05000397/LER-1986-001, :on 860209,spurious Actuation of Control Room Emergency Filtration Sys Occurred Due to Chlorine Monitor Tape Depletion.Caused by Inadequate Design & Personnel Error.Tape Replaced

:on 860209,spurious Actuation of Control Room Emergency Filtration Sys Occurred Due to Chlorine Monitor Tape Depletion.Caused by Inadequate Design & Personnel Error.Tape Replaced

ML20154H280
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	03/03/1986
From:	Davison W, Powers C WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
LER-86-001, LER-86-1, NUDOCS 8603100241
Download: ML20154H280 (3)

LER-1986-001, on 860209,spurious Actuation of Control Room Emergency Filtration Sys Occurred Due to Chlorine Monitor Tape Depletion.Caused by Inadequate Design & Personnel Error.Tape Replaced

Event date:
Report date:
3971986001R00 - NRC Website

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On February 9,1986 a spurious actuation of the Control Room Emergency Filtration system occurred when the chlorine monitor in sample rack WOA-SR-15 (Rad Waste Building Outside Air Sample Rack 15) ran out of tape. The root cause was attributed to inadequate design in that no alarn function exists to warn of impending tape depletion.

A contributing cause was the occurrence of a cognitive personnel error in that the procedure calling for addition of new tape was not followed.

The tape was replaced and the Control Room Emergency Filtration Systen was returned to normal. These monitors are to be eliminated when the method of circulating water treatment is changed from gaseous chlorination to chemical addition of sodium hypochlorite.

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Plant Conditions

a) Power Level - 72%

b) Plant tiode 1

Event On February 9,1986, the chlorine detector on the inlet of the Control Room Ventilation System, WOA-SR-15, ran out of tape causing a Hi Chlorine signal to be generated which started the Control Room Emergency Filtration System.

The paper tape in the detector is chemically treated to react with chlorine in the air. When the tape is depleted the last piece remains in the flow stream and becomes discolored as dirt and moisture accumulate.

This discoloration was sensed as an increasing chlorine concentration which reached the alarm setpoint and actuated the emergency filtration system.

The root cause of this event was evaluated as inadequate design, in that the chlorine detection system does not provide an alarm for paper tape depletion which results in a spurious initiation of an ESF system. A contributing cause was the occurrence of a cognitive personnel error by a utility maintenance technician in that the procedure mandating periodic addition of new tape was not complied with.

Imediate Corrective Action The tape in WOA-SR-15 was replaced, the alarm reset and the Control Room Emergency Filtration System returned to its normal condition.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action As a result of an engineering study, the method of circulating water treatment will be changed from gaseous chlorination to chemical addition of sodium hypochlorite. This design modification will result in removal of the requirement for the intake header chlorine detectors to automatically isolate the Control Room. The removal of the chlorine detectors will eliminate the problem of spurious ESF actuations caused by paper tape depletion.

The utility maintenance technician involved in this event was counselled and reinstructed.

Safety Significance

This event carries no safety significance as there was no actual high chlorine concentration and all equipment operated correctly to place the Control Room Ventilation System in an isolation condition.

Similar Events

Refer to LERs84-057, 84-093,84-128, and 85-026.

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Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509)372-5000 Docket No.

50-397 Marcy 3, 1986 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.86-001

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.86-001 for WNP-2 Plant.

This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 0542 hours0.00627 days <br />0.151 hours <br />8.96164e-4 weeks <br />2.06231e-4 months <br /> on February 9,1986.

Very truly yours, C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)

WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP:mt Encl osure:

Licensee Event Report No.86-001 cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V Mr. R.C. Barr, NRC - Site (901 A)

Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI INP0 Records Center - Atlanta, GA Mr. C.R. Bryant, BPA (M/D 399) o i

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