B12067, Proposed Tech Specs Allowing Implementation of Measures Approved by NRC as One Element of Response to Previously Addressed Small Break LOCA Issue

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Proposed Tech Specs Allowing Implementation of Measures Approved by NRC as One Element of Response to Previously Addressed Small Break LOCA Issue
ML20205P817
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 05/14/1986
From:
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20205P816 List:
References
B12067, NUDOCS 8605220017
Download: ML20205P817 (5)
v • d • e


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Docket No. 50-213

- B12067 Attachment i Haddara Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Emergency Core Cooling System 4

Aiay,1986 8605220017 860514 PDR. ADOCK 05000213

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VALVE NO. LOCATION ACTION RH-MOV-22 Containment' Valve locked in open Sump position, circuit breaker Suction locked out during post-LOCA long term cooling phase.

SI-MOV-24 RWST line Valve locked in open position, circuit breaker locked out whenever reactor critical.*

SI-FCV-875 HPSI mini- Valve blocked and locked flow line in open position whenever reactor critical. 1 RH-MOV-874 RHR Valve locked in closed recirculation position and circuit breaker locked open whenever reactor is critical and reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.*

C. The following actions shall be taken to disable the High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps whenever the RCS temperature is below 3400F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent.

1. De-energize the HPSI pumps by racking out the breakers and locking the cabinets.
2. Close and lock the HPSI pump discharge valves (SI-V-855A -

& B). --

D. The following actions shall be taken to disable one centrifugal charging pump whenever the RCS temperature is below 3400F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent.

1. Place the control switch in the trip pollout position.
2. Red tag the switch "DO NOT OPERATE".

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F B) During normal operating periods, a manual test of all actuated components shall be conducted to demonstrate operability. The test shall be performed in accordance with written procedure as summarized below:

1) Monthly, each of the high pressure safety injection pumps, each of the low pressure safety injection (core deluge) pumps, and each of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps shall be individually test run on recirculation.
2) Monthly, the charging pumps and metering pump shall be individually test run.
3) At cold shutdowns all safety injection and core deluge valves will be cycled under "no-flow" conditions.
4) Monthly, each of the following valves will be exercised as indicated.

VALVE NO. LOCATION ACTION SI-MOV-24 RWST Line Moved manually from full open position approximately 1 inch of stem travel and return to full open position to verify freedom of movement.

RH-MOV-874 RHR Recirculation Cycled fully from the full closed position to the full open position and back to the full closed position by use of the motor operator.

C) If one of the high pressure safety injection pumps or one of the low pressure safety injection (Core deluge) or one of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps is out of service, the remaining pump shall be tested within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and at subsequent intervals of not greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

D) During each refueling shutdown, the remotely controlled, motor-operated containment spray water valve shall be operated under a "no-flow" condition. The test will be considered satisfactory if visual observation shows that the valve has operated satisfactorily.

E) One centrifugal charging pump and the HPSI pumps shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days whenever the temperature of one or more of the non-isolated RCS cold legs i; less than or equal to 3400F and the RCS is not vented by a minimum opening of 3 inches, by verifying that the charging pump control switch is in the trip pullout position and red tagged and that the HPSI breaker cabinets are locked and tagged out and the HPSI pump discharge valves are locked closed.

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F) Periodic leakage testing of each ECCS check valve listed in Table 4.3.1 shall be accomplished prior to entering operational mode 1:

1) Af ter every time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling.
2) Af ter every time the plant has been placed in the cold shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if testing has not been accomplished in the preceding 9 months.
3) Prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed.

Leakage may be measured indirectly using pressure indicators, if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating compilance with the leakage criteria of section 3.14.A.6. The minimum differential pressure across these check valves during these leakage tests shall not be less than 150 psid.

Table 4.3.1 - ECCS Check Valve SI-CV-862A SI-CV-862B SI-CV-862C SI-CV-862D CD-CV-872A CD-CV-872B Basis: The core cooling systems are the principal plant safeguard. They provide the means to insert negative reactivity and limit core damage in the event of a loss-of-coolant incident.

Pre-operational performance tests of the components are performed in the manufacturer's shop. An initial system flow test demonstrates proper dynamic functioning of the system. Thereaf ter, periodic tests demonstrate that all components are functioning properly.

In order to assure that a pressure transient occurring during the testing of the HPSI pumps will not exceed the pressure and temperature limits of specification 3.4, there must be appropriate relief paths available; this is provided for in specification 4.3.A.4.

The separation of emergency power systems and associated core cooling equipment into two indepencent groupings permits complete function testing of the individual systems and equipment.

The containment spray water is provided, if required, by the low pressure safety injection pumps, which are also part of the core deluge system. It is not desirable to test the valve at monthly intervals since it requires closure of a manual valve in the spray header. This valve must be closed to prevent initiation 4-4a

r of spray when the motor-operated spray valve is open since the residual heat removal system will always be pressurized. Closure of the manual valve is not desirable at power and, therefore, dictates that the motor-operated spray valve be tested at refueling intervals only.

The surveillance in Specification E) assures that the limiting conditions for operation required for low temperature overpressurization protection have been met.

The surveillance in Specification F) tests the operability of check valves which act a primary coolant system pressure isolation valves and thereby reduces the potential for an intersystem loss of coolant accident.

In order to use the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps to perform high pressure recirculation (HPR) following a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), successful operation of SI-MOV-24 and RH-MOV-874 is required. The monthly surveillance to be performed on these two valves willincrease the probability that the valves are available to perform their function during the small break LOCA. Since SI-MOV-24 will not be closed to any measurable extent during the surveillance, there will be no effect on safety injection availability.

Surveillance on RH-MOV-874, will only last for a short time and the probability of a small break loss of coolant accident concurrent with the surveillance is extremely low. If the valve becomes inoperable during this time, RH-V-783 in series with RH-MOV-874 can be closed. Therefore, there will be no measurable impact on HPSI system availability as a result of the surveillance.

Reference:

(1) FDSA - Section 5.2.7 (2) FDSA - Section 9.5 e

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