IR 05000250/2025002
| ML25217A026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/2025 |
| From: | Shawn Smith NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB6 |
| To: | Coffey R Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR 2025002 | |
| Download: ML25217A026 (28) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING, UNITS 3 AND 4 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000250/2025002 AND 05000251/2025002
Dear Robert Coffey:
On June 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4. On July 15, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Michael Durbin, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Four findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Four of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements, one was determined to be Severity Level IV. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4.
August 7, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Steven P. Smith, Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000250 and 05000251 License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000250 and 05000251
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000250/2025002 and 05000251/2025002
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-002-0023
Licensee:
Florida Power & Light Company
Facility:
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4
Location:
Homestead, 33035
Inspection Dates:
March 03, 2025 to June 30, 2025
Inspectors:
J. Bell, Senior Health Physicist
J. Diaz-Velez, Senior Health Physicist
A. Donley, Senior Resident Inspector
T. Fanelli, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Knotts, Resident Inspector
D. Orr, Senior Project Engineer
J. Rivera, Health Physicist
A. Rosebrook, Senior Reactor Analyst
D. Strickland, Senior Reactor Inspector
B. Tharakan, Technical Assistant
Approved By:
Steven P. Smith, Chief
Projects Branch 6
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units and 4, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to close 4A main steam isolation valve due to faulty exhaust solenoid valves Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green Severity Level IV NCV 05000251/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS), for the licensees failure to identify and evaluate the operability requirements for the 4A main steam isolation valve (MSIV) ESFAS signal function 4.a Manual Initiation, when the solenoid valves, associated with the manual close function, failed to fully exhaust air from the pneumatic actuator; and a severity level (SL) IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a) for the failure to issue a licensee event report. Failure of the exhaust solenoids prevented the ESFAS function from closing the 4A MSIV when called upon during a normal reactor shutdown on March 01, 2025.
Failure to Survey at the Frequencies Specified by Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000250,05000251/2025002-02 Open/Closed
[P.1] -
Identification 71124.01 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501 when the licensee failed to perform several radiation and contamination surveys in the plant on the required frequency.
Failure to Calibrate Chemistry Count Room Instrumentation at the Frequencies Specified by Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Public Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000250,05000251/2025002-03 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71124.05 An NRC-identified Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified for failure to implement procedures in accordance with the licensees Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR), Section A.7.3. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform annual efficiency checks on gamma spectroscopy equipment as required by procedures.
Failure to Maintain Meteorological Monitoring Instruments Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Public Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000250,05000251/2025002-04 Open/Closed
[P.3] -
Resolution 71124.07 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4, Procedures, when the licensee failed to minimize extended periods of outage for meteorological monitoring instrumentation. Specifically, in calendar year 2024, meteorological instruments were inoperable on multiple occasions and repairs were not performed in a timely manner, contrary to a licensee procedure which requires 90 percent data recovery.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status NOV 05000250,05000251/20 24010-05 Failure to Implement Timely Corrective Actions to Test Molded Case Circuit Breakers 71111.12 Closed URI 05000251/2024004-02 Failure to Classify a Locked High Radiation Area Event as a Performance Indicator Non-Conformance 71151 Closed LER 05000251/2025-001-01 LER 2025-001-01 for Turkey Point, Unit 4, Degraded Condition 71152A Closed LER 05000251/2025-001-00 LER 2025-001-00 for Turkey Point, Unit 4, Degraded Condition 71152A Closed LER 05000250/2024-004-00 LER 2024-004-00 for Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3,
Unplanned Reactor scram 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 3 operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspect period.
Unit 4 started the inspection period in a refueling outage, in Mode 3. Unit 4 entered Mode 2 on April 2, 2025, and Mode 1 on April 4, 2025, and began power ascension. Unit 4 returned to 100 percent RTP on April 8, 2025, where it remained until June 21, 2025, when the unit experienced a complicated reactor trip with a safety injection signal due to the loss of power to the 4A reactor coolant pump. The unit remained in Mode 3 until June 25, 2025, when it entered Mode 2. The unit entered Mode 1 and returned to 100 percent RTP on June 26, 2025, and remained at or near RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of hurricane season for the following systems:
- Intake structure and Unit 3 and 4 intake cooling water pumps (ICW)
- Unit 3 and 4 main, start-up, auxiliary transformers, and the switchyard
- Unit 3 and 4 emergency diesel generator (EDG) buildings
- Auxiliary building
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)4A residual heat removal (RHR) train standby alignment after refueling outage on April 3, 2025 (2)4A EDG standby alignment during 4B EDG maintenance window on April 28 and 29, and May 1, 2025
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the 4B EDG and 4B EDG fuel oil system on June 20, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire zones 70, 71, 95, and 96, 3A and 3B 4160V switchgear room and Unit 3 480V load center rooms on April 1, 2025
- (2) Fire zones 11, 12, 13, 4A and 4B RHR pump rooms and Unit 4 RHR heat exchanger room on April 3, 2025
- (3) Fire zone 98, cable spreading room on April 25, 2025
- (4) Fire zone 133, 134, 135, and 136, 4B EDG, 3AD 4160V switchgear room, 4K motor control center, and 4B diesel fuel oil pump room on May 16, 2025
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated external flooding mitigation protections, credited flood stoplog barriers, for the:
- Auxiliary building
- Turbine building
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during:
- Unit 4 plant operations in Mode 2 pending power ascension to Mode 1 including auxiliary feedwater system surveillance testing, reactivity control, and manual steam generator water level control on April 3, 2025
- Unit 4 power ascension from 25 to 30 percent reactor power and transferring onsite electrical power from the startup transformer to the auxiliary transformer on April 4, 2025
- Unit 4 reactor startup from Mode 3 following an automatic reactor trip on June 25, 2025
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator just-in-time training in the simulator for latching and rolling the main turbine, turbine overspeed trip testing, placing the main generator online, transferring steam generator water level control to the main feedwater regulating valves, and responding to a stuck open atmospheric steam dump valve on April 2, 2025
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Maintenance rule reliability for function, 051-JM-01, Unit 4 containment isolation, due to increased local leak rate testing failures during refueling outage, PT4-35, (action request (AR) 2510510, 2511670, 2511896, 2510908, 2510306)
- (2) AR 2509558, Turkey Point Maintenance Rule Program (a)(3) Assessment, from February 25, 2023, to March 6, 2025
- (3) The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to notice of violation (NOV)
===05000250,05000251/2024010-05, Failure to Implement Timely Corrective Actions to Test Molded Case Circuit Breakers, (ADAMS Accession No. ML24150A242), their corrective actions taken to address recurrence, and the date when full compliance will be achieved and determined it was adequately captured on the docket. No performance deficiency was identified. This NOV is Closed.
- (4) Work order (WO) 41007344, SV-4-2604A and SV-4-2604B 4A main steam isolation valve instrument air closing solenoid valves replacement after failure resulting in steam isolation engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) inoperable Quality Control (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Quality control during the 4B EDG fuel oil storage and day tanks clean and subsequent license renewal commitment inspections, (WOs 40727734 and
===40727789)
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 3 unplanned yellow risk due to 4CD diesel instrument air compressor trip on April 1, 2025
- (2) Unit 4 elevated risk due to 4B EDG inoperability during an extended maintenance window on May 1, 2025
- (3) Unit 4 elevated risk due to 4A ICW pump out of service during major maintenance window, on May 12, 2025
- (4) Unit 4 elevated risk due to 4A EDG inoperability during an extended maintenance window on June 19, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) AR 2508658, 3B fuel oil transfer pump (FOTP) breaker 35211 tripped when attempting to transfer fuel oil to Unit 4
- (2) AR 2401497, 3A EDG sequencer cabinet door will not close and lock
- (3) AR 2507634, 3A EDG local panel synchroscope switch stuck in "on" position
- (4) AR 2515949, 3C steam generator feedwater bypass isolation valve, POV-3-497, excessive air leak from actuator
- (5) AR 2514909, source range nuclear instrument, N-4-31, bistable trip found out of acceptance criteria
- (6) AR 2516841, 4B component cooling water (CCW) pump breaker, 4AB13, wedged in cubicle
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) WO 40992847-01, charging pump discharge to regen heat exchanger root valve (4-383): Repair 4-383 Weld and Remove TEAM Enclosure
- (2) EC 300535, blind flange installation on POV-4-2602, containment purge exhaust valve, to obtain acceptable as left local leak rate testing
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 4 refueling outage, PT4-35, activities from April 1, 2025, to April 8, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) WO 41009719, CV-4-204, reactor coolant letdown isolation valve as left local leak rate and in-service testing following valve overhaul
- (2) WO 41008753, N-4-32, source range nuclear instrument calibration after detector replacement
- (3) WO 40821045 and 40983246, operability of 4A EDG output breaker, 4AA20, following replacement
- (4) WO 40844679, 3B EDG fuel oil transfer pump suction solenoid valve, SV-3-2051B, seat leak and automatic operation test after replacement
- (5) WO 40955456, new electric driven fire pump, P40, initial functional test following installation
- (6) WO 40985742, 4A ICW pump operability test following pump and motor replacement
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
(1)0-CMI-059.10, Excore Neutron Detector Post Installation Inspection and Testing, on April 18, 2025 (2)0-ADM-531, Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, for Unit 4, on April 21, 2025 (3)3-OSP-024.2, Emergency Bus Load Sequencers Manual Test, on April 9, 2025 (4)4-OSP-005.1, Station Black Out (SBO) Breaker Operability Test, on April 11, 2025
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 3 and 4 reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate calculation, for verification of RCS performance indicator data collection, on June 20, 2025
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) WO 40985695, 480V FLEX diesel generator, PDG-2, annual performance test
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Training drill for technical support center staff for classification credit and hurricane seasonal readiness on June 3,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
- (1) Workers, tools and equipment exiting the containment contaminated area during a refueling outage.
- (2) Control of used reverse osmosis membranes from liquid radioactive waste processing skid following change out.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
- (1) Under vessel 10-year in-service inspection activities.
- (2) Reactor vessel head lift.
- (3) Workers at seal table during thimble movement.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas (HRAs) and very high radiation areas (VHRAs):
- (1) Control of under vessel area as locked high radiation area during work activities.
- (2) Letdown regenerative heat exchanger locked high radiation area.
- (3) Waste hold-up tank locked high radiation area.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
- (1) Control room emergency ventilation system.
Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:
- (1) HEPA unit 002 staged at refueling cavity.
- (2) HEPA unit 022 in service at seal table.
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.
External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry.
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:
- (1) One personnel contamination event (PCE) for skin contamination.
- (2) Five PCEs for facial contamination.
Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:
- (1) Effective Dose Equivalent for External Exposures monitoring for 2 individuals.
- (2) Declared Pregnant Worker monitoring for 3 individuals.
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (10 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) Whole body counter and portal monitor (PM) located in the dosimetry lab.
- (2) Area radiation monitors (ARMs) in the Unit 3 and 4 control room and auxiliary building.
- (3) Liquid and gaseous effluent process radiation monitors in the Unit 3 and Unit 4 auxiliary building.
- (4) Personnel contamination monitors (PCMs) at the radiologically controlled area exit.
- (6) Tools and equipment monitors (TEMs) at the RCA exit.
- (7) Thermo Eberline RadEye Portable Neutron Survey Meter inside Unit 4 containment.
- (8) Ludlum 2200 Scalar Ratemeter inside Unit 4 containment.
- (9) Ludlum 12 Radiation Survey Meter in the calibration lab.
- (10) Mirion Technologies Telepole Portable Radiation Survey Meter in the calibration lab.
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (13 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) R-4-1416, South Corridor ARM.
- (2) R-1418, East-West Corridor (West End) ARM.
- (3) RAD-3-6311A, Unit 3 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (CHRRM).
- (4) RAD-4-6311B, Unit 4 CHRRM.
- (5) RAD-4-6311A, Unit 4 CHRRM.
- (8) HPI nos. 1392 and 1394, CRONOS TEMs.
- (9) HPI no. 1833, Mirion Technologies Telepole Portable Radiation Survey Meter.
- (10) HPI no. 1586, Ludlum 9-3 Portable Radiation Survey Meter.
- (11) HPI no. 1670, Thermo Eberline RadEye Portable Neutron Survey Meter.
- (12) HPI no. 1265, Ludlum 2200 Scalar Ratemeter.
- (13) Chemistry count room gamma spectroscopy detectors nos. 3 and 4.
Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) R-18, Liquid radioactive waste effluent monitor
- (2) RAD-6304A, Plant Vent Rad Monitor
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the CY 2024 Joint Frequency Distribution data recovery for the primary and backup meteorological towers.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10)===
- (1) Unit 3 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 4 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 3 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 4 (April 1, 2024, through March 31, 2025)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 25, 2024, through April 4, 2025 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 25, 2024, through April 4, 2025
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) AR 2514550, Unit 4 containment high range radiation monitor, RAD-4-6311B, technical specification required action time exceeds 30 days
- (2) AR 2509407, Unit 4 moist white boric acid identified on bottom mounted instrument penetration #6, on March 3, 2025
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 4 loss of 4A 4160VAC bus, subsequent reactor trip, and notification of unusual event declaration and licensees response on June 21, 2025.
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000251/2025-01-00 and LER 0500251/2025-01-01, Degraded Condition (ADAMS ML25143A173 and ML25115A227)
The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal and the previous LER submittal in this Inspection Report (under IP 71152A). This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 2024-004-00 for Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, Unplanned Reactor scram (ADAMS Accession No. ML25031A065)
The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was a result of a single point vulnerability established by the licensee running the Eagle 21 cards to failure. The licensee determined that the failure of the cards and single point vulnerability did not have an effect on the Reactor Protection Systems safety functions, therefore, no performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to close 4A main steam isolation valve due to faulty exhaust solenoid valves Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green Severity Level IV NCV 05000251/2025002-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.12 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS),for the licensees failure to identify and evaluate the operability requirements for the 4A main steam isolation valve (MSIV) ESFAS signal function 4.a Manual Initiation, when the solenoid valves, associated with the manual close function, failed to fully exhaust air from the pneumatic actuator; and a severity level (SL) IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a) for the failure to issue a licensee event report. Failure of the exhaust solenoids prevented the ESFAS function from closing the 4A MSIV when called upon during a normal reactor shutdown on March 01, 2025.
Description:
On March 1, 2025, at 0101, the 4A steam MSIV failed to perform its safety function when the valve failed to fully close on a manual demand from the control room. This manual demand was performed in accordance with 4-GOP-103, Power Operation to Hot Standby, as part of the controlled reactor shutdown for a refueling outage. Unit 4 was in Mode 3 at this time, and the 4A MSIV was declared inoperable. The station entered TS 3.7.2 at 0110. After venting the MSIV actuator, slight movement of the valve in the closed direction was noted, and the valve was confirmed shut by the station at 0350.
On March 2, 2025, troubleshooting the 4A MSIV (work orders 40942089 and 40948369)identified the MSIV stroke length was 5.125 inches which did not meet the minimum acceptance criteria of 5.25 inches, again showing that the 4A MSIV failed to fully close. The station attributed the failure to the 125 VDC air exhaust solenoids, which did not vent all the air pressure from the actuator. The exhaust solenoid valves were subsequently replaced, and the 4A MSIV was stroked with satisfactory results under work order 41007344.
The inspectors determined that the exhaust solenoid valves are part of the ESFAS signal required for manual and automatic steam line isolation during main steam line break and steam generator tube rupture events. This resulted in a failure to meet the requirements of TS 3.3.2., specifically Table 3.3.2-1 function 4 for steam line isolation. The TS bases designate that the limiting condition for operation (LCO) requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function, listed in Table 3.3.2-1, in the accompanying LCO, to be operable. The degraded condition of the 4A MSIV actuation exhaust solenoids adversely affected the ability of the actuation system to perform its function in accordance with the licensing and design bases. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 7.2.1, Protective Systems, describes the licensing basis application of protective ESFAS channels. Specifically, The protective systems are so designed that, once initiated, a protective action goes to completion. The licensee performed a past operability review (POR) under AR 2509225. The licensees review did not assess or declare any portion of the ESFAS system associated with steam line isolation inoperable. The inspectors determined that the licensees POR failed to consider a portion of the ESFAS actuation as a cause of the 4A MSIV to fully close.
Corrective Actions: The 4A MSIV actuator solenoid exhaust valves were replaced and the 4A MSIV was restored to operable on March 6, 2025, after successfully stroking the valve closed within inservice test requirements.
Corrective Action References: AR 2509225
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to fully consider UFSAR Section 7.2.1 when evaluating the ESFAS steam line isolation signal operability was a performance deficiency, within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, the licensee did not consider the impact that the failed steam line isolation ESFAS function would have when manually demanded or during an event such as a main steam line break or steam generator tube rupture during all modes of applicability.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, a failed ESFAS signal would result in the 4A MSIV not able to perform its safety function to isolate a release during a design basis event (steam generator tube rupture or faulted steam generator) in all required modes of applicability.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Since the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) function was lost for a period greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time the issue screens to a detailed risk evaluation (DRE). A regional Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a DRE using SAPHIRE 8 Version 8.2.11 and the Turkey Point Unit 3 & 4 SPAR Model Version 8.81 dated 7/28/2023. The SRA recognized that although the condition likely existed for most of the operating cycle, the condition would only adversely impact the PRA function when there was no differential pressure across the valve. As a result, the condition would only affect a Steam Generator Tube Rupture in Mode 2 or Mode 3 with the main turbine not online. The SRA conservatively assumed that the plant would be in Modes 2 and 3 ten percent of the operating cycle and adjusted the exposure time from 1 year to 36.5 days. The SRA set basic event MSS-ARV-OO-CV32604 to true to model the A MSIV failing open and ran for a steam generator tube rupture event only. The dominant accident sequence was a steam generator tube rupture, a failure to isolate the faulted steam generator, and operators failing to refill to refuel water storage tank and failing to enter the steam generator tube rupture emergency operating procedure. The change in core damage frequency and large early release frequency were both less than 1 E-7 corresponding to a finding of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the design basis and licensing basis impacts of the failed 4A MSIV actuator required for ESFAS.
Enforcement:
Severity: The inspectors used the NRC Enforcement Policy to evaluate the traditional enforcement aspects of this issue. The NRC Enforcement Policy example in Section 6.9.d.9 indicates the failure to make a 10 CFR 50.73(a) report was an SL IV NCV.
10 CFR 50.73(a), "Reportable Events," requires, in part, that the licensee shall submit an LER for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to submit an LER prior to 60 days from March 1, 2025, for an event involving TS noncompliance or condition prohibited by TS described in 10 CFR 50.73(a).
Violation: TS 3.3.2, ESFAS, requires, in part, The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE. Condition 3.3.2.J. requires both steam line isolation manual initiation channel or train operable. The associated TS action statement required, that with one of the following components inoperable the licensee must restore the inoperable channel or train to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, from October 18, 2023 to March 1, 2025 because of the failure of the solenoid valves associated with the 4A MSIV actuator, the associated ESFAS channel was inoperable and TS 3.5.2.J was not met. The required TS action statement was not entered; the inoperable component was not restored within the required timeframe.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Survey at the Frequencies Specified by Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000250,05000251/2025002-02 Open/Closed
[P.1] -
Identification 71124.01 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501 when the licensee failed to perform several radiation and contamination surveys in the plant on the required frequency.
Description:
NRC inspectors reviewed records associated with the licensee's system of documentation for tracking the completion of routine radiation and contamination surveys within the plant radiologically controlled area (RCA). The frequencies of these surveys are driven by licensee procedure 0-HPA-004, "Scheduling of Periodic Radiation Protection Activities", Revision 4. This procedure requires documentation of daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual surveys on associated forms within the procedure. Upon reviewing forms that were completed in January and March 2025, the inspectors found that several surveys were not completed on the frequencies specified in the procedure. This included several daily surveys of the hot tool room and hot chemistry lab, one monthly survey of the radwaste building north filling room, one monthly survey of the spent fuel pit heat exchanger room, one monthly survey of the refueling water storage tank, one quarterly survey of the radwaste pipe and valve room, and one quarterly survey of the special nuclear material cage. Upon subsequent scheduled surveys performed in these areas, the licensee did not identify any radiological issues.
Corrective Actions: The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program (CAP)under AR 2512404. The licensee performed subsequent surveys of all areas missed and did not identify any radiological issues. Additionally, the licensee performed an extent of condition and communicated the issue and expectations to members of the radiation protection (RP)department.
Corrective Action References: AR 2512404
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure of the licensee to adhere to its procedure for performing radiation and contamination surveys at specified frequencies is a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if surveys are not performed, it could potentially result in the licensee not establishing the appropriate radiological controls.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. Specifically, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to ALARA planning, did not result in an overexposure beyond regulatory limits, there was no substantial potential for overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.1 - Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, licensee supervision and management missed opportunities to identify and correct the issue before it became repetitive.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 20.1501 states, in part, that each licensee shall make or cause to be made, surveys of areas, including the subsurface, that may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in this part. Turkey Point demonstrates compliance with this regulation via licensee procedure 0-HPA-004, Scheduling of Periodic Radiation Protection Activities, Revision 4. This procedure states that all radiation protection activities are completed in a structured and timely manner by use of the Radiation Protection Daily Schedule/Matrix. This schedule includes but is not limited to daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual surveys. Contrary to the above, for January 2025 and March 2025, the licensee failed to make or cause to be made surveys of areas, including the subsurface, that may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in this part. Specifically, several routine RP surveys were not completed per the Radiation Protection Schedule/Matrix in accordance with 0-HPA-004.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Calibrate Chemistry Count Room Instrumentation at the Frequencies Specified by Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Public Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000250,05000251/2025002-03 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71124.05 An NRC-identified Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4, Procedures, was identified for failure to implement procedures in accordance with the licensees QATR, Section A.7.3. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform annual efficiency checks on gamma spectroscopy equipment as required by procedures.
Description:
NRC inspectors reviewed efficiency confirmation and calibration records for gamma spectroscopy counting instrumentation used to quantify radioactivity in technical specification, effluent, and environmental samples. The inspectors found that, in 2024, annual efficiency confirmations for gamma spectroscopy detectors number 3 and 4 were not performed within the 92-day grace period as required by licensee procedures 0-NCCP-103, Calibration of the Gamma Spectroscopy System, Revision 0, and 0-NCOP-310, Calibration and Operation of the Gamma Spectroscopy Counting System, Revision 7. When efficiency confirmations were performed in January of 2025, the inspectors noted that detectors 3 and 4 were found to be out of tolerance for one of the detection geometries (47mm planchet SS2IP). The licensee subsequently performed full efficiency calibrations, using all geometries, in order to bring both detectors back into operable status.
Corrective Actions: The licensee placed this issue into their CAP under AR 02512394. The licensee developed a work order to perform full calibrations of all the chemistry count room detectors. Additionally, the licensee is planning to update gamma spectroscopy procedures to provide clearer guidance on calibration requirements.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure of the licensee to calibrate chemistry count room instrumentation in accordance with licensee procedures was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Program & Process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, if annual efficiency confirmations are not performed as required, then the gamma spectroscopy equipment may drift out of tolerance and give inaccurate results.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix D, Public Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the resultant dose impact to a member of the public from the failure to calibrate instrumentation used for monitoring effluent streams and the environment would be unlikely to exceed Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and/or 10 CFR 20.1301(e).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained, as required by the licensees QATR, which includes procedures described in Regulatory Guide (RG) 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operations) - Effluent Streams and the Environment, Revision 1, dated February 1979. Section C.3 of RG 4.15 recommends procedures for calibration and checks of radiation and radioactivity measurement systems. The licensee implements ITS 5.4.1 requirements in procedures 0-NCCP-103, Calibration of the Gamma Spectroscopy System, Revision 0, and 0-NCOP-310, Calibration and Operation of the Gamma Spectroscopy Counting System, Revision 7. These procedures require an efficiency confirmation or full calibration to be performed on each detector on an annual basis. Contrary to this, in 2024, the licensee failed to perform annual efficiency confirmations or full calibrations on gamma spectroscopy detectors 3 and 4.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Maintain Meteorological Monitoring Instruments Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Public Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000250,05000251/2025002-04 Open/Closed
[P.3] -
Resolution 71124.07 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4., "Procedures," when the licensee failed to minimize extended periods of outage for meteorological monitoring instrumentation. Specifically, in calendar year 2024, meteorological instruments were inoperable on multiple occasions and repairs were not performed in a timely manner, contrary to a licensee procedure which require 90 percent data recovery.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed licensee corrective action documents related to degraded reliability of site meteorological monitoring instruments. In CY 2024, there were 10 ARs written for persistent instrumentation and data integrity issues on the primary and backup meteorological towers. The issues included: temperature and wind direction instruments found out of tolerance during testing, data collection equipment found to be inoperable, both towers being declared inoperable due to bad inputs, and significant instrument deficiencies observed during annual inspections. Guidance for an acceptable meteorological monitoring program is contained in Regulatory Guide 1.23, which states that instruments should be maintained such that the licensee can achieve a 90 percent data recovery rate. The licensee incorporated this guidance into procedure MET-DIR-001, "Land Utilization Department - Lab Administrative Directive Manual: Meteorological System Walkdowns and Inspections". The inspectors noted that data recovery for the measurements of atmospheric stability, wind speed, and wind direction for CY 2024 was approximately 40 percent. The inspectors determined that the licensee's corrective actions failed to ensure their meteorological program complied with providing a minimum of 90 percent data recovery by minimizing extended periods of meteorological instruments outage.
Corrective Actions: The licensee continues to work on a bridging strategy to acquire equipment to repair the towers (AR 02515365).
Corrective Action References: ARs 02510800 and 02515365
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to maintain meteorological instruments such that they achieved a 90 percent data recovery rate, as required by a licensee procedure, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Plant Facilities/Equipment and Instrumentation attribute of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation.
Failure to minimize extended periods of outage for meteorological monitoring instruments increases the likelihood that they will be unavailable if called upon during an accident.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix D, Public Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors used the Radioactive Environmental Monitoring Program portion to assess the significance of the violation. All findings associated with this branch are given a green significance.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Corrective actions for meteorological tower instrument problems were not timely or effective in CY 2024.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS 5.4.1 requires, in part, that the licensee establish, implement, and maintain written procedures required by the QATR. Appendix B to the QATR, requires, in part, that the licensee use Appendix A to Regulatory Guidance 1.33 for establishing the types of procedures that are necessary to control and support plant operation. Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires in part, procedures for meteorological monitoring. Procedure MET-DIR-001, Land utilization department - lab administrative directive manual:
meteorological system walkdowns and inspections, requires, in part, that the licensee maintains a meteorological program providing at a minimum a 90 percent data recovery and minimize extended periods of meteorological instruments outage.
Contrary to the above, for calendar year 2024, the licensee failed to minimize extended periods of outage and ensure that meteorological instruments maintained a 90 percent or above data recovery rate.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Closed)
Failure to Classify a Locked High Radiation Area Event as a Performance Indicator Non-Conformance URI 05000251/2024004-02 71151
Description:
The NRC identified a minor violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, for failing to provide complete and accurate performance indicator (PI) data associated with a non-conformance with TS 6.12, High Radiation Areas, that resulted in the loss of radiological control over work activities in the respective area. Performance indicator data is material to the NRC because it is relied upon to assess the performance of power reactor licensees. The NRC issued a self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV for this event in NRC Inspection Report 2023004 (ADAMS Accession Number ML24043A263). The licensee subsequently submitted Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 25-01 - Reporting PI for Dose Rate Alarm requesting interpretation of whether this event should have been counted against the Occupational Safety Effectiveness Performance Indicator (OR01). The NRC responded (draft response under ADAMS Accession Number ML25150A283) indicating that this event should have been reported as an occurrence against PI OR01 starting in the last quarter of 2023 and should have remained as a reportable occurrence for the three subsequent quarters.
This violation of 10 CFR 50.9 is minor because it is less significant than the Severity Level IV examples in Section 6.9 of the Enforcement Policy. Specifically, if the inaccurate or incomplete PI data had been submitted accurately during its active reporting period, it would not have resulted in the PI crossing the Green/White threshold or in an increase in NRC inspection oversight. Since, at the time of submitting the FAQ, the reporting period for this occurrence had already expired, the licensee is not required to amend the previously submitted PI data.
Corrective Action Reference(s): Inspection Reports 2023004 (ADAMS Accession Number ML24043A263) and 2024004 (ADAMS Accession Number ML25031A060).
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 15, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.
Michael Durbin, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 4, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. Michael Strope, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
action request
2510618, 2514939, 2515744
Procedures
0-ADM-116
Hurricane Season Readiness
4-NOP-022
Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System
4-OP-023
Procedures
4-OP-050
Residual Heat Removal System
PFP-3-TB-18
Unit 3 Turbine Building Elevation 18
PFP-4-EDG-18
Unit 4 Emergency Diesel Generator Building
Unit 3&4 Auxiliary Building Elevation 10
Fire Plans
Unit 3&4 Control Building Elevation 30
0-SME-091.1
Fire and Smoke Detection System Annual Test Circuits 1, 2,
11, 12, 13 and 14
0-SME-091.3
Fire and Smoke Detection System Annual Test Circuits 6, 15
and 32
04/03/2023
0-SME-091.4
Fire and Smoke Detection System Annual Test Circuits 7, 8,
20, 21, 22, 23, and 39
Procedures
PFP-3-TB-30
Unit 3 Turbine Building Elevation 30
Corrective Action
Documents
action requests
2515538
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
action requests
2515744, 2516705, 2516694, 2516622, 2516623
Drawings
5610-C-1696
Main Plant Flood Protection Stop Log Sections & Details
Procedures
0-OSP-102.1
Flood Protection Stoplog Inspection
Work Orders
work order 40885325, 40991187
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
action requests
2514391, 2514809, 2516463, 2509225
Miscellaneous
maintenance rule
evaluations
EVT-051-2025-51733, EVT-067-2025-51779, EVT-047-
25-51732, EVT-064-2025-51731
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Maintenance Rule Program Administration
Work Orders
WO 41008613, 40948369, 40819286, 40190612, 40942089
Corrective Action
Documents
action requests
2511872
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
action requests
2514506, 2514515
0-ADM-225
On Line Risk Assessment and Management
4-NOP-022
Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System
Procedures
Guarded Equipment
Drawings
5613-M-3074
FeedWater System
0-ADM-752
Maintenance Calibrations Response and Review
3-OSP-074.5
FW Control Valve and Bypass Valve Inservice Test
4-SMI-059.04
Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation N31 Calibration
Procedures
Work Orders
WO 40982218, 41020936
Corrective Action
Documents
action requests
2509238, 2511203, 2511530, 2511691, 2511896, 2496679
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
action requests
2515445, 2516073, 2516363
Engineering
Changes
40992847-01
4-383: Repair 4-383 Weld and Remove TEAM Enclosure
04/10/2025
40992847-03
4-383: General Leak PMT Only Task
03/19/2025
40992847-10
4-383: VT-2 Task
04/11/2025
Work Orders
work orders
40858925
0-OP-046
CVCS - Boron Concentration Control
0-OSP-040.19
Low Power Physics Testing
4-GOP-301
Hot Standby to Power Operation
Procedures
4-GOP-503
Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
action requests
2509419, 2509637, 2509422, 2511647, 2506702, 2514088,
2516246, 2516254
0-ADM-502
In-Service Testing (IST) Program
0-CMI-059.06
Excore Neutron Detector Receipt and Preinstallation
Inspection and Testing
0-CMI-059.08
Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range
Nuclear Instrumentation Detectors
0-OSP-016.1
Electric Driven Fire Pump Annual Surveillance Test
05/15/2025
0-PMI-102.5
Target Rock Solenoid Valve Maintenance
0-SMI-059.03
Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation N32 Calibration
3-OSP-041.1
Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation
4-NOP-022
Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System
4-OSP-019.1
Intake Cooling Water Inservice Test
05/13/2025
Procedures
Maintenance Testing
Work Orders
U4 personnel hatch air sampling not running
U4 equipment hatch air sampling not running
Individual entered the RCA without dosimetry
NRC identified scaffold survey tag
NRC identified HCA survey posting
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC identified scheduled survey incomplete
0-HPA-004
Scheduling of Periodic Radiation Protection Activities
Rev. 4
0-HPA-030
Personnel Monitoring of External Dose
Rev. 4
NISP-RP-002
Radiation and Contamination Surveys
Rev. 2
Procedures
NISP-RP-004
Radiological Posting and Labeling
Radiation
Surveys
PTN-M-
250301-13
Cavity drain valve survey
03/01/2025
Procedures
0-ADM-041
PTN Respiratory Protection Plan
2/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Power to essential RP components (HEPAs) being shut off
10/10/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Chemistry count room detector calibrations not within
acceptable criteria
04/03/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Inspection
0-NCCP-103
Calibration of the Gamma Spectroscopy Counting System
2/11/2008
Procedures
0-NCOP-310
Calibration and Operation of the Gamma Spectroscopy
Counting System
09/29/2022
2482420,
2484098,
2484338,
2484356,
2487010,
2487011,
2501312,
2503320,
2504742, and
2506333
Various
Various
Corrective Action
Documents
2510800
Annual MET Tower Report shows 40% data recovery.
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
action requests
2515914
Miscellaneous
Operator Logs
April 2024-March 2025
71151
Procedures
0-ADM-032
NRC Performance Indicators Turkey Point
14, 15
Corrective Action
Documents
action requests
2514544, 2510597, 2516027, 2509407
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
action requests
2516525
Corrective Action
Documents
action requests
2502825
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
action request
2518654
25