IR 05000250/1990040
| ML17348A812 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1990 |
| From: | Butcher R, Crlenjak R, Schnebli G, Trocine L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17348A810 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-90-40, 50-251-90-40, NUDOCS 9101110134 | |
| Download: ML17348A812 (15) | |
Text
UI4I TED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.'IY.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/90-40 and 50-251/90-40 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
L'icense Nos.;
/~ Z8 ate S gne ate gne
~ 24 Wc D te S gne I nspection Conducted:
vember 3 through December 7,
1990 Inspector
.
C.
B her, nior Reside Inspector
.
S eb i, Reside t Inspector
~
L.
roc
,
es>
ent nspector Approved by:
R.
.
r enjak, ection C
f Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident i nspector inspection entailed direct inspection at the site in the. areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observations, operational safety, and plant events.
Results:
e Within the scope of this inspection, the inspectors determined that the, licensee continued to demonstrate satisfactory performance to ensure safe plant operations.
Two violations and one IFI were identified.
VIO 50-250,251/90-40-01.
Failure to perform a Technical:Specification required surveillance on fire hoses within the allotted time period (paragraph 5).
VIO 50-250,251/90-40-02.
Failure to follow procedures 0-ADM-200 and 4-GOP-305 resulting in the inadvertent opening of a Power Operated Relief Valve (paragraph 8).
9101110134 901221 PDR ADOCN 05000250 Q
IFI 50-250,251/90-40-03.
Corrective actions for starting battery failures for BlackStart Emergency Diesel Generators (paragraph 8).
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees T. V. Abbatiello, guality Assurance Supervisor
- J. Arias, Jr., Technical Assistant to Vice President
- L. W. Bladow, guality Manager T. A. Finn, Assistant Operations Superintendent R. J. Gianfrencesco, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent S. T. Hale, Engineering Project Supervisor E.
F.
Hayes,- Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor R.
G. Heisterman, Assistant Superintendent of Electrical Maintenance
- V. A. Kaminskas, Operations Superintendent
- J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor J.
A. Labarraque, Senior Technical Advisor G. L. Marsh, Reactor Supervisor R.
G.
Mende, Operations Supervisor
- L. W. Pearce, Plant Manager, Nuclear T. F. Plunkett, Site Vice President
- D. R. Powell, Superintendent, Plant Licensing K. L. Remington, System Performance Supervisor C. V. Rossi, guality Assurance Supervisor G.
M. Smith, Service Manager, Nuclear R.
N. Steinke, Chemistry Supervisor J.
C. Strong, Mechanical Department Supervisor F.
R. Timmons, Site Security Superintendent
- M. B. Wayland, Maintenance Superintendent J.
D. Webb, Assistant Superintendent Planning and Scheduling
- A. T. Zielonka, Technical Department Supervisor.
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsman, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians..
Resident Inspectors R.
C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector
- G. A. Schnebli, Resident Inspector
- L. Trocine, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview on December 7,
1990
'A Note:
An alphabetical tabulation of acronyms used in this report is listed in paragraph 10.
Plant Status Unit 3 remained at 100K power throughout this inspection period with no major operational problems.
At the end of the inspection period, the unit had completed 174 days of continuous operatio Unit 4 operated at 100K power through November 24, 1990, except for one power reduction to approximately 55K in order to allow replacement of the 4A Feedwater Heater Drain Pump Motor on November 4-5, 1990.
The shutdown on November 24, 1990, was for the planned Unit 4 refueling outage and for the upcoming dual unit outage, which is scheduled to commence on December 11, 1990.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance (92702)
A review was conducted of the following noncompliance to assure that corrective actions were adequately implemented and resulted in conformance'ith regulatory requirements.
Verification of corrective action was achieved through record reviews, observa'tion, and discussions with licensee personnel.
Licensee correspondence was evaluated to ensure the responses were timely and corrective actions were implemented within the time periods specified in the reply.
(Closed)
VIO 50-250,251/89-54-02.
Concerning the failure to take corrective action in response to MSIV terminal block corrosion previously identified.
The licensee responded to this violation by letter L-90-99, dated March 14, 1990.
The inspectors reviewed the required corrective actions and found them to be adequate.
This violation is closed.
Onsite Followup and In-Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events and
CFR Part 21 Reviews (90712/90713/92700)
The Licensee Event Reports and/or
CFR Part 21 Reports discussed below were reviewed.
The inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, root cause a'nalysis was performed, corrective actions appeared appropriate, and generic applicability had been considered.
Additionally, the inspectors verified the licensee had reviewed each event, corrective actions were implemented, responsibility for corrective actions not fully completed was clearly assigned, safety questions had been evaluated and resolved, and violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.
When applicable, the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, were applied.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/88-26.
Concerning the facility being outside the FSAR Design Basis with regard to flood protection.
-.This,issue was initially identified by the licensee's gA department.
Appropriate compensatory measures have been taken in the event of a hurricane warning prior to completion of modifications required to correct the concerns identified in this issue.
The licensee is tracking completion of,this item on its Commitment Tracking System and the Integrated Schedule with a current completion date of December 1992.
This LER is'closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-15.
Concerning the charging pumps being declared inoperable due to inadequate troubleshooting techniques used to 'determine the cause for reduced charging flow to the RCS.
This issue was,previously-discussed in IR 50-250,251/89-45.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them to be adequate.
This LER is close (Closed)
LER 50-250/89-18.
Concerning the plant operating with a design inadequacy in the SI block switch.
This issue was previously discussed in IRs 50-250,251/90-18 and 90-19.
The licensee's review included all safety-related switches of this type.
The increased scope of this deficiency was identified in LER 50-250/90-12 which will be tracked for final closeout of this issue.
This LER is closed.
monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified the test procedure conformed to the requirements of the TS; testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspectors verified testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
O-OSP-016.23, Diesel Driven Fire Pump Operability Test, 4-0SP-068.2, Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test, 4-0SP-075.2, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 2 Operability Test, 4-0SP-075.7, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 2 Backup Nitrogen Test, and O-OP-31, Black Start Diesel Operation (for No.
3 and
BS Diesels)
The inspectors determined that the above testing activities were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements of the TS.
On November 14, 1990, with both units at 100% power, the licensee discovered that TS 4. 15.4.a.
1 surveillance requirement had not been performed within the required time interval.
- This TS requires that fire hose stations in the vicinity of safety-related equipment be visually inspected on a monthly interval.
TS 4.0. 1 allows the scheduled interval to be adjusted, plus or minus 25K, to accoamodate normal test schedules.
This surveillance is scheduled by 0-OSP-200. 1, Schedule of Plant Checks and Surveillances, to be performed on the second Tuesday of each month.
Therefore, depending on which day of the month the second Tuesday-'falls, the time interval can be either 28 or 35 days.
The October 1990 inspection was scheduled to be performed on Oc'tober 9; however, it was completed on October
as allowed by TS 4.0.1.
The surveillance for November was scheduled and accomplished on November 13.
Due to the early performance of the surveillance in October, the interval between the visual inspections was 39 days, which exceeded the time allotted by TS 4.0. 1.
The failure to perform TS 4.15.4.a.l within the allowed time is identified as VIO 50-250,251/90-40-01.
Although the safety significanqe
6.
of this specific issue is minimal, the inspectors are concerned there may be a programmatic problem with ensuring that survei llances are performed within the time period allotted.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review, as appropriate:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected the maintenance performed; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; gC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were properly implemented; gC hold points were established and observed where required; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved gA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities in progress:
Black Start Diesel Battery Cell 38 Failure, Troubleshooting 4A Heyter Drain Pump Grounded Motor, Troubleshooting Unit S and 4 Feedwater Thermocouple Inaccurate Readings, Troubleshooting 4B CS Pump Low Oiler Level, and Repair of B
EDG Starting Air Compressor Unloader Air Leak.
For those maintenance activities observed, the inspectors determined that these activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and that the work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work orders.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
7.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers, and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors verified proper valve/switch a3ignment of selected emergency systems, verified maintenance work orders had been submitted as required, and verified followup and prioritization of work was accomplished.
The inspectors reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with TS LCOs, and verified the return to service of affected component By observation and direct interviews, verification was made that the physical security plan was being implemented.
Plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and implementation of radiological controls were observed.
Tours of the intake structure and diesel, auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid"leaks and excessive vibrations.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems to verify proper valve/switch alignment:
A and B Emergency Diesel Generators; Control Room Vertical Panels and Safeguards Racks; Intake Cooling Water Structure; 4160 Volt Buses and 480 Volt Load and Motor Control Centers; Unit 3 and 4 Feedwater Platforms; Unit 3 and 4 Condensate Storage Tank Area; Auxiliary Feedwater Area; Unit 3 and 4 Hain Steam Platforms; and Auxiliary Building.
The inspectors, as a result of routine plant tours and various operational observations, determined that the general plant and system material conditions were being satisfactorily maintained, that the plant security program was being effective, and that the overall performance of plant operations was good.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Plant Events (93702)
The following plant events were reviewed to determine facility status and the need for further followup action.
Plant parameters were evaluated during transient response.
The significance of the event was evaluated along with the performance =of the appropriate safety systems and the actions taken by the licensee.
The inspectors verified that required notifications were made to the NRC.
Evaluations were performed relative to the need for additional NRC response to the event.
Additionally, the following issues were examined, as appropriate:
'details regarding the cause of the event; event chronology; safety system performance; licensee compliance with approved procedures; radiological consequences, if any; and proposed corrective actions.
On November 4, 1990, at 9:52 a.m.,
annunciator X8/5 indicated a ground on either the 4A or 4B 4KV bus.
Investigation showed the 4A heater drain pump, powered from the 4A 4KV bus, had a ground indication.
The 4A heater drain pump was taken off line after starting the 4C condensate pump.
At 11: 14 a.m.
the licensee started reducing power to 60$ to stabilize the plant and minimize the extended use of the alternate dump to the condenser.
The grounded motor was replaced with a spare and tested satisfactorily on November 5, 1990.
The failed motor was sent to a vendor
for root cause analysis and repair.
The unit returned to 100K power at 10:00 p.m.
on November 5, 1990.
On November 6, 1990, at 9: 10 a.m.,
while operations was attempting to start the number
BS EDG, the number
BS failed to start and the number" 1 BS, which had previously started satisfactorily and was operating, tripped.
Investigation showed that battery cell 38 had failed resulting in a loss of control power.
BS EDGs 1, 3, 4, and 5 were declared OOS.
BS EDG 2 was already 00S for other reasons.
The licensee jumpered battery cells 37, 38, 39, and 40 as a group, reset the battery charger voltage to allow for the reduced battery capacity, and started BS EDGs 1 and 3 to verify operability.
The BS EDGs, except for number 2, were declared back in service at 4: 11 p.m.
on November 6, 1990.
A similar event occurred on September 26, 1990 (ref.
IR 50-250,251/90-03).
The licensee is investigating the events to determine root cause and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
Follow up of the licensee's actions on BS EDG starting battery failures will be tracked as IFI 50-250,251/90-40-03.
On November 13, 1990, at 4:15 p.m., with Unit 4 at lOOX power, a
SNPO reported that the 4B CS pump oiler had no visible level in the reservoir.
The 4B CS pump was declared 00S, at that time, requiring entry into a
24-hour LCO per TS 3.4.2.b.2.
Testing of the 4A CS pump per 4-0SP-068.2, Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test, commenced at 7: 15 p.m.
This procedure requires the 4A CS pump manual discharge valve 4-891A to be closed during the test rendering both trains of CS to be OOS for the duration of the test.
This action required entry into TS 3.0. 1.
In addition, the licensee declared this to be a significant event per
CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) and notified the NRC at 8:24 p.m.
The 4A CS pump was tested satisfactorily, returned to service, and the unit exited TS 3.0. 1 at 7:45 p.m.
Oil was added to the 4B CS pump reservoir and the pump was operationally tested with no visible signs of oil leakage.
The 4B CS pump was declared back in service at 10:20 p.m.
The licensee is currently trying to determine the root cause for the loss of oi 1 in the reservoir.
On November 17, 1990, the Turkey Point fossil units notified the nuclear units of an acid leak in the water treatment plant due to a failure of the equalization line connecting the fossil and nuclear acid tanks.
As a
result, approximately 10 gallons of concentrated sulfuric acid overflowed an enclosed area, entered the storm drains, and was released -"to the environment.
When the leak was discovered, the pipe was isolated, and the spill was contained.
The spill was reported to local county officials per EPA regulations and to the NRC Operations Center per
CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi).
A courtesy notification was 'also-'made to the National Response Center and State Warning Point.
Following this event, the onshift operating crew became concerned about the integrity of the drainage system piping in the water treatment plant after a release from the neutralization tank did not result in the expected increase in neutralization basin level.
It was subsequently determined that a
significant leak may exist in the water treatment plant drainage system piping.
A team was established to create an action plan to identify the leak location.
Actions regarding this item are currently ongoin On November 26, 1990, while preparing to place the OMS into service during the Unit 4 shutdown, PORV 4-455C momentarily opened.
At the time of this event, Unit 4 was in Mode 4; the OMS mode switch was positioned for low pressure operations; the unit was in single pump operation with only the
RCP running; and PT-403, which is located on the suction side of the 8 RCP, was being utilized to monitor RCS pressure.
With the differential pressure across the core (single pump and low pressure operations),
PT-403 indicated a lower pressure than PT-405, which is located on the suction side of the A RCP.
The operator did'ot realize the difference between these two PTs and did not realize how close pressure in the A loop actually was to the OMS setpoint.
In addition, approximately 40 minutes prior to the PORV lift, the operator made an adjustment to the pressurizer spray per paragraph 5. 11 of procedure 4-GOP-305, Hot 'Standby to Cold Shutdown.
This procedure required the operator to maintain pressure within the range of 325 to 375 psi for the establishment and verification of OMS operation.
Following this adjustment to the pressurizer spray, the operator failed to adequately monitor the RCS response.
As a result, indicated pressure at PT-403 (8 loop) increased to approximately 400 psi, while pressure at PT'-405 (A loop) increased to the PORV lift setpoint of 415 psi, and PORV 4-455C (A loop) momentarily opened and reclosed.
The high pressure alert alarm, which utilizes only PT-402 (8 loop),
was received within approximately 1 second of the PORV lift when pressure in the 8 loop reached the alarm setpoint of 400 psi.
The OMS control actuated alarm, which utilizes PT-403 (8 loop)
as the primary and PT-405 (A loop)
as the backup, was also received when the pressure in the A loop reached the lift setpoi nt of 415 psi and the A loop PORV lifted'.
The failure to maintain pressure within the range specified in paragraph 5. 11 of procedure 4-GOP-305 and the failure of the on-shift operator to be aware of and responsible for the plant status at all times per paragraph 5. 1.6 of procedure O-ADM-200, Conduct of Operations, constitute a
violation of TS 6.8. 1.
This item will be tracked as VIO 50-250,251/90-40-02.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were sumnarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant Manager, Nuclear, and selected members of his staff.
An exit meeting was conducted on December 7,
1990, and areas requiring; management",.attention
.were reviewed.
No proprietary information was provided to the inspectors during the reporting period.
The inspectors had the following findings:
Item Number 50-250,251/90-40-01 50-250,251/90-04-02 Descri tion and Reference VIO - Failure to perform a
TS required surveillance on fire hoses within the allotted time period (paragraph 5).
VIO - Failure to follow procedures 0-ADM-200 and 4-GOP-305 resulting in the inadvertent opening of a PORV (paragraph 8).
50-250,251/90-40-03.
IFI - Co'rrective actions for starting battery failures for BS EDGs (paragraph 8).
Acronyms ADH a.m.
BS CFR CS EDG EPA FSAR GOP IFI IR KV LCO LER HSIV NRC OHS OOS OSP p.m.
PORY ps 1 PT QA QC RCP RCS SI SNPO TS YIO and Abbreviations Administrati ve Ante Meridiem Black Start Code of Federal Regulations Containment Spray Emergency Diesel Generator Environmental Protection Agency Final Safety Analysis 'Report General Operating Procedure Inspector Followup Item Inspection Report Kilovolt Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Hain Steam Isolation Valve Nuclear Regulatory Coranission Overpressure Mitigation System Out of Service Operations Surveillance Procedure Post Meridiem Power Operated Relief alve Pounds Per Square Inch Pressure Transmitter Quality Assurance Quality Control Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant System Safety Injection Senior Nuclear Plant Operator Technical Specification Violation