IR 05000237/1990013
| ML17202L295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1990 |
| From: | Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17202L294 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-90-13, 50-249-90-12, NUDOCS 9007100125 | |
| Download: ML17202L295 (6) | |
Text
1 **
. U. S. ~UCLEAR REGOLATORY COMMISSION REGION II I. *
... :
Report Nos. sq-237/90013(DRP); 50-24~/9Q012(DRP)
Docket Nus. 50-237; 50:249
'License No DPR~19; DPR-25
. '
.Licenste: *Commonwealth Edison Company
.
OPUS I-lest I Ir'
.
- 1400 6pu~ Place
- Downers Grove,* IL 60515 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuc.l.ear Power Station., Units 2 and 3 Inspecti08 At:
Dresden Site, Mortis, I Jr1sp~ction Conducted:
April 3, 1990 through June 12, 1990 Inspectors:
S. G. Du Pont D. E. Hills D. E. Jones
/. /1 ;6// t!~ kif.
,Ap~rovt:d By:
J: ~;~Hinds, Chid
- Reactor Projtets Sect ion 1 B Inspection Summa7
- 7bho Date Inspection durin~ the ~eriod of April 3, 1990.through June 12, 1990
- {Report N~s. 50- 37/80 13{DRPJ~ 50-249/90012(DRP).
.
.
Areas Inspected:* Routine resident* inspect.ion and unannounced regional
"lriSpect'1on of licensee event reports followup, plant operations, maintenance and surveillance, safety assessment/quality verification, engi neeri ng/techn i cal support, report reviewi and TMJ Action Plan requirement followup. =
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified *during the *
- inspectio No sc-rams, engineered safety feature ac.tuations or safety injections occurred duri~g the inspection perio Nu new weaknesses were noted during this inspection period and previously *identified strengths continu * DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
- E. Eenigenburg, Station Manager L. Gerner, Technical Superintendent E. Mantel, Services Di~ector
.. n. Van Pelt, Assisiant ~uperintendeht -
Mainten~nce
- J. Kotowski, Production Superintendent **
J. Achterberg, Assistant* Superintendent - Work Planning G *. Smith, A~sistant Superintendent-Operations
- . *K. Peterman, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor W. Pietryga, Operating Engineer M. Korchynsky, Operating Engineer B. lank, Operating Engineer
- J. Williams, Operating Engineer.
M. Strait, Technical Staff Supervisor L. Johnson, Q.C. Supervisor
J. Mayer, Station Security Admjnistrato D. Morey, Chemfstry Services Supervisor D~ Saccoma*ndo, Health Physics Service*s Supervisor K. Kociuba", Q.A. Superintendent The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees; inc_luding members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and aux"iliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument person~el, and contract security personne *D~riotes those attendirig one or more exit interviews conducted informally at various times throughout the -inspection perio. *
~icensee Event*Reports _Followup (90712 and 92700).
(Clos~d) LER 237/90002:. Reactor Scram Following Condensate/Condensate Booster Pump Failure arid Subs~quent L6ss of Offsite Pow~r. *This event was the subject of-previous-Augmented Inspection Report 50~237/9000 This report described the event including the subsequent licensee investigation ~nd corrective action (Closed) LER 249/90002:
HPCI System Inoperabie Due to Flow Transm.itter 3-2358 Amplifier Fail~r ~his failure which occurred during surveillance testing on February 24, 1990 to the flow indication and automatic control of HPCI turbine speed to develop required* pump flo The transmitter's fbver had been removed during ~the.week of February 14, 199.0, to allpw the connection of test leads for a recorder to be used for* the post refueling startup test progra Removal of the
. cover allowed moistur~ intrusion onto. the amplifier board resulting in
~ig~ current flow and ~omponent over-heatin The licensee planned to revise Dresden Operating Surveillahce 2300-7 11 HPCI Pump Test and Fast*
.
.
.. ~--~~:.:...-~u::= ~
. ;
Initiation Test" to ensure connection of test leads is done such that the.cover can be re-installed *with the leads in place *. Dresden Administrative Procedure 15-6 Preparation and Control of Work Requests",
was also-to*be r~~ised to require administrative c6ntrols in wbrk packages involving cover ~emoval f6r attachment of test leads; This event was also to be.discussed during station* tailgate meetl_ngs to emph~size aff~c~s of water intrusio (Closed). LER 249/90004:
Spurious Group V Primary Containme.nt Isolation While Shutdown Due to Design Deficienc This event whi.ch.occurred on February 12, 1990, involved an isolation of the isolation condenser.*
The isolation condenser condensate and steam supply line differential pressure switches. were-found to be within calibration.* Due to past problems of thiS type, a time delay relay had* been installed in the circuitry and.more recently was replaced with a more. accurately scaled time The root cause of this event c6uld'not be determined, but the licensee plans to perform an engineering review of the instrumentation
- for ~ossibl~ further recommendation (Closed) LER 249/90005:
Unit 3 Reactor Scram Due to MSIV 3-203~3A Pilot and*Solenoid Airline Brea This event arid corresponding licensee actions were di.scussed in inspection report 50-237/90009; 50-249/9000 No violations or deviations were identified in this are.. Plant.Operations (71707 and 93702)
..
The inspectors observed control roo~ opetations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during thfs perio T~e inspectors ver_ified the operability of selected emergency systems,
.reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service *of affected compon.ents..Tours of Units 2 and *3 reactor buildings and turbine
.*
buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment:conditions, including potenti~l fire haiards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations.and to * *
verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need *
of maintenanc *
...
Ea~h week.du~ing routine activities or tours, the inspector monitored the n censee IS security program,to ensure that. observed act ions *Were being
- implemented according to their approved security pla The inspector noted that.persons within the protected area displayed* proper photo~identification badges ~nd those Jridividuals requiring escorts were properly escorted.* The inspector a*lso verified that ch.ecked vital areas wer~ locked and alarmed. Additionally, the inspect6r also.verified that 1observed pers6nnel* and packages entering the protected area were searched
~y appropriate equipment or by han The inspecto~s verified that the lic~ns~e*~ radiological protection*
program was implemented in accordance with facility policies and programs and was in compliance with regulatory' requirement... *.
\\
The inspectors.. reviewed new procedures and changes to procedures that.
. were implemented during the inspe_ction perio The review consisted of a verification for accuracy, correctness, and compliance with regulator re~u i rement..
.
.
.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, a~d administrative procedure No violations or deviations were -identified in this area *
., Maintenance and Surveillances (62703; 61726, and 93702) Maintenance Activities
.. Station maintenance activities of systems and cqmponents listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accord<,rnce with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or *standards and in conformance with Techni ca 1 Spec if i cation *The following items were considered dur.ing th.is review:
.The Limiting Conditions for Op~raticin (LCOs) were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals wer obtained prior to initiating the work; activitie.s were accomplished*
using approved procedure~ and were *inspected ~s applicable;
- .
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality contra 1 records were maintained; activities. were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used _were properly certified; radiological controls were imp*lemented; and, fire prevention contrpls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may.affect system performanc *
Main Steamline Radiation Monitor Calibration was observe Surveillanc~ Activities.
The inspectors observed surveillance testing, including required Technical Specification surveillance testing, and verified for actual activities observed that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedure The inspectors also verified that test instrumentation was calibrated, ~hat Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the aff~cted components were acco~plished and that test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure requirement Additionally, the inspectors ensured that.the test results were reviewed by personnel other than the i.ndividual directing the* test, and that any deficiencies identified during th~ ~esting were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne.. _
'*
The inspectors witnessed-or reviewed portions of the following test activities:
Main Steam Isolation.valve timing Control Rod Drive timing Stan(jby Gas Treatment System operability
- High Pressure Coolant Injectibn_ System.operabil_ity low Pressure Coolant Injection System (LPG!) operability*
LPCI Pump.and Val~e lns~rvice Test~~.
.
-
.
No violations or deviations were identi~ied in this are.
.
. Safety Asses*sment/Qual.ity Verification. (35502)
The insp.ectors observed completion of a quality control witness point and a quality assurance surveillance* con.ducted on April 6, 1990, involving calibration of the *Unit 2 main steamline r_adiation monitor These activities were adequately*condu.cted a-nd documente*d including the usage of ap*propriate checklist *
-
. The inspectors also observed porti*ons*of*the ~Eco quality assurance superintendents m~eting conducted*on A~rtl 17~ 1990..
The inspectors considered this meetino to be beneficial towards the free e*xchange of ideas and experience between plant No violations or deviations were identified in this ar*ea*. Engineering and Technical Support (93702):
.
.
. "
The licensee informed the ins~~ctors o~ April 16, 1990, of a prob1em with the LOCA-ECCS analyses that ensured calculat~d peak cladding temperature
- during the des.ign basis accident would. not exceed the Appendix K limit of 2200 degrees F. * In particular, this a'nalysis which was performed by Advanced Nuclear.Fuels, _did not include the 15 to 20 second time delay in
_LPCI swing bus transfer.* This problem wa~o~iginally.discovered at the Quad Cities plant for which General Electric did the analysi The.most
- limiting failure previously assumed in the an~lysis for Dresden was a failure of the LPCI valve on the intact loop to open *. The above time delay would not directly affect this s.i*ngle failure. *However, a te-analysis of a s_ingle failure of a di~sel gener~tor, which includes the
- bus transfer time de.lay, could have shown that failure to be more limitin If so,.it would ~ave neede~ to be analyzed in regard to p~ak *
- cla_dding temperature The previous analyses showed peak claddin temperatures.of 1942 degrees F and 2044 degrees F for the diesel generator and LPCI failure respectively. *A re-analjsis was performed which
- in.eluded LPCI Swing Bus transfer time del.a The re-analysis indicate *that.the most limiting single fe:ilure. did.not change and thus peak cladding temp~ratures were not affected.
.s
't Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed _the licensee's Monthly Operating Report fdr April 1990~ The inspect~rs ~Qnfirmed"that the information provided met the requirements of Technica1 3 Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.16;
f IM( Action Plan Requirement Followup (25565) (Closed) TMI Item II.K.3.13 (Units 2 and 3): This item requi~ed the licensee t~ perform an~lyses and implement changes to separate the initiation level signals.of the high-pressure coolant injection system and the reactor core *isolation cooling syste Dresden station does not have a reactor core isolation cooling system so this TMI action item did not have to be done for Dresde TMI Item II.K.3.13 (Units 2 and 3)
i~ close (Closed) TMI Item II:K.3.19 (Units 2. and 3):
This Hem required the licen~ee to install interlocks on recirculation pump loops on nonjet *
pump plants to assure* that at least two loops are open for recirculation flow. fbr ~odes otber than cold shutdow Dresden station has j~t pumps, so this TMI action item did riot have to be done for Dresde TMI Item II.K.3.19 (Units 2 and 3) is close.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors*met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on Jun~ 12, 1990, and informally throughout the inspection period, and summ?rize9 the s_cope and findings of the.inspection activitie The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard ~o documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar The 1 i censee *acknowledged the findings of the inspectio *
-~6-