IR 05000237/1987030
| ML17199V353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1988 |
| From: | Danielson D, James Gavula, Huber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 50-237-87-30, 50-249-87-29, NUDOCS 8804060511 | |
| Download: ML17199V353 (38) | |
Text
i----
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I II Reports No. 50-237/87030(DRS); 50-249/87029(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 License No. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Station, Units 2 & 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois Sargent and Lundy Office, Chicago, Illinois Impell Corporation Office, Chicago, Illinois U.S. NRC, Headquarters, Bethesda, Maryland U.S. NRC, Region III, Glen Ellyn, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
September 3, 1987, January 26-28, 1988, at Sargent and Lundy September 14, 1987, at NRC Headquarters September 28-29, and October 1,5, 1987, February 24-26, and March 14-16, 1988, at Dresden Inspectors:
Approved By:
January 28, 1988, at Impell February 11, 1988, at Region III D. H. Danielson, Chief, Materials and Processes Section Inspection Summary
<1!/0-v Date-0/n-ate Inspection from September 3, 1987, through March 16, 1988, (Reports No. 50-237/87030(DRS); 50-249/87029(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Special safety inspection of previously identified items of noncompliance and unresolved items, and onsite follow-up of events at operating reactors (92701, 92702 and 93702).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000237 Q
.f DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo)
- E. Zebus, Superintendent Dresden/Quad Cities
- R. Mirochna, Supervising Engineer
- I. Johnson, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
- N. Smith, BWR Licensing Supervisor 0 S. Javidan, BWR Engineer 0 !. Johnson, Nuclear Licensing Administrator 0 E. Armstrong, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
°C. Schroeder, Services Superintendent J. Lizalek, Tech Staff Engineer Sargent and Lundy Engineers (S&L)
T. G. Langlais, Head, Structural Engineering Division
- D. J. Gullaksen, Assistant Head, Structural Engineering Division
- B. A. Erler, Assistant Manager, Structural Department A. Walser, Structural Project Engineer
- P. Gazda, Senior Structural Project Engineer Impell Corporation (Impell)
- T. T. Witting, Division Manager
- A. D. Ho, Section Manager D. Bailey, Engineer NRC Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
- P. T. Kuo, Section Chief, EMEB Brookhaven Nation Laboratory (BNL)
- W. Grossman, Structural Analysis Engineer
- K. Bandyopadhyay, Analysis Engineer
- Denotes those attending the interim exit meeting on January 28, 1988.
0 Denotes those participating in the exit interview on March 16, 198.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation (237/87006-010; 249/87011-0lC):
Procedures for component support inspection in the ISI program did not address spring can setting CEC0 1s response dated September 24, 1987, was reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure DTP-2, 11 In-Service Inspection Plan
,
Revision 6, July 198 The procedure now requires spring can settings to be verified for appropriate settings and variations are to be evaluated by appropriate organizations. Based on these actions this violation is considered close *
- (Closed) Violation (237/87006-0lE; 249/87011-010):
!SI drawings used for component support inspections were inadequat CECo's response dated September 24, 1987, was reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region III. The NRC inspector reviewed the following drawings:
(1)
ISI-200, "Core Spray Piping", Revision B, October 25, 1987 (2)
ISI-202, "Low Pressure Coolant Injection Piping", Revision B, October 23, 1987 All of the previously identified discrepancies had been corrected on these drawing Support designations were revised to indicate the appropriate support drawing number and notes were added to indicate where supports had been previously remove A cursory review of the other ISI drawings indicated that all 96 !SI drawings had been revised and upgrade In addition, a comprehensive
!SI-Vendor Cross Reference document was generated during recent efforts. This data base gives ISI drawing numbers, support numbers, new vendor numbers, existing mark numbers, line numbers, analysis numbers and computer model node number This should greatly simplify the coordination effort for any future ISI related wor Based on these actions, this item is considered close (Closed) Violation (237/87006-0lF; 249/87011-0lE):
Procedures for the IS! component support inspections did not address corrective actions for identified deficiencie CECo's response dated September 24, 1987, was reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region III. The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure DTP-2, "In-Service Inspection Plan", Revision 6, July 198 The procedure now requires all deficiencies which necessitate a work request to be routed to the on-site SNED representative prior to being sent to the shift engineer for loggin Based on the review of the revised procedure this item is considered close (Open) Open Item (237/87006-03):
Possible waterhammer events on the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray Systems require additional system reviews to confirm the adequacy of the corrective action On April 27, 1987, while performing normal surveillance tests on the LPCI system, a water hammer event was observed on the subject syste (Refer to Dresden Deviation Reports (DVR) No. 12-2-87-50 and No. 12-2-87-128 for additional information).
As a result of this occurrence all procedures requiring the operation of the LPCI system were revised to allow venting of the LPCI cross-tie line which was believed to be causing the water hamme Following these procedure changes, another LPCI water hammer occurred on September 22, 198 Additional reviews of the LPCI system ident-ified a vent on the top of the LPCI heat exchanger that was shown on original drawings but was not installed on the heat exchange It was believed that the resulting 13 inch space between the tube sheet plate and discharge pipe could be the source of air causing the water
hammer event Tests confirming this belief have been inconclusive, however, a modification request was submitted to install a vent on the LPCI heat exchang Pending completion of the additional modification and subsequent verification that no further water hammers have occurred, this item will remain ope (Closed) Open Item (237/87006-04):
Revisions were required to Procedure DTS-020- The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure DTS-020-1, 11 Snubber Visual Inspection Criteria
, Revision 7, February 198 The snubbers were all renumbered in a logical sequence to avoid future confusio All information was updated to show the recent additions and deletion Also the snubber settings and thermal movements were verified and documente Based on these actions, this item is considered close (Open) Open Item (237/87007-02; 249/87006-02):
Control room facade panels were not properly secure The NRC inspector toured the control room to evaluate the existing condition of the facade panel attachment The panels are made of approximately 12 gauge metal and are attached to the control panels below and sheet metal extensions above, and each other with a combina-tion of bolts, angle iron kickers and beam clamps (typical to conduct attachments).
For interim operation, CECo has evaluated the existing configuration and determined that it is acceptabl The NRC inspector concurred with this conclusio An engineering change notice (ECN) is currently being prepared to modify the facade attachment configuration to a more appropriate typ Pending the issuance and completion of this ECN, this item will remain ope (Closed) Unresolved Item (237/84027-05; 249/85013-04):
CEC0 1 s technical audit program of architect engineers is questionabl This item was identified in conjunction with violation 237/87027-0 During the closure of this violation, the findings from CEC0 1 s subsequent comprehensive design audit were forwarded to Region III for revie The actions taken by CECo at that time were considered to be adequate by the NRC inspector who identified this concer As a result of this item, CECo added an additional auditing qualification (AQ) No. 26 11 Design Analysis 11 effective July 1, 1985, to the audit progra This AQ now gives minimum requirements for auditors performing design audits and specifies prerequisites, education, experience, training and on-the-job-training requirment A recent Quality Assurance audit report was reviewed by the NRC inspector. Audit AE-88-03 was conducted at an architect-engineering firm by an auditor with AQ-26 qualification The scope of the audit included a detailed review of pipe support calculations, and appeared to address certain technical attribute *
Based on the actions taken and the documentation reviewed, this item is resolved and considered close (Closed) Unresolved Item (237/84027-06; 249/85013-05):
The implementation of a design review procedure by an architect-engineering firm was questionabl Similar to the previous item, this item was identified in conjunction with violation 237/84027-0 The closure of this violation in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-237/87006 cited a comprehensive design audit of the engineering firm by CECo technical personne The results of this audit were considered to be adequate by the NRC inspector who identified this concer CECo's audit, No. G-85-26, conducted May 6-9, 1985, cited the engineering firm with two findings related to design control and document contro These findings were subsequently addressed by the engineering firm and corrective actions were confirmed by CECo during the follow-up closure audits on September 12 and 18, 198 Based on the above actions this item is resolved and considered close.
Action on Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (Closed) LER (237/87-010-1 and 237/87-010-2)):
Design and construction errors resulted in stresses exceeding FSAR allowable Discrepancies disclosed in the reports are being tracked under the previously issued violations 237/87006-0lC and 237/87006-02 (Closed) LER (249/87-005-2)):
Primary structural steel connections did not meet design requirement Discrepancies disclosed in this report are being tracked under the previously issued violation 249/87011-0l.
Flued Head Anchors Background On September 2, 1987, the NRC inspector was contacted by CECo concerning an operability question for the ongoing embedded plate progra (See NRC Inspection Report No. 50-237/87006; 50-249/87011, Paragraph 3.c.1 for background information on the program.)
A followup inspection was conducted the next day to review the details of the operability analysis for a portion of flued head anchor X116A at Dresden Unit It was disclosed that, based on an Impell evaluation, the embedded plate portion of the Xl16A penetration could be considered operable only if increased damping specified in Regulatory Guide 1.61 and increased allowables based on yield strain criteria from ANSI/AISC N690-84 could be utilize Neither of these criteria were part of the licensing basis for Dresde Also, CECo stated that the flued head anchor structures at both Dresden and Quad Cities were not included under the IE Bulletin (IEB) No. 79-14 scope of wor For this reason, none of these anchor structures were ever as-built verified.
At the request of the NRC inspector, CECo contacted NRR personnel to discuss the above situation, and to receive concurrence for the use of the above operability criteria. Based on these discussions, CECo was
- asked to clarify several technical issues concerning the operability analysi Subsequently, CECo was requested to make a presentation giving the justification for use of the above criteria as well as the basis for exclusion of the flued head anchor structures from the IEB 79-14 progra A meeting was held on September 14, 1987, in Bethesda, Maryland to discuss the above topic Presentation material discussed during the meeting is included as Attachment During the meeting CECo presented the original design basis loads and analytical methodologies for the flued head anchor structures in question. It was concluded by CECo that the first operability analysis done by Impell had used a more conservative design assumption than the original analyse Furthermore, by using the original methodologies, the operability question for the Xll6A embedment plate was tompletely resolved since all components could be shown to meet the FSAR stress criteri On this basis, CECo withdrew their request for using Regulatory Guide 1.61 damping and AISC N690 strain criteri Concerning the IEB 79-14 issue, CEC0 1s position was that the flued head anchor structures are structural anchors for the containment penetrations and as such did not require as-built verification under the subject progra The conclusions drawn by the NRC at the end of the meeting were as follows:
0
0 The CECo presentation did not appear to be sufficient for the staff to agree or disagree without further study.
The staff was concerned that the original design basis may not have been properly implemented in some respects such as the application of loads on the structure and assumptions in the frame analysi The staff would have to examine the FSARs for Quad Cities and Dresden before coming to a final conclusio Further efforts by the NRC would include an audit of the design calculations and an inspection of the anchor structure Inspection Activities The Regional NRC inspector field verified the as-built configuration of 11 flued head anchor structures at Quad Cities and 10 anchor structures at Dresde The inspections showed that the overall structures were basically in accordance with the design drawings relative to member sizes and configuration; however, some differences were note At both sites the structure 1s legs were not precisely indicate In some cases the legs were more than 20 inches shorter than specified on the drawing This gave a general indication of a lack of correlation between the design versus the as-built details for the structure In several instances there were missing welds between beam connection At Dresden, the anchorage details were unavailable and therefore could not be compared to the installed configuratio Several anchor structures were noted as being redesigned during the course of recent modification wor Some cross bracing details and attachments to base plates were slightly dif-ferent from the design drawing The original analytical assumption of
pinned connections was considered to be invalid by the NRC inspector.
Additional inspections of design calculations were later conducted by Regional as well as Headquarters and contractor personnel at the engineering offices of S&L and Impel The evaluation report from the contractor assisting in this inspection is contained in Attachment Conclusions The overall conclusions reached during this portion of the inspection is as follows: CEC0 1s decision to exclude the flued head anchor structures from the IEB 79-14 program appeared to be an inappropriate decisio Based on recent walkdowns performed by CECo, a number of anchor structure baseplates at Quad Cities utilized concrete expansion anchors which were never reassessed as required by IE Bulletin 79-0 During the above walkdowns CECo identified a number of discrepancies between the design drawings and as-built configuration. These discrepancies could not be dispositioned using engineering judgement and will require additional reassessmen Impell did not use the original design bases for the requalification and modification of the flued head anchor structures that were altered as part of the Recirculation Pipe Replacement (RPR) Projec Pipe break loads were never considered during the redesign effort, contrary to FSAR requirement The original design methodology assuming pinned connections was not accurate but not necessarily inappropriat The structural members designed using this approach should be adequat However, this approach potentially underestimates concrete attachment loads to a significant degre Anchor bolts should be reevaluated using appro-priate loads with appropriate design capacities and safety factor Based plates should be reassessed for both tension and compres~ion load It was not obvious that the original load combinations provided bounding loads for all cases. This should be reviewed to confirm conservatis Based on the above concerns, CECo committed to implement a comprehensive program to demonstrate the adequacy of the flued head anchor structures at Quad Cities and Dresde On February 11, 1988, a meeting was held in the NRC Regional office to discuss the details of the above progra Information presented at the meeting is contained in Attachment The adequacy of the proposed program is currently under review by NRR.
The overall flued head anchor issue has not been resolved and will continue to be considered an Unresolved Ite (237/87030-01; 249/87029-01).
- LPCI Minimum Flow Bypass Valve Failure The NRC duty officer was notified on February 11, 1988, that the LPCI minimum flow bypass valve was declared inoperable due to a valve operator to valve body yoke failur The NRC inspector reviewed the maintenance work package for the 11A 11 LPCI
. minimum flow bypass valve No.1501-13 Repair of the valve consisted of rewelding the yoke to the valve operato Interviews with plant personnel indicated that the cause of the failure was an improper weld on the valve yoke-to-operator mounting flang The original weld was a fillet weld where a full penetration weld was neede Post-maintenance testing was performed and the valve was declared operable after the maintenance activities were complete The licensee performed visual inspections of similar valves to determine if the same problem existe At the time of this inspection, no other valves had been found with this proble It was noted by the NRC inspector that a contributing cause of the failure could have been a misadjusted torque switch setting on the valve operator. During the NRC review of the maintenance work package, it was observed that the torque switch setting was too high for the closing direction. This higher setting could result in an applied thrust to the valve that exceeded the valve or operator capabilities. This problem had been found by the licensee during the repair work and the torque switch was reset to its correct settin The licensee's staff had not completed their evaluation at the time of the inspectio Pending completion of this evaluation, further evaluations of the possi~le failure mechanisms and corrective actions, this is considered an open item (249/87029-02).
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involves some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot The open item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Unresolved Items An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a deviation, or a violatio The unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph Exit Interview The Region III inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspectio The inspector summarized the purpose and findings of the inspectio The licensee representatives acknowledged this informatio The inspector summarized the purpose and findings of the inspectio The licensee representatives
..
'
acknowledged this informatio The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspectio The licensee representatives did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY j
CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
' !
- .*
'
j:
f SEPTEMBER 14, 1987
- I.
I I.
[ '.
I,
I I I.
i I ;
I I 1 l
AGENDA INTRODUCTION ORIGINAL DESIGN FOR DRESDEN & QUAD CITIES JUSTIFICATION FOR TREATMENT OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS CONCLUSIONS FOR DRESDEN OTHER CECO PLANTS I.M. JOHNSON, CECO B.A. ERLER, S & L T~T. WITTIG, IMPELL B.A. ERLER, S & L I. M. JOHNSON, CECO
-*
I '
Ii *
I l
II. ORIGINAL DESIGN FOR DRESDEN AND QUAD CITIES
- DESCRIPTION
- GENERAL CONFIGURATION
- TYPICAL CONTAINMENT PENETRATION
- TYPICAL FRAME
- QUANTITIES OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ANCHORS
- SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
-
DESIGN DETAILS DESIGN LOAD CASES
- ANALYTICAL MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
-
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
- TYPICAL MARGINS
- FSAR COMMITMENTS
-
SUMMARY
-
.~
-
,.
QUANTITIES OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ANCHORS AND STRUCTURES STATION UNIT NO. OF CONTAINMENT NO. OF SUPPORT PENETRATIONS WITH BELLOWS FRAMES
' '
I
- 22
( I )
DRESDEN
22 r6 ( I )
TOTAL
32 I
12 ( 2)
QUAD CITIES
20
( 2)
TOTAL
24 I*
BOTH STATIONS TOTAL
56 NOTES I) MAIN STEAM -
REACTOR FEED STRUCTURE SUPPORTS 7 LINES 2) MAIN STEAM -
REACTOR FEED STRUCTURE SUPPORTS 9 LINES
-
PENETRATION NUMBER LINE NAME IN THE PENETRATION DRESDEN QUAD CITIES
3 I
MAIN STEAM 105A-D 105A-D 7A-D
'
.
I
- '
MAIN STEAM DRAIN 106 106
~
a REACTOR FEED WATER 107A&B 107A&B 9A&B 9A&B ISO CONDENSER SUPPLY
!OBA IOBA
-
-
~so CONDENSER RETURN IO~A 109A
-
-
RCIC STEAM SUPPLY
-
-
10 HPCI STEAM SUPPLY I 15A 128 I I I I SHUTDOWN SUPPLY 11 IA&B 11 IA&B
-
-
RHRS SUPPLY
-
-
12 L,PCI PUMP DISCHARGE I 16A&B I 16A&B 13A&B 13A&B
)
CLEAN-UP SUPPLY 113 113
14 CORE SPRAY 149A&B 149A&B 16A&B
- f6A&B REACTOR VESSEL HEAD SPRAY 147 147
17 CLOSED COOLING WATER SUPPLY 123 123
23 CLOSED COOLING WATER RETURN 124 124
24 CAD RETURN 144 109B
36 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL 130 130
47 U1
j
! :
!
i Ii *
i L
'
DESIGN BASIS LOADING CASE I:
SLOWDOWN-FORCE FOR THE LINE UNDER INVESTIGATION CASE II & III:
FORCE REQUIRED TO BRING THE PIPE INTO CONTACT WITH THE SPACER, GUARD PIPE OR SLEEV THE MOMENT IS LIMITED TO THE PLASTIC CAPACITY OF THE PIP CASE IV:
WORST LOADING, BASED UPON ACTUAL PIPING CONFIGURATION, FOR OUT-OF-PLANE CONFIGURATION WHICH PRODUCES REACTIONS WITH BENDING AND TORSIO LOADING IS BASED UPON FORCE REQUIRED TO BRING THE PIPE INTO CONTACT WITH THE SPACER, GUARD PIPE OR SLEEV LOAD CASES FOf2 OJ21Gl 1-JAL DESI~
'-'A.~E MODEL-
!:ZeAC Tl Of....J S
~TAll-JMelo-JT ~"'1El.-D WALL
/1.1-JGl-ID~ PC:>lfo.J T I
J-~
R2=
x
"
-~T.,6.ltJMEt-JT J-r
..
~Alt-JMEfo.JT
~Mret..o WAL ! i II x
K'~, Mx L
.p
- ~~,t-J~T"
~
'
~HIEL.D WALL f-l
lII x
F<_j, Mx b
U'J..JTNf.JMl!tJT
...... ~Moe. P't'f t-JT I
. '
~.Al._,Met-rr SHIEL.l?
I.
~*--~
~ MJ£~ ft:>IJ.JT L ~
f<x,M_J,Mi:
f""l
~
A'"l
}-t
!.J x
5e~ Tl 0"-1 A -A
- BELLOW~
FLUED HEAD --
PJPE:
b. 4 * *.
.
.... (/...
. bo.
.
..
..
-~.
. **.<J* J>. *
.....
I>
.
..
~O~TAINMEt-JT
,__..,._.._ PEl-J8TJ?ATl LEE.VE
~~f:' PIPE:
?HIM TYPIGAL FLUED* J-iEAD A1'.JCJ-IOR A"1D SUPPORT
I !
!
!
(.
I I
lu¢ ROCK !>OLT C 5-REQ'D.)
WI~
TYPICAL BRACING INTE..R~AL CONNECT I ON
......... :
..... -:- ~: ~
1 '14* # CORE HOLf. PfA
!JOLT, F'lU.. HOL.E. ~ITH EMBECO ~OtJ-SHRl~K ~ROUT T"fFICAL \\\\/ALL COf\\JNE.CTIOf\\I WITH BRAC tNG E7otei CTYP.)
L 4X (
'*
',-
..
.. *
3 H'Y'2:1:::! 2::10 H ?N 'if cJ '9' 3 H c::J3 n l.::J l"d?ld),._L
/
/
I
/-
1... l' ~
f-f-
TYPICAL ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR ANCHOR FRAME ASSUMPTIONS:
-
EACH OF THE FOUR LOAD CASES APPLIED INDEPENDENTLY
- DIAPHRAGM PLATE TRANSMITS LOADS TO MEMBERS RIGIDLY
- SPACE TRUSS - STRUDL MODEL
- ELASTIC ANALYSIS METHODS USED
,,
'
':. !
HEAD
.SECTION TYPICAL ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR DIAPHRAGM PLATE DRESDEN ONLY ASSUMPTIONS:
- PLATE IS ASSUMED AS RIGID FOR IN-PLANE LOADING
- ANALYSIS FOR AXIAL LOAD AND OUT-OF-PLANE BENDING INDEPENDENT
-
MANUAL ANALYSIS CONSERVATIVELY ASSUMING ONE WAY ACTION
- COMBINATION OF ANALYSIS BY SUPERPOSITION
- ELASTIC PLATE METHODS USED
fl l
HEAD I
SECTIOt--J TYPICAL ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR ANCHOR RING AND PINS QUAD CITIES ONLY ASSUMPTIONS:
- PINS DESIGNED FOR SHEAR LOADING (NO TENSION)
- RING ASSUMED TO BE RIGIDLY SUPPORTED BY THE FRAME
- RING ANO WELD DESIGNED FOR GLOBAL BENDING AND SHEAR
- LOAD DISTRIBUTED FROM HEAD TO PINS BASED ON ELASTIC ANALYSIS
1-
'
'
'
I
[
'
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
-
MEMBERS TENS!ON: FA = 0.9 Fy COMPRESSION: FA = 0.9 Fy
- DIAPHRAGM BENDING: FB = 0.6 Fy
- RING PLATE AND PINS BEARING Fp =.9 Fy SHEAR Fv =. 75 Fy-BENDING FB =.9 Fy
-
ANCHOR BOLTS ROCKBOLTS: FT = 0.9 Fy A36:
FT = 0. 9 F y
- WELDS
[
I _ (KL/R) 2 ]
2c 2 *
c E70 ELECTRODES: Fw-< 1.6 X AISC SEVENTH EDITION E60 ELECTRODES: AISC SI~TH EDITION DIAPHRAGM PLATE TO FLUED HEAD: (E70 ELECTRODES)
- Fw = 1.67 X AISC (ADJUSTED FOR TEMPERATURE)
- CONCRETE PUNCH I NG SHEAR ALLOWABLE =. 9 X 2 J F c BEAR ING ALLOWABLE =. 85 F c
' '
- _I
. '
- l (
[ I ( : r 1 I
- TYPICAL MARGINS IN ORIGINAL ANCHOR STRUCTURE DESIGN MEMBERS 10 TO 25/.
BASE PLATES 0 TO 10/.
CONNECTIONS JO TO 25/.
ANCHOR BOLTS 5 TO 10/.
l
'
I l
.
I I
I.
r:
'
FSAR COMMITMENTS
- PIPE-RUPTURE LOAD CASES ( I ) AX I AL LOAD (2) MOMENT DUE TO PIPE SPLIT (3) MOMENT ANO AXIAL DUE TO PIPE SPLIT PAST 90 DEGREE ELBOW (4) MOMENT, AXIAL AND TORSION DUE TO A SPLIT PAST TWO 90 DEGREE ELBOWS
- l !
I.
l '
I b
I I
SUMMARY
- LOADS USED DURING ORIGINAL DESIGN ARE POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOADS
-
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA USED FOR ORIGINAL DESIGN ARE CONSERVATIVE ELASTIC ALLOWABLE STRESSES
- RESULTING CONFIGURATIONS ARE STRUCTURES WITH MULTIPLE LOAD PATHS (SPACE TRUSSES) AND HEAVY MEMBERS THEREFORE, THERE IS A VERY-HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ANCHOR STRUCTURES, IN THE AS DESIGNED CONFIGURATION, WILL MEET FSAR
-
ALLOWABLES WHEN SUBJECTED TO BULLETIN 79~14 LOADINGS.
[l r
1.. !
L
[
I f :
I I
III. JUSTIFICATION FOR TREATMENT OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
- ORIGINAL VS. CURRENT DESIGN BASIS
- 79-14 AND MARK I EVALUATIONS
-
MAXIMUM LOAD COMPARISONS
- SAMPLE EVALUATION RESULTS DRESDEN 2 LPCI EVALUATION
-
SUMMARY
- '*.
Li
~**
ORIGINAL VS. CURRENT DESIGN BASIS oR*t GI NAL DES I GN
- CONTROLLED BY PIPE RUPTURE LOAD CASES (R)
- ELASTIC STRESSES CURRENT DESIGN LOAD CASES
. ( I )
R ( 2)
G + T + P + E + MK!
WHERE, R =
PIPE RUPTURE T =
THERMAL (HOT OR COLD)
P =
PRESSURE DUE TO A PIPE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT E =
-
j I.
* *'
I i
i l
IEB 79-14 AND MARK I EVALUATIONS IEB 79-14
- CHARTER
- MODIFICATIONS TEND TO REDUCE-ANCHOR LOADS POSTULATED PIPE RUPTURE LOADS CONTROL ORIGINAL DESIGN
- CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS WERE NOT RE-EVALUATED MARK I LOADS ARE NEGLIGIBLE
- MAXI MU OAD COMPARISONS y
03 SOC X-11 IA 03 SOC X-11 IB ORIBINAL Affl ORIGINAL RPR DESIGN DllE DBE (A)
DESIGN (A)
I
- '
-*
FX 16.73 16.'53 FY 3.68 3.46 fl 2.61 2.05 MX 16.01 16.67 MY 51.89 51.41 MZ 56.36 56.61 UNITS IN KIPS AND FT-KIPS It I 03 COSP X-149A 03 COSP X-1496 02 1-F'CI X-l 15A 02 LPCI X-l 16A ORIBINAL RPR ORIBINAL RPR ORI0INAL 79-14 CIUBINAL 79-14 DBE DBE DBE.
DBE DESIGN (A)
DESIGN (A)
DESIGN (B). DESIGN
..__ (B)
7.78 7.72 7.95 17.6 1.42 1.65 6.49 2.3 7.06 15.05 7.06 15.06
. 8.09 10.75 2.0 8.89 8.05 141.58 31.47 156.55 8.0 119.93 12.78 150.96 80.45 38.1 178. I 64.97 178.. 1 42.68 93.55 38.0 NOTES; A) LOAD COMPONENTS ARE MAX. ABS. VALUES B) LOADS ARE MA ~BS. VALUE ENVELOPED FROM HOT AND COLD CONDITIONS
SAMPLE EVALUATION RESULTS
REOESIGflED
"CCEPTABLE STATION ANCHOR DUE TO WITl.IOUT CONSTRUCTION MOO!F'ICATION
.
DRESDE"J 3 LPCI X-I 16A x
DRESDEN 3 LPCI X-1168 x
DRESDEN 3 RWCU X-113 x
DRESDEN 3 ISCO X-!09A x
DRESDEN 3
DRESDEN 3 soc X-11 IB x
DRESDEN 3 COSP X-149A x
DRESDEN 3 COSP X-1498 x
DRESDEN 2 HPCI X-1 ISA x ( I )
DRESDEN 2 LPCI X-l 16A x ( I )
QUAD CITIES 2 COSP X-16A
')<
- .*
NOTES; (I) ONLY EVALUATED WELD, BASEPLATE ANO BOLTS ATTACHED TO EM8EDMENT PLATE.
.
'
i i.
i'
- ,
j '
I j *
"
- DRESDEN 2 LPCI EVALUATION PURPOSE
- PROVIDE LOADS ON THE EMBEDMENT PLATE
-
ONE SUPPORT POINT ONLY PIPE LOAD SUMMARY ANALYTICAL MODELING
- ORIGINAL: SPACE TRUSS PRELIMINARY RE-EVALUATION:
SPACE FRAME
- FINAL RE-EVALUATION:
SPACE TRUSS
-
OVERALL DESIGN MARGIN NO MODIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED
..
L l
, I SPACE TRUSS r :
( !
+ x 35 PLATE
/*
I i
+
+
SECTION
.
I l DRESDEN 2 LPCI X-116A CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ANCHOR LOAD COMPARISON F).
FY FZ MX ORIGINAL DESIGN ( R)
17.2 2.6 ( I )
G+T+E+P+MKI MAXIMUMS 5.3 2'.3 ( 2)
UNITS IN KIPS AND FT-KIPS NOTES; ( 1 ) PER UPDATED FSAR LOAD CASES :.
I ) AXIAL LOAD 2) MOMENT OlE TO PIPE SPLIT 3) MOMENT AN:> AXIAL LOAO OlE TO PIPE SPLIT PAST A 90 o EL.BOW
'AY 38. I 4) t.taENT. AXIAL AN:> TORSION DlE TO A PIPE SPLIT PAST
- l\\1IO 90 ° ELBOWS (2) Tii£ MAXIt.f.JM ABSOLUTE VALUE FOR EACH LOAD COMPONENT IS SHOW MZ 38.0*
_:_j
,.
Fy Fz F )(
R l
/
\\
/
/
\\,,,,,...
/
......,,,,,...,,,,,...\\
/
,,,,,............
\\
..........
L I'
SPACE TRUSS f
'
Fy h
Fz l
t
!.
'
SPACE FRAME
j.. r t
SUMMARY DESIGN BASIS HISTORY RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
- ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS IS CONSERVATIVE
- CONFIRMED BY SAMPLE EVALUATIONS USING CURRENT LOADS
-
NO MODIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED FOR DRESDEN 2 LPCI
l 1. i f :
I,
I 'I i
0 <
ILi
- ~
Cl *o Ow 3. ;s Cl '%
- Q
- "'
- j
~ OUT510E. OF CONTAINMENT 'MAL I I
- .4:
.... *,
. *.**:..o...
. ""'....
Rl"iG. A * <l
'.
- 4
...
'.Q II CONC. ANCHO~S LUG e~szs TYPICAL CONTAINMENT PENETRATION DETAIL LASALLE COUNTY STAT ION
.
UNITS 142 IN510E. 0~
CONTAINMENT
'NALL Llt\\JER. F SLEEVE (IN PLAC.E)
I
.
Ii l
LASALLE, BYRON AND BRAIDWOOD PENETRATIONS LOADS USED FOR CONTAINMENT PENETRATION ANALYSIS WERE AS FOLLOWS:
- PIPE BREAK LOADS
- AS-BUILT PIPING ANALYSIS LOADS 30