05000354/LER-2004-005, Regarding Control Room Emergency Filtration System Train Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days

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Regarding Control Room Emergency Filtration System Train Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days
ML042100131
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/19/2004
From: Hutton J
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N04-0313 LER 04-005-00
Download: ML042100131 (4)
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LER-2004-005, Regarding Control Room Emergency Filtration System Train Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
3542004005R00 - NRC Website
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text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 LR4-QN054Om O PSEG Nuclear LLC U.S. Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 354104-005-00 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - UNIT I FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-67 DOCKET NO. 50-354 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Control Room Emergency Filtration System Train Inoperable For Greater Than 7 Days, submitted pursuant to the requirements of I OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely, lames Hutton wlant Manager - Hope Creek Attachment RFY C

Distribution LER File 3.7 95-2168 REV. 7/99

NRC-FORM 3t6 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 (7-2001)

COMMISSION Estimated burden per esponse to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported sss learned are hIcorporated hIto the licensn process and fed back to Industy Send comments regarding burden estimate lo the Records1Management Branch (Tf-LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

EB) U.S. NudearRegulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, orby intemete-mail to b~nrcov, and to the Desk Officer. Offce of Information and Regultor Affairs, NEOB-(See reverse for required number of 10202 (3150104.O ce of Management and Budget, Washington DC 20503. If a means digitstcharacters for each block) used t Ime Informaon collecon does not display a ojrrentty varid 0MB control number, th NRA narn not mnrndt$ or snonsor AndI A wrsan i't not nerleultd to vesnood tn the

1. FACILITY NAME 2-DOCKET NUMBER
13. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 j

1 OF 3

C TITLE Control Room Emergency Filtration System Train Inoperable For Greater Than 7 Days

5. EVENT DATE S. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE S I. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKETNUMBER SEQUENTIAL REV MO DAY YE-AR YEAR NEQUMBER NOI E

MO DLAY A

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 5

17 2004 2004 005 00 7

16 2004

9. OPERATING

_11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR l: (Check all that arov)

MODE 1

_ 20.2201(b)

_ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

_ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2Xix)(A)

10. POWER 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

_ 50.73(a)(2Xx)

LEVEL 100 20.2203(a)(1)

_ 50.36(cX1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ivXA)

=

73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

_ 50.36(c)(1)(li)(A)

_ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

Specify In Abstract below or In 0.2203(a)(2)()

50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) i: J -_20.2203(a 2)( )

X 50.73(a)(2)(IXB) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)IXC) 50.73(aX2)(viii)(A)

__ii__f___mf__>_____01_

20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)ffi)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) l

____li___i_-__

12. 1ICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAMI:TELEPHONE NUMlBER (Inclu~de Area Code)

R. Yewdall, Licensing Engineer 1856-339-2469MANU-REPORTABLE 1MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX A

KM CHU C150 No i;

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
15. EXPECTED MOTH DAY YEAR S

.E SUBMISSIONX I

lYES (Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE)

I X INO DATEl l

ABSTRACT

On May 20, 2004, a Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) was entered due to degraded performance of the BK400 chiller, a component of the Control Room Emergency Filtration system (CREF). The TSAS was exited later the same day following repair of the chiller. Prior to May 20, 2004, the BK400 chiller had been out of service between May 9 and May 15 for maintenance. A portion of the maintenance activity was the replacement of the guide vane pivot arm. While trouble shooting the problem on May 20, 2004, it was discovered that the chiller guide vane pivot arm was slipping on the drive shaft. Based on this information, the BK400 chiller was determined to not have been capable of performing its design function when it was returned to service on May 15, 2004. Therefore, the BK400 chiller was inoperable from May 9 to May 20 which exceeds the 7 day allowed outage time of TS 3.7.2 Action a.

The cause of the slippage was determined to be setscrews that were not fully engaged. The immediate corrective action was to "dimple the shaft and tighten the setscrews.

This event is being reported in accordance with IOCFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

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NRC FORM 386A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)

NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

II SEQUENTIAL REVISION Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 YEAR I

NUMBER NUMBER 2 OF 3 1

12004 - 005 -

00 TEXT (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)

Chilled Water System {KM)*

Control Room Emergency Filtration System ()1}

  • Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCCQ IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: May 17, 2004 Discovery Date: May 20, 2004 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Hope Creek was in Operating Condition 1 (Power Operation), at the time of discovery. No other required structures, systems or components were inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to the event.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE Hope Creek Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, requires two (2) independent Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) {VI} subsystems to be operable. Included in each subsystem is a chilled water system to maintain the control room envelope within specified environmental limits. The BK400 chiller is a support component of the B CREF train.

With the chiller inoperable, the B CREF train is therefore inoperable. TS 3.7.2, Action a., requires that the inoperable subsystem be made operable within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

On May 20, 2004, at approximately 0715, a report was made to Hope Creek Operations that the BK400 chiller evaporator pressure was 61 PSIG. Procedurally, the chiller evaporator pressure is to be maintained between 35 and 50 PSIG. An investigation was performed and Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS)04-259 was entered declaring the B CREF train inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2 Action a. Corrective maintenance was performed and the system was returned to operable status at 1920, on May 20, 2004.

Prior to May 20, 2004, the BK400 chiller had been out of service between May 9 and May 15 for maintenance. A portion of the maintenance activity was the replacement of the guide vane pivot arm. While trouble shooting the problem on May 20, 2004, it was discovered that the chiller guide vane pivot arm was slipping on the drive shaft.

Based on this information, the BK400 chiller was determined to not have been capable of performing its design function when it was returned to service on May 15, 2004. Therefore, the BK400 chiller was inoperable from May 9 to May 20 which exceeds the 7 day allowed outage time of TS 3.7.2 Action a. Therefore, May 17, 2004 was the date that exceeded the 7 day TSAS.

The event is being reported in accordance with IOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Any operation or condition that was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

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. _-.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-20qt)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION lDOCKET FACILITY NAME (1)

NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 YR NUMBER NUMBER 3 050 3 2004 - 005 -

00 CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of occurrence was inadequate procedure guidance on pivot arm replacement During the maintenance outage which commenced on May 9, 2004, the pivot arm was replaced. The cause for the high evaporator pressure was determined to be the inability of the guide vane to properly modulate. This was due to the pivot arm set screws that were not engaged firmly enough to prevent slipping on the shaft This in turn prevented the chiller from operating as designed. A contributing cause to the LCO being exceeded was an insufficient retest to ensure operability of the chiller.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review of related TS noncompliance LERs was performed for the past 3 years. LER 354103-002-00, entitled

'Inoperability of Control Room Emergency Filter (CREF) subsystems due to Control Room (CR) envelope breach',

dated January 12, 2003 was reviewed for applicability to operability of the BK400 chiller. That event was attributed to a ductwork access hatch opening and no correlation was found to a chiller equipment issue or operability assessments. Based on this review actions associated with that LER would not have prevented this occurrence. LER 354/04-002-00, entitled "Control Room Emergency Filtration System Train Inoperable For Greater 7 Days", involved the same CREF train. The failure mechanism related to that LER was a float which became disengaged from the float arm. Corrective actions related to that event would not have prevented the current event

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences associated with this event since the 'A' CREF train was operable during the period the 'B' CREF was inoperable. Additionally, there were no design basis radiological releases during the period that the 'B' CREF train was inoperable. Only one train of CREF is required to mitigate design basis radiological events that impact the control room envelope.

This event does not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The corrective actions to address the identified problem are as follows:

1. The BK400 chiller was repaired and returned to operable status on May 20, 2004.
2. Maintenance procedure HC.MD-CM.GJ-001 will be revised to add guidance for dimpling the guide vane shaft to properly engage setscrews to prevent slipping.
3. Chiller guide vane maintenance plans will be revised to ensure retests demonstrate that the chillers are fully operable.

COMMITMENTS

The corrective actions cited in this LER do not constitute commitments.

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