode (Closed-Circuit) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (Rebreathers)
IE IN 80-20, dated May 8, 1980, Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capa-bility at Davis-Besse Unit 1 While in a Refueling Mode IE IN 80-21, dated May 16, 1980, Anchorage and Support of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment IE IN 80-22, dated May 28, 1980, B'eakdown in Contamination Control Programs IE IN 80-23, dated May 29, 1980, Loss of Suction to Emergency Feedwater Pumps-8-
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IE IN 80-24, dated May 30, 1980, Low Level Radioactive Waste Burial Criteria IE IN 80-25, dated May 30, 1980, Trar.sportation of Pyrophoric Uranium IE IN 80-26, dated June 10, 1980, E'caluation of Contractor QA Programs
' 27, dated June ll, 1980, Degradation of Reactor Coolant IE -
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Pump Studs IE IN 80-28, dated June 13, 1980, Prompt Reporting of Required Information to NRC Supplement to IE IN 80-06, dated July 29, 1980, Notification of Significant Events at Operating Power Reactor Facilities IE IN 80-29, dated August 7, 1980, Broken Studs on Terry Turbine Steam Inlet Flange IE IN 80-30, dated August 19, 1980, Potential for Unacceptable Interaction Between the control Rod Drive Scram Function and Non-essential Control Air at Certain GE BWR Facilities IE IN 80-31, dated August 27, 1980, Maloperation of Gould-Brown Boveri Type 480 volt type K-600S and K-DON 6005 Circuit Breakers IE IN 80-32, dated August 12, 1980, Clarification of Certain Requirements for Exclusive-use Shipments of Radioactive Materials IE IN 80-33, dated September 15, 1980, Determination of Teletherapy Timer Accuracy IE IN 80-34, dated September 26, 1980, Boron Dilution of Reactor Coolant During Steam Generator Decontamination IE IN 80-35, date] October 10, 1980, Leaking and Dislodged Iodine-124 Implant Seeds IE IN 80-36, dat ed October 10, 1980, Failure of Steam Generator Support Bolting No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Plant Scram Following the plant scram on November 2, 1980, of I' nit 2, the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room logs and discussions with Licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry.
The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the Licensee.
All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on November 3, 1980. The scram was the result of the failure of the Recirculation Motor Generator Speed Controller increasing Reactor Core Flow thus increasing power to the APRM Hi-Hi setpoint.
No items of noncompliance were identi fied,
11.
Refueline Activities The inspe_Lv. verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the technical speci-fications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required by technical specifications; observed three shifts of the fuel handling operations (insertion)
and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the technical specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by technical specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained or the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueline was in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures.
No items of nonc
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12.
Followup on Headquarters Request The inspector verified by direct observation and document review that -the following Category "A" TMI Task Action Plan Requirements were completed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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CATEGORY
"A" TMI TASK ACTION PLAN ItEQUIREMENTS NUREG 0578 TAP Number Number Tit 1e Remarks 2.].2:b I.A.l.1 Shift Technical Advisor On Duty; Training will be completed. January 1, 1981 2.2.1:a i A.l.2 Shi ft Supervisor Responsibilities Specified in Licensee Procedure
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1. '. 3 QAP 300-1 H5 Operations Depart-ment Organization (non-safety i tems delegated to the shi ft foreman)
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I.A.I.3 Shift Manning Speci fied in Licensee Procedure Overtime Limits Speci fied QAP 300-2 R4 Shift Manning:
Overtime Limits Specified
Implemented on November 1, 1980 j
I.C.1 Short Term Accident C Procedure Review Documented in IE Inspection Report i
50-254/80-06, 50-265/80-09 and in Licensee Procedure QAP 400-9R1
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Leakage Reduction i
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2.2.1.c I.C.2 Shift C Relief Turnover Procedure Speci fied in I.icensee Procedures
QAP 300-3R5 Shi ft Change for shi ft
Engineers, QAP 300-4R4 Shift
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Change for Nuclear Station Operators, QAP 300-5R1 Shift Change for Fuel
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llandling Foreman 2.
.2:a I.C.4 Control Room Access Specifled in Licensee Procedure
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QAP 1900-3R8 j
2.1.9 II.B.1 RCS Vents - Design Submitted to NRR No IE Action 2.1.6:b II.B.2 Plant Shielding - Design Review No IE Action i
2.1.8:a II.B.3 Post-Accident Sampling Ve ri fi ed 2.1.2 II.D.1 Valve Testing Requirements Submittal Transmitted Submit Program to NR't 2.1.3:a II.D.3 Valve Position Indicat. ion Ve ri fied
Relief C Safety valves
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NUREG 0578 TAP Number Number Title Remarks 2.1.7:a II.E.1.2 Auxiliary Feed System N/A 2.1.7:b Initiation C Flow 2.1.1 II.E.3.1 Emergency Power for Pressurizer Heaters N/A 2.1.5 II.E.4.1 Dedicated Penetrations - Design Submittal No IE Action (CECO Headquarters)
2.1.5:c Recombiner Procedures Heview CUpgrade N/A Diverse Isolation S1 2.1.4 II.E.4.2 Isolation Dependability Verified Modifications 4/1/79-16 C 4/2/79-16 Completed 2.1.3:b II.F.2 Instrumentation to Detect Inadequate Core Cooling N/A 2.1.1 II.G.1 Power Supplies for Pressurizer Relief Valves C Level N/A Establish Interim Tech. Support 2.2.2:b III.A.l.2 Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities Center - Verified 2.2.2:c III.A.1.2 Onsite Operational Support Center Est ablish Interim Op. Support i
Cem er - Verified
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N Leak Peduction Measure. Leakage i
2.1.6:a III.D.l.1 Primary Coolant Outside Containment Rate Measure Preventive Maintenance gram Established - QTP 500-14 Leak Detection C Reduction Surveillance Procedures for Hi Level Release 2.1.8:b III.D.3.3 Inplant Radiaticn Monitoring Cales. ; Monitoring capabilities 2.1.8:e Improved Radiciodine Monitoring After Accident - Verified Procedures QCP-600-10 Estimating High Activity Releases during Accident Conditions C QCP-600-Il In-plant I-131 Measurement during Post-Accident Conditions
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13.
Fire Protection In accordance with the Fire Protection Evaluation "NRC Staff Positions" the inspector verified that:
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ESS MCC's are protected from water damage (item 10)
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Water damage protection is provided for MCC's 18/19-5 (item 15)
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Modifications to the MG set fire protection facilities is complete l item 25)
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Fire detection is provided for 4kv switchg.ar on turbine mezzanine floor (item 30)
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Manual portable foam suppressing equipment is provided (items 34, 57, 63, 64, 65)
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Oil storage room in turbine building is curbed, drained, sprinkled and enclosed (item 41)
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Hydrant HC-3 has been modified (item 51)
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NRC accepted response per meeting January 31, 1979 (item 68)
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NRC accepted the Licensee's response (item 56)
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NRC accepted response per meeting January 31, 1976 (item 61)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
14.
Inspection of Licensee 's Test and Experiments Program An inspection was conducted to determine whether test and experi-ments were reviewed and performed in accordance with approved proce-dures.
The following test ; and experiments documents were reviewed by the inspector:
Unit 1 Test 1-47: Core Spray Room Ambient Temperature Measurement; to acquire data to monitor ambient temperature variations in the CS pump environment during operation.
Unit 2 Test 2-27: CR 120A Relay Contact Arm Retainer Replacement - Relay Operability Test; to document the operability testing of various CR 120A relays whose contact arm retainers were replaced in accordance with NRC IE Bulletin 78-01.
Test 2-29: Unit Two Cycle Five Startup Test Program; to compile the startup tests associated with post refueline, unit startup.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Exit Interview The inspector met with Lic?nsee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on November 24, 1980, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The Licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments.
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