05000412/LER-1917-001, For Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Surveillance Testing Rendered Service Water System Inoperable Due to the Coupling of Seismic Category L Piping to Not Seismic Category 1 Piping
| ML17124A382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/02/2017 |
| From: | Richey M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-17-152 LER 17-001-00 | |
| Download: ML17124A382 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4121917001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
RrstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Marty L. Richey.
Site Vice President May* 2, 2017 L-17-152 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 LER 2017-001-00 10 CFR 50.73 Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 724-682-5234 Fax: 724-643-8069 Enclosed is a Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Licensee Event Report (LER) 2017-001-00, "Surveillance Testing Rendered Service Water System Inoperable Due to the Coupling of Seismic Category 1 Piping to Not Seismic Category 1 Piping". This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR
- 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(B).
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. Any actions discussed in this document that represent intended or planned actions are described for the NRC's information, and are not regulatory commitments.
If there are ~my questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Brian D. Kremer, Manager, Regulatory Compliance at 724-682-4284.
Enclosure - LER 2017-001-00 cc:
Mr. D. H. Dorman, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. J. A. Krafty, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Ms. B. Venkataraman, NRR Project Manager INPO Records Center (via INPO Consolidated Event System)
Mr. L. Winker (BRP/DEP)
u.s~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMiSS!ON APPROVED BY OMB:* NO. 315o-0104 EXPIRES: 1o!3112018 *
(06-2016)
Estimaled burden per response lo comply with !his mandalOI)' cOllection request: BO hours.
....... ~
Repor1ed lessons learned sra inoorporaled into lhe licensing process and ted back to industry.*
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Send ccmmenls regardi'lg burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-.S F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washi!JJlon, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail *
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) lo lnfoooleds.Resource@nrc.gov. 111d to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulalmy Mairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office ofManagemeid and Budge~ Washington. DC 20503. tt a (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for Instruction and guidance for completing this form means used lo impose an information collection does not display a anrenlly valid OMB conbol http://www,nrn.gov/readjnq-rmkJoc-co!lectjons/nuregs}sla[flw"1Q22/r3/)
number, the NRC may not conduel or sponsor, and a pe!Son is not required to respond to, tt1e.
information colleelion.
- 3. PAGE Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 2 05000 412 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Surveillance Testing Rendered Service Water System Inoperable Due to the Coupling of Seismic Category l Piping to Not Seismic Category 1 Piping
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER 7, REPORT DATE 8, OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I
I SEQUENTIAL 'I REV FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH?
DAY 1 YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.
- '*:MONTH DAY YEAR NIA
'osooo NIA 2017 *.
. FACILITY NAME DocKETNIMBER 03 03 2017 -
001 - 00 05 02 2017 NIA 05000 NIA
- 9. OPERATING MODE c
- 11. THIS RE~9RT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF_ 1_0 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
., o 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(1) d. 50. 73(a)(2)(11){A)
D 50.7~(a)(2)(vlii)(A)
, D 202201(ci>
_ D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
- 0. 50.73(a)(2)(11)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vlii)(B) 1 D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203{a)(4)
. o *so.i3(a)(2)(ili)
.. *o 50.13(a)(2)(ixJ(AJ i
i 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
O 50:13(a)(2)(x)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(1)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL
. o 20.2203(a)(2)(11)
_0 50.36(c)(1 J(ll)(A)
D 50.7~(a)(2)(v)(A) _.
0_73.71(a)(4)
- D 20.22oi<ai<2J(iii) o so.36(c)<2>
[ZJ so.73(aJ(2)(vJ(B)
- '. _D 13.11(~i
- D 20.2203(aJ(2){1vf D 50.46(a)(3)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 13.11(a)(1)
.100 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) o 50.73(aJ(2J(i)(AJ D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 13.11(a)(2)c1i
.D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) lZJ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(~)
D 5o. 13caic2icv1;>..
D 13.11(a)(2)(1i)
- .';J-'J'-....... D 50.13(a)<2ic1)(C)
Oo'.HER
- ::*,: :.<:t~ :zc; :.,.: *. ::::r~:L> 'ti ;-11.0 t.0 Specify In Abstract below or In In April 2017, BVPS determined that although there is reasonable assurance and expectation that the SWS can perform its intended safety function when coupled to the SWE System, (KG) the intentional use of the SWE System (KG) to maintain SWS header pressure during surveillance tests created a non-conformance with the current licensing basis. Therefore, during past performances of the SWS DBA full flow test, the testing configurations resulted in two trains of SWS inoperable for greater than the shutdown completion time ofTS 3.0.3.
This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), for a condition that is prohibited by plant TS 3.0.3. The condition is, also,
- - reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v){B) as a condition which potentially affected the fulfillment of a safety function for the Service Water System, along with the systems it supports including the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS),
the Primary Component Cooling System (CCP), and the Recirculation Spray System (RSS).
CAUSE OF EVENT
. In 2001, an "Assessment of Operability" was used as the basis to change the SWS/SWE System (KG) procedures to intentionally couple the SWE System (KG) to the SWS during surveillance testing without declaring the SWS inoperable, which created a non-conformance with the current licensing basis.
BVPS did not recognize that, although it was shown there was a reasonable assurance and expectation that the SWS
- could perform its intended safety function when coupled with the SWE System (KG), the "Assessment of Operability",
- performed in 2001, provided the justification for past operability due to an automatic start of the SWE System, and was
'not intended to be used as the basis to intentionally couple the not Seismic CAT 1 SWE System (KG) to the Seismic CAT 1SWS.
. This is based on the delta core damage frequency and delta large early release frequency for a total of 29.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> that the non-conformance condition existed in the past three years.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
All applicable surveillance tests have been revised to prevent the alignment as described in this event.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review of events of the previous three years has identified one event which was subsequently granted enforcement discretion by the NRG in accordance with the guidance provided in EGM 2015-002, Rev.1. Reference LER 2017-001(Unit 1/2), Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection Identified Due to Non-Conforming Design Conditions. 3
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