05000400/LER-2004-001, Re Inoperability of the a Containment Hydrogen Analyzer
| ML041110929 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/2004 |
| From: | Waldrep B Progress Energy Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-04-064 LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML041110929 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4002004001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Cjil Progress Energy APR 1 2 2004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-04-064 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2004-001-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2004-001-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This report describes inoperability of the "A" Containment Hydrogen Analyzer.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. John Caves, Supervisor -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, B. C. a drep Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant BCW/rgh Enclosure c:
Mr. R. A. Musser (HNP Senior NRC Resident)
Mr. C. P. Patel (NRC-NRR Project Manager)
Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)
Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 k::' -),'Z, 1)"
Abstract
Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) personnel performed surveillance testing of the "A" Containment Hydrogen Analyzer on February 9, 2004. During the test, the analyzer did not respond as expected. An investigation identified that leads had been reversed during the last performance of the surveillance test on November 17, 2003, resulting in the equipment being inoperable for a period of time greater than allowed by technical specifications.
Immediate corrective action restored the leads to their correct configuration and performed the surveillance test to restore the equipment to operable condition. The 'B' Containment Hydrogen Analyzer was also verified to be operable.
The root cause of the event is that the procedure did not clearly identify the specific leads to be lifted during the performance of the test, which resulted in the wrong leads being lifted and incorrectly restored at the completion of the test. Corrective actions included revising the procedure to clearly identify which leads are to be lifted and to ensure the hydrogen analyzer is functional after termination of the wiring during restoration from the test.
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(If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
Ill.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
There were no safety significant consequences of this event. The 'B' Containment Hydrogen Analyzer was operable during the time that the 'A' analyzer was inoperable except for approximately six and one-half hours, which is less than the technical specification allowed time for both analyzers being inoperable.
The potential safety consequences under alternate conditions, such as the loss of both containment hydrogen analyzers, would be a loss of continuous sampling for hydrogen. However, if the containment hydrogen analyzers were needed following a LOCA, the 'A' containment hydrogen analyzer would have reported an error, which would have been recognized and repaired promptly.
IV.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
HNP Corrective Action Program adverse condition 89588, "Adverse Trend-Maintenance Human Performance" dated 4/3/03. An adverse trend was identified within the HNP Maintenance Unit corrective action program related to human performance. It is not clear why the corrective actions from that condition did not prevent this condition, but the training to occur as a corrective action to this event should reduce the probability of a similar event in the future.