05000275/FIN-2010005-04
Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Operability Determinations |
Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, after Pacific Gas and Electric failed to adequately evaluate two nonconforming conditions for operability as required by Procedure OM7.ID12, Operability Determination. On October 15, 2010, the inspectors identified a less than adequate technical evaluation supporting Prompt Operability Assessment 50350918, Unit 2 - Insulation in Bio-Wall Penetration. Engineering personnel failed to adequately evaluate the extent of condition after technicians identified about 632 pounds of Temp-Mat and 60 pounds of Min-K fibrous insulation in the Unit 1 reactor coolant loop biological shield wall penetrations. This fibrous material could have potentially been transported and plugged the emergency core cooling containment sump screen. The licensee performed the prompt operability assessment for Unit 2, which was operating at the time. The inspectors concluded that the engineering personnel inappropriately applied the leak-before-break methodology to exclude about 87 percent of this material from the extent of condition review in the prompt operability assessment.
The second example involved Prompt Operability Assessment Notification 50355265, RHR Sump Margin, which was completed by the licensee on October 23, 2010. In this example, engineering personnel failed to identify and demonstrate that the specified safety function of the refueling water storage tank could be maintained as required by the plant operability procedure. The inspectors identified that the post accident flow path from the reactor cavity to the containment sump was blocked by a large shield plug. This blockage reduced the amount of post accident inventory available at the containment sump at the time of transition from injection to recirculation mode of emergency core cooling operation. Engineering personnel failed to demonstrate that the safety function to ensure full sump submergence was maintained with the blocked flow path. Full submergence of the sump was used by the NRC as the basis for approval of Technical Specification 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank, inventory requirements. The licensee entered the violation into the corrective action program as Notification 50369117 and revised the prompt operability assessments using assumptions consistent with the current licensing bases. The inspectors concluded that the performance deficiency was more than minor because the finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone initial design control attribute and objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because Pacific Gas and Electric did not use conservative assumptions in decisions to demonstrate component operability in either example H.1(b). |
Site: | Diablo Canyon |
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Report | IR 05000275/2010005 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | E Wong P Goldberg L Ricketson M Brown M Peck C Graves R Kopriva D Allen C Osterholtz I Anchondo D Reinert C Alldredge B Latta |
CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2010005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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