05000400/LER-2004-005, Re Unplanned Start of a Emergency Diesel Generator
| ML043580234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2004 |
| From: | Waldrep B Progress Energy Carolinas, Progress Energy Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-04-153 LER 04-005-00 | |
| Download: ML043580234 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4002004005R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Progress Energy DEC 1 7 2004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-04-153 IOCFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT I DOCKET NO. 50400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2004-005-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2004-005-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This initial report describes an unplanned actuation of the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator and brief interruption of RHR flow for shutdown cooling while the plant was in a refueling outage in Mode 5. Event Notification EN 41129 previously reported this event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Dave Corlett, Supervisor -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, B. C.Warep Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant BCW/bcm Enclosure c:
Mr. R. A. Musser (HNP Senior NRC Resident)
Mr. C. P. Patel (NRC-NRR Project Manager)
Mr. W. D. Travers (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)
Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 165 Nev Hill, NC 27562 I t."-
4
(.-
I--
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150.0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007
,6-2004)
, the NRC maynot conduct digits/characters for each block) or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the Information
- 1. FACILITY NAME
. 2. DOCKET NUMBER
- 3. PAGE Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 05000400 1 OF 4
- 4. TILE Unplanned Start of 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A 05000 FACILrTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 18 2004 2004 - 005 -
00 12 17 2004 N/A 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE 11.THIS REPORTIS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREOUIREMENTS OF10 CFR§: (Checkallthatapply) o 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
O 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0
20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 02 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) a 73.71 (a)(5) 000 0
20.2203(a)(2)(v)
E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify In Abstract below or In (If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of (if more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Power to Emergency Bus 1A-SA was re-established via automatic starting and loading of 'A' EDG.
Control room operators restored 'A' RHR pump flow for shutdown cooling in 4 minutes and 39 seconds.
A Maintenance "stand-down" was conducted to discuss the event and reinforce expectations associated with proper taping practices for lifted leads. A thorough review of RFO-1 2 scheduled activities was conducted to identify activities that may challenge key safety functions. The lessons learned from this event and additional guidance pertaining to the reliance on non-protected train equipment to support key safety functions were provided to Operations personnel. Also, Maintenance training lesson plans are being revised to include instruction on the taping of lifted leads.
Several corrective actions are being taken to improve the station's risk management practices. For example, Outage Management Procedure OMP-003, "Outage Shutdown Risk Management" is being revised to incorporate restrictions which ensure that when only one train of shutdown cooling is operating, the operating train is protected. Also, OMP-003 and Work Coordination Manual Procedure WCM-001, "On-Line Maintenance Risk Managemenr, are being revised to specify which key safety functions can be provided by plant equipment in a non-active "standby" status.
V.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
NRC Inspection Reports 2003010 and 2003008 (dated January 26, 2004 and June 3, 2003 respectively)
On April 28, 2003, testing was being conducted in accordance with OST-1813, "Remote Shutdown System Operability 18 Month Interval Modes 5, 6, or Defueled." During this testing, CCW surge tank level was observed to be decreasing. The operators entered Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-014, "Loss of Component Cooling Water", and both CCW pumps were secured when surge tank level dropped below 4%. Securing the CCW pumps stopped CCW flow to the RHR heat exchangers. The non-essential CCW header was isolated, the 'B' CCW pump was restarted, and RHR temperature control was re-established with the 'B' RHR train. During the approximately 5 minute period in which CCW flow was secured, RCS average temperature increased 4.7 degrees Fahrenheit. The loss of component cooling water inventory resulted from the lifting of a CCW relief valve. This relief valve was found to have improper relief valve nozzle ring settings which resulted in it remaining open longer than designed. This event was determined to be of very low safety significance. The NRC issued a Green Non-cited Violation for failure to follow 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI in that corrective actions from a similar previous event in 1991 (LER 91-016) did not preclude repetition of a loss of CCW. The root causes identified for the 2003 event are not the same as those identified for the event that is the subject of this LER. Thus, the 2003 event is not significant in relation to the subject event.
A review of corrective action program data for the last five years identified no previous similar events resulting from improper taping of lifted leads. Also, there were no similar events over the last decade involving the loss of power to an emergency bus and/or automatic starting of an emergency diesel generator that are significant in relation todthe event that is the subject of this LER.