IR 05000237/1987035
| ML17199T473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1987 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 50-237-87-35, 50-249-87-34, NUDOCS 8712290174 | |
| Download: ML17199T473 (10) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-237/87035(DRP); 50-249/87034(DRP)
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Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P. 0. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted:
October 23 through December 8, 1987
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I nsp'ectors": * S. G. Du Pont
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~* D. Kaufman
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Approved By:**.*M. A. Rfog,C~ie~~
Projects Section lC *. - *
- J Inspection Summary rz/_~z Date
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Inspection during the period of October 23 throu1h December 8, 1987 (Report Nos. 50-237/87035(DRP); 50-249/87034(DRP ).
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors on previous inspection items; operational safety verification; monthly surveillance observation; followup of events; licensee event report followup; management meeting; report review; I.E. Information Notices; maintenance; and commissioners tou Results:
Of the 10 areas inspected, no violations or deviations of NRC*
requirements were identified in 9 areas; one violation was identified in the remaining area; however, in accordance with 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.A., a Notice of Violation was not issued (failure to perform Technical Specification fire barrier surveillance within required time period -
Paragraph 6.)
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
- E. Eenigenburg, Station Manager J. Wujciga, Production Superintendent
- C. Schroeder, Services Superintendent
- L. Gerner, Superintendent of Performance Improvement T. Ciesla, Assistant Superintendent - Planning D. Van Pelt, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance J. Brunner, As~istant Superintendent - Technical Services J. Kotowski, Assistant Superintendent - Operations R. Christensen, Unit 1 Operating Engineer G. Smith, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- E. Armstrong, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor W. Pietryga, Unit* 3 Operating Engineer
.. J.**P..ch.te.rberg;:.. Te~.hnic,al. Sta.ff.*.Super.vi-sor* *...
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. R. "Geier, Q.C. Supervisor
D. Sharper, Waste Systems Engineer D *. Adam, *Radiation Chemistry Supervisor J~ Mayer, Station Security Administrator D. Morey, Chemistry Supervisor D. Saccomando, Radiation Protection Supervisor E. Netzel, Q.A. Superintendent
- c~ Turley, Station Q.A.
. R. Stols, Q.A. Engineer
- R. Janecek, Senior Participant - Nuclear Safety The inspectors also talked with and interviewed ~everal other licensee employees,- including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personne *Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on December 8, 1987, and informally at various times throughout the inspection perio Review of Previous Inspection Items (92702)
(Clssed) Violation (249/87010-01):
Reactor water temperature exceeded 212 F with fuel in the reactor and without primary containment integrity, and low power physics tests were not in progres The maximum temperature reached was 223°F, which is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.A.2 LC The licensee's immediate corbective actions taken were to reduce reactor water temperature below 212 F and establish primary containment. These actions were completed within 22 minutes from the time of discover Plant cooldown procedure DOP 1000-3 has been revised to provide instruction to the operator regarding proper computer point selection and monitoring, primary containment requirements, and reactor water cooling requirement Quiet hours have been instituted to
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provide an atmosphere more conducive to turnover The NSO and SCRE involved in this event received certain disciplinary actio In addition, the licensee implemented an Error Free Operation Plan designed to achieve error free startups after refuel outages and subsequent operation Operational Safety Verification (71710 and 71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators d~ring the period from October 23 to December 8, 198 The inspectors verified the operabflity of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of Units 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the phys.ical security' plan was being implemented in* accordance with the 6ta'tt6n**sec1.1f"ity.*.pfa,}.*...... *_.. ::"*.. *.. *:**** ** :.*:*.. :.
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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and
. verified* implement.at ion cif radiation protection control During the
- inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the systems listed below to verify operability by comparing system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration or present valve lineup
- .lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; arid*verified that instr4mentation was properly valved, functioning, and calibrate While touring the Unit 2 and Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection rb9mi, the inspectors observed the following conditions:
0 HPCI exhaust line drain pot level switch cover removed and wire broken of The licensee had issued work request #69207 on September 25, 1987, to repair the switch, however, no work was inprocess during the inspectors walkdow Local station HPCI motor control valves valve position indicating lights not working for the following HPCI valves:
M0-2-2301-9 HPCI pump discharge valv M0-2-2301-14 HPCI main pump recirc to torus valv M0-2-2301-10 HPCI pump discharge to CST valv M0-2-2301-3 HPCI turbine steam supply valve.
M0-3-2301-3 HPCI turbine steam supply valv **: *.
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HPCI motor control valve stem covers missing on the following limitorque valves:
M0-2-2301-3 Work request #58400 was written on 10/3/86 to replace missing stem cove M0-2-2301-10 Stem cover is missing and no work request has -
been writte M0-3-2301-10 Stem cover is missing and no work request has been writte M0-3-2301-15 Stem cover is missing and no work request has been writte The licensee performs a valve position indicating light walkdown on a monthly basis per DOS 040-4, Revision Unit 2's HPCI valve walkdown, which was completed by the licensee on November 15, 1987, denoted no lamp problem Ho~ever, the residents walkdown on Dece~ber 4,. 1987,
. foun.d,the.. qbove. indicatipg li.ght~. n~t -wq.r:ki.ng... Wor~. r~quest.s ~.hou.ld *initiated to**rep"lace the missing lim"itbrque valve* stem covers ancf re.pair the indicating light The inspectors reviewed new procedures and changes to procedures that were implemented during the inspection perio The review consisted of a verification for accuracy, correctness, and compliance with regulatory requirement *
The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirem~nts established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure The following systems were inspected:
Unit 2
. High Pressure Coolant Injection System Core Spray System Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Common i
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Followup of Events (92700)
During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events, some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7 The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC officials.. In each case, the inspectors verified that the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent future recurrenc The specific event was as follows:
.On December 4, 1987, the licensee reported to NRC Region III that an employee (Stationman) was charged on December 4, 1987, with "possession with intent to deliver" two ounces of cocaine to an undercover metropolitan area narcotics squad agen The licensee pulled the individual's site security badge, and performed a search of the individual's personal locker onsite with negative result On December 7, 1987, the licensee performed a drug dog search within the protected area with negative res~lt.
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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703, 71710)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance wilh technical specification The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testfng and/o~ calibritions were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc *.
The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Unit 2 2C Condensate/Booster pump - inboard seal leaking - repair/replace per work request #D6991 Condensate *Transfer pump - mechanical seal leaking - repair/replace per work request #D7030 *
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- Unit 3 3-1601-62 Air operated valve - replace solenoid on December 7, 1987, per work request #7059 Unit 3 SP-87-10-156, Monthly HPCI System Pump Test for the Inservice Test Progra This special test was perfonned to take vibration data on the HPCI pum Impeller replacement on the booster pump is being scheduled for the March, 1988 refueling outag No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by technical specifications for the items listed below and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test
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were met, that removal* and restoration of the affected components were*
accomplished, that test results confonned with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during. the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
SP-87-10-156, Monthly HPCI System Pump Test for the Inservice Test Progra This special test was performed to take vibration.data on the HPCI pum Impeller replacement on the booster pump is being scheduled for the March 1988 refueling outag *
No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (93702)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications Unit 2 (Closed) 87029-00:
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Steam Lea While performing surveillance testing of the HPCI system on October 1, 1987, with the unit at 97% rated power, a steam leak in the vicinity of the HPCI turbine shaft seal was observe After discussions between shift supervision and the Operating Engineer, HPCI was determined to be inoperable at 1450 hours0.0168 days <br />0.403 hours <br />0.0024 weeks <br />5.51725e-4 months <br /> on October 1, 198 Exact cause of the
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steam leak is unknow A possible cause was a momentary misalignment of the HPCI turbine sprir.£ loaded labyrinth shaft seals due to the starting vibrations of the HPCI turbin The HPCI system was run or October 1, 1987 at 1845 hours0.0214 days <br />0.513 hours <br />0.00305 weeks <br />7.020225e-4 months <br /> and on October 2, 1987 at 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br />, with no leakage observed; HPCI was then declared operabl (Closed) 87030-00:
Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoints Found Outside Technical Specification Limits Due to Mishandling and Setpoint Drift Two Main Steam Safety Valves (Serial No. BK 6290 and BK 62EO) removed during the 1987 Unit 2 outage were tested to determine their as-found setpoint. Valve BK 6290, with a design setpoint of 1260 psig, opened cleanly at 1276 psig, thus exceeding the plus or minus one percent tolerance required by Technical Specification 4.6.E. * Valve BK 6260 designed to open at 1260 psig, failed to open twice at 1300 psi On a third attemgt, the valve opened cleanly at 1282 psig, which exceeded the T.S. 4.6.E toleranc Mishandling of the valve during the transport between the drywell and the test boiler caused contact between the shaft and the internal adjustment guide which increased the valve's setpoin Valves BK 6260 and BK ~290 were over~auled an~ setpoi~ts adjuste~ within
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protett1ve guard* for the -stem assemb1y has been *fabricated-. ne*guara***
will be required during transit per pro~edural chang *
- (clbs~d) 87031-06:
Reactor Building Venti~ation Isolation Start of SBGT System Due t6 Irradiated Metal on Fuel Cas Review of this event is documented in paragraph 4 of Region III Inspection Report 50-237/87026(DRP).
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. (Closed) ~703~~00: Reactor Scram Due to Spurious Main Steam Line Low Pressure Signal Caused by Vibration. Onsite followup of this event was conducted and documented under Followup of Events in Region III Inspection Report No. 50-237/87026 Par~graph (Closed) 870034-00:
Nonconservative Core Thermal Power (CTP) Calculation*
Due to Inadequate Calibration Procedur Three Rosemount 1151 dp feedwater flow transmitters on Unit 2 and one transmitter on Unit 3 were incorrectly calibrate The transmitters had not been calibrated tc compensate fo~ the effects of static pressure span compressure which resulted in a nonconservative error of 0.44% in DP calculation It is estimated that Units 2 and 3 exceeded the CTP limit for a total of 46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> since September 1987 and 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> since October 1986, respectivel Upon discovery of the calculation error, the transmitters were recalibrated. Dresden Instrumentation Procedure (DIP) 600-1, Feedwater Control Calibration and Maintenance and Dresden Technical Staff procedure (DTS) 8733, Unit Z/3) Ccmputer Feedwater Flow Calibration, have been revised to include the proper calibration curve for the Rosemount 1151 dp transmitte *.. '7
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(Closed) 86019-01:
Unit 2 Reactor Scram From Main Turbine Trip on High Water Level Due to Failure of Feedwater Regulating Valve and Personnel Error. This supplemental report was issued to provide additional root cause information found after the initial LER was submitte The licensee discovered that the 11A 11 reactor feedwater discharge check valve failure and a personnel error on the part of an NSO for failure to comply with Dresden Operating Procedure (DOP) 040-4, Control Panel Light Bulb*
Replacement resulted in a reactor scra (Closed) 87001-01:
UT Indications Found on Primary System Piping Due to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Crackin This supplemental report was issued to provide the results of additional UT examinations performed on piping welds as a result of the indications reported in the original LE No additional indications were found upon completion of all UT testin Unit 3 (Closed) 87016-00:
Primary Containment Group I Isolation and Reactor Scram Due to.Apparent Personnel Erro Review of this event is
... **. doc.um.~nted.. in Region..!ll..Iospection.R-eport ~0.-24Q/&7025.,,P.aragr-aph 4, The preceding LERs have.been reviewed against the criteria of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, and the incidents described meet all of the following
- requirement Th~s no Notice of Violation is being issued for these item *
a. * The event was identified by the 1 icensee, The event was an incident that, according to the current enforcement policy, met the criteria for Severity levels IV or V violations, The event was appropriately reported, The event was or will be corrected (including measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonable amount of time), and* the event was not a violation that could have been prevented by the licensee's corrective actions for a previous violatio No violations or deviations were identified in this are (Closed) 50-249/87018-00:
Fire Stop 18 Month Surveillance Interval
.Exceeded Due to Procedural Deficienc On September 20, 1987, a review of upcoming surveillances was be~ng performed when it was found that '-
Dresden Fire Protection Procedure (DFPP) 4175-3, "Shutdown Fire Stop/Break Surveillance", was incorrectly classified as due each refueling outage in the surveillance progra The critical surveillance date for this surveillance was November 1, 198 This surveillance was completed on April 24, 1986, 5 months and 23 days after the critical date. *The critical date was missed due to improper categorizing of the 18 month surveillance as a refuelin~ outage surveillance on the compute Dresden Technical Specification (TS) 4.12.F.1 requires that these fire *
barrier (stop/break) penetrations be inspected once every 18 month Failure to perform this Technical Specification surveillance within the required time period is a violation of TS 4.12.F.1 (237/87035-01;
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249/87034-01).
However, since Unit 3 was in cold shutdown throughout*
this period due to an extended refueling outage, the safety significance of exceeding the surveillance date was minima Consequently, this violation meets the tests of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, and no Notice of Violation will be issued. This item is considered close One violation was identified in this ar~.
I.E. Information Notice Follo~up (92701)
Each of the following I.E. Information Notices (IEN) was reviewed by the Resident Inspectors to verify (1) that the Information Notice was received by licensee management, (2) that a review for applicability was performed, and (3) that if the Information Notice was applicable to the*
facil lty, appl icc:ble actions were taken or were scheduled to be take (Closed) IEN 87-23:
Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor
- .Coolant Level Operatio Dresden Units 2 & 3 do not have RHR systems to remove decay heat,.*so the licensee reviewed t~e Shutdown Cooling system
.with regard to th~.Pr9~le,m idel')~ifie.d.in this. In.fortJla.tion Notice....The:. *.
Shutdown Cooling system takes suction from the Recircul~tion syste The Recirculation system takes its suction from the reactor vessel annulus area and this piping is not isolatable.. The Shutdown Cooling water is returned to =the discharge side of the recirculation pump via the LPCI line. Thus, the reactor water level would have to decrease to a point of*
~ncovering the irradiated fuel before a loss.of suction could occu Dresden has five independent categories cf reactor vessel water level instrumentation to monitor reactor water leve (Closed) JEN 87-42:
Di~sel Generator Fuse C6ntact The licensee had a similar, but lEss serious, incident occur during a test of the Unit 2 diesel generator in 1974 following a maintenance outag Dresden utilizes a similar contact arrangement for the diesel g~nerator potential transformer (PT) fuses and connecting cable The licensee issued DVR 12-2-74-16 and the ensuing inspection* revealed burn marks on the B phase contacts and cables (cables charred), indicative of arcin Poor mating of the fuse and stationary contacts were identified as the cause of the arcin In May l97~, the licenses made modifications (Ml2-2-74-32; M12-2-74-33; Ml2-3-74-48) to the electrical control cabinet doors which enabled them to be screwed closed, thus, insuring a proper mating of the move ab 1 e contact finger connects with the s t?.t i ona ry contac,
No violations or deviations were identified in this are.
Commissioner's Visit On October 23, 1987, Corrrnissioner Kenneth C. Rogers, accompanied by the NRC Region III Deputy Regional Administrator, visited the Dresden Nuclear Station. While, on site, the Commissioner and Region III Management toured the facility with the licensee's corporate and plant management on a familiarizatior. and plant improvement tou The Commissioner also held meetings with licensee plant management and supervisory personne The Commissioner complimented Commonwealth Edison on Dresden's positive progress and directio *.->*>'",'A*,';_: -=-**,*.... *.. *:.
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1 Management Meetings The President, Executive Vice President and other members of Comnonwealth Edison Company met with Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Mr. James M. Taylor, the Region III Regional Administrator, and other NRC representatives in Headquarters on October 28, 1987, to discuss the company's plans to effect sustained performance improvement at the Dresden Nuclear Power *
Statio.
Report Review During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Monthly Operating Report for October 198 The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.A.3 and Regulatory Guide 1.1 The licensee announced the following Dresden site management changes
- effective November 25, 1987:
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. Quality Assurance (QA) Superintemlent, M. J.eisy, will.assume the posi_tion of INPO Coordinato The new*Q:A. Superintendent is E. Netzel,"
transferring from the Braidwood Statio.
Exit fnterview (3070~).
The inspectors m.et with. licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
informally throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on December 8, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie *
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspectio. "
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