05-02-2017 | A review of the current licensing basis revealed that intentionally coupling the Seismic Category I Service Water System ' SWS) with the not Seismic CAT I Standby Service Water System ( SWE)(KG) is a non-conformance with the current icensing basis, and renders the SWS inoperable. As a result, a review of the SWS Design Basis Accident ( DBA) full flow surveillance test revealed that during the past three years performance, there were two trains of SWS concurrently inoperable for a time period, as logged, greater than the seven hour shutdown completion time required by Technical Specification 3.0.3.
This condition is reportable as an operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), and could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) {v)(B) for the SWS along with the systems that it supports of Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS), Primary Component Cooling Water System (CCP), and the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) .
The plant was not aligned to this configuration at the time of discovery, and all procedures have been revised to eliminate this condition. |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24025A0922024-01-25025 January 2024 Requalification Program Inspection L-23-267, Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report (Npdes), Permit No. PA00256152023-12-18018 December 2023 Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report (Npdes), Permit No. PA0025615 IR 05000334/20230112023-12-0404 December 2023 Age-Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000334/2023011 and 05000412/2023011 L-23-229, Request for Additional Information Regarding the Spring 2023 Generic Letter 95-05 Voltage-Based Alternate Repair Criteria and Steam Generator F-Star Reports2023-11-29029 November 2023 Request for Additional Information Regarding the Spring 2023 Generic Letter 95-05 Voltage-Based Alternate Repair Criteria and Steam Generator F-Star Reports IR 05000334/20233012023-11-27027 November 2023 Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000334/2023301 L-23-247, Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA00256152023-11-17017 November 2023 Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615 IR 05000334/20230032023-11-0606 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2023003 and 05000412/2023003 L-23-227, Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615 for Third Quarter 20232023-10-20020 October 2023 Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615 for Third Quarter 2023 ML23279A0612023-10-0505 October 2023 Paragon Energy Solutions LLC, Part 21 Final Report Re Potential Defect with Eaton Jd and Hjd Series Molded Case Circuit Breakers (Mccbs) ML23198A3592023-10-0202 October 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 322 and 212 Analytical Methodology to the Core Operating Limits Report for a Full Spectrum Loss of Coolant Accident (EPID L-2022-LLA-0129) - Nonproprietary IR 05000334/20234022023-09-29029 September 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000334/2023402 and 05000412/2023402 (Cover Letter Only) ML23237B4222023-09-28028 September 2023 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. - Vistra Operations Company LLC - Letter Regarding Order Approving Transfer of Licenses and Draft Conforming License Amendments ML23269A1242023-09-27027 September 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure IR 05000334/20234012023-09-21021 September 2023 Cybersecurity Inspection Report 05000334/2023401 and 05000412/2023401 (Cover Letter Only) ML23263A0192023-09-20020 September 2023 Operator Licensing Examination Approval ML23243A9272023-09-19019 September 2023 Review of the Fall 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23249A1842023-09-18018 September 2023 Authorization and Safety Evaluation for Alternative Request No. 2-TYP-4-RV-06 L-23-208, Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report Cnpdes), Permit No. PA00256152023-09-14014 September 2023 Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report Cnpdes), Permit No. PA0025615 L-23-167, Twenty-Third Refueling Outage Inservice Inspection Summary Report2023-09-13013 September 2023 Twenty-Third Refueling Outage Inservice Inspection Summary Report L-23-205, Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-09-12012 September 2023 Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments IR 05000334/20230052023-08-31031 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000334/2023005 and 05000412/2023005) L-23-172, Quality Assurance Program Manual2023-08-31031 August 2023 Quality Assurance Program Manual ML23129A1722023-08-25025 August 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; and Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 IR 05000334/20230022023-08-0909 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2023002 and 05000412/2023002 ML23219A0592023-08-0707 August 2023 Steam Generator Inspection Reports - Spring 2023 Spring Refueling Outrage L-23-188, Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-08-0707 August 2023 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments L-23-179, Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report, (NPDES) Permit No. PA00256152023-07-18018 July 2023 Submittal of Discharge Monitoring Report, (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615 ML23188A0982023-07-17017 July 2023 Correction to the Safety Evaluation Issued Related to Amendment Nos. 321 and 211 Consolidate Fuel Decay Time Technical Specifications in a New Limiting Condition for Operation Titled Decay Time ML23188A0672023-07-10010 July 2023 Project Manager Assignment L-23-165, Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA00256152023-06-26026 June 2023 Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615 L-23-139, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Fall 2022 180-Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-06-13013 June 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Fall 2022 180-Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23157A1072023-06-0707 June 2023 Request for Information and Notification of Conduct of IP 71111.21.N.04, Age-Related Degradation, Reference Inspection Report 05000334/2023011 and 05000412/2023011 ML23143A0272023-05-23023 May 2023 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test L-23-055, Submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 342023-05-23023 May 2023 Submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 34 ML23102A1472023-05-22022 May 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 321 and 211 Consolidate Fuel Decay Time Technical Specifications in a New Limiting Condition for Operation Titled Decay Time L-23-065, Annual Financial Report2023-05-22022 May 2023 Annual Financial Report ML23135A7872023-05-19019 May 2023 Summary of Conference Calls Regarding the Spring 2023 Steam Generator Tube Inspections L-23-137, Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA00256152023-05-18018 May 2023 Discharge Monitoring Report (NPDES) Permit No. PA0025615 ML23124A1742023-05-17017 May 2023 Energy Harbor Fleet Vistra License Transfer - Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Commance Peak Plant, Units 1 & 2, Beaver Valley Station, Units 1 & 2, Davis Besse Station, Unit 1 and Perry Plant, Unit 1 L-23-125, Cycle 24 Core Operating Limits Report2023-05-17017 May 2023 Cycle 24 Core Operating Limits Report ML23124A3882023-05-16016 May 2023 Summary of Regulatory Audit in Support of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 5.6.3, Core Operating Limits Reports (COLR) and TS 4.2.1 Fuel Assemblies ML23129A0112023-05-16016 May 2023 Notice of Consideration of Approval of Indirect and Direct License Transfer for Comanche Peak Plant, Units 1 & 2, Beaver Valley Station, Units 1 & 2, Davis Besse Station, Unit 1 and Perry Plant, Unit 1 (EPID L-2023-LLM-0000) (Letter) L-23-132, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-05-10010 May 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations IR 05000334/20230012023-05-0808 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2023001 and 05000412/2023001 L-23-129, Response to Request for Additional Information for 10 CFR 50.55a Request 2-TYP-4-RV-06 for Alternative Repair Methods for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetrations2023-05-0505 May 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information for 10 CFR 50.55a Request 2-TYP-4-RV-06 for Alternative Repair Methods for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetrations ML23118A3812023-04-28028 April 2023 10 CFR 50.55a Request 2-TYP-4-RV-06 for Alternative Repair Methods for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetrations L-23-115, Submittal of 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, and 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report (Non-Radiological2023-04-27027 April 2023 Submittal of 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, and 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report (Non-Radiological L-23-126, Discharge Monitoring Report (Npdes), Permit No. PA00256152023-04-22022 April 2023 Discharge Monitoring Report (Npdes), Permit No. PA0025615 CP-202300181, ISFSI, Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, ISFSI, Davis-Besse, Unit 1, ISFSI, Perry, Unit 1, ISFSI, Corrected Affidavit for Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-04-20020 April 2023 ISFSI, Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, ISFSI, Davis-Besse, Unit 1, ISFSI, Perry, Unit 1, ISFSI, Corrected Affidavit for Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments ML23107A2502023-04-18018 April 2023 Requalification Program Inspection 2024-01-25
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEAR05000334/LER-2017-0032018-01-0404 January 2018 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 Reactor Trip due to Turbine Trip and Automatic Initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, LER 17-003-00 for Beaver Valley, Unit 1, Regarding Reactor Trip due to Turbine Trip and Automatic Initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System 05000334/LER-2017-0022017-09-13013 September 2017 1 OF 4, LER 17-002-00 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Regarding Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Tornado Missile Protection Identified Due to Non-conforming Design Conditions 05000412/LER-2017-0012017-05-0202 May 2017 Surveillance Testing Rendered Service Water System Inoperable Due to the Coupling of Seismic Category 1 Piping to Not Seismic Category 1 Piping, LER 17-001-00 For Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Re: Surveillance Testing Rendered Service Water System Inoperable Due to the Coupling of Seismic Category l Piping to Not Seismic Category 1 Piping 05000334/LER-2017-0012017-04-18018 April 2017 Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection Identified Due to Non-Conforming Design Conditions, LER 17-001-00 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Regarding Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection Identified Due to Nonconforming Design Conditions L-08-222, LER 08-01-00 for Beaver Valley, Unit 2, Regarding Unplanned Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System During Plant Startup2008-07-23023 July 2008 LER 08-01-00 for Beaver Valley, Unit 2, Regarding Unplanned Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System During Plant Startup 2018-01-04
[Table view] |
Eshmaled burden per response Is comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (1-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to .
Inf000llects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and RegulakayAffairs, used to impose an information collection does not display a currently vaid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
05000- Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 2 412
NUMB ER
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [KG].
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURENCE
UNIT 2: Mode 1 100% Power There were no systems, structures, or components (SSCs) that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
Per the current licensing basis, the Standby Service Water System, SWE, KG] meets GDC 2 and RG 1.29, Position C.2, with respect to the system's protection against natural phenomena and adequately ensures a sufficient supply of service water is available to accomplish unit shutdown and subsequent cooldown in the event of a flaming barge explosion incapacitating the Service Water System, SWS.
In 2001, a previous "Assessment of Operability", stated that there is a reasonable assurance and expectation that the SWS can perform its intended safety function while coupled to the SWE System (KG), and was used as the basis to revise the SWS/SWE System (KG) procedures to not declare the SWS inoperable when coupled to the SWE System (KG).
In 2016, the NRC issued a Green Finding with a corresponding NCV of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control for inappropriately incorporating a design feature into the SWS/SWE System (KG) procedures. The Assessment of Operability, completed in 2001, was for an automatic actuation of the SWE System, and not intended to be used for intentionally starting the SWE (KG) pump to maintain SWS header pressure during surveillance testing. As a result BVPS, implemented a project to revise the SWS/SWE System (KG) procedures to declare the SWS inoperable when coupled with the SWE System (KG).
In March 2017, the 18 month frequency, refueling surveillance procedure, SWS DBA full flow test was being revised to declare the SWS train inoperable when aligned to the SWE System (KG) during surveillance testing as a result of a condition report captured in our corrective action process in January 2017. It was discovered during the procedure review process, that this change would have resulted in two trains of SWS inoperable, concurrently, during the past three year's performance of the test, due to one SWS train being aligned to the SWE (KG) System at the same time the other train was inoperable due to the test alignment. The procedure was subsequently re-organized in order to perform the test with only one train of SWS inoperable during the setup of the test configuration.
However, the past three year's performance of the test was assessed for reportability for a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.0.3, and a loss of Safety Function. The SWS DBA Full Flow test was not in progress, and had not been performed, since the non-conformance was determined. Therefore, this condition was not reportable under 1 OCFR50.72 for a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the SWS safety function; and neither was it an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.
In order to determine if the condition was reportable under 10CFR50.73, BVPS applied the guidance provided in IM-0326, "Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety' in accordance with the guidance in NUREG-1022, comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T.-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.0001, or by email to NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently vaid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection 1. FACILITY. NAME 05000- Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 2 412 2017 001 Loo_l In April 2017, BVPS determined that although there is reasonable assurance and expectation that the SWS can perform its intended safety function when coupled to the SWE System, (KG) the intentional use of the SWE System (KG) to maintain SWS header pressure during surveillance tests created a non-conformance with the current licensing basis. Therefore, during past performances of the SWS DBA full flow test, the testing configurations resulted in two trains of SWS inoperable for greater than the shutdown completion time of TS 3.0.3.
This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), for a condition that is prohibited by plant TS 3.0.3. The condition is, also, reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) as a condition which potentially affected the fulfillment of a safety function for the Service Water System, along with the systems it supports including the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), the Primary Component Cooling System (CCP), and the Recirculation Spray System (RSS).
CAUSE OF EVENT
In 2001, an "Assessment of Operability" was used as the basis to change the SWS/SWE System (KG) procedures to intentionally couple the SWE System (KG) to the SWS during surveillance testing without declaring the SWS inoperable, which created a non-conformance with the current licensing basis.
BVPS did not recognize that, although it was shown there was a reasonable assurance and expectation that the SWS could perform its intended safety function when coupled with the SWE System (KG), the "Assessment of Operability", performed in 2001, provided the justification for past operability due to an automatic start of the SWE System, and was not intended to be used as the basis to intentionally couple the not Seismic CAT 1SWE System (KG) to the Seismic CAT 1 SWS.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
The plant risk associated with the past performances of the Unit 2 SWS DBA full flow tests is considered to be very low.
This is based on the delta core damage frequency and delta large early release frequency for a total of 29.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> that the non-conformance condition existed in the past three years.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
All applicable surveillance tests have been revised to prevent the alignment as described in this event.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review of events of the previous three years has identified one event which was subsequently granted enforcement discretion by the NRG in accordance with the guidance provided in EGM 2015-002, Rev.1. Reference LER 2017-001(Unit 1/2), Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection Identified Due to Non-Conforming Design Conditions.
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05000412/LER-2017-001 | Surveillance Testing Rendered Service Water System Inoperable Due to the Coupling of Seismic Category 1 Piping to Not Seismic Category 1 Piping LER 17-001-00 For Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Re: Surveillance Testing Rendered Service Water System Inoperable Due to the Coupling of Seismic Category l Piping to Not Seismic Category 1 Piping | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000334/LER-2017-001 | Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection Identified Due to Non-Conforming Design Conditions LER 17-001-00 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Regarding Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection Identified Due to Nonconforming Design Conditions | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | 05000334/LER-2017-002 | 1 OF 4 LER 17-002-00 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Regarding Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Tornado Missile Protection Identified Due to Non-conforming Design Conditions | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000334/LER-2017-003 | Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 Reactor Trip due to Turbine Trip and Automatic Initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System LER 17-003-00 for Beaver Valley, Unit 1, Regarding Reactor Trip due to Turbine Trip and Automatic Initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
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