IR 05000250/1990038
| ML18008A037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18008A036 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-90-38, 50-251-90-38, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 9012170119 | |
| Download: ML18008A037 (29) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNIISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IV.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
<tm 30 ~9K Report Nos.:
50-250/90-38 and 50-251/90-38 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
November 6-9, 1990 Inspector:
(< <cc E..
festa License.Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 up~yr t)aCe Signed Accompanying Personnel:
K. Clark A. Gooden G. Schnebli I. Will (Sonalysts, Inc.)
Approved bye&~~~ ~ P
.
H. Ranin, Cie Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety ano Safeguards
/l gg go ate
~igne SUYiYiARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection included observation and evaluation of the annual emergency response exercise.
Emergency organizations'ctivities and responses were selectively observed in the Control Room (Simulator), Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Field Monitoring Teams, Emergency Operations Facility and Emergency News Center.
The inspection also included a
review of the exercise objectives and scenario details, as well as observation of the licensee's post-exercise critique activities.
The exercise was a
partial participation exercise with the State of Florida and local counties.
The exercise was conducted on November 8, 1990, between the hours of 7:45 a.m.
and 3:00 p.m.
e 901~170119 901130 PDR ADOCK 05000250
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The following strengths were identified in the licensee's emergency response organization and facilities:
Excellent command, control and technical knowledge of the plant and plant systems by the (new) Plant Manager.
The new in-plant radio system provided effective, efficient and reliable exercise controller, operations personnel and fire team communications.
3.
Status boards in the TSC were legibly maintained, frequently updated, and off normal values highlighted for quick identification.
li'ithin the scope of the observed exercise, the licensee fully demonstrated the capability of implementing its Emergency Plan and procedures to provide for the health and safety of the onsite personnel and the offsite publi REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Acosta, Chairman, CNRB
- P. Banaszaic, Lead Systems Engineer
- M. Bomgardner, Communications Coordinator
~F.
Busch, Fire Protection Coordinator
- G. Casto, Specialist, Emergency Planning
- V. Chilson, Principal Engineer
- Yi. Constabi le, gA Engineer
- R. Dodson, Coordinator, Simulator Engineering
- A. Gould, Manager, Health Physics
- S. Hale, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- K. Harris, Senior Vice President - Operations
- J. Hays, Yianager, Nuclear Energy Services
- M. Jimenez, Nuclear Eneroy Specialist
- J. Kirkpatrick, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- M. Klein, Manaaer Corporate Information Services
- J. Knorr, Supervisor, RCG Licensing
~D. Lettsome, gA Engineer
- D. Yiilier, Staff Senior Engineer
- R. Mothena, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
- M. Mullins, gA Auditor-
"G. Patrissi, Senior gA Analyst
- L. Pearce, Plant Manager
- T. Plunkett, Site Vice President
- M. Princevalle, Emergency Planning Support
",J. Sell, Senior gA Engineer
"J. Walls, Principal gA Auditor
- J. West, Manager, Nuclear Security Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Other Organizations
- T. Gildersleve, Enercon
"'D. Giraldo, Director, Emergency Services American Red Cross
- R. Gonzalez, Lieutenant, Metro Dade Police
- C. Hultquist, Planning Manager/REP State of Florida
Nuclear Regulatory Commission P
R. Hutcher, Seniop Resident Inspector G. Schnebli, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test an integrated emergency response capability as well as the basic elements existing within the licensee, State and local Emergency Plans and organization as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives in advance of the exercise.
The final exercise, data and message package were distributed during a pre-exercise licensee briefing held November 7, 1990.
The scenario developed for this day shift exercise was detailed and fully exercised the licensee's emergency organization.
The exercise began at about 7:45 a.m.
EST.
Unit 3 had been operating for 99 consecutive days and Unit
was in day 6 of a
64 day scheduled outage.
The exercise scenario terminated after about 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> at 3:00 p.m.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed adequate interactions between the controller and the players, no controller prompting was observed, r
The inspector observed several instances of free play casualties injected by offsite authorities.
Their interjection caused some minor perturbation to play when controllers were not sure of the source of events and could not confirm or answer player questions.
The licensee recognized the potential for disruption in future exercises and has instituted corrective actions to prevent repeat occurrences.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by
CFR 50.47(b)( 1),, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's onsite emergency response organization, and that adequate staff were available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee
representatives.
-Because of the scenario scope and conditions,"long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
The logistics for relief shifts were planned and transportation to and from the plant was discussed and planned.
Discussions with
,'icensee representatives indicated that sufficient technical staff was available to provide for continuous staf'fing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC),
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
and Emergency News Center (ENC).
At each response center the required staffing and assignment of resporisibility was consistent with the licensee's approved Emergency Plan.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emeroency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to
,
CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to
CFR 50, and specific ouidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654; ( I) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffino to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organization interactions..
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, a'nd the staff was available to fill key functional positio'ns within the organization.
Augmentation of the initial emergency response oroanization was accomplished through mobilization of the additional day shift personnel.
The Shift Supervisor assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of the Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager.
The shift team in the control room simulator performed their duties and, carried out their responsibilities in an outstanding manner.
The depth of knowledge of systems and the resources available combined with a
"cooperative" spirit of this team resulted in an exemplary effort throughout the exercise.
The Plant Manager skillfully used his technical and administrative resources to effectively demonstrate command and control of the TSC in prioritizing and resolving scenario induced casualties.
Supporting technical information and management assistance was made available as requested.
No violations or deviations were identified.,
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)
20101 titled "Duties of Emergency Coordinator" was used to promptly identify and properly classify the scenario simulated events.
The Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE), and General Emergency classifications were timely and correct by procedure.
The Alert occurred at approximately 8:35 a.m.
due to a
simulated uncontrolled fire potentially affecting a safety system and offsite support required.
The SAE was declared at approximately 9:40 a.m.
by the folio>iing Emergency Action Level (EAL) "Plant in Yiode 1, 2, 3, or 4 and Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
leakage greater than
gpm and no indication of steaks generator tube leakage."
A General Emergency was declared at about 9:50 a.m.
by EAL "Plant operating in Node 1, 2, 3, or 4 and RCS leakage greater than
gpm and RCS leakage greater than available chargino pump capacity and loss o'f containment integrity which provided a
flow 'path to the environment and no indication of increased steam generator tube leakage."
The drill was terminated at approximately 3:00 p.m.
Ho violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Yiethods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and thht the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IY.
D and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II. E.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
Notification of the State was completed within 15 minutes following the declaration of the emergency event.
During the initial and followup notification, the inspector observed that the State of Florida Noi.ification Form had no Emergency Coordinator (EC)
authorization signature nor release time space.
It was also noted by the inspector that the communicator made several changes to information on the Notification Form after the EC review and did not bring these changes to the EC's attention.
The licensee stated that these issues would be evaluated.
These items will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI).
IFI 50-250, 251/90-38-01:
Date, time and EC signature line'or the State of Florida Notification Form and training of communicators to inform the EC'f any changes made.
to the notification form after his authorization for release.
The Alert Notification System (ANS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ)
was not actuated during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt comiiunications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph JV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organization, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities.
t No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine the adequate emergency facilities and eouipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities.
. No major equipment deficiencies were observed.
The facilities observed by the NRC evaluation team included:
a
~
Control Room (simulator) - The exercise Control Room was established outside the main Control Room in the simulator at the training center.
The inspector observed.that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate the required responses to the simulated emergencies.
Emergency procedures were available and followed.
The designated exercise Shift Supervisor evaluated the significance of each degradation in plant conditions and quickly and continuously prioritized repair activities.
The simulator shift personnel followed procedures and command and control were demonstrated in a competent manner.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC Yianager (new Plant Yianager)
demonstrated effective command and control and an in-depth knowledge of the plant during the exercise.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their duties, authorities and responsibilities.
The TSC
Vianager conducted an in-depth detailed discussion concerning the various possibilities of plant casualties and resultant classifications.
The TSC prbvided timely knowledgeable support to the Control Room during the casualties.
Status boards were conveniently placed and maintained current.
The highlighting of abnormally high values enabled viewers to quickly identify important data and evaluate trends.
Operations Support Center (OSC) - The inspector observed that following the request for activation, personnel responded promptly to staff the facility.
The use of the newly installed plant radio system provided excellent support to the repair teams sent into the plant to perform various simulated functions.
The direction and control of these teams demonstrated efficient and effective repair planning during casualty situations.
~
The inspector observed that procedures used with an On-The-Spot Change (OTSC)
block were not always verified as current nor signed off and verified prior to their use.
The licensee stated that this issue would be evaluated.
This issue will be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-250, 251/90-38-02:
Ensuring that OSC procedures are completely checked for GTSCs and signed off as verified prior to use.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
-,
The EOF was staffed by pre-staged personnel.
The facility was declared operational at about 10: 10 a.m.
The facility staff were familiar with their emergency duties, authorities, and emergency responsibilities.
The EOF was
'rovided with adequate equipment to support the assigned staff.
Security'nd access control was observed to be appropriately established and maintained.
Communications between the EOF and the TSC at the plant were adequate.
Effective and timely transmission of information was demonstrated.
During a tour and walk-thru of the facilities on November 7, 1990, the inspector found approximately 14 copies of telephone directories with current as well as outdated inserts.
The licensee took prompt corrective action to remove the old telephone number inserts.
Actions have been instituted to prevent a
reoccurrence.
Emergency News Center (ENC) - The ENC was declared operational at approximately 9:30 a.m.
with pre-staged personnel.
Technical briefings were provided to mock news persons.
The inspector observed an adequate demonstration and use of the ENC.
Excessive use of non-technical jargon without adequate layman explanation was identified for correction by the licensee during the critique process.
No violations or deviations were identifie Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure 'that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Both programs appeared effective during this exercise in analyzing the plant status in order to make recommendations to the Emergency Director..
Yiitigating actions were evaluated and recommended to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency condition.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was obserVed to verify that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
The inspector verified that the licensee had adequately used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations (PARs) for the offsite populace within the 10 mile EPZ.
PARs were formulated in a
timely manner and passed on to appropriate offsite decision makers.
Site assembly, accountability and site evacuation were simulated for this
'xercise.
No violations or deviations were observed.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licen'see's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The inspector observed the licensee's player critique conducted in the Control Room, TSC, OSC, ENC and EOF.
The player offered constructive suogestions for improvement.
All substantial suggestions were documented for review and correctio e The inspector also observed the licensee's controller'ritique conducted on November 9, 1990.
The subject critique involved a detailed discussion and an analysis of required improvements and deficiencies identified during the exercise and players critique.
All substantive findings were documented for review and correction.
Corrective actions implemented to aodress these findings will be reviewed during future inspections.
A formal presentation of the critique results was made to licensee management on November 9,
1990.
The conduct of the critique was consistent with regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above.
All exercise objectives were judged as having been met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)
IFI 50-250, 251/89-50-02:
Failure to provide effective communications between the Technical Support Group (TSG)
and other segments of the TSC staff.
The inspector observed the TSG performance during the exercise and determined that effective communication existed between the TSG and other TSC staff.
13.
Exit Interview e
The inspection scope and results were summarized on, November 9, 1990, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and oiscussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Licensee management was informed that one IFI was considered closed.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number 50-250, 251/90-38-01 50-250, 251/90-38-02
~oescri tion and Reference IFI - Date, time, and Emergency Coordinator
.authorization signature line for the State of Florida Notification Form and train communicators to inform the EC of any changes made to the notification form after authorization for release (Paragraph 6).
IFI - Ensuring that OSC procedures are completely checked for OTSC and signed off as verified prior to use (Paragraph 8.c).
Attachments:
1.
Exercise Time Line 2.
Exercise Scope and Objectives
1990 EVALUATEDEXERCISE TURKEY POINT PLANT NOVEMBER 8, 1990 Initial Conditions:
Unit 3 has been operating for 99 consecutive days. The following items are of interest:
o Containment purge in progress in preparation for containment entry to work the flux mapper in order to meet Technical Specification surveillance.
Unit 4 is in day 6 of a 64 day scheduled refueling outage.
The following items are of interest:
o The refueling cavity has not been filled.
o Repairs to the polar crane are continuing.
o Unit No. 4 startup transformer is out of service for preventative maintenance, power is being backfed through Unit 4 auxiliary transformer.
o No. 4B high head safety injection pump is out of service for corrective ma inte na nce.
Common:
o No. 8 auxiliary feedwater pump (AFW) is out of service for preventative maintenance.
o Grass (brush) fires have been a problem in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties.
A grass fire has been reported in the area bounded by S. W. 107th Ave., S. W. 112th Ave. (Allapattah Rd), S. W. 260th Street (Moody Dr.), and the Florida Turnpike - Homestead Extension, (about S. W. 256 Street).
The fire has been burning for several hours and has not been extinguished.
System Operations:
o Unscheduled outages of Riviera Unit No. 3, Sanford Unit No. 5, and St. Lucie Unit No.
2 have put a strain on FPL system capability.
High system load demand is expected today. Allavailable FPL units are operating.
Meteorological Information:
Skies are partly cloudy at 8:00 a. m. The temperature is 78 deg. F, wind is 2-5 mph form the southeast (136 deg.). The forecast is for mostly cloudy skies today with a 30 percent chance of rain. High temperature is expected to be around 85 deg. F today with lows around 72 deg F
this evening. Wind willbe from the southeast at 2-5 mph.
e
- E3/II/ds:October 4, 1990 2:46 PM Page 1 of 1
1990 EVALUATEDDRILL
, TURKEY POINT PLANT November 8, 1990 Timeline:
7:45 a.m.
Exercise commencement.
7:55 a.m. 'etal Impact Monitor System (MIMS)sounds
- minor 7:56 a.m.
R-20 Alarms 7:57 a.m.
Control Room requests Chemistry to get an RCS sample.
7:58 a.m.
Control Room requests Health Physics to survey.
8:00 a.m 8:01 a.m.
8:06 a.rn.
8:07 a.m.
8:13 a.m.
8:16 a.rn.
8:35 a.m.
8:40 a.m.
Control Room receives indication of a fire; audible alarm and red indicating light illuminated on fire detection panel C-39A, Fire Zone 73, Remote Lamp Panel: RLP - 12, Alarm Point 416, Fire Area Z.
Note:
Investigation will reveal the fire is in the No. A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room In the start air compressor.
Control Room sends operator to in'vestigate fire alarm.
Operator reports to the Control Room that there is a fire in the No. A EDG room. around the start air compressor.
Control Room sounds fire alarm and announces fire information.
Fire Brigade Reports to the No. A EDG area.
Fire Brigade Leader notifies the Control Room that offsite assistance will be required to combat the fire.
Note:
The call for offsite assistance willbe simulated.
The Control Room can cal/246-6)83.
Alert should be declared by this time due to an uncontrolled fire potentially affecting a safety system AND offsite support required.
Metallmpact Monitor System (MIMS)sounds - minor.
8:50 a.m.
RCS primary leak begins.
8:51 a.m.
Simulated offsite fire support arrives.
8:54 a.m.
Emergency Coordinator and communicators should be turning over.
8:55 a.rn.
Control Room has indications of a primary leak in excess of 50 gpm.
Charging pump speed increases to the high speed stop and automatic make-up to the RCS is initiated. Containment sump level indicator shows sump level increasing.
- E3/II/ds:September 21, 1990 7:36AM Page 1 of 5
e 1990 EVALUATEDDRILL TURKEY POINT PLANT November 8, 1990 Affected area and Process Radiation Monitors inside containment show an increase in airborne activity.
ARMS R1 - Mezzanine Floor Level 30'6" Elev.
(near personnel air lock)
R2 - Operating Floor Level 58'lev.
R3 - Incore Drive Assemblies 34'" Elev.
8:55 a.m.
PROC E SS MONITORS R-3-11 Particulate
- Alarms (Annunciator H-1/4)
R-3-12 Gaseous
- Slowly increases then alarms (Annunciator H-'1/4)
R-3-14 Plant Vent (just from RCS leak slight increase)
SPING CHRRM's as ARM's exceed 1R (as leak increases)
8:57 a.m.
Control Room isolates containment ventilation, isolates the Control Room, and isolates containment.
NOTE:
When containment purge is terminated because of the RCS leak inside containment, the indicating lights for Containment Isolation Valve (outside containment)
POV-3-2602 show dual indication.
Investigation willshow that the containment purge valve outside containment failed to close when the selector switch was placed in the closed position.
The failure of POV-3-2602 is half of the release path from containment.
The remaining half of the pathway is the leak through the seat of POV-3-2603 (inside containment).
Release starts here and increases as containment pressure increases.
Release continues until valve is repaired.
8:59 a.m.
System contacted for shutdown 9:00 a.m.
9:01 a.m.
9:02 a.m 9:03 a.m.
9:04 a.m Load reduction begins according to ONOP 100.
Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) should be operational by this time.
Control Room will request either I&C, Operators or both go to investigate POV-3-2602. Itwilltake I&C actions to repair this valve.
Control Room contacts OSC to conduct surveys and post radiation areas as required per ONOP-041.3.
MIMS-major
- E3/Il/ds:September 2 I, 1990 7:36 AM Page 2 of 5
e 9:05 a.m 9:05 am.
9:08 a.m.
9:10. a.m.
1990 EVALUATEDDRILL
. TURKEY POINT PLANT November 8, 1990 Process Radiation Monitor (PRM) R-3-20, Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
letdown monitor pegs high as RCS activity increases.
NOTE:
This increase in R-3-20 is due to metal damaging'the fuel.
Reference the MIMSactua tions earlier in the scenario.
The metal is a result ofdamage to a Reactor Coolant Pump impeller.
Control Room contacts OSC to get an RCS sample.
NOTES: Dose rates around the Sample Room may deter. the OSC from acquiring the sample.
If dose rates do not inliibit acquiring a sample, an actual RCS sample willbe drawn and analyzed.
Alert (42) could be declared by this time if the Emergency Coordinator chooses to downgrade from the Alert caused by the fire in the EDG area.
This Alert will be due to the plant in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 AND RCS leakage)50 gpm AND'CS leakage within available charging pump capacity AND no indication of steam generator tube leakage.
NOTE:
RCS leak rate is approximately 70 gpm.
9: 1.5 a.m.
OSC dispatches offsite emergency radiation teams.
9:20 a.m.
Health Physics reports some survey results.
9:21 a.m.
Chem. Tech contacts Control Room to align valves for sample.
9:25 a.m.
RCS leakage increases to approximately 460 gpm.
9:26 a.m.
Reactor is tripped by actuation of the Safety Injection System (SIS) on low RCS pressurizer pressure.
Turbine - generator is tripped by the reactor trip.
9:28 a.m.
No. C AuxiliaryFeedwater pump fails to start.
NOTE:
Investigation into the failure of the No. C Auxiliary Feedwater pump willshow that the pump failed on overspeed.
9:30 a.m.
Release picks up driving force as containment pressure increases.
This is reflected on the Process Radiation Monitor R-3-14, Plant Vent.
9:32 a.m.
Chemistry reports RCS sample analysis.
9:35 a.m.
Control Room requests OSC to line up the Post Accident Hydrogen Monitor (PAHMs)
9:38 a.m.
OSC should have a Team to the No. C AuxiliaryFeedwater pump.
9:40 a.m.
Site Area Emergency should be declared by the Emergency Coordinator due to the plant in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 AND RCS leakage > charging pump capacity ANDno indication of steam generator tube leakage.
NOTE; Site Evacuation and real time EOF/ENC activation willbe simulated.
- E3/II/ds:September 21, 1990 7:36 AM Page 3 of 5
J
1990 EVALUATEDDRILL TURKEY POINT PLANT November 8, 1990 9.41 a.m.
9:42 a.m.
9;43 a.m.
9:50 a.m.
Employee calls Control Room (Simulator) of car wreck at the point where the training building parking meets the main 'parking lot involving site evacuees
.
NOTE:
Control Room should notify TSC of the event.
TSC willnotify OSC and OSC willdispatch Team to the scene.
(noinjuries)
Control Room requests Team to align HHSI pumps from other unit NOTE:
A Team member sent to align the HHSI will be the contaminated injured individual.
Control Room receives indications that containment pressure is increasing.
This, in turn, is causing the Plant Vent, R-3-14 to increase A General Emergency should be declared due to the plant in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 AND RCS leakage > 50 gpm AND RCS leakage greater than available charging pump capacity AND loss of containment integrity which provides a flow path to the environment AND no indication of increased steam gen'erator tube leakage.
NOTE:
Minimum Protective Action Recommendations (PAR's) will be made at this point. Shelter entire radius 0-2 miles and down wind sectors 2-5 miles.
9;52 a.m.
No. 3A High head Safety Injection System (HHSIS) pump trips NOTE:
investigation into the failure of the No. 3A HHSIS pump willreveal motor trip on overload.
9:58 a.m, Control Room requests OSC to begin the lineup of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).
10:00 a.m.
Release is terminated as containment pressure drops NOTE:
Thisis one ofthe criteria needed forrecovery.
10:10 a.m.
10:15 a.m.
Turnover to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) should be occurring.
Team sent to investigate the failure of the No. 3A HHSIS pump.
NOTE:
The Team will be sent to investigate the breakers in the 4160 Switch Gear Room.
When they do not find the problem in the breakers, they may be directed to investigate the pomp in the Sl Room.
10:17 a.m.
Team arrives for HHSI alignment.
NOTE:
This Team willbe followingAttachment B of EOP-E-O. When they get to the breakers, the operator willbe shocked.
A Team member sent to align the HHSI willbe the contaminated injured individual.
- E3/II/ds:September 21, 19907:36AM Page 4 of 5
e 1990 EVALUATEDDRILL TURKEY POINT PLANT November 8, 1990 10:20 a.m.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ahd the Emergency News Center (ENC)
should be operational by this time.
10:30 a.m, State monitoring teams should be out in the field 10:45 a.m 11:00 a.m Mock media representative attempts to gain access into the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
State and local Emergency Operations Centers are fully staffed and operational.
11:30 a.m.
Teams in the plant and in the field are reporting the status of their lobs 12:00 noon Angry mob of citizens arrive at the General Office Building demanding answers to their questions.
NOTE:
Citizens arrive at the front entrance and are demanding answers.
They want to know where they can find the peoplein charge.
They want to speak to someone that knows what's going on with the plant and the radiological release.
12:10 p.m.
Camera man appears at the South Gate.
He wants to get pictures of the plant. He wants to go inside the fence.
12:30 p.m.
Plant goes to Residual Heat Removal (RHR).
NOTE:
The transition to RHR shouldinitiate talks of Recovery.
The offs/te authorities and the FPL representatives in the EOF should be considering both long and short term actions.
12:31 p.m.
38 RHR pump fails to start.
t NOTE:
Investigation into the failure of the 3B RHR pump will reveal a
failure of the prop. spring.
12:45 p.m.
Team should be at the breakers for the 38 RHR pump NOTE:
Team willgo to the breakersin the 4160switchgear room.
1:00 p.rn.
Emergency Control Officer is notified that a representative group of FPL's Board of Directors will be meeting in the General Office Building in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. They want a briefing on the emergency events.
1:30 p.m.
Plume has dissipated.
2:00 p.m.
Recovery discussions are in progress.
2:30 p.m.
Facilities should be reviewing logistical support.
Such things as food, manpower, and housing should be reviewed.
3:00 p.m.
Exercise is terminated.
- 63/II/ds:September 21, 1990 7:36 AM Page 5 of 5
FLORIDA PSKR 4 LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT PLANT EVALUATED EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NOVEMBER 8, 1990 OBJECTIVES A.
Emer enc Or anization and Su ort
'1.
Demon s tra t e the timely activation, adequacy of the staffing and set up, as appropriate, of the following emergency response facilities.
a.
b.
c ~
d.
e.
Control Room Technical Support Center (TSC)
Operations Support Center (OSC)
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
(Not real time activation)
Emergency News Center (ENC)
(Not real time activation)
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the FPL Emergency Response Organization to utilize the Emergency Plan Implementin9 Procedures.
II 3.
Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Coordinator, ECO, OSC Supervisor and Recover Manager to provide direction; including command and control by initiating, coordinating and implementing timely and effective decisions during a radiological emergency.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to transfer command and control of emergency response functions from the Control Room to the TSC and EOF.
5.
Demonstrate the ability of the FPL Emergency Response Organization to interface with the State of Florida, Dade County, and Monroe County to produce a coordinated response to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to control access to Emergency Response Facilities.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to provide an FPL liaison to the Dade County Emergency Operations Center.
8.
Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and equipment to support emergency operations.
9.
Demonstrate the ability of corporate personnel to respond and support the plant as neede IF
B.
Incident Assessment and Classification P
10.
Demonstrate the ava il abi 1 ity of methods, equi pment, and expertise to make timely assessments of any radiological hazards, including the timely dispatch of Offsite Field Monitoring Teams.
Demonstrate the ability to recognize Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and properly classify emergency conditions in a
timely fashion in accordance with applicable Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
C.
Notification and Communications 12.
13.
14.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to notify State and County agencies within 15 minutes of each emergency declaration.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRCOC as soon as possibl e but within one hour of an emergency declaration.
Demonstrate the ability to notify Emergency Response Organization personnel.
Demonstrate the ability to provide updates to offsite authorities.
16.
Demonstrate the communications capabilities between the Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and ENC.
17.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications with the Offs ite Fi el d Moni to ring Teams.
D.
Radiolo ical Conse uence Assessment 18.
Demonstrate the adequacy of methods and techniques for determining the magnitude of the releases of radioactive materials.
19.
Demonstrate the ability to estimate offsite doses from projected and actual dose rates and to compare these estimates with the Protective Action guidelines established in EP IP 20101, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator.
20.
21.
22.
Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker radiation exposure, and as appropriate, determine the need for emergency exposure authorization in excess of 10CFR20 limits.
Demonstrate the availability and use of respiratory protection and protective clothing for onsite emergency response personnel.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination contro I
23.
Demonstrate the ability for onsite and offsite radiol ogi ca 1 moni toring; including col lection and analysis of air samples, provisions for communications arid record keeping.
E.
Protective Action 24.
Demonstrate the 'ability to recommend, as appropriate, protective actions to offsite authorities.
25.
Demonstrate the ability to advise "individuals onsite or in the owner controlled areas of emergency conditions.
26.
Demonstrate the capability to respond to an onsite contaminated injury.
F.
Public Information 27.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
28.
Demonstrate coordination of information prior to its release.
G.
Recover 0 erations 29.
Demonstrate the availability of procedures to suppor't reentry and recovery.
30.
Demonstrate the ability to transfer from the Emergency Response Phase to the Recovery Phase and transform the Emergency Response Organization to the Recov'ery Organizatio ~
'