05000400/LER-2025-001, Fuel Assembly Incorrectly Placed in Spent Fuel Pool B

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Fuel Assembly Incorrectly Placed in Spent Fuel Pool B
ML25336A056
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/02/2025
From: Hoffman D
Duke Energy Progress, Progress Energy Carolinas
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
RA-25-0260 LER 2025-001-00
Download: ML25336A056 (0)


LER-2025-001, Fuel Assembly Incorrectly Placed in Spent Fuel Pool B
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
4002025001R00 - NRC Website

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David S. Hoffman Plant Manager Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562-9300 10 CFR 50.73 December 21 2025 Serial: RA-25-0260 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-400/Renewed License No. NPF-63 Subject: Licensee Event Report 2025-001-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:

Duke Energy Progress, LLC, submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report 2025-001-00 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP). This event had no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

There are no regulatory commitments contained within this report.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Sarah McDaniel at (984) 229-2002.

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David S. Hoffman Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2025-001-00 cc:

P. Boguszewski, NRG Senior Resident Inspector, HNP T. Sierra, NRG Project Manager, HNP NRG Regional Administrator, Region II

Abstract

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 00400 3

Fuel Assembly incorrectly placed in Spent Fuel Pool 'B' 10 10 2025 2025 001 00 12 02 2025 6

000 Sarah McDaniel, Regulatory Affairs Engineer (984) 229-2002 On October 12, 2025, with Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP), in a refueling outage with the reactor defueled, it was discovered that a fuel assembly had been placed in an incorrect location within the spent fuel pool (SFP) 'B' during fuel assembly movement activities. The error was introduced on October 10, 2025, at 23:54 during core offload, while HNP was in Mode 6. The location of the misplaced fuel assembly did not comply with Technical Specification (TS) Design Features Fuel Storage Criticality, 5.6.1.1.d and 5.6.1.1.e. The cause of the misplaced fuel assembly was improper self-checking and verification practices by reactor maintenance personnel that resulted in positioning the bridge over the incorrect location of the SFP 'B'.

Following discovery on October 12, 2025 at 23:15, the fuel assembly was transferred to its correct location on October 13, 2025, at 4:45, restoring compliance with TS 5.6.1.1.d and TS 5.6.1.1.e. Following this event, all reactor maintenance personnel performing fuel handling activities completed training for proper verification practices. A maintenance standing order was implemented immediately to require independent verification and supervisor or senior reactor operator oversight for all fuel or component movements. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Page of

3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

052 050 reactor maintenance activities will be conducted to verify proper human performance tools are being used.

E. Safety Analysis

The SFP criticality analysis evaluates accident conditions in the SFP, including the mis-load of a fresh fuel assembly.

From the HNP UFSAR, Section 9.1.2.1.2 for the PWR racks in SFPs 'A' and 'B', the amount of soluble boron concentration in the SFP required to offset the highest reactivity increase caused by a mis-loaded fuel assembly is 1000 parts per million (ppm). The boron concentration in the SFP 'B' during this event remained above the TS 3.7.14 requirement of greater than or equal to 2000 ppm. Therefore, the boron requirements to assure fuel subcriticality were met with the fuel assembly in an incorrect location. The SFP 'B' never entered an unanalyzed condition and did not exceed any safety limits. This event does not represent a safety system functional failure. The health and safety of the public and site personnel were not impacted during this event.

F. Additional Information

There have been no events at HNP similar to the event documented in this LER in the past three years.

3 3

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 00400 2025 001 00