IR 05000213/1993010

Insp Rept 50-213/93-10 on 930601-04.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Radiation Protection Program,Mgt Organization,Radiation Control During Refueling Outage, ALARA & Implementation of Programs

ML20036C286
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	06/09/1993
From:	Joseph Furia, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20036C284	List: IR 05000213/1993010
References
50-213-93-10, NUDOCS 9306160037
Download: ML20036C286 (5)

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ed U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.

50-213/93-10 Docket No.

50-213 License No.

DPR-61 Licensee:

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Comnany Post Of6ce Box 270 Hartford. Connecticut 06141-0270 Facility Name:

Haddam Neck Plant Inspection At:

Haddam Neck. Connecticut Inspection Conducted:

June 1-4.1993 Inspector:

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UC 6/7/C J. Furti, Senior Radiation Specialist, date Facilities Radiation Protection Section (FRPS),

Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch (FRSSB), Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS)

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Approved by:

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W. Pasciak, Chief, Flip'S, FRSSB, DRSS date Areas inspected: Announced inspection of the radiation protection program including:

management organization, radiation control during a refueling outage, ALARA, and implementation of the above programs.

Results: Continued strong performance in the radiation protection program was noted.

Health Physics control of work activities during the refueling outage was generally very good, and ALARA goals were generally being met.

9306160037 930609 PDP ADOCK 05000213 G

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DETALS 1. Personnel ContactM

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l.1 Licensee Personnel

• R. Aft, ALARA Coordinator

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• E. Annino, Senior Analyst

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• W. Gates, Radiation Protection Supervisor

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R. Haight, Radioactive Materials Handling Supervisor

• J. Hawkins, Senior Station Technician

• T. Mcdonald, Maintenance Manager

• R. McGrath, Senior Radiological Engineer

• W. Nevelos, Health Physics Manager

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• P. Pritchard, Assistant Radiation Protection Supervisor

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• M. Quinn, Acting Director, Station Services J. Su.1z, Vice President

• M. Sweeney, Radiation Protection Supervisor - Services

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1.2 NRC Personnel P. Habighorst, Resident Inspector

• W. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit interview on June 4,1993.

2. Previously identified items (Closed) Violation (50-213/92-16-01) Failure to perform T.S. required audit of the Process Control Program. The licensee amended its procedures for conducting

audits, in order to prevent other T.S. audit requirements from being missed.

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Licensee Procedures NET 2.02, " Charter for Nuclear Review Boards", QSD 1.07, i

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" Computer Tracking Program", and QSDI-AG-1.01, " Performance, Reporting and Follow-up of Assessment Service's Audits" were all amended in order to address this i

corrective action. Previously documented licensee actions (Inspection Report 50-213/92-25) included the performance of an audit of the Process Control Program.

This item is closed.

3. Badiation Protection Program Since the last inspection in this area, the licensee has hired a new ALARA

Supervisor, who previously worked in the licensee's technical training department.

j All other key positions within the health physics organization remained the same.

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3.1 Radiation Work Activities At the time of this inspection, the licensee was in its third week of a scheduled 65 day refueling outage. Core offload, including removal of all fuel to the spent fuel pool had been accomplished prior to the start of this inspection.

Significant work activities occurring at the time of this inspection included:

I testing of the steam generator tubes and placement / replacement of generator tube plugs in all four generators; repair and maintenance of the #3 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor, maintenance of the containment air cooler fans; valve work in the pipe tunnels; and work on the charging pumps.

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l The licensee utilized a remote monitoring system (RMS) for work in the steam generators for the first time during this outage. With this system, current dose rates and accumulated dose for each worker was tracked remotely via

electronic dosimetry and a computer system, communications were maintained

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l via a radio system, and visual contact with workers on the steam generator platforms was maintained via closed circuit cameras. A room for this monitoring equipment was established just outside the Containment access,' and was staffed with two health physics technicians at all times when workers were on the steam generator platform. This system allowed for reduced doses to the plant health physics staff providing job coverage by reducing the frequency

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that technicians needed to enter these high dose rate areas in order to provide appropriate job coverage. In addition, the real time dose rates allowed the technicians covering the job at the trailer to move the workers to low dose rate areas at various times during the job evolution.

In general, all work was performed in a highly professional manner by both permanent plant staff and contractors. Job coverage and control by the health physicists was also generally good. All radiological postings _were appropriate, and the licensee extensively utilized additional informational postings, such as ALARA alert and low dose rate area' postings, to further enhance their program.

Several minor weaknesses were also noted. A radiation worker exiting the containment was obsirved attempting to remove his protective clothing (PCs)

while one of his hanJs was bare. That contradicts the licensee's undress procedure, which r.: quires that a cotton glove liner be worn while removing PCs. The licensee's procedure for removing protective clothing was posted at the containment exit. Once notified of this discrepancy, the licensee published a Health Physics Information Bulletin, dated June 2,1993, and also conducted an in-field review of worker practices, which identified several instances of similar problems. While conducting work in the pipe tunnels, a radiation worker in full PCs was observed ducking under a rope barrier, used to delineate'a posted contaminated area, in order to bring some equipment into

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the area. A health physics technician providing job coverage failed to address this practice, and was later counselled by health physics supervision as to the

appropriate job coverage standards.

Two concerns in the area of industrial safety were also identified. Workers on the mid-level of the containment, working on the containment air cooler fans, were observed on ladders that were not properly secured to prevent falling.

One worker nearly fell off a ladder when it spun around because it was not properly secured while he was standing on it. This issue was discussed with i

licensee industrial safety personnel. A follow-up inspection of the area the next day revealed that all ladders had been appropriately secured. An additional concern, first observed by one of the resident inspectors, was the practice of having radiation workers remove their outer set of PCs when exiting the pipe tunnels (posted as highly contaminated areas) while at the top of the pipe tunnel ladders or while straddling the metal collar that extends above the pipe tunnel manway entrance. In these positions, the workers have a much greater risk of falling than if the licensee created a larger buffer area, away from the pipe tunnel entrances, where workers could more safely remove their PCs. The licensee indicated at the time of the exit interview that these

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observations would be reviewed and addressed as appropriate.

j As part of this inspection, observations of a radioactive material shipment were made. On an almost daily basis during the outage, the licensee has been shipping contaminated laundry to Interstate Nuclear Services (INS) for laundering. The work observed included the off-loading and initial receipt inspection of several bins of processed laundry, and the loading of five bins of contaminated laundry. Work was performed by technicians from the Rad Materials Handling Section of the Health Physics Department, together with j

support from health physics technicians and a surveillance conducted by a member of the licensee's Quality Services Department. All activities observed

were conducted in a professional manner, and no discrepancies were noted.

i 3.2 AI ARA

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The licensee's program for maintaining exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) was under the direction of the AI. ARA Supervisor, who

reported through the Senior. Radiological Engineer to the Health Physics Manager. As discussed previously, since the last inspection in this area, the licensee hired a new ALARA Supervisor, whose previous position with the i

licensee was in the area of technical training, especially health physics and

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For the refueling outage, the licensee had established a goal of not more than

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464.1 Person-Rem, and through day 20 of the scheduled 65 day outage, a total l

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of 191.518 Person-Rem had been accumulated, representing 41.27% of the outage goal. For all of 1993, the licensee had established a goal of not more than 502.7 Person-Rem, and as of June 3,1993 a total dose of 212.6 Person Rem had been accumulated. Significant dose savings had been realized so far in the refueling path, where reactor disassembly and core off-load had taken only 16 Person-Rem, where the job was expected to take approximately 20-25 Person-Rem.

Several initiatives had been undertaken during this refueling outage in an attempt to reduce dose to workers, including the previously mentioned RMS for steam generator work, plus use of additional shielding in high dose areas,

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and the establishment of an ALARA/decon window at the beginning of the outage. The ALARA/decon window allowed health physics and decon

personnel to prepare the containment for general outage work prior to the

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commencement of that work, greatly reducing contamination and radiation levels in all elevations of the containment.

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Additional licensee efforts in ALARA have been directed at better job planning and coordination between various working groups, and greater involvement of other plant departments in the ALARA planning process. The site ALARA Committee had been expanded to include greater participation by members of

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the operations, maintenance and engineering staffs. Improved job coordination minimizes scheduling conflicts and thus minimizes time in high dose rate -

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areas, especially in the containment.

The licensee augmented its ALARA staffing levels du1.., the outage by bringing in contractor ALARA technicians, whose job : (aded the performance of in-progress job reviews, and the documentation and review of completed jobs for inclusion in the post-outage ALARA review. This review

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will be examined during a future inspection.

4. Esit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on June 4,1993. The inspector summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.

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