IR 05000237/1990007

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Insp Repts 50-237/90-07 & 50-249/90-06 on 900410-12.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise Involving Review of Exercise Scenario
ML17202L236
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/03/1990
From: Dan Barss, Snell W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17202L235 List:
References
50-237-90-07, 50-237-90-7, 50-249-90-06, 50-249-90-6, NUDOCS 9005150026
Download: ML17202L236 (33)
v • d • e


Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report Nos. 50~237/90007(DRSS); 50-249/90006(DRSS)

Dockets No. 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company Prist Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:

Dresden Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:

Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois and the Corporate Command Center, Chicago, Illinois Inspection Conducted:

April 10-12, 1990

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Inspector~ D. M. Barss z;'i!J Team Leader Accompanying Inspectors:

Approved By:

T. Ploski G. Martin S. DuPont w.'S-J w. Snell, Chief*

Radiological Controls. and Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary

.*~

Date Date Inspection on April 10-12, 1990 (Re~ort Nos. 50-237/90007(DRSS); 50-249/90006(DRSS))

Areas Inspected~ Routine, announce inspection of the Dresden Station's annual emergency preparedness exercise, involving a review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), observation by four NRC representatives of key functions, activities, and. locations durin9'the exercise (IP 823Ql), and a review of selected emergency action levels (EALs) (IP 82201).

  • Results:

No violations, deficiencie~, or deviations were identifie The licensee demonstrated an acceptable response to a hypothetical scenario with multiple ev~nts and equipment failures.. One ~xercise weakness was assesse related to inadequate contamination and expoure contro *

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  • . DETAILS

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NRG.:,.*,. ~-,, ~tr:S~~anod;~Areas Observed

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'B'~r"ss*.~.. Control Room (CR), Technical Operational Support Center (OSC)

Support Center (TSC),

s. DuPont, CR, Tse*

G. Martin, OSC and inplant teams T. Ploski, Corporate Command Center (CCC) Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison

  • E. Eenigenburg, Station Manager
  • L. f. Gerner, Technical Superintendent
  • R. L. Holman, EP Coordinator
  • D. E. Sharper, EP Coordinator
  • R. Carson, OPS and-Onsite Programs Supervisor
  • T. Lechton, Operations Senior Administrator
  • K. Peterman, Reg. Assurance Supervisor
  • G. Griffiths, Stores Supervisor
  • K. Kociuba; NQP Superintendent
  • S. Vercelli, QA Engineer
  • R. Haight, Emergency Planning Consultant
  • J. P. Mayer, Station Security Administrator
  • M. Korchynsky, Operations *
  • R. Whalen, Assistant Techical Staff Supervisor
  • L. E. Holden, Onsite Progfam EP Coordinato~
  • J. A. Silady, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
  • C. M. Allen, Nuclear Operations.
  • D. A. Adam; Assessment Administrator
  • G. L. Smith, Operations
  • K. Brennan, Regulatory Assessment Administrator
  • S. Kelly, Admin~ Director M. Evans, GSEP Trainer M. Falcone, Group Leader Technical Support*

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  • ~ * * * 'e§Jdent Inspector

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O.s~f at.tiendi ng the NRC exit interview he 1 d on Apri 1 12, 1990.

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The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of th~ inspectio.

Licensee Acti6n on Previously Identified Open Iteins (IP 92701)

(Clos~d) Open Item No. 50-237/89021-01:

The licensee had demonstrated a problem in properly completing and communicating to State officials utilizing the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) form in the 1989 exercis During the 1990 exe~cise the inspectors observ~d lic~nsee.*

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pe.rson.n~l... Jn. the" CR, TSC and CCC comp 1 ete appropriate NARS forms and colll!D~~J~tt,\\~~~~wi~tfresponse cell pers?nnel simula~ing applicab~e State M,!P~~,i~~~ti'v.e~;. From the observat 1 ons of the 1 nspectors, 11 censee p~rs*ohq'~l:-~proper*ly. comp 1 eted NARS forms and effectively communicated util-fz];ng\\... these: form This item is close.

General An.announced, daytime exercise of the Dresden Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Plan was conducted at the Dresden Sta~ion on April 11, 199 This exercise te~ted the licensee's emergency response organization's capabilities to re~pond to a simulated accident scenario which contained multi~le events, some related and others unrelated to a central initiating event, without a postulated severe core damage situation. This provided the licensee's staff with a more realistic scenario of events and provided

  • for more extensive involvement by various responders to each even This was a "utility only 11 exercise without the participation of feoer,al,<stat or 1oca1 agen'ci e.,, ~4; ;> * - ;

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Attachment 1 to this report describes the scope and objectives o.fc' tlte"'~**j.J:.~:.ff

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1990 exercis Attachment 2 describes the 1990 exerc1 se scenaqo'~4: _ ~j~f;~_.. ; "+~:*::~ General Observations

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Procedures

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This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part so; Appendix E requirements us i.ng the Commonwea 1th Edi.son Generating Stations.* Emergency Plan (GSEP), the Dresden annex to the.GSEP, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and t~mely. If the scenario events had been real, the actions tak~n by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigat~ the accident and permit state and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safet Obse.cvers.., )*'-'*"~

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'"'**r..;TJ:1~~ li1:en.~e~:r;~* contro ll ers/eva 1 uators monitored and critiqued this *

... --*~l~"~*ifs~~'-Jo'1.9: with four NRC observer ~.~-*.:: *-... -:... ~(.*... :... * **1;: ~-~,,i.!:.*~<:.. Exercise Critique The licensee's controllers/evaluators held critiques in each facility with participants immediately following the exercis Lead controllers met jointly after the facility critique*s to discuss observed strengths and weaknesses for each facility and the overall exercis The NRC'discussed observed strengths and weaknesses, developed independently by the NRC evaluation team, during the exit intervi~w.*

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  • 6.

Specific Observations (IP 82301)

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?L~iJ:h~:;:i)~'§(ten/General Electric simulator was used as the CR for the ex~rci~e. The use of.the simulator provided an ex~ellent stage upon which licensed operators could effectively demonstrate what actions they would actually take had the scenario events been rea CR personnel took prompt acti o*ns and initiated a reduction in power in response to an increase in recirculation pump seal leakag Both the Load Dispatcher and Nuclear Engineer were contacted and consulted concerning the power reductio An estimation of the increased and total leak rate was developed and evaluated to ensure no technical specification limits had.been exceede When a fire was reported in the radwaste upgrade fabricat.ion.,_area,,

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CR staff quickly dispatched the fire brigade, sounded the.st,atJcfo*-f.{,.. '.":-:~~,*

.fire alarm and provided verbal instruction to personnel in\\the.:plan~* *c(~*

using the plant paging system concerning the location of the;"fire.;,c"'.,..

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This arinouncement could not be heard by the NRC evaluator Jo(the...,.,_n:-.~~;,~~:.<':~-..,'.;I pl ant at the ti me the announcement was mad The l i censee*,:t:-fi'$., awarei':- ir:, : ";;:*

that some areas in the plant have limited reception of pag~j_-r'~' **<:r"..1*~-~~.:~*:

announcements

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When control room annunciators were lost due to the burnt tdi.,~:\\;"':,::~~;::-..".

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block in the 902-34 panel, the Station Control Roo~ Engine~r (SCRE):

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very promptly identified (within approximately 1 minute) this condition as an Alert classification under Emerge-ncy Action Level (EAL) 3 An emergency declaration was made immediately following verification of the condition and EA Appropri'ate Emergency Planning Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were utilized and actions were initiated in accordance with established procedure Appropriate forms were quickly located, properly completed and utilized to mak~ required notifications of state and federal

  • (NRC) agencies within est_ablished time limit The Alert declaration was simulated to be announced from the CR (simulator).

This announcement did not provide a reason for the

    • .. :* em~J,,ij~~,fX.,.,dE!C._~-a~a~ion: A brief stateme~t of ~he basi~ '.o~ the

~*:-~~-:1.,~~~~,,:n~~:_C'l __ ~*~:s1f1cat1on should be provided with the. initial

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":.~-~~~.. t? ensure plant personnel are properly informe,.__. ~c:~.. 1:".:

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->i'J.:: :~~~.1;~~nt if i ed that CR annunciators had been lost, approximately eight minutes elapsed before CR operate.rs were directed to increase vigilance of CR indicatio This direction could have been more timel Communication between CR staff was informal at firs As the scenario progressed and plant conditions deteriorated, the formality of communication did improv Command and control of CR staff was acceptable but not dynami Appropriate logs of emergency actions were initiated by CR personne,.

..

Wh~!'.1-t~,e. T~C-was appropriately staffed and ready to accept

~~~,iti" sJ~j.~'lU es, the Shift Engineer provided a thorough briefing

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,*.~-~,::~,.**_,,,,~:9.-P{>"ihJ.11e above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl However, the following item is recommended for improvement:*

The procedure for notification of plant staff of an emergency classification should be modified to require advisement of the reason for the classificatio Technical Support Center (TSC)

The Technical Support Center (TSC) was rapidly activate TSC staff assumed emergency responsibilities well within established timeframe The Station Director contacted the Shift Engineer and rece1~ed!~-:

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detailed briefing on plant conditions and emergency actiOns. p.r.lor~~.;~1\\~;if to accepting responsibilities and declaring the TSC activtf~><*r~-~~.*-::~. l**t Th~o~g~out the.exercise, the. Station Di rector held frequerif'*bri,e*(r~~~

ut111 zing the installed publ lC address (PA) system, to ens,ure -~ha:t;1,jtl emergency response personnel within the TSC and Ope rat i on'a,lf'Suijpoi;j: I:,.

Center (OSC) were updated on changing conditions and emergf!.'Q.¢y)*::~ _; "--:.:_::::.:;W't,:- response action. <-<--~~i;,;-t; --~ rt~:Jt.;:

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Additional comments were solicited from other key staff personnel and passed over the PA to OSC personnel to ensure they were also updated on important development This use of a* common PA for both the TSC and OSC provided an effective means to ~hsure personnel in both facilities were kept informed of important developments in a timely nianne Status boards in the TSC were kept updated with current and relevant informatio General trending information for specific parameters was indicated as appropriate for quick reference by interested partie Detailed trending information for spent*fuel pool level and temperature was maintained separately to ensure close tracking

.... ~?.f, thJ!,,;$..f}.1_ar:igi/!g status of the parameters of most concern to the TSC

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.,**,_:_~:~~1-f",.;fties were established and clearly communicated to all

  • .{~. ~:tJt.n_4Y.'.:;t,,fpons~ personne As conditions changed, priorities were

- reassessed and adJusted as necessary to ensure efforts and resources remained focused on the most critical activitie The Station Director frequently conferred with key staff members to ensure agreement on established prioritie The Site.Area Emergency (SAE)-condition was classified within 7 minutes of initiating events.. Notifications of the SAE declaratioh were made promptly following established procedures and using designated communication link **

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A $.µ~.ion.assembly and accountability was ordered concurrently with

,_... ~~.h*~!t~i.'~~E~~:<l~@J:l'rat io Within 19 minutes, 781 p 1 ant personne 1 had been

.* * **.*;:acao~f;l,te'i.i(f_g-ii.:and 11 missing personnel identified by nam Due to

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~~~J~asedr.fYlOml'assembly points immediately upon completion of the assembl The 11 missing persons were later accounted fo This process took an artificially long period of time since personnel had already been released from assembly area Communications between real and mock NRC players and the StatiOn

  • Director were excellen Mock NRC players were able to access the plant and report to the TSC within 5 minutes of arrival at the sit The Station Director provided a thorough initial briefing for the arriving response tea Key TSC staff personnel effectively interfaced with mock NRC players to answer questions and provide information as appropriat ~~~.U~~*~.~~ ~~;~

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activitie *

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The Station Director frequently and effectively utilized ~':t~

manpower and co 11 ect i ve expertise of key personne 1 'in the*-~

to research and determine logical and technically correct~*

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solutions to varfous problems as they develope Such ac:. '"'":,~:~

i nc 1 uded:

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Identification and repair of shutdown cooling system problems Increasing iodine levels in spent fuel pool

Determination -0f fuel pool limits and identification of technical background supporting these limits from the Final

  • safety Analysis Report

Coordination of plant walkdowns to assess damages

Identification of potential problems from after shocks

~,;-.. fo.:S.;~~~.t~L:--~f.Kl""~onservative appr~ach ~as us~d in determining criteria

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  • 'fl'cfl;f.~* ase recovery action discussions.

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~19;..... * ector was* not we 11 -'informed on the condition and*

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ij~~ts related to the contaminated, injured man and resin spil The Radiation Chemistry Director should have been more aggressive in obtaining and disseminating this informatio Five sets of Emergency Plan Impl~menting Procedures (EPIP) Response Manuals were not distributed to their appropriate recipients until very late in the exercis Alternate copies of required procedures were available and utilized by key players as neceSSilfY*

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1:tas,e.c:l.,.up_on.the above findings, this portion of the licensee's

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~1.;:*;;i;*:_.y( t~i<:~~~;,, acceptab 1 e; however, the fo 11 owing i tern is recommended rT<-

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.,..*. ~.-;-r?i¥~~nsee should establish administrative procedural guidance to ensure the timely distribution of EPIP Response Manuals to key position Operational Support Center {OSC)

The Operaiional Support Center (OSC) was activated in an orderly

. and timely manner utilizing applicable procedural guidanc Adequate staffing was readily available for assignment as* necessary to various response team Status boards were effectively used to record and track multiple response team For each team the following information was:;?,;readily;....,.~.. *.

available from the status board:

team priority, team number,.1',;,j,_:*~,*::

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~ss~g~ed task, departure and estimated return time, assignt4A~ f"1i;!.1z in~i vi dua 1 s name~ ~nd badge numbers as we 11 as a_ record O;~:;~~!r'"*

~~:.f-"",:.1t-daily exposure limit and accumulated dos These teams were{t-:;;ir~,}{

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effectively dispatched and monitored as they proceeded witi~,f~~4f:~~ti:i*\\,1 ::l:

assigned task

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Good co'!1mu~i~ation was.maintained betwe~n TS~ and OS~- key_.1Jers~q:~W~~~~-i~¥j.\\.:

Task priorities established by the Station Director in the'

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understood and appropriately addressed by OSC personnel.

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Contamination and exposure control during the response to the resin spill and personal injury were inadequat The one Health Physics (HP) technician who responded to the scene was not capable of handling both the medical response and to establish contamination and exposure contro Additional HP technicians should have been dispatched once the situation was know The following are examples of inadequate contamination and exposure control:

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the ambulance was driven into the contaminated area

ambulance personnel entered contaminated areas without

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-:%~:Pry~~f were allowed to enter and spend excessive time

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. C0~.\\Q~ exposure area

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  • the~rHP technician at scene did not perform a who 1 e body frisk prior to leaving the scene even though he was most likely contaminated

no steps were taken to protect the ambulance from contamination

no contamination survey instrument was available at the accident scene

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.t,1)~£:-;.S.!i!'lu1 ated ambulance and its crew were never adequately

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~~(~o" p'rovi de adequate contamination and exposure contra 1

.*I?.~;. ur,,i:ng~"esponse activities to the resin spill are an Exercise*

Weakness and will be tracked as Open Item No. 50-237/90007-0 The HP technician ~ho responded to the injured man initially entered the spill area and obtained a quick dose rate reading to determine exposure levels._ He.then proceeded to do a thorough medical survey of the victim to de~ermine the extent of injurie After assessing the victim 1s injuries and the dilemma of the man 1s arm pinned under the cask, the HP technician appropriately summoned additional manpower and equipment to free the trapped individua These efforts were undertaken with. proper regard for the existing medi ca 1 and radio 1 ogi ca 1 condition A good effort was mad.e~'-ti:>h-,:,. *.

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provide psychological support for the victim and to keep hTi~)~Fi*~~i:[%f~~}

informed of what actions were being take However, the sul)'.~1!~queo '.:

first aid treatment of the victim was not adequately perfqf'*"***~*~\\~

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When the victim was moved,.no.stretcher was employed even(~,filfiWf:~

one was brought to the accident scene by responder Wheo.::t~i':,.**.,~ ***

victim was loaded into the simulat~d ambulance, no stretch~*'\\rta~-~

use The treatment for shock was riot started until approxfmat-11 minutes_ after first aid responders arrived at the scenet~.,wile_

shock treatment was applied, minimal effort was made to protect the injured person from direct exposure with the cold ground"he was placed o The effo;ts to apply a splint to the crushed arm were appropriately taken utilizing available fi~st aid supplies, a wire mesh and an ace bandag However, due to the ~ultiple manipulations 6f the injured appendage, the victim would have suffered uncalled for increased pai More appropriate splinting materials, such as inflatable splints, could have been appropriately utilized had they been availabl A bottle of saline solution in the first aid kit brought to the scene had an expiration date of February 1990 and should be replace,'.*;.. :...2'.t>th.~: jniJi~_k ~hree man ~e~m.who responded to the injur~d ~i~tim-,

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"':.~:*~..... ~~~t1ons were rn1t1ated and performed by one rnd1v1dua *:~..,~....

.:'~~~~-response plan should be developed..

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  • ~8'~iladequaci es in rendering appropriate first aid treatment to an injured* person are an open. item and wi 11 be tracked by Open Item No. 50-237/90007-0 Several problems'with exer~ise control we~e observed during the exercise which adversely affected*inplant teams 1 ability to adequately demonstrate their,response capabilitie Some examples are as follows:
  • ~;;IJ~ttl~~n~.,of co~tro 11 e~s. to ~omm~ni cate with H,P personnel

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-,. ::'~~~o~~~ their part1c1pat1on in the* respons¢ to the fir :.,i-~'*

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,_jl>~u11i cation between contra 11 ers led responders to report

  • *"h *<Jr.. 'biz::d'.ifferent areas in response to the same assignment causing unnecessary confusio *

A mispositioned controller delayed the timely recognition of

  • important* plant informatio *

The lack of controller guidance prevented the instrument air repair team from actua'lly obtaining necessary supplies to properly utilize the provided mock-up *

The dummy utilized as an injured person was not provided with an appropriate security badge and dosimetry, nor did controllers have adequate medical status information to",.,:,

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provide responder > :.;.%_--~~"~:-.. !::A:-.

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With the exceptions of the exercise weakness and the open.*1t~~*'<.th1f.,.,,_:.;~>c>:,,;:~.:

portion of the licensee program was acceptabl However, tf'l~f foJlOJl;lng;..f;;,:;*

item should al so be considered for improvement:

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The t~aining, preparation, plac~ment and coordination"'*iif:.:.::1'1'":*:";;f%t~:f~L~~~

exercise controll!i!rS should be improved to ensure play~rs,~,,~0'!;;~."'~~-~.:;r.~~~/

receive the appropriate information necessary to evoke'the*(:'.*_~,.,~

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anticipated actions.

Corporate Command Center (CCC)

A prudent decision was made to activate the Corporate Command Center (CCC) shortly before 9:00 a.m. due to.the existence of several unrelated, abnormal conditions at the Dresden Statio CCC staff activated the facility and began establishing communications with their TSC counterparts in an organized, efficient manner. *The Environmental Director and the CCC Director provided accurate initial briefing~ to their staff The CCC Director and the TSC 1s Station Director (SD) had conferred

  • 1. ~.QJ,~~;t continued operation of the TSC and CCC was warranted

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"'. *.. >>> er of abnormal onsite conditions that had recently *

tK.* ~f though the loss of CR annunciator situation had been

.;~f~y_t;about 10: 05 a. m., the CCC Di rector had obtained eS:>!.'ttl'&t the onsite fires had no apparent safeguards concerns among their root cause *

The Environmental Director and Health Physics Specialist exhibited proper concern for the potential radioiodine release from the Unit 3 fuel pool well before the SAE declaratio The Environmental Director's staff adequately monitored pool temperature, refuel floor radiation levels, and containment radi~tion levels th~oughout the emergency respons *

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T~e.,nyironmental Director's staff had also quickly determined that

if;~~""': * *.~$¢~r.ological data were r~l~vant for this exercise ~cenario.

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tJ,""':;:~and_ *f9recast weather cond1t1ons were adequately monitored

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F~ftic;:uJ:{lf attention was given to determining whether a wind

-:***i{\\ti:l~~titor:r<<;:hange to the potentially affected downwind sectors had occurre Such a change occurred shortly after 12:30 p.m., was promptly brought to the CCC Director's attention and was

  • communicated to simulatedState official The CCC Director assumed contr~l of the licensee's response at 10:20 At that time, proper decisions were made regarding which facility (TSC or CCC) would assume responsibility for communications with the simul~ted NRC and*State officials.. -Since the CCC is not equipped with an ENS telephone, TSC staff retained res pons i bil ity for communicating over that dedicated lin Some HPN communications were performed by CCC staf CCC staff also assumed responsibility for NARS communi cat i ans once TSC staff had completed the i ni ti al..
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notification call to the State for the Site Area Emergency.. ($~£::~};.. :,"

declaration

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CCC staff prepared hourly update messages to the State in* acc*orClaficf*

with the emergenc~ pl an 1 s C?mmitment.,

The CCC Di rector aJ>.B~RV~#<;

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these messages prior to their transmittal at roughly one h9.tt*~'-"~~... ;,,

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interval Copies of these messages were transmitted to tfl1!~:TSe'-:

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The CCC Director remained well aware of degraded onsite co'tcilfit9*. !;f*i.:~f~:',~~~!:'~*:'

and associated corrective act i an He conducted periodic update.... _,.,._.,... * *

briefings of his staff and routinely solicited their input These briefings were well done, with the only minor flaw being that not all CCC staff were promptly told.of the reason (earthq~ake related damage) that had placed the EOF out of servic The unavailability of the EOF was later noted on the electronic status board output distributed in the CC The CCC Director made. a prudent decision to let his Environmental Director and the TSC's Environs Director choose who should direct the two Environs Team TSC staff retained control o.f these team CCC envi~onmental staf~monitored the TSC's communications with these teams and occasionally offered suggestions regarding the

.t~ams'.d,ep]c;>ym_ent to their TSC counterparts.

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~'I-'fi'iti°tonin1!rital Director monitored the need for offsite Protective

~--~R~otnmendations (PARs), and gave the CCC Director good advice

-'~;,,;*_ *"'*,,.. ~<~ili ttie?'appropriateness of the "prepare for possible actio~

  • recoriuTie'ndation and what conditions could warrant a "take shelter offsite PA The offsite recommendation appropriately remained 11 to prepare for possible action.

Status boards were adequately kept up to dat Hardcopy outputs of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) displays were poste Electronic status board information generated by TSC staff was transmitted to the CCC, where it was distributed to key CCC staff to supplement their verbal briefing The.. CC_C Di rector simulated ca 11 s to the LaSalle and Braidwood

  • '.1 :*'!j'p~f.:~ g~termi ne whether they had experienced the earthquake

-*,

adr:ithe O.resden Statio Later, environmental staff contacted i~:-~-1~:*~:--""'Js~f~~tO.n~'*to arrange_for additional field sur.vey monitoring

~!..,.*~

tgJ,f!Ja,~s)'fouVd-the need aris *

The CCC 1 s Information Coordinator prepared five press releases, four of which were issued before exercise terminatio The CCC Director reviewed all draft press release However, the CCC.Director did not identify two relatively minor errors in the otherwise well-detailed press release News Release No. 1 did not clearly indicate which of several events listed had warranted the Alert declaratio Although New Re lase No. 2 correctly indicated. that the transport of a contaminated/injured man to a local hospital was not due to the earthquake, the cause of the accident was incorrectly reported as an overturned truck in_a radwaste handling are *

' _ffe. *'*.~.;&...: -**-- -~i*fi-The ln'.ormat ~on _Di rect~r arran~ed. for an al tern~te JPIC t~}:l~~f~Jin**' i~Y!'*~*.-:~_;

established-in the Jo~i~t, Illinois, area ~nc~ it was det~:~~\\tC':':i:~{-'i~...;,

that the EOF/JPIC facility near Mazon, Illrn~is, had sust'M1'if;~:

-~:.. -.

earthquake damag The alternate JPIC location was well de$i,;;,m:

-*""

in a news re 1 eas l/$}*->:::-:~?~;:

    • -:t.f..h.A*...

The CCC Di rector had his staff began compiling a,list of q}fsj'.tl':-<

<<J-recovery action items before*l:OO p.m., even as they contf.tl~~t.c>:/'.:0*:::.:;t*

..,

monitor degraded plant condition Criteria in the emerge~cyfpl~ri*-:~V:... Y::~~:

were fo 11 owed in order to determine whether a dee l arat ion of Recovery* '***

could be made prior to exercise terminatio In view of the ongoing earthquake damage assessments, proper concern for wanting fuel pool temperature to return to a near-normal temperature, and concern over possible aftershocks, the situation correctly remained classified as a SA The CCC Di rector. conferred with the TSC 1 s SD on the recovery action itefl! list and the Recovery classification concerns prior to exercise terminatio Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee 1 s program was acceptabl However, the following item.should be considered for improvement:

./I!:**'.~~ -!~~~~:l-~s~'*!~~~~~r a~~o~~~o~~:~r~n;~~; ~~~d~~~~~~ '

s a ~~ey

*'..

':..'-'ar~-~-lgf9)i.~; at the time, are clearly described in news

> *~

hreT~ases'*'..i ssued by the CCC staf *

_,,~~~:

.:~~~-:;~:~~:~-

~* *

~.~ -~.:.'" -.

-~~rt1t e. * Fiei'c(Monftor1ng Teams Field monitoring teams were not directly observed during this

  • exercis The activities of the Environs Director and his staff in the TSC were observed briefly. Appropriate radio communications were maintained between the field teams and the TS Field

-

monitoring results were reported and correctly recorded utilizing established procedural guidelines and available form Appropriate plant parameters were monitored and trended to provide early indication of any developing event.

eq*~HP-~-P. *.tl;l.~. above findings, this portion of the licensee program

  • ""* ""lf tf 1~-,

"'~2~c, l

The exercise objectives and draft scenario were submitted to the NRC for review in accordance with established NRC timeframe Comments were provided to the licensee following a review of the draft scenari The scenario was sufficiently challenging for a utility only exercise and included multiple unrelated events as well as several activities related to a central initiating even The licensee very effectively made use of several mock-ups to provide realistic conditions for responders to timely demonstrate implementation of corrective action This use of mock-ups is highly commendable and

~ncouraged. However, as p:eviousl~ ~oted, controller training. nee _s:;*,.. =~.-.~; t*;i'..

improvement to more effectively utilize these mock-up ]:,.,

'>-.... ~:~::~i-'~_';.<

.

-~~

.

The licensee's scenario was very realistic and the.supporting-co~~

messages, alarm messages, control room and maintenante/operator'~ij/

were logical and well matched to scenario condition ~

Based upon the above findings, this portion of the license~'s was acceptabl.

Licensee Critiques The licensee's controllers/evaluators held critiques in each facility w1th the participants immediately following the exercis Lead controllers met after the facil 1ty critiques to discuss observed strengths and weaknesses for each_ facility and the overall exercis NRC personnel attended several of these critiques and determined that the self-c~itique process was well performe Significant NRC identified:exercise deficiencies had also been i dent.i fi ed by licensee personnel, as we 11 as numerous other i tern Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl. * Eme.r. eJJC,~_*.Ac-:.tion..:Le.vels (EALs Use and Review IP 82201

.

~~;;,,,-~..

.

i'.:;_.tl~~

.

.

.

.

o'

_

..._t;:'~o.a1iucted operator examinations (see Report No*:.-,.*

-~* -

  • -~,~o~Q-j:.), a weakness was identified with proficiency in tflg,ju'S~b.. :~iie~*s~1Wlrat i ng Station Emergency Pl an (GSEP) and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).

This concern was specifically evaluated during the exercise and no weaknesses were observed by the.

NRC exercise evaluation tea Personnel in the control room (simulator),

Technical Support Center and Corporate Command Center were observed to effectively and efficiently utilize the established GSEP and associated EPI There does not appear to be any weakness among the plant operating staff to proficiently use the EPIPs or the GSE This weakness seems to be more of a problem with new trainees in the operator training progra This matter.was discussed with licensee representatives and the NRC

  • Senior Resident Inspecto Both concurred with this concl~sio,-!:

12.

.*

A seq~ndJ~.e.mwas_.discussed in Report No. 50-237-0L-90-0l which *identified

~* conee:t:n~:w:~~tbra:i;very restrictive use of criterion-based emergency cJa*sS!j~\\j.f~io~~/,.Dresden's ~mergency Action Lev~l. (EAq cl~ssification (E~-J~~~~y;;pr,qce~ure requires th7 use of spec~ f1 c. cr1 ter1 a to ass7ss the.Jf~~l4,re*~~of-'.fiss10n Product Barrier The cr1ter1a used to classify

  • an Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency conditions are very restrictiv For example, the only fuel cladding failure criterion is a grab sample activity equivalent to 300 uCi/g dose equivalent of I-131; the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) failure criterion is containment pressure greater than 2 psig AND reactor vessel level of less than or equal to -59 inches with controlled evolution not in progres These criteria do not consider other applicable conditions such as:

High Main Steam Lin Radiation, High Air Ejector Condenser Monitors or High Primary Containment Monitors as conditions or indications of fuel failure or the failure of the RCS outside the primary containment, which would preclude th~,required 2 psig containment pressur,*

This concern was discussed with 1 i censee personne 1 during the co1.o:s.~,,"gJt~'.:..:

this inspectio It was determined that similarly restrictive,. sp@.J'f'f:i criteria are used generically at other Commonwealth Edison sit~S..~~t:~~:t.b"Z respective EA L *

_.;.:~.;.;.:.( c *\\

,

.

r-*~

  • .::::*::**i:~:

~:~~:~jif.:*

Less. restrictive. crit7ria ~e7d to ~e ~eve~oped and implemented* 1~~~~..

  • .*-.

fg."

,~":~}l~

pr?v1de more rap1~ly ident1f1able rnd1~at1ons ?f core dama~e anp;*c:l:a.O,~}:,.

~
_.
,'ft!f:

failure to operating personne The.time required to obtain an(J',artalj}:e.~... ~>rjpy*,

grab samples fo_!' specific isotopic activity could unnecess_arily:*d~-l~Y;f)'~~/:~:>.f:;:*~

initiation of appropriate emergency classifications and ti~ely ~rritective

~. *

action recommendation Additionally, the requirement to identify both the conditions of specific containment pressure and reactor vessel level before determination of a 1 oss of Reactor Cool ant System (RCS) integrity does not.take into account the possibility of RCS failure outside of the primary containmen A less restrictive criteria which would provide operating personnel a basis to identify RCS leakage outside of containment should be provide This concern for restrictive criteria based EALs will be tracked as Open Item No. 50-237/90007-0 It i.s recognized that this open item has applicability to other licensee sites and as such will require that these concerns be addressed by licensee personnel other than those specifically assigned to t~e Or:~~~e~.. ~~a~~..PJl.. ; however, the open item will be tracked under the i~tf*

  • ' ~ -~1~.f:lnd will be considered to generically apply to the Tl*
  • ;*;te :~~~'

.

lo O

s~.,.,,.,

.

.e.,rox, Op~n items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which

  • wi 11 be reviewed further by the inspector and which i nvo 1 ve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Three open items were identified during this inspectio They are discussed in detail in Paragraphs 6.c and 9 of this repor....

1 Ex,i.t *,:ilnte;~¥\\iew *,,_, :

~;/::-- *~-,~,.*. -:*~

Th~~\\~,~

_)ifri_t~'~ held an exit interview on April 12, 1990, with the_

ri;t:§,~.,.-a:figM,~:$e{itat i ves denoted _in Section The NRC team 1 eader diS'cus*s~d-:t::ttte:*scope and findings of the inspectio No violations of NRC requirements were identifie The licensee was informed of the Exercise Weakness i dent ifi ed during the i nspecti. on and was requested to redemonstrate proper contamination and exposure control at a future drill or exercis The licensee was a~ked if any of the information discussed during the exit interview was proprietar The licen~ee responded that none of the information was proprietar Attachments: Dresden 1990 Ex~rcise Scope and Objectives* Dresden 1990 Exercise Scenario Outline

.-

DUSDD RUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 OBJICTIVBS PRIMARY OBJICTIYB:.

C01mODYealth Edison will demonstrate the ability to implement the Generating Station Emergency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of the public health and safety in the event of a major accident at the Dresden lfuclear Power Station. The 1989 demonstration will be conducted during the hours which qualify as a daytime Exercise in accordance.with lfRC Guideline SUPPORTIBG OBJICTIVBS:

1) Assessment and Classification Given information provided by the Exercise Scenario, demonstrate the ability to assess initiating conditions which warrant a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15) llinute (CR, TSC) Demonstrate the ability to determine which Emergency Action Levels (KAI.a) are applicable within fifteen (15) minutes of determina.tion of the initiating conditions warranting classificatio *

- (CR, TSC)

2) lfotification and Conillunications

_ Ol64D/l/wjm Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out a HARS form in accordance with EPIPs or EOF procedure *- (CR, TSC) Demonstrate the* ability to malt_e applicable notifications to offsite State and local organizationa within fifteen (15)

minutes of malting an Emergency classificatio (CR, TSC)

'. DellOUStrate the ability to correctly fill out an OS Rotification Worksheet in accordance with EPIPs or EOF

  • procedure (CK, TSC, CBOF) Dem0nstrate the ability to notify the lfRC iDlllediately after the State notifications and within one (1) hour of the Bllergency classificatio (CR)

DRPS '90 GSBP i 2) Notification a:D.d Communications (cont'd) Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates to the States at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of changes in monitored condition (CJl, TSC, CEOF) Demonstrate the ability to make Protective Action Recolllllendations (Pila).

-

(TSC). Demonstrate the c.apability to contact appropriate support organizations that would be available to assist in an actual emergency within one (1) hour of conditions warranting their assistanc (TSC, CEOF)

h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the BRC (EBS) upon reques (TSC, CEOF)

i. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates to the BRC at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of changes in monitored condition (CR, TSC, CEOF)

3) Emergency Facilities Ol64D/2/wjm Demonstrate the ability to activate the on-site Emergency Response Facilities within thirty (30) minutes of the Alert Classification in accordance with EPIP (TSC, OSC), _ Demonstrate the ability to augment the Control Room staff within thirty (30) minutes of an appropriate Emergency Classification in accordance with the BPIP (CR) Demonstrate the ability to activate the Corporate EOF within approximately one (1) hour of the Site Emergency Classification in accordance with EOF procedure (CEOF)

d. Using information supplied by the Exercise scenario, demonstrate the ability to record, track and update information on Status Boards at least every thirty (30)

ninutes.**

-

(TSC, OSC, CEOF) Demonstrate the ability to document all Operations and Maintenance Team activities in logs and on appropriate Status Board (CR, TSC, OSC)

DNPS '90 GSEP E ).Emergen,cy Facilities (cont'd) Demonstrate the ability to track all in-plant job statuses in logs and on Status Board (CK, TSC, OSC)

      • . &*

Dmonstrate the ability to provide Station activity updates*

to the CEOF at least every thirty (30) minute (TSC)

4) Emergency Direction and Control Demonstrate the ability of the individuals in the Emergency Response Organization to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities as specified in Generic GSEP and position-specific procedure (CK; TSC, OSC, CEOF) Demonstrate the ability of the Ranagers and Directors to

.a:ert Command and Control in their respective areas of responsibility as specified in Generic GSEP and position-specific procedure ~ (CR, TSC, OSC, CEOF) Demonstrate the ability to coordinate Operations and Maintenance activities during abnormal and emergency situation f *. *

- (CK, TSC, OSC)

Demonstrate the ability to prioritize in-plant Raintenalice activities during abnormal and emergency situation (CK, TSC, OSC)

Demonstrate the ability to requisition emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant condition (CR, TSC, CEOF)

Demonstrate the ability to acquire and transport emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant *condition (TSC, OSC,.CEOF)

-.*.. Demonstrate *the ability to assemble and account for all on-site personnel within thirty (30) minutes of sounding the Assembly Alar (TSC)

0164D/3/vjm DRPS '90 GSBP B.~.

'.

4)

Emergency Direction and Control (cont'd) Demonstrate the ability of Emergency Response Facility Management to provide briefings and updates concerning plant status, event classification and activities in progress at '

least every thirty (30) minute (Cll, TSC, OSC, CEOF)

i. Demonstrate the ability to provide access for a Mock RRC Site Teaa in accordance with Access Control procedure.(TSC)

j. Demonstrate the ability to interface with a MOck RRC Site Tea (TSC)

'

5) Radiological Assessment and Protective Actions 0164D/4/wjm a. *Demonstrate the ability to trend plant radiological survey information for conditions presented in the scenari (TSC, OSC, CEOF) DellODStrate the ability to collect and document all radiological surveys t&lten for conditions presented in the scenari d.' **

-

(OSC)

Demonstrate the ability to take appropriate protective actions for on-site personnel in accordance with Station EPIP : (TSC, OSC)

\\

Demonstrate the ability to adequately prepare and brief personnel for entry into a High Radiation Area in accordance

  • with Station procedures and policie (TSC, OSC)

Demonstrate the ability to issue and adminstratively control dosimetry to the teams dispatched from the OSC in accordance with established policies and Station procedure (OSC)

Demonstrate the ability to establish radiological controls in accordance with established Health Physics policies and plant procedure (OSC)

Dellonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document radiation e1posure to inplant Operations and M&intenance Teaaa in accordance with established policies and plant procedure (OSC)

DRPS '90 GSBP B ) Radiolodcal Assessment and Protective Actions (cont'd) Demonstrate the abi~ity t~ establish radiological monitoring and controls of Assembly areas in accordance with established policies and plant procedure (OSC)

i. Demonstrate the ability to perform decontamination of radioactively contaminated individuals in accordance with established policies and procedure (OSC)

6) First Aid Actions Demonstrate the ability of a first Aid Team to promptly respond to the scene 8nd evaluate the situation within 15 minutes of receiving notification of a proble (OSC)

7)

Recovery

.Ol64D/5/vjm Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria to downgrade or enter a Recovery classification in accordance with procedure (TSC, CEOF)

DBPS '90 GSEP B I

. j

/

DRESDEN 1990 EXERCISE TIMELINE

[ ALERT

][

SITE EMERGENCY

][ RECOVERY ]

01!0 * * * * * * * * * os!o * * * * * * * * * * o~3o * * * * * * * iA3o * * * * * * * * * i t3o * * * * * * * * * iJ3o * * * * * * * ~ 13!0 * * * * * * * * * i!3o ALERT - [0830 - 1000] LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS SITE EMERGENCY [1000 - 1330] EARTJ<<)lJAKE > 0.2g 0730 INITIAL CONDITIONS 1930/wjm*

0750 RECIRC PUMP LEAK INCREASES * *

0800 (EST) OPERATORS OBSERVEIK)NITOR RECIRC PlJ1P LEAK 0805 FIRE IN RAD WASTE OB25 FIRE IN 902-34 PANEL 0830 LOSS OF 3, 5, AND B PANEL ANr<<J<<:IATORS FROM FIRE 0835 (EST) 903-34 PANEL DAMAGE ASSESSED 0845 (EST) START REPAIRS OF ANNUNCIATOR DAMAGE 0900 RAIMASTE RESIN *HIC IS DROPPED" 0930 (EST) START CLEAN UP OF SPLIT RESINS 0945 (EST) CONTAMINATED INJURED WORKER TAKEN BY Af18ULANCE 0955 (EST) ANNUNCIATORS REPAIRED 1000 EARTt<<)UAKE (SJIJTDOWN COOLING SPOOL PIECE ()AMAGED)

1000 REACTOR SCRAMS (GROUP I ISOLATION)

1005 INSTRUMENT AIR ALARPfS 1005 (EST) START PLANT WALKDOWNS 1005 EOF REPORTS EXTENSIVE EARTt<<JUAKE DAMAGE 1010 INDICATIONS OF WATER LEAKING 1020 (EST) START INSTRUMENT AIR REPAIRS

. 1020 UNIT 3 FUEL POOL SKI"1ER ALARM 1030 UNIT 3 C SHUTDOWN COOLING PUMP TRIPS 1035 FUEL POOL TEMPERATURES INCREASE 1045 Mlt<<JR EARTt<<)UAKE DAMAGE REPORTm 1050 (EST) DISCOVER BROKEN SPOOL PI.ECE 1100 START SPOOL PIECE REPAIRS 1115 (EST) RESIN SPILL CLEANED UP 1210 Mlt<<JR EARTtf)tJAKE DAfMGE REPAIRm 1230 (EST) SPOOL PIECE REPAIRm 1230 (EST) INSTRUMENT AI,R REPAIRS COMPLETED 1245 START FILL OF FUEL POOL 1300 START "C* StllTDOWN COOLING PUMP 1315 FUEL POOL TEMP DE~REASING.

1330 ENTER RECOVER DRESDEB llUCLEAR POWER STATI01'

1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 INITIAL COBPITIOBS (0730 - 0820)

Unit 3 was recently shut down for refueling and has just defueled with fuel handiing in progres Fuel Pool water temperatures are slightly elevated and 3 C Shut Down Cooling is being used to cool the Fuel Poo Unit 2 is currently at_ 95 % power and has been operating at high power levels for the last six month There is a known problem with the Unit 2A Recirc Pump Sea Work is being performed on the Halon System in the Auxiliary Electric Room and a Fire Watch is Stationed in the Auxillary Electric Room while the Halon System is Out of Servic At 0750, the

_Unit 2A Recirc Pump which already has a pre-existing seal problem develops a leak in the other seal resulting in alarms and other indications in the Control Roo At 0805 hours0.00932 days <br />0.224 hours <br />0.00133 weeks <br />3.063025e-4 months <br />, a painting contractor, working in the Rad _Waste Fab Area, knocks a can of paint thinner into>a space heate The paint thinner ignites and the flames spread to a 55 gallon drum of expoxy based paint which also catches fir The Contractor calls the Control Room and reports the fire. If requested, the painter also informs the Control Room that the sprinklers did not come o EXPECTED ACTIONS The Control Room should start to reduce power and flow in preparation for and shutdown.of 2A Recirc P~p. After the phone call concerning the Fire in,-Rad Waste is received, the Cont_rol Room should form the Fire Brigade. - The Fire Brigade should go to the scene of the fire and take

.1 prompt actions to extinguish the fir Investigation to determine why the Sprinkler System did not work may also be performe /1

  • DRESDEN RUCLKAR POWER STATIOR 1990 GSBP'BXERCISB APRIL 11, 1990 ALERT (0830 - 1000)

While the Control. Room is dealing with the Recirc Pump Problem, at 0830, a bell is heard in the Control Room and all Unit 2 annunciators are lost except for DC' Power Failure Alarms on all the pat1els'.

At this time, the Fire Watch, stationed in the Auxiliary Electric Room, calls the Control Room and reports that smoke is coming out of the 902-34 Pane In addition, a smoke detection a1arni is received on the XL3 Type The Fire Watch reports that the smoke is clearing but the room smells like burnt plasti At 0900, the "D" ring on an overhead crane sling fails and a Low Level Radwaste High Integrity, Container (HIC) Liner filled with 170 cubic feet of dewatered resin falls off the over head cran The liner was positioned over a trailer with a cask on it to receive the resin line The liner, which weighs approximately 6000 lbs., falls through the open roll up doorway and strikes the Radwaste Shipping Supervisor pinning the Supervisor's arm under the HIC line The Supervisor is contaminated by the r~sins and the trapped in a radiation field of 5 R/h EXPECTED ACTIONS The Control Room should declare an Alert due to loss of all Annunciator Unit. 2 should continue to operate with Control Room personnel monitoring appropriate parameter A Supervisor should be dispatched to the Auxiliary Electric Room to investigate the smoke, and repairs_to the 902-34 Panel Fuse block should be starte llD/2

  • DRESDEB BUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990

~

(0830 - 1000)

EXPECTED AC'fIORS(.cont 'd)

An Operating Supervisor and Rad Protection personnel should be promptly dispatched to the dropped HIC liner, the liner rigged and lifted off the injured victi The victim should be stabilized and decontaminated as much as possibl Appropriate notifications should be made on the contaminated injured Supervisor and an ambulance called from Coai Cit Once the ambulance arrives, the victim will be treated and taken by ambulance to the hospita The area containing the spilled resins should be controlled, surveyed and poste Clean up of resins may be started if time and resources permi SITE EMERGENCY (1000 - 1300)

At 1000, an earthquake measuring greater thau 0.2 Gs strikes the Sit The earthquak~ causes enough vibrations that a Group l isolation occurs which SCRAMS Unit Depending upon the timeliness of 902-34 panel repairs, annunciators may or maync.t be operable at the time of the SCRA In addition, the earthqualce creates waves in the TORUS resulting in TORUS level HI/LO alarm Earthquake related.damage includes a spool piece on the Shut Down Cooling Line, Instrument Air (IA) lines, a broken fire main header in the crib house and several minor problems in the plan The dam~ged Shut.Down Cooling spool piece leaks causing fuel pool to level to drop below the fuel pool skimmer wier This causes cooling pumps to trip on low suction and fuel pool cooling is los Fuel pool temperature will start to rise and eventually reach levels that release Iodine from the wate If Iodine is released from the water it will create a local airborne p~oblem in the Fuel Pool area. Leaking water will be observed running down the floor and stairs and sumps pum IA pressure will drop on both Units, but remain high enough to prevent loss of I *

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 SITE EMERGENCY

{1000 - 1300)

EXPECTED ACTIONS The Control Room should declare a Site Emergency once the magnitude of the earthquake is know Proper procedural actions should be taken in response to the Group 1 isolation and SCRAM and the Isolation Condenser should be starte Damage Assessment Teams should be formed and sent into the Plan Damage reports should be made back to the TSC/OSC and work should be coordinated and prioritize Personnel should be sent to the Fuel Pool in response to the pump trip alarm The lower water level and the increasing fuel.pool temperature should be observed by.personnel sent to the Fuel Poo The problem with the broken Shut down Cooling spool piece should be recognized and Shut down. cooling isolated from the Fuel Poo Once water is added restoration of Fuel Pool cooling will help stabilize temperatures but not be sufficient to lower temperatures until Shut Do.wn Cooling (or other alte'rnate cooling is established) *

. RECOVERY PHASE

{1300 -1500)

By 1300 Operator actions in the Control Room will have resulted in Unit 2 be:ini close to cold shut dow The problem with the Shut Down Cooling spool piece is understood and.repairs have either been started or complete Fuel Pool temperatures have eit.her stabilized or started to decreas Assessment of earthquake damage is complete and the extent of damage is understoo The damage IA lines have been isolated/temporarily patched and IA pressure has increased back to normal level D/4

DRESDEB NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 RECOVERY PHASE (1300 -1500)

EXPICTKD ACTIONS Determination if conditions warrant Recovery and planning for Recovery Phase work should take plac Clean up of contamination from the spilled resins should be completed and the area release Work should be started on the damaged shutdown cooling line if not already starte Permanent repairs should be planned for the damaged IA line D/5

"".........

.DY.DO.LI DESCRIPTION:

CHAJj.qGIBG ASPECTS; EXPECTED ACTIONS; MOcmpS:

  • 0172D/1/wjm DRESDEN llUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSBP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 LOSS OF AKRUBCIATORS With Unit 2 running at full power, at 0830, a "ding" is heard in the Control Room.and all annunciators are lost except for the DC Power Failure Alarm on every power pane The Control Room receives a phone call from the Fire Watch, who is stationed in the Auxiliary Electric Room due to the Halon System being out of servic The Fire Watch reports that smoke is coming out of the 902-34 Panel and the smoke has caused the room to smell. In addition, smoke detector alarms are received on the XL3 fire alarm typer. The Fire Watch reports that the smoke is clearing and it appears that the fire may be ou The Control Room must operate the Plant with no annunciator on Unit 2. If timely repairs are not made, activities after 1000 a.m. will be greatly complicated when an earthquake causes the Reactor to SCRAM and damages Instrument. Air (IA)

lines which could result in los~ of Instrument Air if the IA problem is not quickly diagnosed and correcte All unnecessary activities should be suspended and available Control Room Staff assigned to monitor plant parameters. A Shift Supervisor should be dispatched to the Auxiliary Electric Roo The_ Fire Brigade may or may not be dispatched depending on how the various fire alarms and the phone call from the Fire Watch is interpreted. The problem should be diagnose~ as burnt up Rormal Power Fuse Bloc Electricians should disconnect the burnt fuse block and connect to the Reserve Feed which will allow recovery of annunciator A bell will sound on the Control Room (Simulator) and all

'other annunciators will be silenced. All annunciators will be disabled to prevent reading annunciator informatio A mock 902-34 panel will be utilized. The mock up will be wired as the 902-34 panel, wires will originally be attached to a burnt fuse block (normal power) and a good fuse bl9ck (reserve power) will be available to re-connect the wire *

VTrD-..o

.l>Y.l>.L"t.L 1 DESCRIPTION; CHAJJ.IJIJGIBG ASPECTS; EXPECTED AGTIOBS; MOCXIJPS; Ol72D/2/vjm DRESDEB BUGLE.AR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP.KXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 KVEBT SUMMARY LOW.LEVEL RADWASTE RESIN HIGH INTEGRITY COBTAIRER (HIC)

LIRER IS DROPPED At 0900, the "D" ring on the Overhead Crane sling fails and a Low Level Radwaste HIC Liner filled with 170 cubic feet of devatered resin falls off of the overhead cran The liner was positioned over a trailer with* a cask on it to receive the resin liner. The liner, which weighs approximately 6000 lbs., falls and hits the front of the semi-tractor and falls through the open roll up doorwa As the liner came to rest, it struck the Rad Waste Shipping Supervisor, who was outside the door counting empty drum The Supervisor's arm is piilned under the liner and the Supervisor has other minor injuries..,The dose rate from the devatered resins is 5 R/hr and spilled resins from the broken liner are all over the ground in the vicinity of the injured Supervisor who is also highly contaminated from the spilled resin The challenging aspects of this event is to promptly respond to a seriously injured worker trapped in a High Radiation

,and highly contaminated are..

An empty HIC Liner will be u.sed to simulate a full liner. A d\\IDlllY will be initially utilized with its arm pinned under the "HIC" Liner and rigging must be performed to lift the liner off the trapped arm.. After the HIC has been lifted, the injured worker will beinade up with a moulag Contaminated resin will be mocked up using shelled cor *,

~*

""""""*

.DY.DD.L *

.DESCRIPTION:

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

EXPECTED ACTIOlfS:

MOCKUPS:

  • Ol72D/3/wjm DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATIOR 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 EVERT SUMMARY IRJURED RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMIRATED INDIVIDUAL While working in the D 2/3 Radwaste Truck Bay, a Supervisor is injured by a HIC when it falls from the overhead cran His left arm is crushed by the HIC and along with his chest becomes contaminate The RIC must be moved to remove the victi The Rad Protection, Operating and Maintenance personnel-involved will need a rig to remove the HIC in order to perform a primary survey of.the victi The victim should be stabilized and not moved until the Emergency Squad arrives. It is determined that the victim has contamination of 5,000 cpm on his left arm and chest in several spot The contamination should be removed as much as possible before transport to the hospita The Coal City Fire Department should be notified immediately after the Control Room {Cell I

. ) is notified. Rad Protection and an Operating Supervisor should be dispatched

  • to the scen The HIC should be rigged and moved so that a complete primary survey of the victim can be performe Victim should be stabilized and decontaminated as much as possible. The victim should not be moved from the area until the Emergency Squad arrives for transport to the
  • hospital. A radiation survey of the area should be made of the area and contamination should be marked off and/or
  • deconne Lantern mantels will be used as sources for the contamination on the victim's left arm and chest area. A HIC and a semi tractor trailer will be used in the truck bay are *

EYENT:

DESCRIPTION:

' Cll.ALLEBGING

  • ASPECTS:

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

MOCICIJPS:

0172D/4/wjm DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 EVENT SUMMARY FIRE IB*RADWASTE UPGRADE FAB AREA At 0805, a Painting Contractor working in the Radwaste Upgrade Fab area knocks a can of paint thinner into a space heater. The paint thinner ignites and flames spread to a 55 gallon drum of epoj[y based paint which also catches fir The contractor then calls the Control Room and reports the fir Timely. response is needed to prevent extensive fire damag The Control Room must coordinate dispatch of the Fire Brigad Failure to promptly respond to the fire will complicate problems after 1000 a.m. when the earthquake hit The Control Room should dispatch a Fire Brigad The Fire Brigade should be formed and dispatched to the scene of the fir Prompt actions should be taken to put out the fire *

. An actual fire will need to be extinguished by the Fire Brigad The fire will set in a designated area. This is being _coordinated with the Dresden.Fire Marshal *

EYEBT:

DESCRIPTION:

CllALLERGIRG ASPECTS:

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

MOCKIJPS:

0172D/5/wjm DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATIOR 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 EVENT SUMMARY MIHOR EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE An earthquake measuring greater than 0.2 Gs onsite occurs*.

The earthquake causes the Reactor to SCRAM, sets up waves in the Torus and damages several pieces of equipment in the plan The most significant damage is to Instrument Air lines and damage to the Shutdown Syste (IA damage and Shutdown Cooling damage events are discussed separately.)

In addition, minor damage occurs in several areas. This damage will be indicated as personnel conduct plant walk.downs after the earthquak. A Nitrogen Tank line will be broken causing nitrogen to leak and forming frost in the vicinity of the lea.

A fire main is broken in the Crib Bouse causing water to leak onto the floor and results in partial impairment of the Fire Protection Syste Except for Shutdown Cooling problems and Instrument Air problems which are discussed separately, earthquake damage does not represent actual threats to plant Safety however, this occurs simultaneously with the more serious problem The combiiiatlon of multiple problems challenges all aspects

    • of work planning, priortization and communication betwee the Control Room, TSC and OS Damage Assessment Teams should be formed and dispatched to walkdown the plant. Upon discovering the minor damage reports should be made and depending upon available resources the leaks should be isolated or simply noted for later wor Mockups will be utilized for the Ritrogen Tank Lin..
  • **

EVEIJT;.

DESCRIPTION; CHAI.IJUfGING ASPECTS; EXPECTED ACTIONS; MOCKIJPS;*

0172D/6/wjm DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 EVERT SUMMARY LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR An earthquake damages an Instrument Air on Unit 2 and on Unit Depending on the availability of Annunciators various alarms are received and damage is discoverable by teams performing plant walkdovn The damaged Instrument Air line on Unit 2 is on the line feeding the Filter Building HVA This leak is easily isolatable and should not cause any problem A level 1 Operator making rounds in the Turbine Building will report *the break in Unit 3 IA line. This leak is to the Main Feed to Unit 3 Reactor Buildin The leak is not isolatable and Unit 3 will loose Instrument Air if timely repairs are not made to the damaged lin The Control Room must deal with the damage to IA and isolate or repair.the leaks in order to prevent loss of Instrument Air on Unit 3. If IA is lost on Unit 3, additional operational difficulties associated with loss of Instrument Air will occu Repair Teams should be dispatched to the Unit 3 IA to Reactor Building line brea Temporary repairs such as a rubber gasket and saddle clamps should be used to stop the lea The leak to the Unit 2 HVAC Filter Building HVAC should be isolated by turning the valv The Unit 3 IA to Reactor Building Line leak will be mocked up with a capped*length of damaged copper line that is connected to source of pres.surized air or nitrogen bottl EVEJtT; DESCRIPTION; CHALLElfGil'fG ASPECTS;.

EXPECTED ACTIONS; MOCXIJPS; 0172'1)/7/wjm

,*

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1990 GSEP EXERCISE APRIL 11, 1990 EVENT SUMMARY FUEL POOL COOLING PROBLEMs Unit 3 is in refueling and the Fuel Pool is loaded with recently removed fuel which has resulted in the Fuel Pool being close to its Maximum Heat Loa The Fuel Pool is being cooled by the 3C Shutdown Cooling System and the normal Fuel Pool Cooling Syste WHen the earthquake s~rikes, a spool piece on the 3C Shutdown Cooling Line is damaged and starts to lea The leak causes loss of water inventory and makeup is insufficient to maintain level. The Fuel Pool Cooling surge tanks empty and the Fuel Pool Cooling pumps t'rip on low skimmer level while the 3C Shutdown Cooling Pump trips on low suction pressur Fuel Pool temperatures start to increase which is noticeable only by local temperature indicator Fuel Pool water from the damaged Shutdown Cooling Line leaks out the Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Room and runs down the stairs ultimately resulting in Reactor Building sumps operatin The source of the leak must be recognized and corrected in a timely manner or fuel pool temperatures will increase to the point where iodine would be released from fuel pool water causing an airborne contamination problem in the plant. It is not anticipated that the problem could go on long enough to cause an actual fuel proble Shutdown Cooling should be isolated from the Fuel Pool Cooling Syste The Fuel Pool surge tanks should be refilled and the Fuel Pool Cooling system restarte However, this will not be sufficient to maintain fuel pool temperature Repairs should be st~rted on the damaged Shutdown Cooling Line spool piec Once the line is repaired, Shutdown Cooling should be restarted and fuel pool temperatures will start to dro Fuel pool temperatures will also start to decrease if alternate means of Fuel Pool Cooling are establishe A damaged spool piece will be mocked up and have to be repaire... *

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  • -3
  • DESCRIPTION:
  • CBALLEBGiBG ASPECTS:

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

MOcmpS:

0172D/8/wjm DRESDEN JllUCLEAR POWER*STATIOR 1990 GSBP EXERCISE APRIL 11. 1990 EVERT SmmARY REPAIR OF SHUTDOWN COOLING SPOOL PIECE When the earthquake strikes a spool piece on the 3C Shutdown Cooling Line it is damaged and starts to leak. whiCh resulted in loss of water inventory and insufficient cooling capacity to maintain fuel pool temperature Restoration of Shutdown Cooling is required to maintain fuel pool temperatures and prevent the release of Iodine from the wat~ Shutdown Cooling should be isolated from the Fuel Pool Cooling Syste Mechanical Maintenance should troubleshoot the problem. obtain gasket material. disassemble the spool piece. install. the new gasket and reinstall the.spool plec Once the line is repaired. Operators should restart Shutd9wn Coolin 'A damaged spool piece will be mocked up and have to be repaire )

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