|
---|
Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEAR1CAN109906, Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 11999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 1 ML20217J4971999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Addl Info Re Results of Util Most Recent Steam Generator Insp at ANO-2 & Util Methodology Used to Predict Future Performance of SG Tubes ML20217J3871999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 0 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure 2CAN109902, Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs1999-10-15015 October 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs ML20217J3601999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Integranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 1 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure 2CAN109903, Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp1999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp ML20217D1721999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re 990729 Request for Amend to TSs Allowing Special SG Insp for Plant,Unit 2.Questions Re Proposed Insp Scope for Axial Cracking Degradation in Eggcrate Support Region Submitted.Response Requested by 991015 1CAN109905, Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included ML20212L0621999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation & Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability 1CAN099908, Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria1999-09-30030 September 1999 Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria 2CAN099902, Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,20001999-09-29029 September 1999 Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,2000 1CAN099903, Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.31999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.3 1CAN099907, Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative1999-09-26026 September 1999 Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative 1CAN099906, Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data1999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data 2CAN099901, Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 9908271999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 990827 2CAN099904, Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR ML20212F5031999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards SER Granting Relief Requests 1-98-001 & 1-98-002 Which Would Require Design Mods to Comply with Code Requirements,Which Would Impose Significant Burden Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) 1CAN099905, Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments1999-09-17017 September 1999 Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments ML20212D9961999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of Arkansas Nuclear One.Nrc Plan to Conduct Core Insps at Facility Over Next 7 Months.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl 1CAN099902, Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld 2CAN099905, Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested1999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested 1CAN099901, Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments1999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) 0CAN099906, Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs1999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs ML20211L4901999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-12 & 50-368/99-12 on 990711- 0821.No Violations Noted ML20211J2351999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant, Unit 1 ML20211E6161999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Amend 15 to ANO Unit 2,USAR,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6).Summary of 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Associated with Amend 15 of ANO Unit 2 SAR Will Be Provided Under Separate Cover Ltr with 30 Days 0CAN089905, Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 19991999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 1999 ML20211F4181999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 980603 & 990517 Requests for Approval of risk-informed Alternative to 1992 Edition of ASME BPV Code Section Xi,Insp Requirements for Class 1, Category B-J Piping Welds ML20211G0731999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Applications for Renewal of Operating License for Kw Canitz & Aj South.Without Encls 1CAN089904, Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl 0CAN089903, Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves1999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves IR 05000368/19990111999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313//99-11 & 50-368/99-11 on 990719-23.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program & Observation of Requalification Exam Activities at Unit 1 2CAN089901, Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 9907291999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 990729 1CAN089902, Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License1999-08-0505 August 1999 Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License 2CAN089902, Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested1999-08-0404 August 1999 Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams 0CAN089902, Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified1999-08-0202 August 1999 Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified 0CAN089901, Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 9906031999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 990603 ML20210L3581999-07-29029 July 1999 Ltr Contract,Task Order 43, Arkansas Nuclear One Safety System Engineering Insp (Ssei), Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 1CAN079903, Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks ML20216D8131999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant,Unit 1 ML20216D3561999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses non-cited Violation Identified in Insp Rept 50-313/98-21,involving Failure to Have Acceptable Alternative Shutdown Capability for ANO-1 ML20210C2191999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-08 & 50-368/99-08 on 990530-0710 at Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2,reactor Facility.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities at Plant Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations ML20209H5251999-07-15015 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Licensee 980701 & 990311 Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 RAI, Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 1CAN079901, Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages1999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages 0CAN079902, Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl ML20209E5551999-07-0808 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Rv Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEAR1CAN109906, Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 11999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 1 2CAN109902, Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs1999-10-15015 October 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs 2CAN109903, Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp1999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp 1CAN109905, Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included 1CAN099908, Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria1999-09-30030 September 1999 Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria 2CAN099902, Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,20001999-09-29029 September 1999 Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,2000 1CAN099903, Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.31999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.3 1CAN099907, Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative1999-09-26026 September 1999 Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative 2CAN099901, Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 9908271999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 990827 1CAN099906, Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data1999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data 2CAN099904, Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR 1CAN099905, Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments1999-09-17017 September 1999 Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments 1CAN099902, Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld 2CAN099905, Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested1999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) 1CAN099901, Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments1999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments 0CAN099906, Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs1999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs ML20211E6161999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Amend 15 to ANO Unit 2,USAR,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6).Summary of 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Associated with Amend 15 of ANO Unit 2 SAR Will Be Provided Under Separate Cover Ltr with 30 Days 0CAN089905, Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 19991999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 1999 ML20211G0731999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Applications for Renewal of Operating License for Kw Canitz & Aj South.Without Encls 1CAN089904, Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 0CAN089903, Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves1999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves 2CAN089901, Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 9907291999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 990729 1CAN089902, Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License1999-08-0505 August 1999 Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License 2CAN089902, Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested1999-08-0404 August 1999 Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested 0CAN089901, Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 9906031999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 990603 0CAN089902, Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified1999-08-0202 August 1999 Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified 1CAN079903, Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks ML20216D3561999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses non-cited Violation Identified in Insp Rept 50-313/98-21,involving Failure to Have Acceptable Alternative Shutdown Capability for ANO-1 1CAN079901, Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages1999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages 0CAN079902, Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl ML20210K1621999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That Licensee in Process of Preparing Scope of Service Delineation for Environ Assessment to Be Performed for New Airport Located Near Russellville,Ar,To Identify Anticipated Environ Impacts from Various Agencies 1CAN079902, Documents ANO-1 Position Discussed on 990705,with Members of NRC Staff & Formally Requests Enforcement Discretion from Requirements of TS 3.7.2.C to Allow Continued Power of Operation1999-07-0606 July 1999 Documents ANO-1 Position Discussed on 990705,with Members of NRC Staff & Formally Requests Enforcement Discretion from Requirements of TS 3.7.2.C to Allow Continued Power of Operation ML20209B6081999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Encl 0CAN069906, Forwards Corrected Pages to 1997 & 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Repts, Issued 980430 (0CAN049804) & 990506 (0CAN059902).Ltr Number & Page Number Are at Top of of Corrected Pages to Replace Originally Pages1999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Corrected Pages to 1997 & 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Repts, Issued 980430 (0CAN049804) & 990506 (0CAN059902).Ltr Number & Page Number Are at Top of of Corrected Pages to Replace Originally Pages 1CAN069905, Forwards non-proprietary Version of Rev 0 to TR BAW-10235, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs1999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards non-proprietary Version of Rev 0 to TR BAW-10235, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs 0CAN069903, Submits Rept of Each Change to or Error Discovered in Acceptable Evaluation Model or in Application of Such Model for ECCS That Affects Peak Cladding Temp,Iaw 10CFR50.46(a) (3)(ii)1999-06-10010 June 1999 Submits Rept of Each Change to or Error Discovered in Acceptable Evaluation Model or in Application of Such Model for ECCS That Affects Peak Cladding Temp,Iaw 10CFR50.46(a) (3)(ii) 2CAN069901, Forwards Probabilistic Operational Assessment of ANO-2 SG Tubing for Cycle 14. Replacement of SGs Planned for Next Refueling Outage (2R14) Scheduled for Fall of 20001999-06-0202 June 1999 Forwards Probabilistic Operational Assessment of ANO-2 SG Tubing for Cycle 14. Replacement of SGs Planned for Next Refueling Outage (2R14) Scheduled for Fall of 2000 1CAN069901, Submits 10CFR50.46 Rept Re Inconsistent Input in SBLOCA Analysis.Rept Submitted in Accordance with Recommendations Stated in Notice1999-06-0202 June 1999 Submits 10CFR50.46 Rept Re Inconsistent Input in SBLOCA Analysis.Rept Submitted in Accordance with Recommendations Stated in Notice 0CAN059906, Forwards Response to NRC 990402 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990402 RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20207E4341999-05-25025 May 1999 Submits 30-day Written Rept on Significant PCT Changes in ECCS Analysis for ANO-1.CRAFT2 Limiting PCT for ANO-1 Was Bounded by 1859 F PCT Calculated at 2568 Mwt for Crystal River 3 Cold Leg Pump Discharge Break Size of 0.125 Ft 1CAN059904, Informs NRC That Wl Franklin No Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 1.Requests License for Wl Franklin Be Withdrawn1999-05-20020 May 1999 Informs NRC That Wl Franklin No Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 1.Requests License for Wl Franklin Be Withdrawn 2CAN059906, Informs That ANO-2 UFSAR Will Be Revised to Include Comprehensive Discussions of Each Category of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices,Per NRC Review of 980806 TS Change Request Re Relocation of TS Table 3.8-11999-05-18018 May 1999 Informs That ANO-2 UFSAR Will Be Revised to Include Comprehensive Discussions of Each Category of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices,Per NRC Review of 980806 TS Change Request Re Relocation of TS Table 3.8-1 1CAN059902, Responds to NRC 990406 RAI Re risk-informed Inservice Insp Pilot Application,Submitted 980603.Approval of Alternative Is Requested Prior to End of July 1999,to Allow Sufficient Time for Util to Revise ANO-1 ISI Program1999-05-17017 May 1999 Responds to NRC 990406 RAI Re risk-informed Inservice Insp Pilot Application,Submitted 980603.Approval of Alternative Is Requested Prior to End of July 1999,to Allow Sufficient Time for Util to Revise ANO-1 ISI Program 2CAN059905, Expresses Appreciation for Staff & Mgt Team Efforts in Aggressively Pursuing Risk Informed ISI Initiative1999-05-14014 May 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Staff & Mgt Team Efforts in Aggressively Pursuing Risk Informed ISI Initiative ML20206P7681999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Applications for Renewal of Operating License (Form 398) for MW Little & F Uptagrafft.Without Encl 2CAN059903, Forwards Rev to Footnote Submitted to Provide Clarity to Aforementioned Guidance1999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Rev to Footnote Submitted to Provide Clarity to Aforementioned Guidance ML20206N1921999-05-10010 May 1999 Provides Revised Attachment 2 for Alternative Request IWE-02,originally Submitted 990429 Re Bolt Torque or Tension Testing of Class Mc pressure-retaining Bolting as Specified in Item 8.20 of Article IWE-2500,Table IWE-2500-1 ML20206H7121999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept, for Ano.All Radionuclides Detected by Radiological Environ Monitoring Program During 1998 Were Significantly Below Regulatory Limits 1999-09-09
[Table view] |
Text
_ ._. . _ . . ._. __ .~ _ __ _ __
m &
cntargy opsrztlons. ine. '
c= ENTERGY- 2448 ca 333 Russede. AR 72801 Toi 501858 5000 i July 3,1996 '
1CAN079601 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mail Station PI-137 ,
Washington, DC 20555-
Subject:
Arkansas Nuclear One- Unit 1 i Docket No. 50-313 i License No. DPR-51
- Request For ReliefFrom ASME Sections III and XI Due to Flaws in Service Water Piping Gentlemen: ,
In accordance with 10CFR50.55a and the guidance provided in Generic Letters 90-05, l
" Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 Piping," and 91-18, "Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability,"
Entergy Operations hereby requests relief from the requirements of the ASME Boiler and 7 Pressure Vessel Code, Sections III and XI. On June 5,1996, during the performance of
. - an automated ultrasonic inspection of 42 locations of the service water system piping, ,
- three locations on the loop 2 supply pipe were identified as having less than minimum wall i
,~'
thickness (t.;) as required by the ASME code. Additionally, based on estimated i corrosion rate values, three additional pipe locations are projected to be at or below their !
_ minimum allowable wall thickness before their currently scheduled replacement dates. :
The piping is not leaking at any of the above identified locations, but it contains pits which l exceed, or are projected to exceed, code acceptance limits; therefore, the guidance j provided in Generic Letters 90-05 and 91-18 was determined to apply. Plans are to J perform code repairs on these identified locations of the piping before, or during, the next refueling outage (IR13) scheduled to begin in September 1996. However, should a leak develop prior to the repair, plans are to install a simple rubber patch with band clamps to -
serve as a "stop gap" measure to limit leakage for housekeeping purposes. Attachment 1 '
contains the' technical justification for a temporary repair in accordance with Generic L Letter 90-05.
l l ' Should you have questions or comments, please contact ne.
]
9607090'153 960703
'PDR- ADOCK 05000313
" fD l P PDR ;
V .
. U. S. NRC -
(-
July 3,1996 '
1CAN079601 Page 2 Very truly yours,
' Dwight C. Mims Director, Nuclear Safety -
DCM/dwb Attachments cc: Mr. Leonard J. Callan Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RegionIV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One P.O. Box 310 -
London, AR 72847 Mr. George Kalman NRR Project Manager Region IV/ANO-1 & 2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Mail Stop 13-H-3 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852
Attachment I to:
ICAN079601 Page1 of7 Attachment 1 Technical Justification for a Temporary Repair In Accordance with Generic Letter 90-05 1.0 Flaw Detection and System Description .
On June 5,1996, during the performance of an automated ultrasonic inspection of 42 locations of the service water system piping, three locations on the loop 2 supply pipe were identified as having less than minimum wall thickness (t,.i.) as required by the ASME code. These pit locations exhibited a wall thickness of 0.050",0.026", and 0.050", respectively. Based on an engineering calculation and a conservatively assumed system pressure of 120 psig, the minimum allowable wall thickness for this pipe is 0.056". This section of the loop 2 service water supply piping is not isolable and therefore, is pressurized at the normal supply header pressure (current service water pump discharge pressure =78 psig). Manual ultrasonic inspections were performed to validate these fmdings; however, due to the geometry of the pits, the exact readings could not be repeated using an independent inspection method. The manual readings were greater than the minimum recorded automated readings. These three degraded areas are located in the reactor auxiliary building on the main loop 2 service water system supply piping, HBD-20-14". Specifically, the
' locations are: (1) 4% feet downstream of the HBD-4-8" branch to the emergency feedwater supply line; (2) between the HCD-117-3" branch for the emergency control room chiller VCH-4A and vent valve SW-634; and (3) between system vent valve SW-634 and the HBD-45-10" branch for the reactor building coolers VCC-2C/D.
The automated ultrasonic inspection data collected indicated that the average wall corrosion rates are approximately 0.003"/ year and the pit corrosion rate is approximately 0.008"/ year. Using these estimated corrosion rate values, three additional pipe locations are projected to be at or below their minimum allowable wall thickness before their currently schedule replacement dates.
Specifically, the locations are: (1) loop 2 supply header HBD-20-14" between vent valve SW-634 and the HBD-45-10" branch for the reactor building coolers (VCC-2C/D) in the reactor auxiliary building ; (2) loop 2 supply header HBD-20-18" approximately six feet downstream of FE-3901 in the turbine building pipe chase; and (3) loop 1 supply header HBD-14-18" approximately 6%
feet downstream of FE-3902 in the turbine building pipe chase. A visual inspection was perfon ted at these six locations. It was verified that the service water piping was not leaking and the external appearance of the areas of concern was not degraded. The loop 1 pipe is currently schedrie to be replaced during IR13 and the loop 2 pipe during IR14.
The ultrasonic inspections were performed in accordance with procedure OP1415.023 Rev 4, "Ditrasonic Thickness Measurements." This automated process utilizes a computerized projection image scanning (P SCAN) ultrasonic testing system. The P SCAN method provides average piping wall thickness and pit depth data for each location, resulting in a 9" by 360 representation of the pipe wall condition. The location selection for the inspections and the data evaluation were performed in accordance with procedure OP1309.014 Rev 3, " Service Water Piping Thickness Evaluation." There were twelve loop 1 locations, filleen loop 2 locations, five
)
1
, l
. Attachment I to:
1CAN07,9601 ;
P'a ge 2 of 7 l
~ locations in the common supply header in the intake structure, and ten locations in the return lines !
inspected. ]
The Unit I service water system was constructed in accordance with ANSI B31.1, but was I reclassified as ASME Class 3 for the purpose ofin-service inspection specified in ASME Section XI. The loop 2 supply pipe, HBD-20-14", is a 14" carbon steel, STD schedule (nominal wall thickness of 0.375"), " moderate energy" pipe. The HBD-14-18" and the HBD-20-18" pipes are 18" carbon steel, STD schedule (nominal wall thickness of 0.375"), " moderate energy" pipes.
, In the event that an entire loop of service water is declared inoperable, cascading technical i specifications cause the associated trains of emergency diesel generator, high pressure injection, ;
low pressure injection, reactor building spray, and reactor building cooling to be inoperable. A i condition that would cause one loop of service water to be inoperable requires that the plant be placed in hot shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> per technical specification 3.3.6.
2.0 Cause and Effect Evaluation The operability of the service water system in the "as-found" condition was assessed. Based on ;
1 this assessment, the service water piping, system, and associated equipment remains operable and -
' available. The issues considered were; f
e Flooding concerns
- Effect ofleakage spray on area components e Reduction in flow to service water supplied components
<
- Emergency cooling pond inventory concerns Structural Intenrity Three localized pits were found on loop 2 of the Unit I service water system. The actual minimum wall thickness recorded, using an automated ultrasonic inspection technique, were less than t,.w. These three locations were found in scan numbers SW-128, SW-220 and SW-309C and i the minimum wall thickness reported were 0.050",0.026" and 0.050", respectively. Additionally, ,
based on the results of Design Engineering evaluation number 91-E-0125-06, Revision 0, that !
reviewed all of the ultrasonic inspection data recorded during this inspection period, three other l
! locations were identified to have a pit where the minimum wall thickness was projected to t;o below t , prior to IR14. These other three locations are SW-128B, SW-134A and SW-136A.
. SW-128B and SW-136A are also on loop 2 of the Unit I service water system. SW-134A is on loop 1 of the Unit I service water system. All of the above thinned areas were evaluated using .
the guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 90-05 and have been found to be acceptable for continued operation until IR13. The automated ultrasonic inspection data was utilized to characterize each of the thinned areas. The data revealed that the pipe wall thinning originated from corrosion pitting on the interior surface of the pipe. The pipe contained pits of varying
- degrees around the circumference of the pipe. However, significant average overall pipe wall l thicknesses remained in each of the scanned locations. All other locally thinned areas were found i
J 2
h' )
4
. - - = _ ._ .. . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ ___ _
1 .
Attachment I to:
ICAN079601 i l' age 3 of 7 !
to be above te required for pressure, and are projected to remain above te until at least IR14. I f
The following contains a detailed discussion of each of these thinned areas.
2 Table 1 provides a summary of the flaw parameters, flaw characteristics, and a summary of the evaluation per NRC Generic Lette 90-05 through-wall approach. Use of the through-wall flaw !
technique is conservative since none of the scanned areas were through-wall, and no visual j leakage had been noted at these locations. The table entries are as follows: j i e Scan Location
< e Avg. Thick - Average measured wall thickness
- Min. Required - Minimum required wall thickness to meet all ASME Section III Class III Code equations (Equations 8, 9B, 9D, and 11) f a Tg - The minimum pit wall thickness measured using ultrasonic scan data l
- te - Calculated thickness required to meet ASME Section III Class III Code equation 3
- e Fm - Thickness used in determining flaw size
- F.no ,- Maximum allowed flaw size j e Fuw -Minimum allowed flaw thickness
- _ Projected Wear till IR13 l
l 0,
i l
i-4 l
1-
Attachment I to: .
ICAN079601 Page 4 of 7 -
Table I r ( j [
'A eqM 'i J
(
f
. f[f'! i'ff [
f ,
'{ fo[IN.
kf [f !l f
, SW-128 14", sch. 30, 0.257 0.100 0.050 0.056 0.720 0.112 0.740 0.100 0.012 0.002 C.S.
SW-128B 14", sch. 30, 0.249 0.100 0.062 0.056 0.800 0.116 0.810 0.108 0.008 0.002 C.S.
SW-134A 18", std wt, 0.318 0.145 0.072 0.072 0.800 0.175 1.020 0.165 0.010 0.002 C.S.
SW-136A 18", std wt, 0.301 0.146 0.076 0.072 0.500 0.155 0.790 0.145 0.010 0.002 C.S.
SW-220 14", sch. 30, 0.254 0.080 0.026 0.056 0.800 0.125 0.870 0.115 0.010 0.002 C.S.
SW-309C 14", sch. 30, 0.287 0.080 0.050 0.056 0.600 0.125 0.740 0.115 0.010 0.002 C.S.
L f
. Attachment I to:
ICAN079601 Page 5 of 7 From the table, all measured flaw sizes were determined to be less than the allowed flaw size. The measured flaw thickness is greater than the minimum allowed flaw thickness, and the allowed wear until IR13 is greater than the projected wear through IR13, as detailed in Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO)-Calculation 91-E-0125-06, Rev. O. Therefore, all scanned locations meet the intent of NRC Generic Letter 90-05.
Flooding concerns As stated previously, the piping is not leaking. However, should leaks occur, no flooding concerns would result. Floor drains are located in the general areas and are sized to remove minor leakage from the areas of concern. For the degraded areas in the reactor auxiliary building, any significant change in leakage would be identified by an increase in the auxihary building sump level or during operator tours. For the degraded areas in the turbine building pipe chase, the floor drains go directly to the main discharge flume. Any significant change in leakage in any of the areas of concern could be identified by a change in the monitored service water pump discharge pressure. However, based on the ;
structural assessment, known corrosion rate, and engineering experience, no leakage is expected to occur. ;
Efect ofleakage spray on area comoonents A system engineering survey of the immediate area determined that there are no components which would be affected by spray if the degraded areas begin to leak. The local floor drains could accommodate the leakage.
Reduction in flow to service water supplied components Based on the refueling outage IR12 as-left service water flow test with the system in an engineered safeguards alignment, the total measured loop 2 service water flow was 4,912 gpm. As determined by an evaluation performed in response to condition report action item CR-1-96-0203-02, it has been determined that a loop 2 leak rate of 314.4 gpm could be tolerated before any of the associated components would reach unacceptable low flow conditions. The reduction in :hw to the associated loop 2 components due to any leaks occurring in the system would be insignificant and will not cause the service water loop, nor individual system components, to be degraded.
Emernency coolina cond MCP) inventory concerns j Leakage from the service water system would also provide an additional drain path from ,
the emergency cooling pond. The overall leakage from the emergency cooling pond is routinely accounted for by totaling the sluice gate and system boundary valve leakage from both ' Unit I and Unit 2 (because the ECP is a shared emergency source of service
-water). The IR12 as-left sluice gate and system boundary valve leakage tests determined that the total leakage from Unit I was 6.4 gpm compared to an allowable 39.74 gpm,
! . Attachment I to: .
ICAN079601 ,
Page 6 of 7 which indicates a margin of 33,74 gpm. Based on past experience, if a leak did develop at these locations, the leak rate would be considerably less than the 33.34 gpm margin.
i Root cause determination I
^
Based on the ultrasonic data, the flaws are characterized as highly localized pits typical of corrosion degradation in service water system piping. Previous evaluations of the large '
i bore service w'ater pipe condition, as part of ANO's service water integrity program, have determined that similar pitted areas are most likely due to microbiologically induced j corrosion' in the form of anaerobic- sulfate reducing bacteria under deposits or 3 tuberculation. :
3.0 Augmented Inspection
. The automated ultrasonic inspection plan selected locations that provided a l comprehensive representation of the pipe condition in the service water system. For this inspection, there were 42 locations selected, twelve loop 1 locations, fifteen loop 2 i i
locations, five locations in the common supply header, and ten locations in the return lines.
1 These locations include multiple flow regimes and similar water and piping conditions for both loops of the service water system piping. Thirty-four of these locations were l
inspected in previous years. This provides a composite representation of the system condition.
The data collected indicated negligible corrosion or pit propagation. Comparing the new i inspection data with previous inspections revealed that the average wall corrosion rates l- are approximately 0.003"/ year, which compares favorably with the 0.004"/ year corrosion rates measured on corrosion coupons used to monitor the service water system chemical control program efficiency. The measured pit corrosion rate is approximately 0.008"/ year.
L Based on previous experience of similar flaws, consideration of flaw growth is not a significant concern. The piping inspection showed that the three areas were the only locations that were less than the minimum required wall thickness and the additional three areas were the only locations that were predicted to become less than the minimum i required wall thickness before their scheduled replacement. Based on this and previous i extensive inspections performed, it was determined that no additional inspections were i needed to assess the overall condition of the system piping. Therefore, it has been l concluded that the overall condition of the system is acceptable with respect to Generic l
' Letter 90-05 until the next Unit I refueling outage (IR13).
[
4.0 Impracticality of Repair Determination I It was determined that conducting a code-qualified pipe replacement during power operation is not feasible since one entire loop of service water and its associated trains of emergency diesel generator, high pressure injection, low pressure injection, reactor building spray, and reactor building cooling would have to be rendered inoperable. . A condition that would cause one loop of service water to be inoperable requires that the plant be placed in hot shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> per technical specification 3.3.6. A code-i 1
- _ - . .- , ,- .-~
.- - -. - - .. . . . . . . ..- ~ - - . . , _ . . - - - . _ - . .. ..
. Attachment I to: ,
o ,. ICAN079601
. Page 7 of 7 '
i qualified pipe repair method is currently being developed that should allow installation -
during power operation. Upon completion of the required engineering and supporting i
documentation, installation is expected to be completed prior to the next Unit I refueling outage (IR13).
j Because the pipe flaws are not through-wall and are not expected to leak, no immediate i temporary repairs are deemed necessary. However, if a leak does occur before code repair, plans are to install a simple rubber patch attached to the pipe by band clamps to serve as a "stop gap" measure to limit leakage for housekeeping purposes. The installed patch will not alter the stmetural integrity of the piping and will be reversible if necessary.
This patch or a similar configuration would be maintained as the temporary repair until i code repairs could be made. In addition, if the temporary repair were to fail, there is no 7
- equipment in close proximity to the probable leak locations that would be affected.by i j water spray, and the leak rate would be small enough that local floor drains are expected
. to mitigate any potential for flooding. The loss of system flow through the leak would not reduce the ability to provide cooling water to critical equipment since the leak rate would -
be insignificant compared to the overall capacity margin of the service water system.
Because a failure of the temporary repair would have no adverse safety impact, the structural condition of the rubber patch and clamp would not require a rigorous structural j analysis. No credit would be taken for the additional structural strength contribution from
! the patch and band clamps. ,
i 5.0 Code Repair Schedule l
Since the pits meet the criteria covered by Generic Letter 90-05, and the documentation to j support the permanent repairs in accordance with the ASME Code are not complete,
- Entergy Operations requests relief for continued operation and permitting a temporary
! non-code repair of the aTected service water piping (if necessary) as an alternative to the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. Entergy
- Operations is evaluating the most suitable permanent repair method and will complete the
! code repair as soon as practicable. The next scheduled outage of adequate duration is Unit l's IR13 refueling outage which is currently scheduled to begin in September 1996.
The permanent code repair is schedu!ed to be performed prior to, or during, this outage.
In accordance with GL 90-05 guidance, the integrity of a non-code repair will be assessed on a quarterly basis utilizing an ultrasonic testing examination method, Furthermore, a
- qualitative visual assessment for leakage of the affected piping will be performed on a weekly basis to determine any degradation of structural integrity. These inspections will continue until the code repair is completed.
l l
i \
1
.-