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ACCELERATED Dg RIBUTION DEMONSTXTION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9102080132 DOC.DATE: 91/02/04 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M.
Carolina Power
& Light Co'.
RICHEY,R.B.
Carolina Power
& Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET g
05000400 SUBJECT:'ER 90-001-00:on 910103,operations personnel identified procedural deficiency that resulted in check valves not being tested as required.Caused by procedural deficiency.
Procedure revised to incorporate testing.W/910204 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR L ENCL J SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.
=05000400 D
D'ECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 LA BECKER,D INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H NRC PDR NSIC MURPHYPG A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB 8D NRR T/.S.PLB8 D-REG' E
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PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
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Caroljna Power 8 Light Company P. O. Box 165 ~ New Hill,N. C. 27562 R. B. RICHEY Vice President Harris Nuclear Project HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P. 0.
Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 FEB 0 419S1 Letter Number.'HO-910016 (0)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-001-00 Gentlemen:
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.
This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.
Very truly yours, R. B. Richey Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RBR:gcm Enclosure cc:
Mr. R. A. Becker (NRR)
Mr. S.
D. Ebneter (NRC RII)
Mr. J.
E. Tedrow (NRC SHNPP)
MEM/HO-9100160/1/OS1 9i02080i32 9i0204 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S
&eh W
NRC FOAM 366 (64)9)
U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATOAYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
APPROVED OMB NO. 31504)(04 EXPIAESI 4(30IS2 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION AEOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE AECORDS AND REPOATS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRO3ECT (31500104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON.DC 20503.
FACILITYNAME (1)
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Unit I1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)
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5 0
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TITLE Ie) Technical Specification violation due ta missed surveillance testing for Control Room EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER (6)
MONTH OAY SEDUENTIAL NUMBER YEAR YEAR
)sm REVISION NUMBER MONTH OAY YEAR REPOR'r DATE (7)
DOCKET NUMBERIS) 0 5
0 0
0 FACILITYNAMES OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDIS) 0 1
3 91 91 0 0 1
0 0 0 2 0 4 9
1 0
5 0
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OPERATING MODE (6)
POWER LFvEL 1
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I 50.73(ew2) (ivl 50.73(IHEHvl 50.73(ew2)(v4) 50,73(r)(2HvBI)(AI 50.73(el(2HvBI)ml 50.73(e) (2 Hxl THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ()I ICnrck onr oi more ol tne Iollowingl (11 73.71(III 73.7((c)
DTHER Isnrclty En Aostirct Below rsvd In Test, HRc Form 35(IAI NAME Michael Verrilli, Specialist Reg.
Compliance TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 9
19 362-23 03 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOA EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRISEO IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.
TURER EPEETEEEE $~4)(y E
VEE SKM~S%.
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.
TURER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS k%5%%
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTFD (14)
YES IIIyrA coinPlrtr EXPECTED SVSEIISSIOH DATEI NO ABsTRAcT ILlmltto 1400 sprees, Ir., eppioslmrtrly Iiftern single sneer typewritten llnNI (16)
MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
I rs On I/3/91 the plant was operating in Mode-1 at 100 percent, power.
During a
procedure review of OST-1131 (Control Room Area HVAC System Inservice Test - punrterly Interval), Operations personnel identified a procedural deficiency that resulted in two check valves not being tested as required.
Inservice Inspection Test (ISI-203) implements the requirements of Technical Specification (TS)
Section 4,0,5, which in turn implements ASME Section XI testing.
Check valves SICZ-15 and ICZ-16 are required to be full forward flow tested, per ISI-203, on a quarterly basis'uring the aforementioned review of OST-1131, it was revealed that the acceptance criteria of the procedure erraneously took credit for testing these check valves, but in actuality, did not conduct or document, an independent forward flow test for these check valves.
The cause of this event was procedural deficiency.
OST-1131 has never included steps to properly test these two check valves.
This procedure was immediately revised to incorporate the required testing and was successfully performed on I/18/91
'here were no significant safety cansequences as a result of this procedural deficiency.
This is based on the following evidence that validates the functional status of these valves nnd the fact that the systems safety function hns never been challenged by radiological conditions.
Forward flaw is tested through at least one of these check valves once per 18 months by the performance of OST-1231 (Control Room Emergency Filtration Operability Test) ~
This test hns consistently verified forward flow and wns last performed satisfactorily on 10/I/90.
This provides n high degree of confidence that the valves would have functioned as designed if needed'his is being reported in accordance with IOCFR50.73 (a) (2).(i) (8) as a TS violation.
NRC Fosin 366 (664)
NRC FOR)51 368A (84)9)
UN. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 600 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH IP4301. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANDTO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(500(04). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503, FACILITYNAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER 12)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Unit I/1 TEXT///mfmfpff8lf/88uied. 848 ~/VRC lomI3MAB/((2) o so o 04 00 YEAR Sg 9
1 SEOVENTIAL NUMSE R 0 0 1
REVISION NUMSE R 00 02 OF 0 2
EVENI DESCR I PT ION:
On I/3/91 the plant was operating in Mode-1 at 100 percent power.
During a
procedure review of OST-1131, Operations personnel identified a procedural deficiency that resulted in two check valves not being tested as required, Inservice Inspection Test (ISI-203) implements the requirements of TS Section 4.0.5, which in turn implements ASME Section XI testing.
Check valves llCZ-15 and ICZ-16 are required to be full forward flow tested, per ISI-203, on a quarterly basis.
During the aforementioned review of OST-1131, it was revealed that the acceptance criteria of the procedure did in fact take credit for testing these check valves, but i'n actuality, did not conduct or document an independent forward flow test for these check valves.
There has been one previous similar event, in regards to IST program/procedure deficiencies.
This was submitted on LER 90-011,
CAUSE
The cause of this event is procedural deficiency, OST-1131 has never included steps to properly test these two check valves.
SAFETY S I GN IF I CANCE:
There were no significant safety consequences as a result of this procedural deficiency.
This is based on the following evidence that validates the functional status of these valves and the fact that the systems safety function has never been challenged by radiological conditions.
Forward flow is tested through at least one of these check valves once per 18 months by the performance of OST-1231 (Control Room Emergency filtration Operability Test).
This test has consistently verified forward flow and was last performed satisfactorily on 10/I/90.
This provides a high degree of confidence that the valves would have functioned as designed if needed, CORRECT I VE ACTIONS:
1.
EPT-I72 was specifically developed to perform a forward flow test for check valves ICZ-15 and ICZ-16'his test was successfully completed on I/16/91 to verify system operability.
2.
OST-1131 was revised to incorporate this testing and was performed satisfactorily on I/18/91 '
~
Operations procedure group will review this event to enhance their awareness of potential problems related to ISI program requirements contained in OST procedures.
4 ~
ISI personnel will perform a
comprehensive procedure review to identify similar IST program problems, related to the testing of parallel flow through check valves E I SS CODE I tFORMATION:
N/A NRC Form 388A (889)
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| 05000400/LER-1991-001, :on 910103,operations Personnel Identified Procedural Deficiency That Resulted in Check Valves Not Being Tested as Required.Caused by Procedural Deficiency. Procedure Revised to Incorporate Testing |
- on 910103,operations Personnel Identified Procedural Deficiency That Resulted in Check Valves Not Being Tested as Required.Caused by Procedural Deficiency. Procedure Revised to Incorporate Testing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(4) | | 05000400/LER-1991-001-01, :on 910225,Tech Spec Violation Due to Missed Surveillance Testing for Control Room HVAC Check Valves. Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Event Will Be Reviewed & ISI Personnel to Perform Comprehensive Review |
- on 910225,Tech Spec Violation Due to Missed Surveillance Testing for Control Room HVAC Check Valves. Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Event Will Be Reviewed & ISI Personnel to Perform Comprehensive Review
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-002-02, :on 910305,determined That Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Trip Inoperable on Train B of Solid State Protection Sys.Caused by Umbilical Cord in Breakers Not Connected.Training Provided |
- on 910305,determined That Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Trip Inoperable on Train B of Solid State Protection Sys.Caused by Umbilical Cord in Breakers Not Connected.Training Provided
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-003-01, :on 910121,missed Surveillance Test During Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sampling.Caused by Personnel Error.Training Conducted for Chemistry Personnel & Procedure RST-209 Revised |
- on 910121,missed Surveillance Test During Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sampling.Caused by Personnel Error.Training Conducted for Chemistry Personnel & Procedure RST-209 Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-004-01, :on 910314,train B Essential Svc Chilled Water Sys Inoperable Due to Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results.Caused by Inability to Verify Check Valve Had Closed.Procedure OPT-1512 Revised |
- on 910314,train B Essential Svc Chilled Water Sys Inoperable Due to Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results.Caused by Inability to Verify Check Valve Had Closed.Procedure OPT-1512 Revised
| | | 05000400/LER-1991-005-01, :on 910313,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Failed Performance Test on Emergency Sequencer B While Csip a Inoperable.Caused by Isolated Contact Failure in B Program Relay.Faulty Relay Replaced |
- on 910313,Tech Spec 3.0.3 Entered Due to Failed Performance Test on Emergency Sequencer B While Csip a Inoperable.Caused by Isolated Contact Failure in B Program Relay.Faulty Relay Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(8) | | 05000400/LER-1991-006-01, :on 910319,shutdown Margin Requirements Not Verified During Surveillance Testing on source-range Nuclear Instruments.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tech Specs.Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 910319,shutdown Margin Requirements Not Verified During Surveillance Testing on source-range Nuclear Instruments.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tech Specs.Procedures Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000400/LER-1991-007-01, :on 910325,one Emergency Svc Water Pump Inappropriately Removed from Svc for Outage Work.Caused by Personnel/Mgt Error.Info Re Event Disseminated to Personnel & TS Will Be Annotated |
- on 910325,one Emergency Svc Water Pump Inappropriately Removed from Svc for Outage Work.Caused by Personnel/Mgt Error.Info Re Event Disseminated to Personnel & TS Will Be Annotated
| 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(6) | | 05000400/LER-1991-008-02, Forwards LER 91-008-02.Rev Discusses Addl Testing Performed on High Head SI Sys During Current Refueling Outage & Mod to Sys Which Will Prevent Recurrence of Event | Forwards LER 91-008-02.Rev Discusses Addl Testing Performed on High Head SI Sys During Current Refueling Outage & Mod to Sys Which Will Prevent Recurrence of Event | | | 05000400/LER-1991-008-01, :on 910403,common-cause Failures Affecting Trains of High Head Safety Injection Identified.Caused by Water Hammer That Apparently Occurred Because of Air Void. Relief Valves Being Rebuilt & Retested |
- on 910403,common-cause Failures Affecting Trains of High Head Safety Injection Identified.Caused by Water Hammer That Apparently Occurred Because of Air Void. Relief Valves Being Rebuilt & Retested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-008, :on 910403,common Causes Failure of High Head Safety Injection Alternate Miniflow Occurred.Caused by Water Hammer Due to Air Void.Supports Added to Test Connection Lines |
- on 910403,common Causes Failure of High Head Safety Injection Alternate Miniflow Occurred.Caused by Water Hammer Due to Air Void.Supports Added to Test Connection Lines
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-009-01, :on 910521,AFW Actuation Occurred Due to Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level Alarm Inadvertently Generated During Troubleshooting.Caused by Personnel Error.Technicians Counseled & Addl Procedural Guidance Developed |
- on 910521,AFW Actuation Occurred Due to Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level Alarm Inadvertently Generated During Troubleshooting.Caused by Personnel Error.Technicians Counseled & Addl Procedural Guidance Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-010-01, :on 910603,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Pressure Spike in Flow Transmitter Ref Leg for Reactor Coolant Loop Low Flow.Caused by Perturbation in Sensing Lines.Rcs Flow Calibr Procedures Revised |
- on 910603,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Pressure Spike in Flow Transmitter Ref Leg for Reactor Coolant Loop Low Flow.Caused by Perturbation in Sensing Lines.Rcs Flow Calibr Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000400/LER-1991-011-01, :on 910512,identified Required Boration Flowpath Functional But Not Operable for Six Days.Caused by Human Error.Procedure RST-201 Being Revised to Specify Acceptable Range for Boron Concentration |
- on 910512,identified Required Boration Flowpath Functional But Not Operable for Six Days.Caused by Human Error.Procedure RST-201 Being Revised to Specify Acceptable Range for Boron Concentration
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000400/LER-1991-012-01, :on 910515,unplanned Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Occurred.Caused by Failure of Main Feed Pump a to Start.Investigation & Testing Performed on Pump & Associated Circuitry |
- on 910515,unplanned Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Occurred.Caused by Failure of Main Feed Pump a to Start.Investigation & Testing Performed on Pump & Associated Circuitry
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000400/LER-1991-013-01, :on 910515,reactor Trip Occurred During Performance of Calibrs.Caused by Personnel Error.Need for Effective Communications Stressed to Applicable Operations Personnel |
- on 910515,reactor Trip Occurred During Performance of Calibrs.Caused by Personnel Error.Need for Effective Communications Stressed to Applicable Operations Personnel
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(1) | | 05000400/LER-1991-015, :on 910519,AFW Actuation Occurred.Caused by Improperly Set Feed Flow Transmitter.Investigation, Adjustment & Successful Testing Performed to Restore Feed Flow Transmitter to Svc |
- on 910519,AFW Actuation Occurred.Caused by Improperly Set Feed Flow Transmitter.Investigation, Adjustment & Successful Testing Performed to Restore Feed Flow Transmitter to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-016-01, :on 910808,containment Cooling Water Pump B Started,Resulting in Momentary Pressure Spike Which Caused Three Relief Valves to Open.Caused by Error in Original Sys Design.Personnel Trained Re Valve Setting |
- on 910808,containment Cooling Water Pump B Started,Resulting in Momentary Pressure Spike Which Caused Three Relief Valves to Open.Caused by Error in Original Sys Design.Personnel Trained Re Valve Setting
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(1) | | 05000400/LER-1991-017-01, :on 910827,tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Missed Composite Sample During Release of Secondary Waste Sample Tank.Caused by Personnel Error.Verified That Effluent Stream Contained No Radioactivity |
- on 910827,tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Missed Composite Sample During Release of Secondary Waste Sample Tank.Caused by Personnel Error.Verified That Effluent Stream Contained No Radioactivity
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000400/LER-1991-018-01, :on 910923,personnel Emergency Air Lock Surveillance Interval Exceeded Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.b.1 of Once Per 6 Months.Caused by Personnel Error. Schedule Revised |
- on 910923,personnel Emergency Air Lock Surveillance Interval Exceeded Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.b.1 of Once Per 6 Months.Caused by Personnel Error. Schedule Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000400/LER-1991-019-01, :on 911022,containment Ventilation Isolation Signal Generated,Resulting in Unplanned Actuation of ESF Component.Caused by Spike on Three Radiation Monitors.Power Supply Circuitry Repaired & Adjusted |
- on 911022,containment Ventilation Isolation Signal Generated,Resulting in Unplanned Actuation of ESF Component.Caused by Spike on Three Radiation Monitors.Power Supply Circuitry Repaired & Adjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-019, :on 911022,containment Ventilation Isolated Due to Spike on Radiation Monitor,Constituting Unplanned Actuation of ESF Component.Special Test Developed & Performed During Refueling Outage 4 |
- on 911022,containment Ventilation Isolated Due to Spike on Radiation Monitor,Constituting Unplanned Actuation of ESF Component.Special Test Developed & Performed During Refueling Outage 4
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-020-01, :on 911204,discovered Deficiency in Radiation Surveillance Test Used for Leak Testing Sealed Sources to Satisfy TS Requirements.Caused by Procedural Deficiency. Procedure Revised & Training Provided |
- on 911204,discovered Deficiency in Radiation Surveillance Test Used for Leak Testing Sealed Sources to Satisfy TS Requirements.Caused by Procedural Deficiency. Procedure Revised & Training Provided
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000400/LER-1991-021-01, :on 911218,error Discovered in Program Utilized to Determine Containment Sump in-leakage Flow Rate.Caused by Personnel Error During Computer Design Development.Erroneous Error Corrected & Event Reviewed |
- on 911218,error Discovered in Program Utilized to Determine Containment Sump in-leakage Flow Rate.Caused by Personnel Error During Computer Design Development.Erroneous Error Corrected & Event Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(v) |
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