05000313/LER-1990-004

LER 90-004-00:on 900531,degraded Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Discovered in 2-inch Metal Sleeve Through Floor Slab & Conduit Contained within Sleeve.Caused by Personnel Oversight.Fire Barrier Sealed & Log updated.W/900702 Ltr

ML20055D515
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	07/02/1990
From:	Ewing E, Saulsberry D ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
1CAN79001, LER-90-004, LER-90-4, NUDOCS 9007090045
Download: ML20055D515 (4)

LER-2090-004,

Event date:
Report date:
3132090004R00 - NRC Website

text

~

, e Entergy 'an Operstlons t'.1<#

rt<

• ^n 7aai~g ft),'-

16E01.N43103 July 2, 1990 1 CAM 079001 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D. C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51 Licensee Event Report 50-313/90-004-00 1

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), attached is the subject report concerning a degraded fire barrier penetration as the result of personnel oversight and procedure inadequacy.

Very truly yours, ff)

~~

E. C. Ewing

~~b General Manager, Technical Support and Assessment ECE/DBS/sgw Attachment cc: Regional Administrator Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regult.itory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 '

INPO Records Center

. Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 9no7opoo45 900702 ADOCK C3000313

[DR PDC /,[p i

/ I i

. Form 1062.01A NRC Fom 366 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (6 89) Approved OMB No. 3150 0104 Expires: 4/30/92 L1C(NS(( [V[NT REPORT (L t R)

FA;1LITt MME (1) Arkansas huclear One, Unit One IDOCMT NJMBER (2) IPAGE (3) 10151010101 31 Il 3!110F1013 TITLE (4) Degracea Fire Barrier Fenetration as the Result of Personnel Oversight and Procedural Inadequacy EVENT DATE (5) ,ER NJISER (6? REPORT DATE (7) OTHER F ACILITIES JNVOLVED (6) l I Jequentiali, I Revision l l Month Day Year Year '

Number Number IMonthi Day Year Facility Names Docket Number (sh l l 0 5 0 0 0 01 5 31 1 91 0 91 0 1--1 0 1 01 a '~

.  ; 0 ! 0_ l 01 71 Of 2 91 01 0 5 0 0 0 OPERAING . lTn 5 REPORT 15 50BMITTED PUR5UANl TO THE REQVIREMENT5 0F 10 CFR 5 MDDE (9) l NI (Check one or more of the followinL) (11)

POWER l l_I 20.402(b) 6,,,6 20.405(c) l_ l 50.7)(a)(2)(iv) l_l 73.71(b)

LEVELI 1 20.405(a)(1)(1) l.,,,,1 50. 36(c )(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) l_I 73.71(c)

(10) 101810 ,,,1 1 20.405(a)(1)(ii) l

~

50.73(a)(2)(vii) l

~~i 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 7l 50.36(c)(2)

~ 50.73(a)(2)(1)

~

~

l 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)l_l Other (Specify inAbstract below and

~ l 20.405(a)(1)(tv) - $0.73(a)(2)(ii) 11 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)) -In Text, NRC Form l 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73Ja)(2)(iii) l~l 50.73(a)(2)(x) 1 366A)

',1CEN5EE C0hTACT FOR THIS LER (12) home Daryll Saulsberry l Telephone Number l Area l Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist (Code l 1510111916l41 13111010 COMPLETE ONE LIhE FOR EACH COMP 0hEhT FAILURE DE5CRIBED IN THI5 REPORT (13) l l l l Reportable l l l iReportablel Causelsystem Component Manufacturer to NPR05 Cause System Comporent Manufacturert to NPRD5 I I I I I i 1 1 1 1 1 I I l- t 1 l l I I '

I i 1 1 I I I I 1 I I I I i _1 SUPPLEMENT REPORT EkPECTED (14) l EkPECiED Month Day Year i SUBM15510N l l'1 Yes (if yes, complete fxpected submission Date) (Il No l DATE (15) l l l 1 . I AB5 TRACT (Limit to 14D0 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 31, 1990 at 1330, while conducting a fire barrier penetration seal inspection as part of a comprehensive inspection program initiated as part of a Generic Letter 86*10 evaluation, a degraded fire barrier was discovered by personnel within the fire protection group at Arkansas Nuclear One. The deficient seal consisted of a 2 inch metal sleeve through a floor slab and a 1\ it.ch conduit contained within the sleeve. A review of past documentation revealed this condition has existed prior to a general fire barrier inspection walk down conducted in 1983. Since this condition was not identified during this walk down or subsequent Technical Specification surveillances, the root cause of this condition has been determined to be personnel error and oversight regarding incorrect procedure identification ci penetration number 97 0038. Upon discovery of this condition, the corresponding fire detection system was verified operable, a fire watch was posted in accordance with Technical Specification requirements, the fire barrier was sealed, and the applicable fire print and penetration log updated.

In addition, the fire barrier inspection procedure will be revised and a training program will be implemented for fire barrier inspectors. The degraded fire barrier penetration seal is not a significant safety concern considering the fire preventative measures currently available but is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

i

.a

• 1 I

Form 1062.01B NRC Form 366A U.$. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (609) Approved OMB No. 3150 0104 Expires: 4/30/9' LICENSEE EYENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONT]NUAT10N FACILITY MME (1) (DOCAEl NJMBER (2) ( ,[R NJ45[R ((O l FAGE (3) l l l , seguential I Revision) l l_ Year Number Number l Arkansas Nuclear One. Unit One 10151010101 31 11 31 91 0 -

0 I 01 4 **

OIO 10ltl0F1013 ItKI (If more space is required, use socitional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A. Plant Status At the time this condition was discovered. Unit 1 (AND 1) was in power operations at 80 percent.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) (AB) temperature was 579 segrees Fahrenheit and reactor coolant  ;

system pressure was approximately 2155 psig. 1

8. Event Description On May 31,1990 at 1330, while conducting a fire barrier penetration seal inspection as part of a j comprehensive inspection progree initiated to ensure installed seals are in accordance with tested 1 configurations or have adequate basis for installation (i.e., Generic Letter 6610 evaluation), j a degraded fire barrier was discovered by personnel within the fire protection group at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO). The degraded fire barrier consisted of a 2 inch metal sleeve extending approximately 3 inches above the floor slab to approximately 22 inches below the floor slab between the cable spreading room and the solid waste filler storage room. A Ik inch conduit passing through the 2 inch metal sleeve was surrounded t>y an open annulus which dio not contain a fire retardant seal.

The sleeve appears to have been used as an equipment drain line, at one time, with the portion of the drain line extending through the floor slab modified into a sleeve and subsequently utilited for the routing of conduit through the fire barrier. The sleeve and conduit pass through penetration number 97 0038 in room 97. The sleeve passing through the floor slab was surrounded by an adequate seal and was properly identified in the fire barrier inspection procedure. The conduit within the sleeve was not surrounded by a seal nor was it identified in the inspection procedure. Documentation pertaining to installation of the conduit indicates that the conduit was routed prior to a major fire barrier walk down effort, conducted in 1983, which served to fiele Orify the adem .y of penetration seals located in either an NRC required fire barrier or insurant .. ...ed fire barrier. The results of the fire barrier walk down effort were used to supply baseline data for future inspections of fire barrier penetration seals.

C. Root Cause Fire barrier penetration seals inspected during the walk down effort of 1983, including penetration number 97-0038, were either found containing a satisfactory fire barrier seal or were modified to confore with approved fire barrier sealant standards. Historical documentation of penetration t

number 97 0038 indicates that no deficiencies were found with this fire barrief seal during the l 1983 walk down. Since existing documentation indicates that the routing of conduit was performed I prior to the 1983 walk down, the concition should have been identified during these inspections since inspection guidance was available to the inspector. However, the sleeve configuration was such that it could have misled the inspector to overlook the gap and accept the fire barrier penetration as satisfactory. Additionally, several Technical Specification surveillance procedures for fire barrier penetrations have been performed since 1983 and also have friled to identify the deficient fire barrier penetration seal. Therefore, the root cause of this condition has been determined to be personnel error and oversight related to the failure to identify an inadequate fire barrier seal during the 1963 walk down effort. A contributing factor associated with this condition may be attributed to the fact that the sleeve through which penetration number 97 0038 passes was not correctly identified in the procedure used to perform Technical Specification inspections. Technical Specification surveillances were conducted by maintenance personnel; whereas, the current fire barrier penetration seal inspection program is being conducted by the ANO fire protection group.

D. Corrective Actions l

Upon discovery of this condition, the fire detection system for the cable spreading room was verified operable and a fire watch was posted in accordance with Technical Specification requirements, The fire barrier was sealed through a job request initiated to ensure the annulus l between the sleeve and conduit was adequately enclosed. In response to identifying the fire barrier penetration for future inspections, the new fire barrier penetration designation for i

sleeve (97 0127) has been listed on fire print 97-1 and entered in Penetration Log FB 00-L1, This l Should be effective in providing a cue to inform the fire barrier inspector that this penetration

. exists and requires inspection during future inspections.

l

. - . . - . - - ~

r s

w .

Form 1062.01B NRC Fors $66A U.$. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (6 89) Approved OMB ho. 3150-0104 LIC[NS(( IV[NT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUAi!ON 1 iACILITY h8ME (1) lDOCMT NMER (2) l ,[R N M ER (6) l PAGE (3) l l pequentiall Revisiont l LYeer Numbee Number l Arkansas Nuclear One. Unit One 10151010101 31 11 31 91 0 ~ 0 1 01 4 --

0i0 101310Fl013 MT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,usesoditionalNRCForm366A's)(17) '

Additionally, fire barrier inspection procedure (1405.016) will be revised to correctly identify the new designated fire barrier penetration. This action will be completed prior to December 1, 1990. i These actions are in addition to the current fire barrier seal inspection program which is part cf the AND Business Plan (Action D.5.c) scheduled for completion prior to December 31, 1991. The objectives of the assessment program are to verify the physical configuration of Technical $pecification penetration seals, perfore evaluations of seal designs when deviations are identified, develop a data base and procedures for seal configuration sianagement, and the correction of identified deficiencies.

To provide additional guidance to the fire barrier penetration seal inspector on the correct ,

method of inspecting fire barrier penetrations, a training program will be developed addressing .

the identification of deficient conditions. The training program also will present a discussion (

of penetration sealant material and p9ssible conditions rendering particular sealant materials >

deficient. This program is scheduled for development prior to December 1, 1990. '

E. Safety $ignificance This condition has potential cafety significance considering that the deficient fire barrier seal provides protection for the cable spreading room. A fire spreading to the cable spreailing room could result in degraded plant control due to possible conductor damage associated with Control Room instrumentation. The degree of damage to Control Room instrumentation is dependent on the nature and extent of the fire within the cable spreading area. Plant control in the event of a fire in the cable spreading room is addressed through abnormal operating procedure 1203.02.

In actuality, the fire preventative measures currently evallable make the spread of fire in these areas only remotely possible. These measures include a fixed fire detection system in the cable spreading room which provides alarm annunciation in the ANO 1 Control Room, fire suppression equipment in the form of fire extinguishers, fire water hose reels, and an automatically actuated system. Fire Brigade personnel, specifically trained in fire fighting, are available at all times in the unlikely event a fire were to occur. Although the seal was degraded, the availability of .

detection instrumentation, suppression equipment, and Fire Brigade personnel provide adequate protection against fire propagation. Therefore, there is not a safety concern related to the j degraded seal.

At the ANO site there are approximately 10,000 total penetrations through p1' ant fire barriers. l Approximately 1500 penetrations have already been reverified with only the condition addressed in this report being identified as a deficient fire barrier penetration seal. Therefore, considering the small population of deficient penetrations which have been identified, the safety concerns as they relate to potentially existent conditions are relatively small for the remaining number of seals which have not been inspected at this time.

F. Basis for Reportability This condition is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

G. Additional Information f A condition involving an inadequate fire barrier seal in conjunction with personnel related l oversight was previously reported in 50-368/88-018 and 50 368/90-01F 00.

Revisions to this licensee event report may be submitted in the future if additional inadequate fire barrier seals are identified as part of the current fire barrier inspection program.

Energy Industry Identification System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (XX).

l