05000400/LER-2010-001, Unit 1 Regarding Clearance Error Results in Required Equipment Becoming Inoperable
| ML100200271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/2010 |
| From: | Henderson K Progress Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-10-003 LER 10-001-00 | |
| Download: ML100200271 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4002010001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
rogress Energy JAN 10 2010 Serial: IHNP-10-O03 10CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:.Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
,SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEARPOWER PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/RENEWED LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2010-001-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2010-001-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications. This report describes an event in which an inadequate clearance resulted in the required number of Operable and operating Residual Heat Removal loops being less than that required by Technical Specifications due to "B" Emergency Service Water being non-functional. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) requirements, this LER is submitted within 60 days following discovery of the event.
This document contains no Regulatory Commitments.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Dave Corlett, Supervisor -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, Kelvin Henderson Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant KH/jmd Enclosure cc:
Mr. J. D. Austin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, HNP Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II Ms. M. G. Vaaler, NRC Project Manager, HNP Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P 0. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
Estimated burden per. response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information (See reverse for required number of collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 0500040 1 of 3
- 4. TITLE Clearance Error Results In Required Equipment Becoming Inoperable
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER _
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQENTAL EVFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR N/A 05000 tt FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 10 2009 2010 001 -
001 01 11 2010 N/A 05000
- 9.
OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5 E:
20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
[I 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[E1 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[. 1 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
. El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
[
50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
E-73.71(a)(5) 000 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
'El.50.73(a)(2)(&)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
M 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
John M. Doorhy Jr. - Licensing Specialist
/(919) 362-2137CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER EPO X
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX ATRI TOEX N/A N/A N/A N/A Y
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION [E YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
A past operability determination completed on November 10, 2009, concluded that on October 18, 2007, during Refueling Outage 14, a clearance rendered 1SW-271, "B" Emergency Service Water (ESW) Discharge Valve unable to remain open when opened. This resulted in the"B" ESW system being non-functional during a time when "B" ESW was required to be functional. At the time of the clearance hang, the plant was shut down in Mode 5 with loops not filled. Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 states two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be operable and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation. The plant transitioned to Mode 5 with loops filled and Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.1 states at least one RHR loop shall be operable and in operation. While in this mode "A" RHR was made inoperable for testing. For these plant modes, "B" ESW should have been in a functional status.
The root cause of this event was determined to be that inaccurate information was communicated with regards to impacted equipment associated with opening breaker DP-1 B-SB-33 (Feed to Aux Transfer Panel). Work being performed was to re-wire transfer switch 43T-28SB/822. The review of impacted equipment was focused on equipment affected by the transfer switch contacts instead of equipment impacted by the breaker.
Planned corrective actions to prevent recurrence are to revise procedures to alert the clearance prepeirers and schedulers that due to the complexity of DC power distribution circuitry, removal of DC power within Main or Auxiliary Transfer Panels, Auxiliary Relay Panels (ARPs) or Annunciator Cabinets should not be performed on equipment that is the Protected Train.
NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION REPORT
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUBR NME Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 1
NUMBER NUMBER 05000-400 2010 001 00 2
OF 3
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text within brackets [].
I.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
A past operability determination completed on November 10, 2009, concluded that on October 18, 2007, during Refueling Outage 14, a clearance rendered 1SW-271, "B" Emergency Service Water (ESW) [BI] Discharge Valve to Auxiliary Reservoir unable to remain open when opened. This resulted in the "B" ESW system being non-functional during a time when "B" ESW was required to be functional. At the time of the clearance hang, the plant was shut down in Mode 5 with loops not filled. Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2 states two Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
[BP] loops shall be operable and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation. The plant transitioned to Mode 5 with loops filled and Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.1 states at least one RHR loop shall be operable and in operation.
While in this mode "A" RHR was made inoperable for testing. For these plant modes, "B" ESW should have been in a functional status.
On October 19, 2007, at 04:19 the "B" ESW Pump was started and the Control Room Operators noticed that the Aux. Reservoir discharge valve, 1SW-271, failed to operate correctly. Because Normal Service Water (NSW) [KG]
was available, the "B" ESW header was immediately realigned to be supplied by NSW and the "B" ESW Pump was secured using plant procedures. Subsequent investigation revealed that the auto open controls for 1SW-271 were disabled by clearance 153137 hung to support Engineering Change 62848. During the time that clearance 153137 checklist 7 was hung, the "B" train was the Protected Train.
"B" train RHR was inoperable from the time clearance 153137 checklist 7 was hung on breaker DP-1B-SB-33 until 1SW-271 was opened and breaker 1B35-SB-5D opened to maintain 1SW-271 open, a total time of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> and 24 minutes. This was due to a non-functional "B" ESW flow path.
II.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
Inaccurate information was communicated to the clearance preparers with regards to impacted equipment associated with opening breaker DP-1 B-SB-33 (Feed to Aux Transfer Panel). Work being performed was to re-wire transfer switch 43T-28SB/822. The review of impacted equipment was focused on equipment affected by the transfer switch contacts instead of equipment impacted by the breaker.
I1l.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
There were no actual significant safety consequences as a result of this condition. For the Mode that this occurred, ESW is not required to be Operable but must be functional. The safety significance is low due to the fact that NSW was supplying "B" ESW header. This condition is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since the required number of Operable and operating RHR loops was less than that required by Technical Specifications due to "B" ESW being non-functional.PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERPRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION REPORT
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR ISEQUENTIAL I REVISION YEAR NUBR NME Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 1
NUMBER NUMBER 05000-400 2010 001 00 3
OF 3
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Immediate corrective actions to this event were to open and deactivate 1SW-271 in the open position. The pump was then started and 'B",ESW header was aligned to be supplied from "B" ESW Pump as a functional ESW train.
Following restoration of the "B" ESW header as a functional ESW train, clearance 153137 was lifted and breaker DP-1 B-SB-33 turned on. This allowed normal operation of 1SW-271 with ESW pump starts.
Planned corrective actions to prevent recurrence are to revise procedures to alert the clearance preparers and schedulers that due to the complexity of DC power distribution circuitry, removal of DC power within Main or Auxiliary Transfer Panels, Auxiliary Relay Panels (ARPs) or Annunciator Cabinets should not be performed on equipment that is the Protected Train.
V.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
No previous HNP events or conditions are known within the last five years where a clearance error resulted in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERPRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER