IR 05000213/1993002

Emergency Preparedness Exercise Insp Rept 50-213/93-02 on 930326-29.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Annual partial- Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20035G299
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	04/19/1993
From:	Lusher J, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20035G292	List: IR 05000213/1993002
References
50-213-93-02, 50-213-93-2, NUDOCS 9304270092
Download: ML20035G299 (9)

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I Docket / Report:

50-213/93-02 License: DPR-61 Licensee:

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101-0270 Facility Name:

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station Inspection:

March 26-29,1993 Inspection At:

Haddam Neck, Connecticut

.3 Inspectors:

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j. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Section date j

C. Gordon, Emergency Preparedness Section

J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness section R. De La Espriella, DRP/ Reactor Engineer

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W. Raymond, Senior Resident, Haddam Neck P. Habighorst, Resident, Haddam Neck l

b O-b Approved:

E. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section date Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Areas Inspected The licensee's annual, partial-participation emergency preparedness exercise.

Results Exercise performance provided reasonable assurance that adequate on-site actions can be taken in an emergency. Exercise strengths included command and control in all emergency response facilities, recognition of potential plant degradations, and diagnosis and mitigation of the event.

No exercise weaknesses or violations of regulatory requirements were identified, and weaknesses from the previous exercise were corrected. Several potential Areas for Improvement were identified to the licensee for consideration.'

i 9304270092 930419 PDR ADOCK 05000213 O

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted t

The following individuals were contacted during the inspection.

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D. Aloi, Senior Scientist, Emergency Preparedness P. Baueldmann, Emergency Planner R. Brown, Connecticut Yankee Staff Assistant l

W. Buch, Senior Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Connecticut Yankee

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K. Burgess, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Connecticut Yankee

T. Drake, Emergency Planner i

D. I2ne, Emergency Planner

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P. Lucky, Senior Emergency Plan Trainer E. Maclean, Emergency Plan Trainer W. McCance, Senior Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Millstone q

D. Ray, Director Nuclear Unit, Haddam Neck P. Rainha, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Operations, Shift Supervisor T. Reyher, Emergency Planning R. Rodgers, Director, Emergency Preparedness

R. Rogozinski, Supervisor Procurement Engineering, Connecticut Yankee

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W. Romberg, Vice President Nuclear Operations Senrices J. Stetz, Vice President, Haddam Neck Plant A. Tatro, Nuclear Information Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness J. Watson, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Millstone The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel.

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2.0 Emergency Exercise j

A partial-participation emergency exercise was conducted at the Connecticut Yankee Atomic

Power Station on March 27,1993 from 0700 to 1345.

2.1 Scenario Planning Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on December 28,1992. The completed scenario package was submitted to the NRC on January 28,1993. Region I reviewers discussed

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scenario improvements with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff on February 5,1993.

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I Changes were made to the scenario, which adequately tested major portions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures, and also exercised areas previously identified by the NRC

as in need of corrective action.

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On March 26,1993, at 1300, NRC observers attended a licensee briefm' g on the revised scenario

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in the Connecticut Yankee Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at Haddam Neck. The licensee i

stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would l

intercede in exercise activities to prevent disrupting plant activities.

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2.2 Exercise Scenario The submitted scenario included the following simulated events:

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Plant operating at approximately 100% power at the middle of core life. The "B"

Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) monitor out of service due to SOLA transformer failure.

The condensate CATION high conductivity annunciator is in alarm; all associated notifications have been made, and Operations has been directed to reduce power to

<65% for condenser repair. A repair party consisting of an auxiliary operator and a

maintenance technician is awaiting power reduction.

An unisolable steam line break occurs outside containment on Main Steam Line #1, and

results in a reactor trip and safety injection. (A Site Area Emergency)(Connecticut F

Posture Code Charlie-Two).

i Emergency Generator (EG)-2A fails.

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The "A" ICC monitor fails.

t EG-2B is secured as per procedure. EG-2B "Not ready for auto start annunciator

alarms."

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I A news helicopter flies too close to the plant and causes flying debris to damage a (

breaker on incoming AC power, resulting in a station blackout.

A General Emergency (Connecticut Posture Code Bravo) condition develops due to loss i

or potential loss of all off-site and all on-site AC power for greater than two hours.

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Due to the high differential pressure across the #1 steam generator tube sheet, a steam j

generator tube rupture causes a release of primary coolant to the environment.

Repairs to EG-2A or EG-2B are completed and the EGs can be operated to provide

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emergency power.

Isolation stop valves for #1 primary coolant loop are shut, stopping the release.

• Exercise terminated.

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2.3 Activities Observed

The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response l

Facilities and the actions of the Emergency Response Organization. The following were

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observed:

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Selection and use of control room procedures.

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Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.

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Direction and coordination of emergency response.

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Notification oflicensee personnel and off-site agencies.

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Communications /information flow, and record keeping.

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Assessment and projection of off-site radiological dose, and consideration of protective acticas.

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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection.

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. Provisions for communicating information to the public.

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Accident analysis and mitigation.

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Accountability of personnel.

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Post-exercise critique by the licensee.

2.4 Exercise Finding Classifications

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Inspection findings were classified, where appropriate, as follows:

Exercise Strencth: a strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the emergency plan.

Exercise Weakness: less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not, alone,

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constitute overall response inadequacy.

A_rea for Imorovemen_t1 an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which me:its licensee evaluation for corrective action.

2.5 Exercise Observations Activation and utilization of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and Emergency.

Response Facilities (ERFs) were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). The following observations were made in the ERFs.

Overall ERF Observations The emergency facilities were manned and activated in accordance with the emergency plan and procedures.

All facilities functioned well in taking corrective actions and mitigating the

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i accident. There was a good interface with the State and Local officials. Command and control

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in all emergency response facilities was an exercise strength evident in the following:

Frequent and timely staff briefings on plant conditio Is and significant developments.

• ERO personnel were quick to recognize plant vulnerabilities and potential degradations,

and appropriately focused assessment actions.

ERO actions were effective in mitigating the event.

• No exercise weaknesses were observed.

The following areas for improvement were noted:

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Controller / Player interaction:

controllers engaged in conversations with players regarding scenario simulation difficulties, and the validity of repair team proposed

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corrective actions.

Specifically, during the EG-2B failure scenario, an innovative solution by the repair team (which the controllers had not anticipated) created much discussion amongst the controllers, and between the controllers and the players.

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Additionally, controllers questioned the players on the validity of the repairs, and the i

difficulties they might encounter.

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The following communications equipment problems were apparent.

i Team #3 from the Operational Support Center (OSC) was without an operable radio for e

some time and had to communicate by telephone. It was not clear that this team ever i

received an operable radio.

l The OSC Maintenance Assistant (OSCMA) had problems communicating with in-plant

teams by telephone. This appeared to be due to not using proper telephone procedures.

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On the dedicated telephones, problems were apparent in communicating information

between the Director and staff of the Corporate Emergency Response Organization (CERO) and their site counterparts.

Simulator Control Room (SCR)

The Following exercise strengths were identified:

Event diagnosis, classification, and notifications.

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Power Company Excellent recognition of plant conditions and use of plant Emergency Operating

Procedures (EOPs) to take corrective actions.

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Excellent mitigation measures were developed to place the plant in a safe condition,

and to reduce and stop the release.

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No exercise weaknesses were observed.

I The following areas for improvement were noted.

l The Shift Supervisor did not refer to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)

1.5-26, Manager Contiol Room Operations (MCRO). That resulted in not discussing

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changing radiological conditions with the control room operating crew, as specified in Step 6.2.3. This is a repeat of a finding identified in Inspection Report 50-213/92-06.

The Director of Station Emergency Operations (DSEO) did not provide periodic

updates on in-plant radiation levels, post-accident sampling results, and Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) to the simulator control room.

Except for the primary reactor operator, no log keeping was evident.

• Technical Support Center (TSC)

TSC performance was identified as an exercise strength. The TSC assessed plant data accurately and made appropriate recommendations to mitigate plant damage. TSC status

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boards and logs were updated frequently and contained accurate information. The TSC was properly equipped, allowing the staff to monitor plant conditions during the simulated accident and to support activities to mitigate the event. TSC equipment worked well, and the TSC staff were familiar with the equipment and their duties. Significant TSC suppon to the DSEO included timely inputs related to the following:

Closure of loop stop valves prior to loss of all AC power.

• The high differential pressure across the steam generator tube sheet and recognition of

the potential radiological source term and release path in the event of steam generator tube integrity degradation.

Recognition of the vulnerability of the plant to a station blackout, and the

development of contingency actions.

Obtaining the portable 1.5 MW generator from Millstone.

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1 Assistance to the OSC regarding the on-site EGs.

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The recommendation to add water to the secondary side of the #1 Steam Genemtor to J

mitigate the potential source term created by steam generator tube degradation.

No exercise weaknesses were observed.

f The following area for improvement was noted:

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Availability of control circuity wiring diagrams and vendor manuals to the TSC. Such

material could have facilitated response to a request by the OSC for information on the EG-2A field breaker.

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Operational Sunnort Center (OSC)

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No exercise strengths or weakness were observed. The Manager, Operational Support Center (MOSC) provided good direction to the facility staff, kept them informed of plant status through

regular briefings, and maintained good communications with the DSEO and MCRO. OSC

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assistants kept status boards up to date, provided briefings to maintenance teams, and maintained

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good communications with teams in the field. Teams were formed, briefed, and dispatched in

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an efficient manner.

Emergency Team Work Assignment (ETWA) forms were used to administratively track the teams, and DSEO approval was obtained for team dispatch. NRC observers noted that the new ETWAs forms were often not completely filled out.

An administrative assistant kept thorough logs.

l After the release, all maintenance teams donned respirators until it was determined that there was I

i no danger to in-plant teams from the plume. However, it was not apparent that Emergency Radiological Work Authorizations were ever completed, per the licensee's procedure, for the

dispatched teams.

l The following areas for improvement were observed.

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Control of repair teams: the top priority repair activity (repair of both EGs) was not

approached aggressively. The OSC sent out only one team, an electrician and a -

mechanic, to repair both emergency diesel generators. EG restoration was the #1 l

priority of the DSEO and the MOSC, and became even more significant after the station

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blackout, but there was still only one team assigned to restore both EGs. That repair

team could only concentrate on one EG at a time, and both EGs could have been worked

simultaneously. Then, at about noon, an extra electrician was re-directed by the OSC i

from Team #3 to Team #1, with instructions to support EG repair. That electrician j

provided little visible support to the team. He could, for example, have worked on replacing the EG-2A exciter field breaker as a parallel path to EG restoration, j

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Corrective actions proposed by the repair team did not appear to be fully considered by

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the OSC, TSC, and Operations. For example, Repair team #1's innovative idea to l

disconnect the linkage connecting the fuel racks to the governor was not fully considered l

before implementation. The team simulated removing that linkage with EG-2B running at 450 rpm, and manually controlling EG speed with the fuel rack positioner. This was i

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done with the approval of the OSC. No approval by the Engineering or Operations

groups was evdent. The difficulty of controlling diesel speed when loads are added to j

the emergency im, and the lack ofinstrumentation for this purpose at the EG control l

panel, indicate that additional review may have been beneficial. Additionally, the EG

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was permitted to run at idle speed for over an hour during station blackout, without l

service water cooling of the engine coolant heat exchanger.

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t Also, after off-site power had been restored, the exciter field breaker was replaced l

without considering doing so using a normal work authorization. Since off-site power l

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had been restored, it appeared appropriate that this activity be undertaken with normal precautions for such work in effect.

Emercency Operations Facility (EOF)

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The EOF was activated in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)

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1.5-19 and 1.5-21. Command and control was shifted to the DSEO, who quickly established

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cffective command and control of the ERO.

An EOF strength was evident in quick DSEO recognition of vulnerabilities and potential problems, DSEO meetings with and briefings of the EOF staff, and EOF efforts to mitigate the event. No EOF weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.

Corporate Emercency Operations Center (CEOC)

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The Dose Assessment and other CERO staffs continually looked ahead during the exercise.

Emergency Action Levels were continuously reviewed, numerous what-if calculations were made, and timely requests were made for Technical Suppon Staff prognoses.

The upgraded dose assessment model used appeared to enhance the ability of the dose assessment

staff to use the syste.m.

No exercise strengths, weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.

3.0 Licensee action on previously identified items

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Based upon discussions with the licensee representatives, examination of procedures, and records, and NRC observations during the exercise, the status of open items is as follows:

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Closed (50-213/92-06-01). Timeliness of forming, briefing, and deploying Damage

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Control Teams (DCTs). The previous weakness in this function was shown to be corrected by the overall good performance of the OSC during this exercise.

i Closed (50-213/92-06-02). In the previous exercise, the licensee's dose assessment staff

did not demonstrate the ability to provide timely and correct dose projection inputs to the formulation of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS). Good performance of this function was evident during this exercise. However, obtaining concurrence on PARS by the l'irector, Corporate Emergency Response Organization (CERO) (per Corporate Organization for Nuclear Incidents procedures (CONI) 4.12) prior to communicating PARS to the State of Connecticut is still an open item (IFI 50-213/93-02-01).

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4.0 Licensee critique

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On March 29, 1993 the NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique. The licensee's

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critique was assessed as thorough in identifying strengths and areas for improvement.

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5.0 Exit Meeting

On March 29,1993, the NRC team met with the licensee personnel listed in Detail 1 of this

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report. NRC team observations were summarized. The licensee was informed of the following:

Licensee performance provided reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures

can be taken in the event of an emergency.

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No violations were found.

e Previous concerns had been resolved.

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l The areas for improvement and open item identified during this exercise.

• Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action on the identified items.

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