05000400/LER-2015-001, Regarding Safety Valve Setpoint Drift
| ML15131A566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/2015 |
| From: | Waldrep B Duke Energy Progress |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-15-042 LER 15-001-00 | |
| Download: ML15131A566 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4002015001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
May 11,
. 6HULDO HNP-15-042 ATTN: Document &RQWURODesk
. U.S. 1XFOHDURegulatory Commission Washington, DC
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 3ODQWUnit No. 1 Docket No. 5HQHZHGLicense No. NPF-63 Benjamin C. :DOGUHS Vice President Harris Nuclear Plant 5413 Shearon Harris Rd New Hill NC
919-362-2502
CFR
Subject:
Licensee Event Report Safety 9DOYHSettings Outside 7HFKQLFDO Specification 7ROHUDQFH Ladies and *HQWOHPHQ
Duke Energy Progress,,QFsubmits the HQFORVHGLicensee Event Report in accordance ZLWKCFR for Shearon Harris 1XFOHDUPower 3ODQW Unit 1. This report describes a condition where VXUYHLOODQFHtesting identified safety YDOYHsettings outside of WHFKQLFDOspecification DOORZHGWROHUDQFHThe safety YDOYHsettings were restored to within the DOORZHGWROHUDQFH
This document contains no new UHJXODWRU\\commitments.
3OHDVHHrefer any questions regarding this VXEPLWWDOto Dave &RUOHWW5HJXODWRU\\Affairs Manager, at (919) 362-3137.
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(QFORVXUH Licensee Event Report
cc:
Mr. J. D. Austin, NRC Sr. Resident,QVSHFWRUHNP Ms. M. %DULOODVNRC Project Manager, HNP Mr. V. M. McCree, NRC 5HJLRQDOAdministrator, Region,,
NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
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- 1. FACILITY NAME Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000400
- 3. PAGE 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Safety Valve Setpoint Drift
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME None DOCKET NUMBER 03 12 2015 2015 -
001
- - 00 05 11 2015 FACILITY NAME None DOCKET NUMBER
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET The Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA) is affected by the MSSV lift setting because the steam generator is a heat sink to the RCS in the early phase of the event. The lowest banks of MSSV are analyzed to open at 2%
above their nominal setpoint to control secondary temperature. The MSSVs banks with higher pressure settings remain closed. Therefore the observed lift settings for the MSSVs have no impact on SBLOCA.
PSV Premature operation of the PSV could adversely impact departure from nucleate boiling ratio conditions in events such as the reactor coolant pump seized rotor. A review of FSAR chapter 15 events for a PSV tolerance of +/- 4% concluded that there would be no adverse impact due to the reported low opening pressure.
Additional Information
Harris licensee event report (LER) 2013-002-00 reported a similar condition, where two MSSVs had lift settings outside technical specification tolerances. The cause reported in that LER was setpoint drift incompatible with analysis specified criteria. The corrective action to preclude recurrence was implementation of a revised safety analysis that accommodates increased setpoint drift and supports revised technical specification setpoints. The root cause and corrective action to prevent recurrence were appropriate; however the revised safety analysis and corresponding change to the technical specifications were not completed prior to the next scheduled test, nor were interim actions established to prevent recurrence. Note that if the safety analysis and TS lift setting tolerance for the MSSVs and PSVs had been increased as planned, the as-found lift settings would have been within the 3% tolerance. Because the MSSV lift settings have been observed to drift beyond the 1% tolerance when tested at a three-cycle interval, the testing interval has been reduced to every operating cycle. A subset of five MSSVs that historically have drifted more than the others will be tested within twelve months of start-up from the current refueling outage.
In addition, upon replacement of an MSSV, the valve will be tested within three months of installation.
This report contains no regulatory commitments.