05000272/LER-1981-056, Forwards LER 81-056/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-056/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20005B108
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 06/19/1981
From: Uderitz R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20005B109 List:
References
NUDOCS 8107060318
Download: ML20005B108 (3)


LER-1981-056, Forwards LER 81-056/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2721981056R00 - NRC Website

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PSEG Pubhc Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 June 19, 1981 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-56/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence Sl-56/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, R. A.

Uderitf General Manager -

Nuclear Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies) l GIfl

(

8107060319 6106'19 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

LPDR c

-]

Report Number:

Sl-56/03L Report Date:

June 19, 1981 Occurrence Date:

5-21-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 and 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactor Coolant System - Leakage Detection System - Loss of 1F and 1G Buses.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1 - Mode 1 - Rx Power 28% - Unit Load 300 MW Unit 2 - Mode 2 - Rx Power 0

- Unit Load 0 MW DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

Action Statement 3.4.6.lb was entered at 0836 on May 21, 1981 when the No. 3 Unit Generator Breaker was manually closed while in the test position.

The closure of this breaker in the test position caused the inadvertent breaker closure relay protection to trip the IF and lG 4KV buses.

The loss of the 4KV buses resulted in the de-energization of the auxiliary alarm typewriters for Units 1 and 2 used to record containment sump pump start and stop times.

This resulted in the Containment Sump Level Monitoring Systems being inoperable.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Design deficiency.

Operation of the No. 3 Unit Generator Breaker for maintenanc-testing while the breaker was in the test position caused the loss of power to the auxiliary alarm typewriters.

The inadvertent breaker closure circuit for No. 3 Unit was designed to allow testing of the relay protection with the generator breaker in the test position.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 requires that with only two of the required Leakage Detection Systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required gaseous and/or particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

LER 81-56/03L 6/19/81

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Power was restored to the auxillary alarm typewriters at 1110 on May 21, 1981 and Action Statement 3.4.6.1.b was terminated at this time.

A Design Change Request (lSC-0577) has been initiated to modify the breaker protection scheme to prevent recurrence of this incident.

A caution tag has also been affixed to the breaker to instruct the operator not to manually close the No. 3 Unit Generator Breaker in the test position.

In addition, Operating Memo OM-5 was revised to explain the above precaution.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By J.

J.

Espey

]/[Mt L..z cc, Manager'- Salem Generating Station SORC Meeting No.

81-50 l

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