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LER-2016-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Following Loss of Reactor Closed Cooling
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x); 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1)
	3972016001R00 - NRC Website
	v • d • e

Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Following Loss of Reactor Closed Cooling
	ML16145A332
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	05/24/2016
From:	Hettel W; Energy Northwest
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	GO2-16-078 LER 16-001-00
	Download: ML16145A332 (5)
	v • d • e

ENE William G. Hettel Vice President, Operations NORTHWEST Ph.

wghettel @ energy-northwestcom 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2016-007-00

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 2016-001-00 for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

There are no commitments being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. D.M. Wolfgramm, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, at (509) 377-4792.

Executed this day of 2016 Respectfully, W. G. Hettel Vice President, Operations Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 201 6-001 -00 cc:

NRC Region IV Administrator NRC NRR Project Manager NRC Sr. Resident lnspector/988C CD Sonoda BPN1 399 WA Horin

- Winston & Strawn G02-1 6-078 May 24, 2016

GO2-16-078 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2016-001-00 Enclosure

26158 R6 NRC Form 366 (01-2014)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (01-2014)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block).

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 01/31//2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days 0.0222 hours 1.322751e-4 weeks 3.044e-5 months .

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Columbia Generating Station

2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000 397

3. PAGE 1

OF 3

4. TITLE MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING LOSS OF REACTOR CLOSED COOLING

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 03 28 2016 2016 001 00 05 24 2016 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203 (a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

Plant Conditions

The reactor was at 100% power before the event. There were no structures, systems or components that malfunctioned or that were out of service that contributed to this event. One of the four reactor source range detectors failed to insert during the scram, with no impact on safety functions.

Event Description

On March 28, 2016, Operators performed a partial surveillance of the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC)

System [DA] to satisfy Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) for a Service Water (SW) [BI] to FPC isolation valve. Per PMT instructions, sections of the surveillance procedure had been marked as Not Applicable (N/A) for steps not considered necessary for the partial surveillance. The steps marked as N/A included closing Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC) [CC] isolation valves on the downstream side of the heat exchanger that isolate SW from RCC. Opening the SW valve without isolating RCC resulted in loss of pressurized RCC inventory into depressurized SW piping.

Operators recognized the loss of RCC from Control Room indications and took appropriate actions to manually scram the reactor as required by abnormal operating procedures. All plant systems responded as expected during the scram transient. The SW valve was closed after approximately 2 minutes of being opened and RCC inventory recovered quickly.

This event was reported (EN 51826 - 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months notification) under criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)

- Actuation of Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] when the reactor is critical. The event also requires a 60-day report, or Licensee Event Report (LER), under criterion 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as applicable to condition 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1) - An event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the RPS system including: reactor scram or reactor trip.

Event Precursors The SW valve maintenance was originally scheduled to be performed concurrent with the quarterly surveillance of FPC. A change to the schedule moved the maintenance to after the surveillance. As a result a partial surveillance was performed. Work control reviews and pre-job briefs failed to recognize the significance of some of the steps being bypassed (N/Ad) in the partial surveillance such as closing the RCC isolation valves.

Cause

The root cause was determined to be that Operations personnel were not consistently rigorous with procedure adherence in the use of N/A as it relates to evaluating plant impacts as required by Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence requirements.

26158A R3

ENE William G. Hettel Vice President, Operations NORTHWEST Ph.

wghettel @ energy-northwestcom 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2016-007-00

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 2016-001-00 for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

There are no commitments being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. D.M. Wolfgramm, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor, at (509) 377-4792.

Executed this day of 2016 Respectfully, W. G. Hettel Vice President, Operations Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 201 6-001 -00 cc:

NRC Region IV Administrator NRC NRR Project Manager NRC Sr. Resident lnspector/988C CD Sonoda BPN1 399 WA Horin

- Winston & Strawn G02-1 6-078 May 24, 2016

GO2-16-078 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2016-001-00 Enclosure

26158 R6 NRC Form 366 (01-2014)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (01-2014)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block).

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 01/31//2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days 0.0222 hours 1.322751e-4 weeks 3.044e-5 months .

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Columbia Generating Station

2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000 397

3. PAGE 1

OF 3

4. TITLE MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING LOSS OF REACTOR CLOSED COOLING

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 03 28 2016 2016 001 00 05 24 2016 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203 (a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

Plant Conditions

The reactor was at 100% power before the event. There were no structures, systems or components that malfunctioned or that were out of service that contributed to this event. One of the four reactor source range detectors failed to insert during the scram, with no impact on safety functions.

Event Description

On March 28, 2016, Operators performed a partial surveillance of the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC)

System [DA] to satisfy Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) for a Service Water (SW) [BI] to FPC isolation valve. Per PMT instructions, sections of the surveillance procedure had been marked as Not Applicable (N/A) for steps not considered necessary for the partial surveillance. The steps marked as N/A included closing Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC) [CC] isolation valves on the downstream side of the heat exchanger that isolate SW from RCC. Opening the SW valve without isolating RCC resulted in loss of pressurized RCC inventory into depressurized SW piping.

Operators recognized the loss of RCC from Control Room indications and took appropriate actions to manually scram the reactor as required by abnormal operating procedures. All plant systems responded as expected during the scram transient. The SW valve was closed after approximately 2 minutes of being opened and RCC inventory recovered quickly.

This event was reported (EN 51826 - 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months notification) under criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)

- Actuation of Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC] when the reactor is critical. The event also requires a 60-day report, or Licensee Event Report (LER), under criterion 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as applicable to condition 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1) - An event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the RPS system including: reactor scram or reactor trip.

Event Precursors The SW valve maintenance was originally scheduled to be performed concurrent with the quarterly surveillance of FPC. A change to the schedule moved the maintenance to after the surveillance. As a result a partial surveillance was performed. Work control reviews and pre-job briefs failed to recognize the significance of some of the steps being bypassed (N/Ad) in the partial surveillance such as closing the RCC isolation valves.

Cause

The root cause was determined to be that Operations personnel were not consistently rigorous with procedure adherence in the use of N/A as it relates to evaluating plant impacts as required by Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence requirements.

26158A R3

05000397/LER-2016-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Following Loss of Reactor Closed Cooling

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05000397/LER-2016-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Following Loss of Reactor Closed Cooling

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Subject:

Dear Sir:

Plant Conditions

Event Description

Cause

Subject:

Dear Sir:

Plant Conditions

Event Description

Cause

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